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Abstract 		 The	present	dissertation	 is	 an	 inquiry	 into	how	 the	 relationship	between	war	and	the	subject	has	been	problematised	through	an	ontology	of	operativity	and	command.	 It	 demonstrates	 how	 from	 the	 earliest	 political	 treatises	 of	 the	Western	tradition,	notably	in	Plato	and	Aristotle,	the	notion	that	war	[polemos]	must	 be	 subjected	 to	 ‘steering’	 has	 been	 present.	 Once	 conceived	 by	 the	 Pre-Socratics	as	inseperable	from	life	[bios],	permeating	being	as	well	as	the	cosmos,	the	 dissertation	 shows	 how	 war	 [polemos]	 in	 classical	 Greece	 came	 to	 be	discovered	as	a	relationship	of	 forces	that	must	be	mastered	by	the	 individual	and	governed	at	the	 level	of	 the	polis.	The	dissertation	shows	how,	 in	 fact,	 the	
polis	was	 founded	 on	 the	 idea	 of	 steering	war	 as	 a	means	 of	 rendering	 being	governable	 forming	 the	 terrain	 for	 the	entry	 into	 life	 [bios]	of	 the	ontology	of	operativity	and	command.	The	dissertation	demonstrates	how	the	ontology	of	operativity	and	command	finds	its	early	expression	in	the	Greek	stratia	[army]	as	 an	articulation	of	 the	 ruling	principle	 [arkhē]	 that	 ties	 together	 a	 tactics	of	individuating	 bodies	 via	 discipline	 and	 a	 strategy	 that	 integrates	 the	 tactical	individuation	of	bodies	to	form	an	assemblage	of	forces	that	can	be	steered	by	command.	 The	 dissertation	 shows	 how,	 in	 the	 stratia,	 the	 ruling	 principle	articulated	 a	 homological	 relationship	 between	 the	 government	 of	 self	 and	others	 enabling	 the	 army	 to	 be	 shaped	 from	 the	 otherwise	 disordered	multitude.	A	primordial	strategic	incitement	for	rendering	being	governable,	in	the	 army	 the	 individual	 stratiōtēs	 [a	 citizen	 bound	 to	military	 service],	 in	 his	government	of	self,	simultaneously	came	to	bind	himself	to	the	command	of	the	stratēgos	[general].	Tracing	an	itinerary	from	archaic	Greece	to	the	end	of	the	period	of	the	later	 Roman	 Empire,	 the	 dissertation	 analyses	 the	 formation	 of	 the	 field	 of	knowledge	in	which	the	ontology	of	operativity	and	command	is	displaced	from	the	classical	sense	of	being	to	be	tied	to	the	existence	of	God.	The	dissertation	explains	 how	 this	 displacement	 takes	 place	with	 the	 translation	 of	 the	 Greek	
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Introduction 					One	would	have	a	difficult	time	finding	among	the	Greeks	anything	resembling	the	modern	notion	of	‘war’.	Although	the	word	polemos	is	commonly	translated	as	‘war’,	polemos	had	a	distinctly	different	meaning	far	removed	from	what	we	today	have	learned	to	think	of	as	a	certain	practice	confined	to	the	logical	space	occupied	by	the	military	apparatus	or	its	counterpart,	the	terrorist	organisation.	To	 speak	 of	 polemos	 strictly	 in	 terms	 of	 the	militia	 [military]	 or	 the	 stratia	[army]	would	have	made	no	 sense.	Nor	would	 it	have	been	meaningful	 to	 the	Greeks	to	speak	of	polemos	simply	in	terms	of	the	singular	activity	of	delivering	the	soul	of	 the	enemy	to	 the	underworld	of	Hades.	The	Greeks	certainly	had	a	vocabulary	available	for	describing	such	activities,	for	example,	makhē	[combat]	or	nikaō	[conquest],	but	the	category	that	covered	these	activities	is	much	more	difficult	to	grasp.	Contrary	 to	 the	 modern	 notion	 of	 war,	 polemos	 did	 not	 function	 as	 a	category	that	determined	a	conceptual	boundary	enabling	the	disclosure	of	the	true	 nature	 of	 war	 or	 the	 practices	 that	 since	 came	 to	 animate	 it,	 gave	 it	presence	 and	 allowed	 it	 to	 function	 in	 our	 reality.	 While	 Plato,	 for	 example,	could	certainly	speak	of	polemos	when	describing	the	practice	of	combat,	he	did	not	 specifically	 have	 in	mind	 a	 certain	 privileged	 activity	 bestowed	 upon	 the	
stratia	to	carry	out	by	the	command	of	the	stratēgos	[general].	In	fact,	polemos	could	not	be	explained	as	the	effect	of	a	command	or	a	particular	will,	as	we	are	accustomed	to	in	our	thought	with	the	aphorism	of	war	being	the	continuation	of	 politics	 by	 other	 means.	 Continuing	 this	 line	 of	 thought,	 the	 idea	 of	 a	threshold	 of	 politics	 at	 which	 point	 war	 supposedly	 ends	 seems	 to	 appear	distinctly	modern	 in	view	of	 the	classical	Greek	discourse	on	polemos.	 Indeed,	
polemos	 does	 not	 seem	 to	 have	 functioned	 as	 a	 term	 that	 demarcated	 a	temporally	 or	 spatially	 delimited	 state,	 which	 could	 then	 be	 excluded	 from	
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political	 life	 [bios	politikos]	and	confined	 to	 the	outside	of	 the	polis.	 In	 fact,	 to	think	of	polemos	 in	terms	of	an	exteriority	to	the	site	where	man	appears	as	a	living	being	would	 already	be	 a	mistake.	On	 the	 contrary,	polemos	 is	 the	 very	site	on	which	man	appears.	In	the	early	representations	of	polemos	in	the	oratory	tradition	of	Homer,	we	 find	no	 separation	between	man	and	war.	 In	 fact,	 the	Homeric	 vocabulary	does	not	seem	to	know	the	idea	that	war	could	have	an	identity	different	from	what	simply	occurs	at	the	level	of	being.	In	Homer,	polemos	is	the	very	theatre	of	being	and	the	site	at	which	the	hero	turns	up,	half	man,	half	god,	to	perform	his	deeds	and	acts.	In	just	as	striking	a	fashion,	when	the	poet	recounts	the	epic	tale	of	 heroes,	 gods,	 and	mere	mortals,	we	 find	 no	 real	 distinction	 between	 being	and	 action.	 In	 Homer,	 action	 is	 not,	 as	 it	 would	 become	 with	 Aristotle,	 what	occurs	as	an	effect	of	being	having	potentiality,	which,	by	 the	effectuation	of	a	sense	of	will,	would	pass	over	into	actuality.	The	division	of	being	introduced	by	Aristotle	 into	 dynamis	 [potential]	 and	 energeia	 [act]	 remains	 unknown.	Accordingly,	when	the	hero	performs	his	deeds	and	acts,	Homer	does	not	invoke	the	 idea	of	 an	operativity	of	being	 that,	 as	 an	articulation	of	will,	 brings	mind	[nous,	intellect]	to	bear	on	the	world	of	things	to	let	potentiality	pass	over	into	actuality	in	what	we	would	call	action.	On	the	contrary,	when	the	hero	seems	to	act,	 it	 is	because	Arēs,	 the	 terrible	war-god,	has	 inspired	 in	his	soul	 the	divine	exaltation	of	rage	and	affect,	or	because	the	mighty	Sky-god,	Zeus,	has	filled	his	limbs	with	the	force	of	that	of	a	wave	thrusting	against	the	seashore,	and	if	not	then	because	another	and	perhaps	 lesser	god	or	maybe	an	entire	host	of	gods	have	 intervened	 in	 the	 world	 of	 mortals,	 with	 their	 multiple	 appetites	 and	pleasures	 and	 pains,	 their	 cunning	 schemes	 and	 innocent	 deceits,	 and,	 in	 the	ceaseless	polemology	of	being,	once	again	set	 things	 in	motion	 in	 the	bringing	together	of	opposite	forces;	the	reality	known	as	polemos.	The	 idea	of	a	self	one	could	 identify	as	responsible	 for	bringing	potential	into	act	in	other	words	seems	absent	in	Homer.	Moreover,	Homer	had	no	need	for	the	notion	of	a	self	precisely	because	being	and	action	were	but	the	workings	of	polemos.	This	is	also	to	say	that	the	Homeric	hero	cannot	get	away	from	war.	In	 fact,	 even	 the	 gods,	who	 at	 first	 glance	would	 seem	 to	 command	 the	battle	from	 a	 distance,	 find	 themselves	 in	 perpetual	 struggle,	 conflict,	 and	 tension.	
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There	is	no	outside	of	polemos,	then,	no	exteriority,	and	no	point	of	articulation	from	which,	at	the	site	of	an	absolute	distance	to	being,	actuality	could	be	traced	back	 to	 disclose	 a	 supreme	 origin	 of	 things.	 Polemos	 is	 both	 the	 relations	 of	opposites	 of	which	 the	world	of	men	and	gods	 is	made	 and	 the	 verve	 that,	 in	pulling	apart	and	drawing	together	these	opposites,	engenders	being	as	a	state	of	 perpetual	 motion.	 Things	 remain	 in	 perpetual	 motion,	 then,	 which	 is	 why	there	can	be	no	notion	of	the	self	or	the	identity	of	things.	While	this	system	of	thought	remains	implicit	in	Homeric	poetry,	the	Pre-Socratics	 would	 make	 it	 explicit,	 in	 particular,	 in	 the	 Pythagorean	 and	Heraclitean	 notions	 of	 movement	 [kinēsis].	 Even	 in	 Aristotle,	 kinēsis	 would	remain	a	fundamental	principle.	Only	here	kinēsis	is	what	allows	for	being	to	be	‘mobilised’	and	put	 in	movement	 in	the	passage	from	potential	 to	act.	No	such	distinction	appears	in	Homer,	and	it	would	have	made	little	sense	for	Homer	to	speak	of	things	in	terms	of	substance	[ousia]	(Aristotle)	or	form	[eidos]	(Plato),	potential	 and	 act.	 On	 the	 contrary,	 things	 come	 into	 being	 and	 become	intelligible	 by	 simple	 opposition;	 day	 and	 night,	male	 and	 female,	 famine	 and	plenty	 come	 to	 presence	 by	 virtue	 of	 forming	 relationships	 of	 contraries	 tied	together	 as	 a	 chain	 of	 resemblances.	 All	 things	 are	 but	 what	 appear	 in	 the	coming	 to	 presence	 of	 relationships	 of	 opposites,	 which	 is	 to	 say	 that	 the	essence	of	matter	is	polemos,	and	everything	was,	is,	and	always	will	be	given	by	
polemos	as	energy	in	flux,	the	pure	relativity	of	force.	In	 Socratic	 thought,	polemos	 still	 remains	 tied	 to	being.	However,	 during	the	classical	period	a	reworking	of	the	discourse	on	being	will	appear	in	which,	perhaps	 for	 the	 first	 time	 in	 history,	 it	will	 be	 possible	 to	 think	 of	polemos	 in	terms	 of	 kind,	 one	 which	 can	 be	 rendered	 intelligible	 by	 knowing	 the	 form	[eidos]	of	it.	Each	kind	of	war,	which	nonetheless	still	lacks	a	true	identity,	will	then	 correspond	 to	 a	 different	 mode	 of	 being	 and	 inform	 of	 a	 different	relationship	 between	 man	 and	 the	 world.	 In	 the	 Laws,	 then,	 we	 find	 Plato	discussing	 polemos	 in	 terms	 of	 eidos.	 There	 are	 three	 kinds	 of	 war,	 Plato	explains	well-knowning	that	no	such	philosophy	of	the	order	of	things	had	yet	been	attempted.	First,	 there	 is	 the	kind	of	war	 that	goes	on	among	city-states.	Second,	 Plato	 says	 in	 a	 passage	 that	 may	 have	 influenced	 Hobbes	 and	 the	natural	rights	thinkers,	there	is	a	war	that	goes	on	in	the	public	sphere,	in	which	
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“…	 everyone	 [is]	 an	 enemy	of	 everyone	 else”	 (Laws	626e).	But	 there	 is	 also	 a	third	 kind	 of	war	 that	 belongs	 to	 the	 sense	 and	mode	 of	 being	 for	which	 the	word	polemos	 came	 to	 be	 used	 during	 the	 classical	 period.	 It	 is	 a	war	 fought	neither	 with	 weapons	 or	 fists	 nor	 with	 wilful	 expressions	 or	 emphatic	gesticulations:	 Hence	 “each	 man	 fights	 a	 private	 war	 against	 himself”,	 says	Cleinias	the	Cretan	to	the	Athenian	Stranger	and	adds	“This,	sir,	is	where	a	man	wins	the	first	and	best	of	victories	–	over	himself”	(Ibid.).	While	the	passage	may	be	 read	 as	 a	 mere	 allegorical	 exchange	 between	 partners	 in	 polemic,	 Plato,	elaborating	the	theme	of	this	struggle	of	the	self,	page	after	page,	in	fact	seems	to	have	 considered	 this	 kind	of	war,	 in	which	man	 is	 called	upon	 to	do	battle	against	certain	belligerent	forces	within,	to	be	the	most	important	of	the	three.	This	 follows	 from	the	 fact	 that	what	was	at	stake	 in	 this	war	 that	 lacks	all	 the	usual	 blood	 and	 mud	 of	 battle,	 and	 which	 was	 given	 form	 by	 the	 power	 of	imagination,	was	not	a	simple	rhetorical	gesture,	but	the	practice	on	which	the	
telos	of	the	classical	polis	rested.	However,	when	we	first	encounter	this	discourse,	it	is	clearly	controversial.	Not	 only	 did	 this	 distinctly	 new	 mode	 of	 thinking	 present	 its	 audience	 with	certain	 ontological	 difficulties, 1 	even	 its	 principal	 protagonist	 immediately	recognises	the	paradoxical	nature	of	it.	Eidos	must	be	understood	as	something	that	 exists	 only	 in	 itself,	 Plato	 explains	 in	 the	 Symposium.	 In	 fact,	 says	 Plato	(211b),	eidos	is	not	anywhere	present	in	a	thing,	as	in	an	animal,	or	in	earth,	or	in	 heaven,	 or	 in	 anything	 else,	 but	 merely	 reside	 in	 the	 arbitrary	 relation	between	language	and	the	world.	Plato,	in	other	words,	is	perfectly	well	aware	that	the	positing	of	polemos	in	terms	of	form	represents	an	abstraction,	since	the	actuality	of	polemos	 is	but	different	manifestations	of	the	same	order	of	reality	in	which	man	 finds	 himself	 in	 a	 relationship	 of	 struggle,	 conflict,	 and	 tension.	However,	as	it	often	happens	in	the	strategic	displacements,	rearticulations,	and	intertextual	 overlays	 of	 discourse	 that	 make	 up	 the	 fabric	 history,	 the	‘constructivism’	admitted	by	Plato	in	his	philosophy	of	form	seems	to	have	been																																																									1	An	example	of	the	difficulties	encountered	with	Plato’s	philosophy	of	form	could	be	drawn	from	Plato’s	exchanges	with	his	Cynic	partner	in	polemic,	Diogenes	of	Sinope.	Legend	has	it	that	when	Plato	defined	a	human	being	as	a	featherless	biped,	and	was	praised	for	it,	Diogenes	plucked	a	chicken,	brought	it	to	Plato's	Academy,	and	declared,	"Behold	-	Plato's	human	being."	Plato	then	added	"with	broad,	flat,	nails"	to	his	definition.	
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lost	 to	 historical	 contingency	 even	 to	 the	 point	 where	 it	 has	 become	 wholly	obscured.	Most	importantly,	in	the	complex	course	of	descent	through	Western	history,	the	discourse	on	the	self	has	been	divorced	from	the	original	setting	in	which	 it	appeared	 in	 the	practice	of	private	war	 in	 the	 formation	of	a	political	anatomy	of	being	that,	in	dividing	polemos	from	being	in	the	realm	of	ideas,	once	made	it	possible	to	render	being	governable.	In	The	Use	of	Pleasure,	Michel	Foucault	referred	to	this	practice	of	private	war	that	emerges	in	classical	Greece	in	terms	of	the	government	of	self.	Writing	in	 the	 second	volume	of	The	History	of	Sexuality,	 the	 intellectual	 itinerary	 that	seems	 to	 have	 guided	 Foucault	 was	 the	 problematisation	 of	 the	 subject.	Contrasting	 the	 political	 techniques	 of	 subjection	 that	 governs	 the	 modern	subject	with	the	practices	of	the	government	of	self	and	the	art	of	living	[technē	tou	biou]	found	in	Greco-Roman	antiquity,	Foucault	discovers	how	the	subject	is	possible	not	 simply	 in	 the	sense	of	 subjection,	but	 in	 the	deliberative	sense	of	subjectivation.	 A	 set	 of	 practices	 that	 defined	 the	 domain	 of	 an	 ethics	 of	existence,	 Foucault	 explains,	 the	 requirement	 involved	 in	 the	 classical	 Greek	government	of	self	“…	was	not	presented	in	the	form	of	a	universal	law,	which	each	 and	 every	 individual	 would	 have	 to	 obey,	 but	 rather	 as	 a	 principle	 of	stylization	 of	 conduct	 for	 those	 who	 wished	 to	 give	 their	 existence	 the	 most	graceful	 and	 accomplished	 form	 possible.”	 (Foucault	 1992:	 250-251).	 The	government	of	self	by	each	individual	rather	than	the	universal	law	to	govern	all	subjects	 in	 the	 same	 way,	 Foucault	 contends	 while	 implicitly	 scorning	 the	simultaneously	universalising	and	 totalising	aspirations	of	modern	power,	 the	cipher	 that	 informs	 the	 classical	 idea	of	being	 is	 the	ethical	 subject	 capable	of	governing	himself.	Most	 interestingly,	Foucault	does	not	 seem	to	have	been	concerned	with	how	it	is	the	ethical	subject	of	the	classical	Greek	era	appears	to	have	come	into	being	 by	 means	 of	 war.	 This	 is	 surprising	 in	 view	 of	 how	 Foucault	 devoted	significant	 time	 and	 effort	 to	 the	 study	 of	 war	 in	 relation	 to	 subjectivity	 and	power	 relations.	 In	 Discipline	 and	 Punish,	 Foucault	 first	 explained	 how	 the	modern	subject	and	early	modern	society	came	to	be	shaped	from	disciplinary	techniques	issuing	from	the	military	organisation	for	war.	A	set	of	strategies	and	tactics	 borrowed	 from	 the	 military	 sciences	 and	 the	 institution	 of	 the	 army,	
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disciplinary	power	emerged	as	a	whole	 series	of	practices	 for	putting	 life	 into	work	 through	 the	 simultaneous	 pacification	 and	 mobilisation	 of	 being.	 A	disciplinary	power	over	 life,	 Foucault	 says,	moulded	 the	modern	 subject	 from	the	 fabric	 of	 the	 ‘docile’	 body	 of	 the	 soldier,	 which,	 as	 a	 general	 model	 of	discipline	was	dispersed	 throughout	 society	and	came	 to	 function	 in	 the	most	diverse	spheres,	in	particular,	in	the	educational	space,	the	hospital,	the	prison,	and	eventually	the	factory	(Foucault	1991:	165).	Moving	from	the	analysis	of	disciplinary	power	in	Discipline	and	Punish	to	the	analysis	of	biopolitical	power	in	The	Will	to	Knowledge,	Foucault	shifts	focus	to	pursue	the	modern	problem	of	war	explaining	how	war	came	to	function	as	a	strategy	of	the	state	for	the	‘management	of	life	and	survival’	in	the	mobilisation	of	entire	populations	for	war	(Foucault	1998:	137).	Finally,	in	his	1976	lecture	series	at	Collège	de	France,	Society	Must	be	Defended,	Foucault	shifted	 focus	to	analyse	how	the	practice	of	private	war	was	reinvented	in	seventeenth-century	England	and	came	 to	 function	as	a	 ‘disruptive	principle’	employed	 first	by	 the	Parliamentarians	 in	 their	 opposition	 to	 the	 Royalists,	 and	 later,	 when	 it	appeared	in	France	at	the	end	of	the	reign	of	Louis	XIV,	by	the	aristocracy.	With	the	most	perfect	lucidity,	Foucault	shows	how,	in	the	early	modern	discourse	on	private	 war,	 society	 was	 considered	 as	 completely	 permeated	 by	 warlike	relationships;	that	war	was	regarded	as	a	social	relationship	and	the	primal	and	basic	state	of	affairs,	that	war	was	seen	as	the	principle	of	power	relations,	and	that	civil	order	must	in	fact	be	considered	an	order	of	battle,	one	which	goes	on	at	 all	 times	 beneath	 the	 state	 apparatus	 (Foucault	 2004).	 While	 the	 major	traditions	of	political	theory	might	lead	us	to	mistaken	this	sense	of	private	war	for	 the	primitive	state	of	 the	 ‘war	of	every	man	against	every	man’	 in	Hobbes,	Foucault	 explains	 how	 this	 private	war	 cannot	 be	 understood	 in	 terms	 of	 the	idea	of	the	state	of	nature.	On	the	contrary,	in	Hobbes,	the	state	of	nature	exists	as	a	fictional	principle	that	allows	for	the	justification	of	the	theory	of	the	State	(the	principle	of	sovereignty,	the	monopoly	on	war,	the	teleology	of	peace).	The	discourse	of	Hobbes,	then,	is	the	point-for-point	exact	opposite	of	the	discourse	on	private	war	that	claims	war	cannot	belong	to	the	State;	that	war,	rather	than	an	 instrument	of	State,	 is	 the	 irreducible	and	permanent	relationship	of	 forces	in	which	 society	 and	 social	 relations	 consist	 (Ibid.	 87-111).	 This	 argument,	 in	
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turn,	 has	 Foucault	 explaining	 how	 the	 virtuality	 of	 war,	 in	 the	 sense	 of	 the	Hobbessian	 state	 of	 nature,	 is	 the	 cipher	 of	 the	 form	 of	 peace	 that	 modern	societies	realise.	In	 any	 case,	 the	 interiority	 of	 the	 classical	 Greek	 private	 war	 certainly	seems	most	 different	 from	 the	 exteriority	 of	 the	 private	war	waged	 against	 a	real	opponent	in	seventeenth-century	England	and	France.	It	also	appears	to	be	unrelated	 to	 the	 state	 warfare	 of	 modern	 biopolitical	 power	 that	 mobilises	entire	 populations	 to	wage	war	 to	 the	point	where	 the	 species	 itself	 becomes	what	 is	 at	 stake.	 However,	 while	 these	 manifestations	 of	 war	 are	 certainly	distinctly	modern	phenomena,	the	point	where	they	find	their	common	locus	or	point	of	articulation	 is	precisely	 in	 the	political	anatomy	 inaugurated	with	 the	classical	Greek	ontology	on	being	and	war,	operativity	and	command.	This	is	not	by	any	means	to	say	that	they	are	ontologically	similar	and	made	from	the	same	social	fabric.	Nor	is	it	to	say	that	they	–	even	remotely	–	function	in	a	similar	way	at	 the	 interstices	 of	 a	 timeless	 history.	 It	 is	 to	 say	 that	 in	 problematising	 the	relationship	 between	man	 and	war,	 the	 Greeks	 opened	 up	 the	 terrain	 for	 the	formation	of	a	field	of	knowledge	in	which	it	became	possible	to	recognise	war	as	a	means	of	rendering	being	governable.	Accordingly,	one	could	contrast	the	interiority	of	 the	 classical	Greek	private	war	of	 the	 self	with	 the	exteriority	of	the	 disciplinary	 techniques	 that	 appeared	 at	 the	 threshold	 of	 modernity	assuming	 control	 over	 bodies	 to	 increase	 their	 utility.	 However,	 the	 ethical	subject	who	came	into	being	in	classical	Greece	with	the	government	of	self	has	more	 in	 common	with	 the	 eighteenth	 century	 soldier	who	 became	 the	model	modern	subject	than	what	might	be	assumed.	Obviously,	the	end	of	disciplinary	power	and	its	functioning	through	apparatuses	in	modern	society	have	nothing	to	do	with	the	end	of	political	community	in	classical	Greece.	In	fact,	one	needs	to	 look	 no	 further	 than	 to	 the	 intrinsically	 modern	 idea,	 discovered	 by	disciplinary	 power	 and	 developed	 by	 biopolitical	 regimes,	 of	 ‘labouring	mankind’	 to	 realise	 that	 they	 are	 completely	 different	 models	 and	 modes	 of	subjection;	 the	 functional	 reduction	 of	 the	 body	 and	 its	 refiguration,	 its	 re-organisation	in	relation	to	time	and	space,	the	extraction	of	its	forces	and	their	re-insertion	into	an	economy	of	forces	–	all	these	modes	of	subjection	emerged	in	 modernity	 with	 a	 strategic	 impetus	 that	 no	 doubt	 would	 have	 been	
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completely	 alien	 to	 the	 Greeks	 to	 whom	 oikonomia	 [economy]	 concerned	 a	matter	of	the	private	household.	However,	the	model	of	discipline	emergent	from	the	military	organisation	is	 clearly	 much	 older	 than	 modern	 disciplinary	 power.	 In	 fact,	 by	 the	 time	modern	disciplinary	power	appears,	the	military-disciplinary	model	had	been	in	circulation	 for	 at	 least	 two	 thousand	 years	 dating	 back	 to	 Greco-Roman	Antiquity.	 While	 the	 Roman	 legio	 [legion]	 perfected	 the	 military	 model	 of	discipline,	 the	military	model	seems	to	have	come	 into	being	with	 the	birth	of	the	 Greek	 stratia	 and	 the	militia.	 What	 the	 present	 study	 has	 had	 to	 record	among	its	findings,	then,	is	that	the	analyses	cannot	be	separated.	Schematising	a	great	deal	we	could	say	that	when	Foucault	speaks	of	 the	modern	subject	 in	terms	 the	 ‘docile’	 body	 and	 discipline	 as	 an	 ‘art	 of	 rank’,	 which	 operates	 by	means	 of	 ‘the	mastery	 of	 each	 individual	 over	 his	 body’	 (Foucault	 1991:	 137;	146),	or	that	war	is	the	cipher	of	the	form	of	peace	that	modern	societies	realise	(Foucault	 2004:	 110-111),	 or	 that,	 in	 turn,	 the	 problem	 of	 war	 is	 radically	exacerbated	 inter-socially	as	modern	power	assumes	 the	role	of	managing	 life	and	 survival	 (Foucault	 1998:	137),	 one	 should	 also	hear	 the	 telos	 of	 an	 ethics	required	 in	 the	 government	 of	 self	 formed	 on	 the	 terrain	 of	 classical	 Greece.	This	relationship,	which	for	now	must	be	held	in	the	suspension	of	a	hypothesis,	becomes	more	readily	apparent	when	one	considers	the	fact	that	the	practice	of	the	government	of	self	appeared	not	so	much	in	the	image	of	the	first	dawn	of	ethical	 discourse,	 but	 rather	 on	 the	 battlefield	 as	 a	 fundamental	 strategic	incitement	for	the	government	of	men.	The	government	of	self,	in	other	words,	seems	to	have	emerged	from	what	we	for	heuristic	purposes	alone	could	call	the	military	dimension	of	the	classical	
polis.	In	its	military	form,	the	government	of	self	appeared	in	the	conjunction	of	a	 tactics	 of	 individuating	 bodies	 via	 discipline	 and	 a	 strategic	 model	 that	integrate	 the	 tactical	 individuation	 of	 bodies	 to	 form	 an	 assemblage	 of	 forces	that	 can	 be	 steered	 by	 command.	 The	 principle	 that	 allowed	 for	 the	 tactical	schema	 and	 the	 strategic	model	 of	 command,	 out	 of	which	 the	 stratia	 [army]	was	 shaped	 from	 the	 otherwise	 disordered	 multitude,	 emerged	 with	 what	Aristotle	 came	 to	 discover	 as	 the	 ruling	 principle	 [arkhē];	 that	 is,	 the	 ruling	principle	 according	 to	 which	 the	 individual	 stratiōtēs	 [a	 citizen	 bound	 to	
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military	service],	in	his	government	of	self,	simultaneously	came	to	bind	himself	to	the	command	of	the	stratēgos	[general].	In	its	political	form,	as	we	find	it	in	the	first	political	treatises,	it	appears	in	the	requirement	of	the	individual	to	construct	a	relationship	of	command	with	the	self	as	a	condition	of	possibility	of	being	political.	The	most	famous	example	appears	 in	 the	 alluring	 definition	 of	 man	 in	 the	 Politics	 where	 Aristotle,	 in	 a	passage	that	was	to	become	canonical	to	Western	political	thought,	defined	man	as	a	politikon	zōon.	While	this	definition	is	often	rendered	in	terms	of	Aristotle	positing	man	as	an	animal	with	the	capacity	for	political	existence,	the	definition	in	fact	only	attains	its	meaning	when	taken	together	with	the	distinction	drawn	by	Aristotle	between	the	politikon	zōon	and	the	seemingly	peculiar	figure	who,	by	 reference	 to	 Homer,	 is	 described	 as	 one	 ‘whose	 desire	 is	 ruled	 by	 war’	[polemou	 epithumētēs]	 (Politics	 1253a:	 1-6).	 In	 opposing	political	man	 to	 the	mode	 of	 being	 of	 the	 one	whose	 desire	 is	 ruled	 by	war,	 Aristotle	 defined	 the	sense	 of	 being	 political,	 not	 so	 much,	 as	 has	 been	 assumed,	 in	 terms	 of	 an	ontology	of	man	and	animal	or	a	distinction	between	forms	of	life,	but	rather	by	recourse	to	a	certain	character	in	Homer	who,	as	will	become	apparent,	seems	to	show	a	stubborn	inability	to	follow	command	and	govern	the	self.	If	 we	 turn	 now	 to	 Plato’s	 discourse	 on	 private	 war	 in	 the	 Laws,	 we	basically	find	the	same	requirement	of	the	individual	to	construct	a	relationship	of	command	with	the	self.	In	this	sense,	Plato	was	perhaps	the	first	to	discover	the	site	of	 struggle	where	 the	citizen	soldier	and	 the	general,	 the	 individuated	body	and	the	self,	once	found	their	common	place	of	residence.	It	 is	the	site	of	conquest	and	victory	where	the	command	of	the	self	echoes	the	command	of	the	general	as	man	‘wins	the	battle	over	himself’,	but	it	is	also	the	site	of	defeat	and	profound	 loss,	as	man	 loses	his	sense	of	self	 to	obedience	and	command	(as	a	rule,	 the	 will	 of	 someone	 else).	 In	 fact,	 as	 the	 present	 dissertation	 will	 put	forward	for	reflection,	what	is	at	stake	in	Plato’s	private	war	of	the	self,	hinging	on	the	division	of	polemos,	is	the	quintessential	politico-strategic	incitement	for	rendering	being	governable,	an	incitement	which	would	exercise	an	influence	so	profound	in	the	history	of	Western	political	thought	that	one	might	refer	to	it	as	a	primordial	ontology	of	the	political.	
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While	Foucault’s	untimely	death	prevents	us	from	knowing	how	he	would	have	 developed	 the	 inquiry	 into	 the	 subject,	 it	 is	 nevertheless	 puzzling	 how	Foucault,	in	his	analysis	of	the	government	of	self	in	classical	Greece,	makes	no	mention	of	the	analysis	in	Discipline	and	Punish	of	the	formation	of	the	modern	subject	by	disciplinary	power	in	the	transposition	of	the	military	organisation	to	society.	Discipline	and	Punish	 in	fact	 is	a	paradigmatic	text	on	how	the	military	model	is	deployed	by	disciplinary	power	in	a	war	fought	for	political	order,	not	among	 states,	 but	 at	 the	 more	 fundamental	 level	 of	 the	 human	 body.	 In	 an	argument	that	seems	to	read	as	an	inversion	of	Plato’s	discourse	on	private	war	and	the	conquest	of	self,	Foucault	shows	how	the	most	 important	battle	 is	not	the	one	fought	on	the	territorial	battlefield	where	the	forces	of	states	clash,	but	rather	the	one	fought	on	the	battleground	of	the	human	body.	What	is	important,	Foucault	argues,	is	the	order	being	assumes	within	the	human	body,	since	what	is	at	 stake,	 in	 these	minutiae	workings	of	power,	 is	 the	 form	of	order	modern	societies	realise.	In	 any	 case,	 what	 explains	 the	 absence	 in	 The	 Use	 of	 Pleasure	 of	 the	military-disciplinary	perspective	 is	perhaps	the	simple	fact	that	Foucault,	after	the	 publication	 of	 the	 first	 volume	 of	 The	History	 of	 Sexuality,	 seems	 to	 have	reorientated	 his	 work	 from	 a	 political	 reading	 of	 war	 and	 the	 power	apparatuses	 of	 Western	 modernity	 to	 an	 ethical	 reading	 of	 subjectivation	 in	Greco-Roman	Antiquity.	In	other	words,	war	was	not	the	chosen	thematic	to	be	pursued	 by	 Foucault	 in	 the	 second	 volume	 of	 The	 History	 of	 Sexuality.	Nonetheless,	 in	 these	 pages	 Foucault	 shows	 an	 acute	 sensitivity	 to	 how	 the	government	 of	 self	 of	 the	 ethical	 subject	 emerged	within	 an	 agonistic	 field	 of	forces.	While	 never	 mentioning	 the	 term	 polemos,	 Foucault	 explains	 how	 the	classical	 vocabulary	 used	 to	 describe	 the	 realisation	 of	 the	 cardinal	 virtues	 of	the	 ethical	 subject,	 the	 virtues	 of	 moderation	 [sōphrosynē]	 and	 self-control	[enkrateia],	 was	 expressed	 by	 a	 whole	 series	 of	 representations	 seemingly	borrowed	 from	 war.	 The	 discourse	 on	 moderation	 and	 self-control,	 says	Foucault,	whether	 in	Xenophon,	Diogenes,	Antiphon,	Plato	or	Aristotle,	was	 in	fact	written	entirely	in	the	codes	of	war,	combat,	and	conquest:		
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Ethical	conduct	in	matters	of	pleasure	was	contingent	on	a	battle	for	power.	This	perception	 of	 the	 hēdonai	 [pleasure]	 and	 epithumia	 [desire]	 as	 a	 formidable	enemy	 force,	 and	 the	 correlative	 constitution	 of	 oneself	 as	 a	 vigilant	 adversary	who	confronts	them,	struggles	against	them,	and	tries	to	subdue	them,	is	revealed	in	 a	 whole	 series	 of	 expressions	 traditionally	 employed	 to	 characterise	moderation	and	immoderation:	setting	oneself	against	the	pleasures	and	desires,	not	giving	 in	 to	 them,	resisting	their	assaults,	or	on	the	contrary,	 letting	oneself	be	overcome	by	them,	defeating	them	or	being	defeated	by	them,	being	armed	or	equipped	against	them.	It	is	also	revealed	in	metaphors	such	as	that	of	the	battle	that	has	to	be	fought	against	armed	adversaries…”	(Foucault	1992:	66-67).		As	 Foucault	 explains,	 one	 could	 behave	 ethically	 only	 by	 adopting	 a	‘polemical’	attitude	towards	oneself;	the	individual	could	achieve	the	virtues	of	moderation	and	self-control	only	through	makhē	[combat]	and	nikaō	[conquest].	Most	 importantly,	we	see	how	this	struggle	seems	 to	 imply	 the	 formation	of	a	tactical	 divide	 within	 the	 self.	 To	 form	 oneself	 as	 a	 virtuous	 and	 moderate	subject,	Foucault	says,	“…	the	individual	has	to	construct	a	relationship	with	the	self	 that	 is	 of	 the	 ‘domination-submission’,	 ‘command-obedience’,	 ‘mastery-docility’	 type	 (Ibid.	 70).	 The	 virtuous	 individual	 must	 interiorize	 a	 tactical	division	 of	 the	 self	 enabling	 a	 relationship	 of	 domination,	 a	 relationship	 of	mastery	by	which	the	individual,	pace	Foucault,	could	‘rule	the	desires	and	the	pleasures’,	 ‘exercise	 power	 over	 them’,	 ‘govern	 them’	 [kratein,	 archein].	 Now,	the	principle	 that	enables	 this	 simultaneous	division	and	articulation	of	being,	that	 is,	 the	 principle	 that	 enables	 the	 individual	 to	 become	 virtuous,	 Foucault	mentions	en	passant,	was	the	ruling	principle	[arkhē]	(Ibid.).	The	analysis	of	the	body	as	the	strategic	battleground	of	power	is	certainly	present	in	Foucault’s	analysis	of	the	Greeks	then.	However,	it	is	rather	with	the	analytical	 aim	 of	 disclosing	 the	 possibility	 of	 subjectivation	 apparent	 in	 the	‘mode	of	subjection’	according	to	which	the	conduct	of	man	was	to	be	regulated.	The	 mode	 of	 subjection,	 Foucault	 explains,	 was	 defined	 by	 a	 savoir-faire,	 a	practice	or	art	that	prescribed	the	modalities	of	the	action	to	be	taken	according	to	circumstance	and	which,	most	importantly,	the	individual	could	equally	well	chose	not	 to	 follow.	 In	 this	sense,	as	Foucault	argues,	 “…	the	mode	of	being	 to	which	 this	 self-mastery	gave	access	was	characterized	as	an	active	 freedom,	a	
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freedom	that	was	 indisociable	 from	a	structural,	 instrumental,	 and	ontological	relation	 to	 truth.”	 (Ibid.	92).	But	while	 the	mode	of	 subjection	 involved	 in	 the	practice	of	self-mastery	certainly	appeared	as	an	active	freedom,	detached	from	the	constraints	of	the	universal	law,	Foucault	does	not	seem	to	pay	attention	to	how	 it	 was	 modelled	 after	 the	 principle	 of	 arkhē	 and	 the	 form	 of	 political	authority.	Indeed,	in	this	mode	of	subjection,	the	idea	of	freedom	and	the	idea	of	rendering	being	governable	are	part	of	the	same	dream.	And	while	this	mode	of	subjection	allowed	for	the	spiritual	combat	of	the	aesthetic	self	in	the	realisation	of	freedom,	it	was	never	specifically	tied	to	the	individual.	On	the	contrary,	the	government	of	self	and	the	government	of	others	were	seen	as	having	the	same	form,	 the	 form	 given	 by	 the	 ruling	 principle,	 the	 arkhē.	 This	 is	 how	 the	relationship	 of	 command	 and	 obedience,	 ruling	 and	 subject	 element	 appears	both	at	the	site	of	interiority	and	exteriority,	in	fact	simultaneously,	permeating	the	most	diverse	of	spheres	of	classical	Greek	society.	Foucault’s	text,	although	intended	to	demostrate	the	ethical	qualities	of	life	in	the	polis,	is	instructive:		Self-mastery	and	mastery	of	others	were	regarded	as	having	the	same	form;	since	one	was	expected	 to	govern	oneself	 in	 the	same	manner	as	one	governed	one’s	household	and	played	one’s	role	 in	 the	city,	 it	 followed	that	 the	development	of	personal	virtues,	of	enkrateia	in	particular,	was	not	essentially	different	from	the	development	that	enabled	one	to	rise	above	citizens	to	a	position	of	 leadership.	The	same	apprenticeship	ought	to	make	a	man	both	capable	of	virtue	and	capable	of	exercising	power.	Governing	oneself,	managing	one’s	estate,	and	participating	in	the	administration	of	the	city	were	three	practices	of	the	same	type.	(Ibid.	75-76).			 As	 Foucault	 shows,	 a	 perfect	 ethical	 homology	 existed	 between	 the	government	of	self	and	the	government	of	others,	a	homology	that	we	moderns	certainly	 cannot	but	 admire	not	 least	 for	 its	 reference	 to	being	 as	 a	matter	 of	true	 action	 rather	 than	 true	 knowledge.	 Surprisingly	 though,	 Foucault	 never	dwells	 on	 the	 exemplary	 place	 in	 which	 this	 homological	 relationship	 of	command	and	obedience	found	its	expression	in	the	classical	period.	However,	in	 perfect	 consistency	 and	 continuity	 with	 the	 requirement	 found	 in	 the	government	 of	 self,	 the	 command-obedience	 principle	 of	 arkhē	 is	 articulated	
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most	 clearly	 in	 the	 practices	 of	 the	 stratia,	 in	 particular,	 in	 the	 relationship	between	the	ruling	element	of	the	general	[stratēgos]	and	the	subject	element	of	the	citizen	soldier	 [stratiōtēs].	 In	 the	practices	of	 the	army,	 the	government	of	self	does	not	refer	to	being	in	the	sense	of	an	active	freedom,	but	rather	to	the	imperative	 form	 of	 command	 as	 a	 having-to-be	 or	 –do.	 As	 Plato	 says	 in	 a	passage	 of	 the	 Laws,	 where	 he	 explains	 a	 whole	 set	 of	 rules	 governing	 the	relationship	between	 the	 citizen	 soldier	and	 the	general,	 in	matters	of	war	no	one	should	be	 left	 to	 their	own	device.	That	 is,	one	must	give	 full	 attention	 to	observing	the	ruling	principle	according	to	which	no	one	should	‘follow	his	own	work’	 (942a-c).	 In	 Xenophon’s	 account	 in	 the	 Spartan	 Constitution,	 we	 find	 a	similar	concern	about	following	command,	which	is	how,	Xenophon	explains	of	the	 Spartan	 military	 paideia	 [education],	 “…	 at	 Sparta	 the	 boys	 were	 never	without	a	ruler”	(2.11).		It	 is	 in	 this	 sense	 of	 the	military-strategic	 principle	 that	 simultaneously	pacifies	 and	 mobilises	 being	 to	 a	 certain	 end	 we	 must	 now	 resituate	 the	meaning	of	virtue	on	the	terrain	of	operativity.	As	Plato	explains	in	a	discussion	of	the	cardinal	virtues	of	warfare,	in	combat	it	is	vital	that	the	individual	shows	obedience,	moderation,	and	self-restraint	(Ibid.).	This	is	echoed	in	Xenophon	in	a	passage	of	Memorabilia	 in	which	he	also	stresses	 the	 importance	of	being	of	sound	 mind	 [sōphroneō]	 and	 showing	 disciplined	 and	 orderly	 behaviour	[eutakteō]	 (3.5.21,15).	However,	 contrary	 to	 the	practice	of	 self-mastery	as	an	active	freedom	in	the	use	of	pleasure,	discipline,	moderation,	self-restraint,	and	obedience	are	not	so	much	signs	that	read	as	aesthetic	beauty	or	gracefulness,	as	they	are	operative	principles	of	being	that	enable	the	functioning	of	the	army.	By	having	 self-restraint	and	being	of	 sound	mind,	 the	 soldier	does	not	pursue	the	enemy	recklessly	like	the	individual	who	cannot	control	the	affects.	By	being	obedient,	 the	 soldier	 does	 not	 abandon	 his	 general	 or	 fellow	 soldier	 and	 run	away	 from	 the	 battle.	 By	 having	 discipline,	 the	 actions	 of	 the	 soldier	 are	 not	driven	 by	 desire	 and	 excess,	 but	 guided	 by	 inward	 reflectiveness,	 wherefore,	even	in	the	face	of	danger,	he	does	not	break	ranks,	but	stays	in	formation	thus	safeguarding	the	army	as	an	assemblage	of	forces.	In	the	stratia	and	the	militia,	virtue	is	what	renders	being	operable	to	give	foundation	to	command,	which	is	how	virtue	becomes	duty,	 and	duty	 virtue.	 In	 the	military	model	 of	 command	
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and	 operativity,	 duty	 and	 virtue,	 ethics	 and	 warfare	 enter	 into	 a	 zone	 of	indistinction.	A	certain	relationship,	then,	seems	to	exist	between	the	disciplinary	power	of	 modernity	 and	 classical	 Greece	 as	 tied	 together	 by	 the	 military	 model	 of	command	and	operativity.	Hence,	 if	we	are	to	 further	pursue	the	Foucaultdian	project	 of	 problematising	 the	 relationship	 between	 the	 subject	 and	 war,	 we	must	go	beyond	the	classical	Greeks.	Indeed,	the	truly	profound	implications	of	the	military	model	can	only	be	grasped	if	we	return	to	the	Homeric	world	from	which	we	set	out	at	the	beginning	of	this	study.	In	Homer,	we	saw	how	the	logic	of	 the	 command-obedience	 relationship	 found	 in	 the	arkhē	 remains	 absent	 in	the	 workings	 of	 the	 deeds	 and	 acts	 of	 the	 hero.	When	 Achilles,	 the	 best	 and	bravest	of	heroes,	performs	his	deeds	and	acts	it	is	not	because	the	general	or,	more	 exactly,	 the	 king	 of	 the	 Achaeans,	 Agamemnon,	 has	 commanded	 it.	 It	 is	because	the	gods	have	inspired	his	soul	or	filled	his	limbs	with	the	force	of	their	appetites	 and	 pleasures	 and	 pains.	 This	 entails	 a	 most	 different	 relationship	between	being	and	war	the	importance	of	which	becomes	apparent	when,	in	the	
Iliad,	Agamemnon	attempts	to	do	what	would	be	seen	as	wholly	natural	and	the	duty	of	any	virtuous	arkhōn	[leader]	or	stratēgos	of	the	classical	era,	which	is	to	rule	 over	Achilles	 commanding	 him	 into	 battle.	What	 happens	 next	 is	 not	 the	execution	of	 command.	On	 the	 contrary,	Achilles	 enters	 into	 a	 certain	 state	of	profound	rage	[menis],	 the	kind	of	rage	that	appears	because	Agamemnon	has	usurped	 a	 power	 that	 belongs	 to	 no	 mere	 mortal.	 This	 is	 how,	 in	 complete	opposition	 to	 the	 classical	 virtues	of	obedience,	moderation,	 and	 self-restraint	that	governs	the	citizen	soldier,	the	attempt	at	commanding	Achilles	is	seen	as	an	act	against	nature	to	which	the	gods	can	only	respond	by	inspiring	in	the	soul	of	Achilles	the	exaltation	of	rage.	In	fact,	so	begins	the	primordial	work	on	war	of	 the	Western	 tradition	 not	 with	 the	 display	 of	 self-restraint,	 moderation	 or	obedience,	but	with	rage,	as	the	poet	calls	on	the	goddess	to	let	the	divinity	of	it	be	known:		Of	 the	 rage	 of	Achilles,	 son	of	 Peleus,	 sing	Goddess	 that	murderous	 rage	which	condemned	 Achaeans	 to	 countless	 agonies	 and	 threw	many	warrior	 souls	 into	Hades,	and	made	themselves	spoil	for	dogs	and	every	bird…	(Iliad	I:	1-3),	
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As	we	learn	from	the	first	line	of	the	Iliad,	rage,	while	certainly	announcing	the	coming	of	dreadful	and	atrocious	events,	has	a	more	important	and	special	significance.	In	fact,	it	attains	a	distinctly	positive	meaning	in	Homer	and	occurs	in	 close	correlation	with	 the	virtue	of	arētē	 [excellence,	honour].	As	Sloterdijk	(2010)	 argues	 in	 an	 attempt	 at	 relating	 the	 archaic	 experience	 to	 the	 more	familiar	vocabulary	of	the	classical	era,	rage,	although	it	will	be	situated	at	the	exact	 opposite	 position	 in	 the	 classical	 hierarchy	 of	 human	 affects,	 could	 be	considered	as	being	close	to	 ‘the	good’.	Contrary	to	the	economy	of	virtue	and	war	of	the	classical	military	organisation,	then,	the	Homeric	economy	of	war	and	virtue	is	an	economy	of	the	passions,	of	rage	and	affect.	Virtue	is	situated	within	a	 thinking	 of	 war	 that	 has	 at	 its	 disposal	 a	 vocabulary,	 which	 not	 only	establishes	a	positive	relation	between	the	affects	and	war,	but	conceives	of	this	relationship	as	divine	and	the	expression	of	life	most	profound	and	most	worthy	of	praise.	So	much	so	that	the	Greeks	had	a	term	to	express	the	kinship	of	man	and	war	that	runs	through	the	channels	of	affect.	The	term	philopolemos,	which	occurs	most	frequently	in	Homer,	literally	means	‘lover	or	friend	of	war’.	To	be	
philopolemos	 expresses	 the	 highest	 praise	 in	 Homer	 placing	 the	 strife	 of	 the	singular	polemistēs	[warrior]	among	the	deeds	and	acts	of	gods.	To	be	philopolemos	might	seem	to	imply	a	certain	pertinacious	conviction	of	the	singular	hero	to	follow	no	one,	but	the	will	of	gods	to	whom	he	is	bound	by	divine	order.	It	is	no	doubt	in	this	image	of	the	unique,	autarkical,	passionate,	but	 also	 narcissistic	 ‘man	 of	 war’	 that	 the	 ancient	 cult	 of	 heroes	 is	 often	portrayed	 in	 the	 literature.	 The	 self-conceived	 grandeur	 and	 the	 slightly	delusional	account	of	divine	kinship,	in	turn,	is	what	accounts	for	the	seemingly	obstinate	 behaviour	 in	 Achilles.	 But	 this	 would	 not	 be	 true	 to	 the	 world	 of	archaic	 Greece.	 It	 is	 because	 of	 the	 brilliant	 reading	 of	 Homeric	 poetry	 by	classical	philologist	Bruno	Snell	that	the	present	inquiry	has	not	had	to	remain	content	with	an	analysis	based	upon	preconceived	notions	conferred	onto	 the	archaic	 system	of	 thought	by	another	most	different	 from	 it.	 In	his	analysis	of	the	Homeric	characters,	Snell	shows	how	the	apparent	obstinacy	of	the	hero	to	make	conscientious	attempts	to	control	the	affects	and	passions	has	little	to	do	with	eccentricity,	obstinacy	or	will	of	self.	Rather,	it	has	to	do	with	the	fact	that	the	 idea	 of	 the	 mind	 [nous]	 and	 the	 will	 [boulēsis]	 are	 completely	 absent	 in	
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Homer’s	 account	 of	man.	 In	The	Discovery	of	 the	Mind,	 Snell	 explains	 how	 the	mind	 in	 fact	 was	 the	 invention	 of	 the	 classical	 Greeks,	 in	 particular,	 classical	philosophy.	 The	 absence	 of	 the	mind	 as	 an	 explanatory	 principle	 of	 action	 is	precisely	what	explains	the	invocation	by	Homer	of	the	Olympian	gods.	Homer,	in	other	words,	could	not	do	without	the	 invention	of	 the	deities	 if	he	were	to	make	sense	of	his	characters	doing	something	rather	than	nothing.	In	terms	of	the	present	study,	Snell’s	account	of	an	archaic	world	without	the	soundness	of	mind	to	guide	being	and	action	seems	to	affirm	the	suspicion	that,	perhaps,	what	was	at	stake	 in	 the	practice	of	 the	government	of	 self	was	not	so	much	an	ethics	or	an	art	of	living	(although	they	were	certainly	integral	to	it),	but	rather	the	elaboration	of	a	certain	idea	of	the	self	or,	more	precisely,	the	notion	of	the	soul	seen	as	the	division	and	simultaneous	articulation	of	the	relationship	of	command	and	obedience	found	in	the	arkhē.	If	this	is	true,	then	it	will	be	necessary	to	reconsider	not	only	the	sense	of	the	Aristotelian	definition	of	man	as	 a	political	 reference	 to	 life,	 but	 also,	 in	 turn,	what	we	have	 learned	think	of	as	war.	Indeed,	the	logic	once	found	in	the	principle	of	arkhē	may	be	so	deeply	interlaced	with	the	idea	of	the	self	and	the	notion	of	war	that	we	cannot	think	 of	 either	 the	 subject	 or	 war	 without	 re-invoking	 the	 ontology	 of	operativity	and	command2	that	once	emerged	with	the	military	government	of	self	 and	 others.	 This	 suspicion	 seems	 supported	 by	 a	 passage	 in	 Heidegger	where	he	quotes	a	certain	 fragment	53	by	the	Pre-Socratic	 thinker,	Heraclitus.	At	 first	 glance,	 the	 fragment	 appears	 to	 be	 a	 kind	 of	 oracular	 exegesis	 of	war	belonging	to	an	ancient	form	of	poetry	whose	sheer	exoticism	makes	it	difficult	to	fathom.	However,	what	reads	as	paradox	and	parable	is	in	fact	the	language	of	another	system	of	thought,	which,	as	one	reads	the	fragment,	seems	to	shatter	all	 the	 familiar	 landmarks	 of	 one’s	 thought,	 of	 our	 thought,	 threatening	 to	destroy	 the	 age-old	distinction	between	 the	 Same	and	 the	Other	by	which	we	have	become	accustomed	to	grasping	what	we	call	war	and	what	we	refer	to	as	
																																																								2	I	borrow	the	term	‘ontology	of	operativity	and	command’	from	Agamben	(2013)	to	employ	it	here	in	a	different	way	to	designate	the	relationship	of	command	and	obedience	articulated	in	the	ruling	principle	of	arkhē.	
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the	subject.3	Here	is	the	text	of	the	fragment	in	the	translation	of	W.K.C.	Guthrie	(2003:	446):		Polemos	pantōn	men	patēr	esti,	pantōn	de	basileus,	kai	 tous	men	theous	edeixe	tous	de	anthrō̄pous,	tous	men	doulous	epoiēse	tous	de	eleutherous.		War	 is	 father	of	all	and	king	of	all,	and	some	he	reveals	as	gods,	others	as	men,	some	he	makes	slaves,	others	free.		‘War	is	father	of	all’,	we	learn	in	the	first	line,	which	is	to	say	that,	obviously,	the	fragment	does	not	locate	war	on	an	axis	of	politics	or	at	the	point	of	emergence	of	a	state	of	violence.	In	fact,	it	appears	there	is	no	origin	of	war.	It	is	rather	the	reverse;	war	 is	 the	origin.	Accordingly,	war	 is	not	situated	at	 the	site	where	 it	would	appear	as	the	effect	of	a	series	of	events,	which	is	to	say	in	a	relation	of	posteriority	to	the	state,	the	city,	or	man	from	which	point	of	origin	it	could	be	brought	into	being	in	what	we	call	‘making	war’.	Rather,	the	fragment	seems	to	invert	the	site	of	order	in	fact	reversing	the	relationship	between	man	and	war	situating	war	before	man	in	the	order	of	 things.	However	strange	or	alien	this	may	 seem	 to	 the	 modern	 mind,	 the	 order	 in	 which	 the	 things	 listed	 in	 the	fragment	appear	is	not	the	only	oddity.	What	seems	disturbing	to	our	thought	is	certainly	also	the	narrowness	of	the	distance	that	separates	the	things	listed.	In	fact,	there	really	are	no	fixed	limits	that	mark	the	clear	separation	of	things.	War	is	 juxtaposed	 with	 things	 that	 belong	 to	 apparently	 different	 categories	 and	classifications	as	men	appear	in	intimate	propinquity	with	the	gods,	the	slaves,	and	the	free.	In	fact,	even	if	each	category	can	be	assigned	a	clear	meaning	and	a	demonstrable	content,	the	disturbing	nearness	of	gods	and	men,	the	slaves	and	the	 free,	seems	so	strangely	unfamiliar	to	us	as	to	appear	wholly	obscure.	The	fragment	 in	other	words	 imbues	war	with	an	unimaginable	order	of	 things.	 It	destroys	 syntax	 and	 renders	 the	 relationship	 between	 language	 and	 logic	unstable.	 In	 fact,	 it	 seems	 to	be	 the	confusions	of	 language	 in	which	noun	and	verb	are	applied	indifferently	to	subjects	and	objects,	 intermixing	the	qualities	of	the	Same	with	properties	of	the	Other.	War	is	the	site	where	the	fictions	and	
																																																								3	The	form	of	this	argument	is	an	allusion	to	Foucault	(2008:	XVI-XXIV).	
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fables	 loom	 in	 the	 dimension	 of	 an	 Orphic	 language	 of	 strange	 resemblances	that	never	cease	to	proliferate.	However,	 in	view	of	the	ontology	of	operativity	and	command	delineated	in	these	pages,	it	appears	that	what	we	perceive	as	the	strange	intermingling	of	things	 in	 a	 foreign	 dimension	 is	 in	 fact	 a	 reflection	 of	 the	 limits	 of	 our	 own	system	of	 thought,	 the	very	 impossibility	of	 thinking	 the	 relationship	between	man	 and	war	 in	 that	 sense.	 Indeed,	 the	 ontology	of	 command	and	operativity	runs	counter	to	the	idea	that	war	could	be	‘father	of	all’	and	that,	because	of	the	location	of	war	at	the	site	of	anteriority,	no	sense	of	self	or	soundness	of	mind,	at	least	in	the	classical	sense,	can	exist	to	enable	the	separation	of	things,	to	tame	their	wild	profusion	and	avoid	their	dangerous	mixtures,	and,	once	having	been	‘placed’	or	‘arranged’,	each	in	its	proper	place,	to	keep	them	separated	by	their	adherence	 to	 a	 proper	 field	 of	 knowledge.	War	 is	 father	 of	 all	 wherefore	 the	categories	 applied	 do	 not	 function	 as	 boundaries	 of	 things	 that	 localise	 their	power	of	contagion	–	there	are	no	dangerous	mixtures	to	be	avoided,	since	the	identity	 of	 things	 remain	 but	 relationships	 of	 forces.	 All	 things	 appear	 in	 a	recurrent	 confrontation	 where	 beings	 turn	 up	 and	 reveal	 their	 nature	 for	 a	moment,	but	only	to	lose	it	and	disappear	into	the	resemblances	of	war	that	give	birth	to	new	gods,	new	slaves,	and	new	masters.	 It	 is	the	site	where	war	gives	birth	to	all	things,	as	things	appear	in	a	profound	chain	of	resemblances.	It	is	the	site	where	war	wanders	off	with	words	and	things,	men	and	gods,	subjects	and	objects.	 It	 is	 the	 site	 where	 the	 kosmos	 and	 all	 that	 belongs	 to	 it,	 men,	 gods,	animals,	 nature,	 are	 ‘steered’	 [kubernaō]	 by	 war	 [polemos].	 At	 the	 site	 of	
polemos,	 so	 difficult	 to	 express	 in	 our	 language,	 war	 glitters	 in	 universal	resemblance	with	the	Sovereignty	of	the	Same.	The	boundary	we	encounter	when	we	read	the	fragment	then	is	precisely	the	ontology	of	operativity	and	command.	It	is	what	renders	it	impossible	in	our	knowledge	 to	recognise	 the	site	at	which	 the	order	of	 things	 is	steered	not	by	the	 command	 of	 men,	 gods,	 or	 masters,	 but	 by	 war.	 Specifically,	 what	 seems	impossible	to	our	knowledge,	and	what	stands	in	stark	contrast	to	the	order	we	apprehend	 in	one	great	 leap	–	 the	 things	we	allude	 to	by	 the	words	 ‘war’	and	‘self’	–	is	the	absence	of	the	ontology	of	operativity	and	command.	Conversely,	if	we	 displace	 the	 axis	 of	 analysis	 to	 look	 at	 order	 from	 the	 point	 of	 view	 of	
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polemos,	then	what	is	indeed	possible	to	think	in	our	knowledge	seems	perhaps	even	more	disturbing.	From	the	vantage	point	of	polemos,	devoid	of	foundation	in	 the	 ruling	 principle,	 we	 are	 compelled	 to	 discover	 the	 strangeness	 of	 the	particularly	 pertinacious	 idea	 –	 so	 intimately	 related	 with	 Western	 political	thought	 –	 that	war	 is	 something	 you	 can	 govern,	 wage,	 win	 or	 lose,	 use	 as	 a	means	of	securing	the	peace	or	of	liberating	those	who	are	bound	to	servitude.	That	war	 is	 something	 that	 can	be	attributed	 to	 certain	actors	or	 traced	 to	an	origin,	which	can	be	determined	as	the	source	of	war.	Indeed,	is	this	not	how	we	always	look	for	the	general	staff	assuming	that	war	is	and	has	always	been	the	effect	of	a	command;	that	war	is	something	the	sovereign	can	decide	upon	and	shape	from	strategic	objectives	derived	from	certain	tactical	interventions,	that	war	 is	 an	 instrument	 the	 state	 can	 master	 or	 an	 art	 in	 which	 practice	 the	strategic	 mind	 is	 endowed	 with	 certain	 natural	 powers	 or	 special	 gifts.	Continuing	 this	 line	 of	 thought,	 is	 the	 logical	 endpoint	 of	 the	 itinerary	 that	emerged	with	the	relationship	of	command	and	obedience	not	the	instrumental	ontology	of	war	that	has	us	arriving	at	the	strange	premonition	that	war	is	equal	to	the	military	institutions;	that	war	is	an	entity	one	can	install	in	an	economy	of	violence	to	be	kept,	mobilised,	or	stored	away	for	later	use.	In	short,	one	must	wonder	if	this	is	not	how	war	has	come	to	be	recognised	at	the	safe	distance	to	being	 as	 an	 object	 one	 can	 administer	 from	 the	 Archimedean	 foothold	 of	 the	command	bunker.	In	 the	 final	analysis,	 this	 is	 the	 thesis	 the	present	 study	will	put	 forward	for	 reflection:	 what	 we	 refer	 to	 as	 the	 paradigm	 of	 Western	 politics	 is	 a	particular	 order	 of	 war,	 an	 order	 of	 war	 that	 once	 had	 its	 humble	 beginning	when	 man,	 in	 applying	 the	 ruling	 principle	 [arkhē]	 to	 war	 [polemos]	 –	 the	metaphysical	exercise	par	excellence	–	once	assumed	the	task	of	steering	war.	The	first	question	political	man	asks	himself,	 the	dissertation	argues,	 is	not,	as	has	been	assumed,	the	innocuous	question	about	how	life	according	to	the	good	might	 be	 procured	 through	 peace,	 law,	 and	 order,	 but	 rather	 a	 more	 basic	question	 and	 primary	 strategic	 incitement:	 how	 can	 being	 be	 rendered	governable	or,	in	the	vocabulary	of	the	Greeks,	how	can	polemos	be	subjected	to	steering;	 how	 can	 the	 relationships	 of	 opposites	 that	make	 up	 the	 kosmos	 be	conquered	so	as	to	put	man	on	the	one	side	in	the	struggle	where	he	can	fight,	
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win,	 and	 rule?	 The	 present	 analysis	 proceeds	 from	 the	 elaboration	 of	 this	question,	in	turn,	asking	how	it	is	that	the	relationship	between	being	and	war	in	the	first	place	came	to	be	discovered	as	a	problem	that	required	the	solution	found	 in	 the	 government	 of	 self.	Who	 came	up	with	 the	 idea,	 the	 dissertation	asks,	of	subjecting	the	kinship	of	man	and	war	to	steering,	entailing	a	complete	reversal	of	the	order	of	things,	as	man	and	war	came	to	change	places?	Now	 is	 probably	 the	 time	 and	 place	 to	 admit	 that	 The	 Order	 of	War	 is	really	not	so	much	about	war,	then,	as	it	is	an	inquiry	into	the	problematisation	of	 the	 subject	 as	 a	political	 reference	 to	 life,	 emergent	 at	 the	 intersection	of	 a	certain	mode	of	subjectivity	and	a	certain	idea	of	war,	that	with	the	emergence	of	 the	 concept	 of	 war	 came	 to	 define	 an	 important	 part	 of	 the	 complex	topological	 figure	of	the	modern	principle	of	sovereignty.	When	I,	nonetheless,	intend	to	study	war,	it	is	because	the	terrain	of	war	is	where	political	life	[bios	politikos]	 once	 appeared	with	 idea	 of	 rendering	 life	 governable	 by	 command.	Indeed,	 only	within	 the	 horizon	 of	 the	 Greek	 experience	 of	polemos	will	 it	 be	possible	to	decide	whether	the	principle	of	steering	war	that	once	founded	the	Western	idea	of	the	political	will	have	to	be	abandoned	or	will,	 instead,	regain	the	meaning	 it	 lost	 in	 that	 very	 horizon	where	 the	 problem	 of	war	was	 once	discovered	in	man.	
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Situating the thesis							In	 asking	 these	 questions	 about	 how	 the	 relationship	 between	 war	 and	 man	came	to	be	problematised	in	the	past,	then,	the	intention	is	not	so	much	to	say	something	 new	 about	 the	 history	 of	 the	 past	 as	 it	 is	 to	 contribute	 to	 what	Foucault,	in	his	lecture	on	Kant’s	What	is	Enlightenment,	refers	to	as	‘the	history	of	the	present’	and	the	writing	of	a	‘critical	ontology	of	ourselves’.	In	this	lecture,	Foucault	 situates	 his	 thinking	 as	 a	 continuation	 of	 the	 philosophical	 ethos	 of	critical	 inquiry	 that	 emerged	 with	 this	 seemingly	 marginal	 text	 in	 Kant.	However,	in	the	Kantian	interrogation	of	the	question	of	the	Enlightenment	vis-à-vis	 his	 own	 enterprise	 Foucault	 identifies	 the	 origin	 of	 an	 ‘ontology	 of	contemporary	reality’	in	the	sense	of	the	emergence	of	modern	philosophy	as	a	certain	mode	of	thinking,	a	critical	impulse,	in	which	philosophy,	perhaps	for	the	first	time,	begins	to	reflect	upon	the	limits	of	its	own	thought:		 The	 hypothesis	 I	 should	 like	 to	 propose	 is	 that	 this	 little	 text	 is	 located	 in	 a	sense	 at	 the	 crossroads	 of	 critical	 reflection	 and	 reflection	 on	 history.	 It	 is	 a	reflection	by	Kant	on	the	contemporary	status	of	his	own	enterprise.	No	doubt	it	is	not	the	first	time	that	a	philosopher	has	given	his	reasons	for	undertaking	his	work	at	a	particular	moment.	But	it	seems	to	me	that	it	is	the	first	time	that	a	 philosopher	 has	 connected	 in	 this	 way,	 closely	 and	 from	 the	 inside,	 the	significance	of	his	work	with	respect	to	knowledge,	a	reflection	on	history	and	a	particular	analysis	of	the	specific	moment	at	which	he	is	writing	and	because	of	which	he	is	writing.	It	is…	the	reflection	on	'today'	as	difference	in	history	and	as	motive	for	a	particular	philosophical	task.	(Foucault	1984:	36).			Foucault	articulates	his	own	project	of	critical	inquiry	in	extension	of	this	mode	of	 thinking	as	 “…	a	philosophical	ethos	consisting	 in	a	critique	of	what	we	are	
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saying	thinking	and	doing	through	a	historical	ontology	of	ourselves.”	(Ibid.	50).	The	 critical	 ontology	 of	 ourselves,	 then,	 is	 a	 certain	 philosophical	 ethos	 that	proceeds	 from	 an	 interrogation	 of	 ‘the	 pre-existing	 relation	 linking	 will,	authority,	and	the	use	of	reason’.	 In	the	outset,	 this	requires	releasing	thought	from	“…	a	certain	state	of	our	will	that	makes	us	accept	someone	else's	authority	to	 lead	us	 in	areas	where	 the	use	of	reason	 is	called	 for…”	as	when	“…	a	book	takes	the	place	of	our	understanding,	when	a	spiritual	director	takes	the	place	of	our	conscience,	when	a	doctor	decides	for	us	what	our	diet	is	to	be.”	(Ibid.	33).	In	other	words,	 the	 critical	 ontology	of	 ourselves	 examines	 the	present	not	 in	terms	 of	 preconceived	 notions,	 theories	 or	 doctrines,	 but	 in	 terms	 its	 moral,	philosophical,	 political,	 juridical,	 and	historical	 conditions	of	possibility	with	a	view	to	transgressing	the	limits	imposed	on	being	and	thought:			The	critical	ontology	of	ourselves	has	to	be	considered	not,	certainly,	as	a	theory,	a	doctrine,	nor	even	as	a	permanent	body	of	knowledge	that	 is	accumulating;	 it	has	 to	 be	 conceived	 as	 an	 attitude,	 an	 ethos,	 a	 philosophical	 life	 in	 which	 the	critique	of	what	we	are	is	at	one	and	the	same	time	the	historical	analysis	of	the	limits	 that	 are	 imposed	 on	 us	 and	 an	 experiment	 with	 the	 possibility	 of	 going	beyond	 them.	 [It	 is]	 a	 type	 of	 philosophical	 interrogation…	 that	 simultaneously	problematizes	man's	relation	to	the	present,	man's	historical	mode	of	being,	and	the	constitution	of	the	self	as	an	autonomous	subject	(Ibid.	39;	49-50).		Enlightenment,	per	Foucault,	is	in	other	words	the	‘permanent	critique	of	our	historical	era’	posited	in	terms	of	an	experiment,	an	experiment	situated	at	the	 intersection	 of	 ontological	 critique	 and	 historical	 analysis	with	 the	 aim	 of	providing	access	to	another	figure	of	truth	of	what	we	are,	and	what	this	present	is	 that	 make	 up	 our	 reality.	 Naturally,	 this	 ‘methodology	 of	 enlightenment’	involves	asking	questions	about	this	present,	which	is	how	the	semantic	field	of	formation	is	opened	up	to	problematisation.	In	terms	of	the	present	study,	the	analytical	 interest	 that	 guides	 the	 dissertation	 originates	 from	 the	problematisation	 of	 political	 modernity	 first	 posited	 by	 Foucault	 in	Discipline	
and	Punish	in	terms	of	how	the	military	organisation	came	to	be	invested	in	the	relations	of	forces	in	a	war	fought	for	political	order.	How	must	we	understand	our	present	and	ourselves,	Foucault	asks	at	the	interstices	of	his	critical	inquiry,	
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if	political	order	and	the	mode	of	subjectivity	it	affords	have	been	shaped	from	the	 military	 organisation	 for	 war?	 How	 must	 we	 understand	 this	 present,	Foucault	 elaborates	 in	 The	Will	 to	 Knowledge,	 which,	 despite	 the	 promise	 of	political	order	to	ensure,	maintain	and	develop	the	life	of	population	in	pursuit	of	peace	and	the	flourishing	of	mankind,	simultaneously	allows	for	societies	to	become	 increasingly	 violent	 exacerbating	 war	 inter-socially	 and	 intensifying	war	among	states.	Indeed,	as	Foucault	observed	himself:	“…wars	were	never	as	bloody	 as	 they	 have	 been	 since	 the	 nineteenth	 century,	 and	 all	 things	 being	equal,	never	before	did	regimes	visit	such	holocausts	on	their	own	populations.”	(Foucault	 1998:	 136-7).	 Tracing	 an	 itinerary	 from	 these	 questions	 and	 the	answers	 Foucault	 provided	 with	 the	 analysis	 of	 disciplinary	 power,	 political	sovereignty,	and	the	thesis	of	biopolitics,	the	present	study	seeks	to	contribute	to	 the	writing	of	 the	ontology	of	ourselves	articulated	under	 the	 theme	of	 the	problem	 of	 war	 and	 the	 subject.	 In	 doing	 so,	 it	 extends	 the	 inquiry	 by	 re-problematising	 subjectivity	and	war	on	 the	 terrain	of	 ancient	Greece,	 and	 this	not	out	of	speculative	choice	or	a	particular	conviction	to	study	the	ancients,	but	because	 it	 is	 the	historical	period	 in	which	 the	 relationship	between	man	and	war	was	first	called	into	question.	More	 generally,	 the	 philosophical	 aspiration	 and	 analytical	 intent	 of	 the	dissertation	 is	 located	 within	 the	 field	 of	 critical	 analysis	 that	 has	 come	 to	constitute	an	important	area	of	international	relations	and	security	studies	over	the	 last	 two	decades.	A	wealth	of	 literature	exists	 in	the	tradition,	which	I	will	not	 try	 to	do	 justice	 to	 in	 the	 form	of	a	summary	review.4	In	 the	 limited	space	available,	I	will	instead	focus	on	some	important	precursors	within	the	tradition	to	the	argument	I	will	advance	in	these	pages.	Most	important	is	the	intellectual	itinerary	from	which	the	tradition	of	critical	inquiry	derives	its	raison	d’être	as	distinct	from	the	general	field	of	International	Relations.	In	a	sense,	this	begins	with	the	question	raised	by	Foucault	on	the	history	of	the	present	we	refer	to	as	political	modernity	or,	more	precisely,	 that	of	 liberal	modernity.	The	question	could	 be	 phrased	 thus:	 How	 is	 it	 that	 liberal	modernity,	 as	 a	 political	 project	
																																																								4	For	an	overview	of	critical	inquiry	in	International	Relations,	see	for	example	Global	Politics	(Edkins	&	Zehfuss	2013).	For	an	excellent	collection	of	essays	on	the	broader	thematic	of	the	present	thesis,	see	Foucault	on	Politics,	Security	and	War	(Dillon	&	Neal	2008).	
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based	on	peace	and	security	 in	 the	 service	of	mankind,	has	nevertheless	been	characterised	 not	 only	 by	 the	 recurrence	 of	 war,	 but	 also	 by	 the	 incessant	pursuit	of	ways	in	which	human	life	can	be	targeted	for	killing	in	war?	As	Julian	Reid	has	observed,	this	is	a	paradox	that	International	Relations,	despite	it	being	
the	 discipline	 uniquely	 tasked	with	 providing	 answers	 to	 the	 problem	 of	war	and	peace,	has	not	been	analytically	fit	to	solve:	“As	a	discipline	it	has	been	and	continues	 to	 be	 profoundly	 shaped	 by	 the	 influence	 of	 ideas	 drawn	 precisely	from	the	tradition	of	thought	and	practice	responsible	for	the	generation	of	this	paradox,	liberalism.”	(Reid	2009:	3).	In	other	words,	the	discipline	is	trapped	in	a	kind	of	epistemological	circularity	in	which,	having	been	shaped	from	the	very	same	 system	 of	 thought	 that	 made	 the	 paradox	 possible	 in	 the	 first	 place,	 it	cannot	but	affirm	 the	paradox	we	already	know	 instead	of	 inquiring	 into	how	and	to	what	extent	it	may	be	possible	to	think	differently	and	go	beyond	it.	The	epistemological	 task	of	 finding	a	way	out	of	 this	 circularity	between	the	 analytical	 ordering	 codes	 of	 International	 Relations	 and	 the	 system	 of	thought	of	 liberal	modernity	 is	what	warrants	 the	 turn	 to	Foucault.	One	must	avoid,	 Foucault	 explains	 in	 the	 Archaeology	 of	 Knowledge	 (2008b:	 42),	 the	temptation	of	‘completing	the	blessed	circle’,	and	this	is	the	task	critical	analysis	assumes	in	its	inception.	In	doing	so,	it	invests	International	Relations	with	the	philosophical	 ethos	 of	writing	 the	 critical	 ontology	 of	 ourselves.	 Of	 particular	importance	here	is	the	inaugural	work	done	by	Michael	Dillon	in	the	late	1980s	in	 which	 the	 problematisation	 of	 security	 is	 divorced	 from	 structural	 and	ontological	 relations	 to	 truth	 and	 redefined	 in	 terms	 of	 political	 practice.	 Of	special	 significance	 to	 the	 argument	 to	 be	 deployed	 in	 the	 present	 study	however	is	the	line	of	thought	developed	in	the	Politics	of	Security.	While	further	exposing	 the	 epistemological	 lacuna	 in	 International	 Relations,	 here	 Dillon	interrogates	the	ontological	account	of	human	life	as	a	form	of	 life	that	always	seems	 to	 be	 in	 the	 need	 of	 security.	 In	 providing	 an	 answer	 to	 the	 question,	Dillon,	rather	than	asking	why	modern	regimes	go	about	practicing	security	or	inquiring	 into	 the	 essential	 nature	 of	 security	 (questions	 that	 always	 seem	 to	end	 up	 completing	 the	 ‘blessed	 circle’	 where	 essentialism	 affirms	 analytical	intent	 and	 vice	 versa),	 Dillon	 asks,	 how	 is	 it	 that	 “…	 seeking	 security	 became	
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such	an	insistent	and	relentless	(inter)national	preoccupation	for	humankind?”	(Dillon	1996:	15).	In	 asking	 how	 rather	 than	 why	 the	 epistemological	 crisis	 is	 avoided.	Moreover,	 the	semantic	 field	of	 formation	in	which	security	appears	 is	opened	up	 to	 a	 re-problematisation,	 a	 re-problematisation	 that	 explains	 how	 the	ontological	account	of	life	as	distinguished	a	priori	by	its	‘being	insecure’	and	‘in	need	of	security’	 is	 the	account	of	 life	on	which	the	principle	of	sovereignty	of	modern	political	regimes	has	been	founded.	The	how	question,	in	other	words,	puts	 the	 inquiry	 onto	 the	 analytical	 path	 of	 historical	 contingency	 and	ontological	 critique	 that	 necessarily	 must	 go	 beyond	 modern	 concepts	 of	sovereignty	and	security.	 If	one	 is	 to	understand	how	it	 is	 that	 life	came	to	be	rendered	 insecure	as	modern	regimes	began	 to	exert	a	power	over	 life,	Dillon	argues,	then	one	must	start	by	questioning	how	the	problem	of	security	came	to	be	invested	in	Western	political	thought.	In	the	tradition	of	critical	inquiry,	this	would	 normally	 call	 for	 a	 genealogical	 inquiry	 or	 what	 we,	 in	 a	 strictly	provisionary	way,	 could	 call	 an	 analysis	 of	 how	 the	 present	 came	 into	 being.	However,	 in	 the	 Politics	 of	 Security	 Dillon	 proceeds	 by	 means	 of	 an	archaeological	 reading	 that	 puts	 ‘security’	 back	 into	 the	 semantic	 field	 of	formation	in	which	it	once	appeared	on	the	terrain	of	ancient	Greece.	The	Greek	 sense	of	 security	as	asphaleia,	Dillon	explains,	had	 little	 to	do	with	the	modern	notion	of	security	even	if,	in	Aristotle,	it	also	concerns	a	matter	of	 the	polis.	 In	 fact,	 in	 the	 translation	of	Heidegger,	 to	asphales	means	 the	 ‘un-falling’,	in	the	sense	of	what	remains	standing,	and	“…	never	the	‘certain’	and	the	‘secure’	in	the	modern	sense	of	certitudo.”	(Ibid.	123).	In	the	Greek	experience	of	
asphaleia,	 security	was	 is	other	words	recognised	 in	 terms	of	 the	 ‘indissoluble	relation	 between	 security	 and	 insecurity’	 or	 what	 Dillon,	 in	 maintaining	 the	irreducible	 duality	 of	 struggle	 and	 tension	 [polemos]	 found	 in	 asphaleia,	denotes	to	as	(in)security.	In	its	original	setting,	(in)security	must	therefore	be	conceived	antilogically.	This	is	a	critically	important	distinction.	Ontologically,	it	informs	 of	 a	 system	 of	 thought	 in	 which	 truth	 is	 understood	 not	 as	 the	 one-sidedness	 of	 dialectical	 opposition,	 but	 rather	 as	 the	 coming-to-presence	 of	relationships	of	concurrent	opposites,	that	is,	as	alētheia.	This	is	to	say	a	system	of	thought	that	answers	to	the	form	of	truth	in	which	insecurity	is	to	be	found	in	
	 31	
security,	war	in	peace,	night	in	day	as	the	intimate	and	infinite	relatedness	of	a	constantly	 mobile	 whole.	 Epistemologically,	 this	 archaeological	 dig,	 in	 turn,	enables	the	analysis	to	re-problematise	the	modern	sense	of	security.	From	the	point	 of	 view	 of	 asphaleia,	 then,	 it	 becomes	 possible	 to	 observe	 the	 modern	sense	of	security	as	articulated	in	a	division	enabling	the	profound	displacement	in	which	insecurity	has	come	to	be	understood	as	a	certain	object	that	can	be	if	not	eradicated	then	at	least	governed	in	the	act	of	providing	security:		Modern	 usage…	 proposes	 that	 there	 is	 a	 state	 of	 affairs	 –	 insecurity	 –	 and	 the	negation	of	that	state	of	affairs	–	security	–	and	by	doing	so	thoroughly	represses	the	complexity	not	only	of	the	act	of	securing	but	also	of	the	inextricable	relation	between	security	and	insecurity.	It	offers,	instead,	a	simple	dialectical	opposition	together	 with	 the	 implied	 promise	 that	 insecurity	 can	 always	 be	 mastered	 in	principle	if	not	in	current	practice.”	(Ibid.	122).		 There	 are	 some	 critical	 analytical	 precursors	 to	 be	 observed	 here	 in	situating	the	present	inquiry.	Not	only	does	it	become	obvious	that	the	object	of	inquiry,	 in	 this	case	 ‘security’,	has	a	history,	but	also	 that	 this	history	 is	by	no	means	 linear	 or	 stable,	 but	 rather	 one	 of	 synchronic	 and	 diachronic	problematisations	that	articulate	intertextual	overlays	across	different	systems	of	thought.	This	is	why,	as	I	will	explain	in	the	ensuing	chapter	on	method,	the	present	 analysis	 will	 proceed	 from	 the	 methodology	 of	 problematisation	studying	discrete	discursive	events	simply	because	this	is	the	way	in	which	the	object	of	 inquiry	can	be	brought	to	 life	and	awakened	from	the	slumber	of	the	blessed,	but	endlessly	repetitious	circle	in	which	knowledge	is	always	referred	back	 to	 the	 origin.	On	 a	 final	 note,	 in	 putting	back	 security	 into	 the	 setting	 in	which	it	once	appeared,	the	Politics	of	Security	did	something	important.	In	the	careful	reading	of	(in)security	as	asphaleia	it	provided	access	to	another	figure	of	truth	and	a	different	mode	of	being	thereby	inscribing	International	Relations	in	the	ethos	of	writing	the	critical	ontology	of	ourselves,	or	as	it	is	stated	in	the	final	chapter,	the	project	of	re-situating	International	Relations	as	a	site	‘we	are	challenged	to	out-live’	(Ibid.	203).		
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Method						The	 present	 dissertation	 seeks	 to	 analyse	 the	ways	 in	which	 the	 relationship	between	the	individual	and	war	has	been	problematised	through	an	ontology	of	operativity	 and	 command.	 By	 this	 I	 do	 not	mean	 any	 stable	 or	 homogeneous	entity	as	if	sovereignty	supposedly	had	pervaded	all	history	from	the	ancients	to	the	present.	On	the	contrary,	I	simply	mean	to	capture	heuristically	the	common	place	of	residence	of	a	diverse	multiplicity	of	discoursive	formations	emergent	in	 what	 we	 could	 call	 problematisations	 of	 the	 relationship	 between	 the	individual	 and	war.	 First,	 it	 is	 an	 attempt	 to	 analyse	 the	 Greek	 experience	 of	
polemos,	 and	 the	modality	of	 the	order	of	war	 to	which	 the	exchanges	of	man	owed	their	laws.	I	am	concerned	to	show	its	developments	from	archaic	Greece	to	 the	 end	 of	 the	 period	 of	 classical	 Greece.	 Second,	 I	 will	 inquire	 into	 the	emergence	 at	 the	 threshold	 of	 classical	 Greece	 of	 the	 notion	 of	 man	 as	articulated	in	the	principle	of	steering	war	and	the	elaboration	of	the	self	in	the	birth	 of	 the	 idea	 of	 rendering	 being	 governable.	 Third,	 I	 will	 examine	 the	reworking	 of	 the	 classical	 theme	 of	 war	 and	 the	 subject	 in	 the	 divine	 art	 of	ruling	as	it	occurs	in	Christian	thought,	and,	finally,	how	it	came	to	find	its	way	into	its	political	form,	the	mortal	divinity	of	Hobbes’	Leviathan.	Put	 very	 schematically,	 the	 present	 inquiry	 has	 revealed	 two	 important	displacements:	 the	 first	appears	at	 the	threshold	to	classical	Greece	where	the	experience	of	polemos	is	gradually	reworked	by	recourse	to	the	ruling	principle	[arkhein]	in	the	discovery	of	the	mind.	The	ruling	principle	will	be	posited	at	the	origin	of	things	as	classical	thought	uncovers	in	the	arkhē	of	kosmos	a	principle	for	 the	 government	 of	 self	 and	 others.	 This	 concerns	 the	 period	 we	 usually	attribute	 to	 the	 birth	 of	Western	 politics.	 The	 second	marks	 the	 beginning	 of	early	Christian	thought	in	which	the	Greek	sense	of	arkhē	would	work	loose	of	its	 foundation	 in	being	and	the	world	of	sensible	 things.	Tracing	the	discourse	
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on	 the	arkhē	 from	archaic	Greece	 to	 the	end	of	 the	period	of	 the	 later	Roman	Empire,	 the	 dissertation	 analyses	 the	 formation	 of	 the	 field	 of	 knowledge	 in	which	the	ontology	of	operativity	and	command	is	displaced	from	the	classical	sense	 of	 being	 to	 be	 tied	 to	 the	 existence	 of	 God.	 Under	 the	 theme	 of	 divine	governance,	the	classical	sense	of	polemos	inaugurated	by	the	classical	Greeks	as	private	war	is	effaced	in	the	reworking	of	the	theme	of	the	private	war	of	self,	which	now	appears	no	longer	in	relation	to	truth	as	alētheia,	but	in	relation	to	divine	 truth	devoid	 of	 foundation	 in	 being.	 The	Greek	 subject	 of	 sound	 action	becomes	the	Christian	subject	of	true	knowledge,	as	the	principle	of	command	and	operativity	is	tied	to	ontologically	to	divine	truth.	Finally,	having	dispensed	with	the	private	war	of	self,	the	early	modern	subject	turns	up	no	longer	in	the	problematisation	of	the	relationship	of	self	 to	war,	but	as	given	by	the	state	of	nature	in	the	form	of	Hobbes’	belligerent	man.	The	ontology	of	operativity	and	command	becomes	the	reference	of	political	sovereignty	to	life,	the	dissertation	explains,	 in	 a	 transformation	 that	 can	 be	 identified	 in	 the	 translation	 of	 the	Greek	 notion	 of	 polemos	 [war]	 into	 the	 Latin	 bellum,	 in	 the	 reworking	 of	 the	Platonic	theme	of	the	war	of	every	man	against	every	man	in	the	public	sphere	into	 its	 Christian	 and	 modern	 secular	 forms,	 in	 the	 rendering	 of	 the	 ruling	principle	[arkhē]	as	the	word	of	God	[logos],	which,	eventually,	will	be	identified	with	the	will	(of	God)	and,	ultimately,	the	command	of	the	sovereign.	Following	 Foucault’s	 teachings	 on	method,	 the	 dissertation	 employs	 the	methodology	of	problematisation.	As	briefly	discussed	in	the	preceding	chapter,	this	concerns,	pace	Foucault,	a	form	of	critique,	which,	in	contrast	to	the	search	for	formal	structures	with	universal	value,	inquires	into	“…	the	events	that	have	led	us	to	constitute	ourselves	and	to	recognise	ourselves	as	subjects	of	what	we	are	doing,	thinking,	saying.”	(Foucault	1984:	42).	In	terms	of	the	present	study,	this	could	be	translated	into	the	observation	that	the	objects	of	inquiry,	war	and	the	 individual	 as	 well	 as	 their	 complex	 internal	 relationship,	 are	 conditioned	upon	what	it	means	to	be	a	human	being	as	much	as	what	it	means	to	talk	about	the	 terrible	War-God	and	 the	battle	of	Plataea,	 the	steering	of	cosmos	and	 the	identity	of	nature,	the	divinity	of	rage	and	the	problem	of	affect,	the	love	of	war	and	 the	 serenity	 of	 peace.	On	 a	more	 basic	 note,	 it	means	 that	 the	 analysis	 is	formed	on	the	basis	of	the	observation	that,	since	the	objects	of	inquiry,	war	and	
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the	individual,	have	a	history,	and	since	what	has	a	history	is	not	a	universal,	but	contingent,	then	one	must	study	the	objects	of	inquiry	in	terms	of	the	dispersed	discoursive	events	in	which	they	have	come	to	be	problematised.	The	aim	is	 therefore	not	to	write	the	ancient	history	of	war,	politics,	and	the	subject,	as	if	pretending	to	disclose	these	complex	and	diverse	phenomena	in	their	full	historical	significance.	As	I	will	explain	in	this	chapter,	the	intention	is	to	provide	an	analysis	of	specific	semantic	fields	of	formation	that	have	been	decisive	 in	 the	 coming	 to	 presence	 and	 change	 of	 the	 set	 of	 knowledges	 and	practices	 that	 once	made	 it	 possible	 to	 inscribe	war	 and	 the	 individual	 in	 the	political	 idea	 of	 steering.	 To	 this	 aim,	 I	 intend	 to	 study	 discrete	 discoursive	events,	 or	 what	 Foucault	 calls	 ‘statements’,	 concerning	 war	 and	 the	 subject	rather	than	the	formal	structures	we	normally	conceive	of	in	the	history	of	war	and	in	the	politico-philosophical	account	of	the	subject,	be	it	Kantian	reason	or	Hobbessian	egoism.	The	analysis	will	therefore	necessarily	be	one	of	apparently	insignificant	 battles	 fought	 in	 the	 day-to-day	warfare	 of	 discourse	 and	 not	 so	much	the	study	of	actual	battles	having	been	fought	or	if	they	were	orchestrated	by	 the	 erudite	 Clausewitzian	 or	 whether	 victory	 came	 from	 below	 when	 the	doctrine	of	Vegetius	got	rid	of	the	peasant	and	gave	man	‘the	air	of	the	soldier’.	This	is	not	to	say	that	I	will	not	study	the	forms	in	which	thought	manifests	itself	in	practices	and	vice	versa,	for	this	is	exactly	what	I	intend	to	do.	It	is	to	say	that,	in	 terms	 of	method,	 one	 cannot	 limit	 the	 analysis	 to	 the	 point	 of	 view	 of	 the	historiographical	account	of	war,	the	study	of	battles	or	of	the	military	sciences,	just	as	one	cannot	leave	the	inquiry	into	the	subject	to	political-juridical	theory	or	transcendental	philosophy.	For	we	would	thereby	run	the	risk	of	ascribing	to	war	and	the	individual	a	privileged	form	or	identity	and	thereby	get	caught	up	in	the	kind	of	circularity	from	which	there	is	no	way	out,	but	rather	the	infinite	return	to	the	origin.	So,	instead	of	referring	to	a	concept	of	war	or	a	theory	of	the	subject,	one	should	 rather,	pace	Foucault,	 try	 to	analyse	 the	different	 statements	by	which	war	 and	 the	 subject	 have	 come	 to	 be	 constituted	 within	 a	 certain	 corpus	 of	knowledge.	 This	 is	 what	 I	 mean	 when	 I,	 in	 the	 following,	 will	 argue	 that	 the	intention	is	to	study	war	and	the	subject,	not	from	the	point	of	view	of	politics,	sovereignty,	 or	 law,	 but	 in	 terms	of	 statements	 and	 the	 systems	of	 thought	 in	
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which	they	have	come	to	function	so	as	to	constitute	a	certain	knowledge	of	war	and	 the	 subject.	 The	 question	 of	 truth	will	 in	 other	words	 need	 to	 be	 held	 in	suspension,	 as	 the	 inquiry	 displaces	 the	 axis	 of	 analysis	 from	 the	 study	 of	 a	preconceived	body	of	knowledge	to	the	study	that	traces	war	and	the	subject	in	terms	of	their	historical	conditions	of	possibility.	Drawing	on	Foucault,	I	intend	to	 operationalise	 the	 methodology	 of	 problematisation	 in	 the	 form	 of	‘archaeology’	and	‘genealogy’	in	the	conscientious	attempt	of	examining	war	and	subjectivity,	 not	 from	a	 preconceived	body	 of	 knowledge,	 but	 as	 it	 appears	 in	language,	as	it	was	spoken,	and	in	exchanges	as	they	were	carried	out.	As	I	will	explain	 in	 this	chapter,	 the	dissertation	employs	the	method	of	archaeology	to	establish	the	synchronic	structure	of	the	ontology	of	command	and	operativity,	that	 is,	 the	 structure	 that	 renders	 it	 intelligible	 as	 a	 regularity	 between	 a	number	of	 statements,	 be	 they	on	 cosmos,	 virtue	or	war.	 Second,	 the	 analysis	draws	on	the	‘tactic’	of	genealogy	to	analyse	the	diachronic	coming	to	presence	and	change	of	this	structure	that	we,	 in	providing	some	provisionary	signpost,	may	 identify	 in	 its	emergence	as	 the	 idea	of	steering	war	and	determine	 in	 its	(preliminary)	endpoint	as	the	modern	principle	of	political	sovereignty.	But,	as	in	any	critical	inquiry	into	the	ontology	of	ourselves	and	the	history	of	the	present,	pace	Foucault,	there	is	a	negative	work	to	be	carried	out	first.	We	must	rid	ourselves	of	whole	mass	of	notions,	Foucault	explains,	each	of	which,	in	its	own	way	may	obscure	the	analysis	of	statements	by	installing	the	primacy	of	continuity	 over	 discontinuity,	 concept	 over	 contingency,	 transcendence	 over	history,	truth	over	being:		Take	the	notion	of	tradition:	 it	 is	 intended	to	give	a	special	temporal	status	to	a	group	of	phenomena	that	are	both	successive	and	identical	(or	at	least	similar);	it	makes	it	possible	to	rethink	the	dispersion	of	history	in	the	form	of	the	same;	it	allows	a	reduction	of	the	difference	proper	to	every	beginning,	in	order	to	pursue	without	 discontinuity	 the	 endless	 search	 for	 the	 origin;	 tradition	 enables	 us	 to	isolate	the	new	against	a	back-ground	of	permanence,	and	to	transfer	its	merit	to	originality,	to	genius,	to	the	decisions	proper	to	individuals.	(Foucault	2008b:	23).			
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Following	 the	advice	provided	by	Foucault,	 in	 terms	of	 the	present	 study,	one	could	start	by	getting	rid	of	the	notion	of	the	state.	The	notion	of	the	state	makes	possible	 a	 particular	 idea	 and	 rationality	 of	war	 to	which	 a	 series	 of	 politico-juridical	properties	are	commonly	applied;	as	if	we	could	be	sure	that	war	had	always	existed	at	the	politico-juridical	extremities	of	the	relations	of	forces,	war	is	either	recognised	in	a	certain	primitive	or	primordial	form	before	sovereignty	is	 instituted	 or	 it	 is	 seen	 at	 the	 point	 of	 its	 dissolution.	 According	 to	 this	conception,	 then,	 war	 is	 believed	 to	 have	 emerged	 from	 its	 inception	 fully	adequate	to	its	own	nature	in	what	we	could	call	a	political	economy	of	violence,	an	economy	whose	integrity	is	guaranteed	precisely	by	the	notion	of	the	state.	One	 must	 dispense	 with	 the	 notion	 of	 the	 state	 then,	 since	 contrary	 to	 the	conceptual	 analyst	who	 treats	 this	 arrangement	of	 truth	 as	 the	 reality	 of	war,	the	 genealogist	 sees	 it	 as	 the	 expression	 of	 a	 particular	 order	 of	 war,	 which	during	the	course	of	history	may	have	developed	from	the	most	diverse	forms	propagated	under	most	different	regimes.	When	discussing	war,	the	genealogist	argues,	one	should	 in	other	words	keep	 in	mind	that	what	we	have	 learned	to	perceive	by	the	term	war	and	the	concept	of	war	is	the	effect	of	a	realisation	of	certain	historico-political	possibilities	that	appeared	at	a	given	time,	and	which	could	have	been	different.	What	Clausewitz	 famously	stated	as	an	aphorism	at	the	 threshold	 of	 modernity	 –	 war	 is	 the	 continuation	 of	 politics	 pursued	 by	other	 means	 –	 is	 certainly	 what	 has	 been	 true	 of	 the	 organisation	 of	 the	knowledge	 of	war	 from	 the	 inception	 of	 the	modern	Western	 state.	However,	since	 the	 genealogist	 cannot	 take	 for	 granted	 the	 sovereignty	 of	 politics	 over	war,	 this	 particular	 schema	 of	war	 and	 politics	 cannot	 be	 taken	 as	 a	 point	 of	departure,	but	must	rather	be	treated	as	a	particular	form	of	truth	that	emerged	because	of	certain	possibilities,	which	could	have	been	different.	Moreover,	 one	 has	 to	 recognise	 such	 a	 figure	 of	 truth,	 not	 only	 in	 its	distinct	outlines,	but	also	 in	 its	various	shapes	and	 forms,	 its	morphology	and	numerous	new	beginnings	that	are	called	upon	to	inform	us	of	an	allegedly	new	reality	of	war.	The	post-Cold	War	period	could	be	considered	as	one	such	‘new	beginning’	 born	 from	 the	 strange	 experience	 of	 redemption,	 dissolution,	 and	dissymmetry	 that	 gave	 rise	 to	 the	 political	 incident	 that	 rediscovered	‘humanitarian	 war’,	 but	 more	 recently,	 in	 the	 decade	 that	 has	 passed	 since	
	 37	
September	11th,	the	same	war	has	been	assured	yet	a	new	beginning	under	the	prophetic	 guise	 of	 the	 conceptual	 analyst.	 Once	 again,	 new	 signifiers	 such	 as	‘new’	(Kaldor	2002),	‘asymmetrical’	(e.g.	McKenzie	2000),	‘network’	(Der	Derian	2002),	‘cyber’	(Clarke	2010)	etc.	are	called	upon	to	recapture	war,	which	seems	to	have	escaped	its	concept.	While	the	conceptual	analyst	plays	tag	with	war,	the	genealogist	will	cultivate	the	‘grammatical	accident’	of	this	game	bequeathed	to	war	where	certain	adjectives,	while	clearly	informing	us	of	a	particular	nature	of	behaviour	involved	among	the	actors	implicated,	do	so	precisely	by	recourse	to	the	 politico-juridical	 notion	 of	 sovereignty	 and	 the	 old	 schema	 of	 war	 and	politics.	 Specifically,	 this	 late	 modern	 discourse	 on	 war	 is	 bound	 to	 the	assumption	that	war	has	an	essence	that	can	be	defined	in	the	outset,	one	that	war,	supposedly,	can	now	deviate	from	in	order	to	take	on	a	new	identity,	and	one	that	war	inevitably	must	return	home	to	as	war	assumes	its	proper	place	in	the	order	of	things.	The	genealogist	will	await	the	emergence	of	such	accidents,	and,	once	unmasked	as	 the	apparition	of	an	old	 figure	of	 truth,	will	show	how	the	 conjuring	up	of	new	 identities	of	war	 redraws	 the	very	boundaries	of	our	political	imagination	that	have	engendered	our	understanding	in	the	first	place.	Truth,	 Foucault	 says,	 “…	 is	 undoubtedly	 the	 sort	 of	 error	 that	 cannot	 be	refuted	 because	 it	 was	 hardened	 into	 an	 unalterable	 form	 in	 the	 long	 baking	process	of	history.”	(Foucault	1971:	79).	As	Foucault	explains	 in	his	 important	article	 on	 genealogical	 method,	 Nietzsche,	 Genealogy,	 History,	 the	 tactic	 of	genealogy	 is	 the	 relentless	 interrogation	of	 this	kind	of	 error,	using	history	 to	bring	 truth	 to	 the	 point	 where	 it	 splinters.	 Or	 when	 history	 can	 no	 longer	contain	 this	 sort	 of	 error,	 when	 the	 truth	 of	 the	 thing	 splinters	 and	 loses	 its	identity,	as	perhaps	happened	to	war	on	September	11th,	genealogy	is	not	there	to	recover	 the	remains	of	 its	 lost	unity.	 “War	 is	 the	perpetuation	of	deliberate	violence…	war	belongs	to	two	categories	of	human	experience…	First	it	is	a	form	of	violence…	Second,	 it	 is	a	member	of	a	class	of	occurrences	whose	activity	 is	‘injuring’…”	(Jabri	2009:	11).	War	belongs	to	the	register	of	‘deliberate	violence’,	war	cannot	be	separated	from	violence;	war	is	violence.	But	is	it	necessarily	so?	Genealogy	refuses	the	temptation	of	nostalgia	that	regresses	back	to	the	origin	and	whose	function	is	to	recover	a	presupposed	essence	of	war	at	the	moment	when	history	can	no	longer	contain	this	sort	of	error.	The	genealogist	 in	other	
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words	 refrains	 from	 the	 venture	 into	metaphysics,	 pace	 Foucault	 (1971:	 78),	since	he	is	not	under	the	illusion	that	it	is	possible	‘to	capture	the	exact	essence	of	things,	their	purest	possibilities,	and	their	carefully	protected	identities’.	It	is	the	idea	‘that	things	are	most	precious	and	essential	at	the	moment	of	birth’,	but	from	the	vantage	point	of	genealogy,	 there	are	no	true	or	original	 identities	of	things	to	be	found	in	history.	When	studying	history,	as	opposed	to	metaphysics,	the	genealogist	learns	that	things	have	no	essence;		“…	if	the	genealogist	refuses	to	extend	his	faith	in	metaphysics,	if	he	listens	to	history,	he	finds	that	‘there	is	something	 altogether	 different’	 behind	 things:	 not	 a	 timeless	 and	 essential	secret,	 but	 the	 secret	 that	 they	 have	 no	 essence	 or	 that	 their	 essence	 was	fabricated	in	piecemeal	fashion	from	alien	forms.”	(Ibid.).	The	idea	of	disclosing	the	truth	of	things,	the	genealogist	argues,	is	basically	a	‘metaphysical	extension’	derived	from	the	belief	that	things	once	emerged	at	the	site	of	the	origin:		We	tend	to	think	that	this	is	the	moment	of	their	greatest	perfection,	when	they	emerged	dazzling	from	the	hands	of	a	creator	or	in	the	shadowless	night	of	a	first	mourning…	 From	 the	 vantage	 point	 of	 an	 absolute	 distance,	 free	 from	 the	constrains	of	positive	knowledge,	the	origin	makes	possible	a	field	of	knowledge	whose	function	is	to	recover	it,	but	always	in	a	false	recognition	due	the	excesses	of	its	own	speech.	The	origin	lies	at	a	place	of	inevitable	loss,	the	point	where	the	truth	 of	 things	 corresponded	 to	 a	 truthful	 discourse,	 the	 site	 of	 a	 fleeting	articulation	that	discourse	has	obscured	and	finally	lost.	(Foucault	1971:	79).		There	 is	no	supreme	origin,	 then,	at	 the	beginning	of	which	a	primordial	truth	 emerges	 ‘fully	 adequate	 to	 its	 nature’.	 What	 is	 found	 at	 the	 historical	beginning	 is	 not	 the	 true	 or	 inviolable	 identity	 of	 things.	 On	 the	 contrary,	beneath	 the	utopias	 that	 assign	 identity,	 form,	 and	unity	 to	 things	one	always	finds	 the	 disparity	 of	 things,	 the	 heterotopias.	 Once	 detached	 from	 the	metaphysics	of	 the	origin	and	the	belief	 in	that	which	has	no	history,	Foucault	explains	in	allusion	to	Nietzsche,	must	also	dispense	with	concept	and	definition.	As	 Nietzsche	 says	 in	 The	 Genealogy	 of	 Morals:	 “it	 is	 only	 that	 which	 has	 no	history,	which	can	be	defined.”	(2003:	53).	Insofar	as	the	genealogist	dwells	on	the	 concept	 of	 war,	 he	 stands	 detached	 from	 it,	 bracketing	 its	 familiarity,	 in	order	 to	analyse	 the	 theoretical	and	practical	content	with	which	 it	 is	and	has	been	 associated.	 The	 genealogist	 therefore	 finds	 that	 any	 affinity	 or	 fixed	
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identity	 between	 the	 twin-notions	 of	 ‘war’	 and	 ‘violence’,	 their	 possible	intersection	and	 joining	 in	 the	 intentional	 act	of	 the	 strategic	mind,	 cannot	be	taken	for	granted,	but	have	to	be	subjected	to	further	investigation	and	perhaps,	ultimately,	 abandoned.	 The	 analysis	 cannot	 take	 as	 point	 of	 departure	 the	assumption	that	war	is	a	phenomenon,	which	comes	into	being	in	the	joining	of	action	 with	 violence	 by	 the	 subtle	 calculations	 of	 the	 strategist.	 Further,	 we	cannot	assume	that	war	has	always	been	inseparable	from	what	we,	in	terms	of	certain	 moral	 codes,	 have	 come	 to	 think	 of	 as	 violence.	 For	 we	 would	 then	presuppose	that	war	has	always	been	understood	in	terms	of	a	set	of	universal	norms	that	could	be	observed	from	the	outside,	as	if	an	entire	moral	economy	to	all	 times	 had	 covered	 the	 surface	 of	 war.	 War	 is	 violence,	 you	 say.	 The	genealogist	 would	 rather	 say	 that	 violence	 is	 perhaps	 the	 most	 carefully	protected	 identity	 of	 war.	 In	 short,	 the	 genealogical	 inquiry	 cannot	 be	 based	upon	 the	 assumption	 that	 war	 has	 always	 been	 a	 phenomenon,	 which,	ultimately	and	inviolably,	is	related	to	violence	and	suffering.	So,	rather	than	investing	in	the	strange	belief	of	a	timeless	truth	about	war,	the	 genealogist	 seeks	 to	 interrogate	 this	 point	 of	 intersection,	 perpetuated	 by	the	 late	modern	discourse	 on	war,	 in	which	war	 always	 seems	 to	 be	 referred	back	to	the	notional	set	that	places	it	on	an	axis	of	violence,	as	if	neither	war	nor	violence	had	a	history	of	their	own	of	conceptual	problematisations	if	not	raids,	invasions,	and	subjugations.	Indeed,	one	should	rather	ask	questions	about	who	came	 up	 with	 this	 idea	 of	 an	 in-disparity	 between	 war	 and	 violence,	 and	 of	disclosing	the	intimate	secrets	of	war	as	‘intent’	and	the	moral	corollary	‘guilt’.	We	 must	 ask	 whether	 in	 fact	 questions	 of	 intent	 and	 guilt	 have	 always	permeated	the	understanding	of	war.	We	must,	in	short,	inquire	into	the	limits	of	our	certainty	of	the	truth	articulated	by	this	discourse	that	claims	war	to	be	given	 to	 experience	 as	 violence.	 Examining	 the	 empirical	 aspirations	 of	 the	discourse	that	claims	the	unity	of	war	and	violence,	genealogy	learns	that	it	was	born	 in	an	altogether	 ‘empirical’	 fashion	–	 from	metaphysics.	What	 is	 found	at	the	historical	beginning	of	war,	 the	discourse	says,	 is	 the	 inviolable	 identity	of	violence,	and	since	war	is	violence,	war	is	always	in	the	need	to	be	subjected	to	the	pacifying	forces	of	the	state.	Have	we	then,	the	genealogist	must	ask,	in	fact	not	regressed	back	 to	 the	point	 that	marks	 the	return	of	Hobbes’	 sovereign	 in	
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whom	peace	once	emerged	dazzling	from	the	hands	of	the	creator,	but	in	whom	peace	 remains	 lost	 within	 the	 perpetual	 state	 of	 violence	 that	 must	 be	suspended,	but	can	never	really	be	so	because	it	is	the	very	principle	that	makes	peace	 possible	 and	 sustains	 it	 in	 the	 virtuality	 of	 war?	 Have	 we	 in	 short	 not	arrived	 at	 the	 figure	 of	 truth	 that	 we,	 for	 the	 sake	 of	 convenience	 could	 call	Hobbes’	hypothesis	of	war,	the	figure	of	truth	that	posits	the	origin	of	war	at	the	site	of	a	primordial	state	of	violence	as	the	permanent	backdrop	of	politics;	the	state	of	violence	that	exists	before	the	state	 is	 instituted,	remains	contained	in	its	virtuality	in	the	figure	of	the	sovereign	when	the	state	is	born,	and	reappears	beyond	the	state	at	the	brink	of	its	dissolution.5	Now,	 while	 Hobbes	was	 clearly	 aware	 that	 the	 state	 of	 nature	 could	 be	understood	as	a	principle	 internal	 to	 the	 state,	 rather	 than	as	a	 real	historical	epoch,	 the	 late	modern	 discourse	 on	war,	 claiming	 the	 unanimity	 of	war	 and	violence,	 seems	 subject	 to	 the	 kind	 of	 error	 that	 happens	 in	 the	 intertextual	overlay	 of	 new	 problematisations	 in	 which	 what,	 in	 Hobbes,	 is	 basically	 a	thought-experiment,	 by	 simple	 mistake	 of	 calculation	 that	 was	 lost	 to	 the	exteriority	 of	 accidents,	 now	 acquires	 the	 form	 of	 truth.	 Hence	 the	 problem	posed	 to	 the	 present	 inquiry:	 if	 the	 ‘sorting	 table’	 or	 tableau,	 to	 put	 it	 in	Foucaultdian	terms,	remains	the	figure	of	the	state	of	nature	and	the	principle	of	sovereignty,	 then	 the	 analysis	 of	 war	 will	 remain	 trapped	 within	 a	 sort	 of	theoretical	naturalisation	of	Hobbes’	schema	of	war	and	politics	being	unable	to	perceive	of	war	outside	of	this	figure	of	truth,	which	once	had	its	beginning	as	a	politico-philosophical	fiction.	Indeed,	one	must	not	give	in	to	the	temptation	of	pursuing	war	 in	 terms	of	 the	 late	modern	 signifiers	 of	war	 in	 their	 seemingly	endless	proliferations	such	as	‘new’,	‘asymmetrical’,	‘network,	‘network-centric’	‘cyber’,	and	without	doubt	several	other.	So	 long	as	 the	 tableau,	pace	Foucault	remains	 Hobbes’	 state	 of	 nature,	 then	 the	 effort	 to	 establish	 new	 analytical	coordinates	 for	 the	 analysis	 of	 war	 will	 never	 catch	 up	 with	 war,	 but	 rather	remain	in	perpetual	pursuit	of	war	since	war	inevitably	exceeds	the	attempt	of	speciation	 by	 virtue	 of	 not	 corresponding	 to	 the	 analytical	 pretention	 that	merely	traverses	the	circularity	of	its	own	intrinsic	logic.	
																																																								5	See	Agamben’s	analysis	of	the	state	of	nature	and	the	principle	of	sovereignty	(1998:	35-38).	
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Now,	since	we	should	seek	to	avoid	the	kind	of	assertions	that	cling	to	the	conviction	that	the	state	of	violence	is	the	human	condition,	we	should	perhaps	instead	 postulate	 that	 this	 notion	 and	 reality	 of	 war	 has	 emerged	 through	 a	series	 of	 intertextual	 overlays,	 displacements,	 reversals,	 errors	 or	 simple	mistakes	 of	 calculation,	 and	 their	 successions	 in	 which	 the	 idea	 of	 trial	 by	strength	 only	 in	 recent	 human	 history	 has	 acquired	 the	 singular	 identity	 of	violence	 as	 the	 corollary	 to	 an	 obscene	 practice	 of	 annihilation.	 If,	 on	 the	contrary,	we	were	to	maintain	that	war	could	be	defined	in	terms	of	a	particular	form	of	violence,	 instrumental	or	 intentional,	public	or	private,	by	 locating	the	thresholds	where	politics,	supposedly,	begins	and	ends,	 it	would	amount	to	an	entirely	tautological	claim.	One	would	assume	of	war	to	exist	as	the	extension	of	a	politics	or	strategy	already	in	existence.	Or	better	yet,	 if	we	pursue	the	same	argument	from	the	opposite	side,	one	would	assume	of	politics,	that	is	if	we	still	wish	 to	maintain	 a	 separation	 between	 politics	 and	 violence,	 that	 it	 can	 only	come	into	being	by	way	of	the	suspension	of	this	war,	which	was	not	there	in	the	first	place	precisely	by	virtue	of	politics	having	not	yet	come	into	being.	In	short,	if	 we	 were	 to	 maintain	 that	 war	 is	 violence,	 we	 would	 once	 again	 need	 to	sacrifice	war	on	the	altar	of	positive	truth	reaffirming	our	 faith	 in	the	peculiar	idea	of	a	politics	that	cannot	come	into	being	without	making	recourse	to	a	state	of	violence	it	supposedly	suspends.	Clearly,	the	genealogical	analysis	cannot	rely	on	such	speculative	discourse,	nor	can	it	afford	such	venture	into	fiction.	This	is	not	to	say	that	to	tell	the	truth	about	war	and	violence	we	should	abandon	the	hypothesis	of	a	 relationship	among	 them.	 It	 is	 to	 say	 that,	perhaps,	we	should	begin	 to	 consider	 violence	 as	 one	 among	many	 possible	 relationships	 of	war,	and	maybe	not	the	most	important.	Leaving	the	terrain	of	the	Hobbessian	hypothesis	of	war,	one	is,	however,	still	 left	with	the	problem	of	how	to	analyse	the	relationship	between	war	and	man.	 The	 epistemological	 obstacle6	we	 encounter	 here	 in	 terms	 of	 analysis	 is	what	 modern	 juridico-philosophical	 thought	 saw	 as	 a	 solution	 to	 order;	 the	subject.	 It	 is	 Hobbes’	 rational	 egoist	 and	 Descartes’	 cogito,	 but	 it	 is	 also	Rousseau’s	sociable	subject	who,	upon	retreating	into	the	self,	believed	to	have	
																																																								6	I	borrow	the	term	epistemological	obstacle	from	Gaston	Bachelard	(1949).	
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abandoned	 the	 confines	 of	 reason	 in	 favour	 of	 the	 immediacy	 of	 the	 senses.7	This	is	to	say	that	the	problem	we	encounter	here	does	not	so	much	concern	the	question	of	the	modality	of	this	subject,	as	it	appears	in	the	disputes	on	reason.	It	 is	 rather	 a	matter	 of	 the	 subject	per	 se	 we	 learn	 of	 in	 the	 critique	 of	 these	disputes:	“there	can	be	really	no	polemic	of	pure	reason”,	Kant	said	(2010:	502).	Although	we	cannot	know	the	nature	of	it,	the	subject	is	given	to	experience	and	so	 exists	 beyond	 dispute,	 Kant	 explained	 in	 the	 critique	 that	 rose	 above	 all	disputes,	and	thus,	by	intent	or	out	of	accident,	came	to	reaffirm	its	faithfulness	to	 the	 law	 that	 grants	 the	 subject	 transcendence	 and	 assures	 the	 subject	 the	privileged	 place	 in	 the	 idea	 of	 order	 as	 political	 sovereignty.	 In	 Kant,	 the	transcendental	 subject,	 unchanging,	 eternal	 and	 yet	 indeterminate,	 would	redraw	the	boundaries	of	the	political	imagination	from	which	it	once	emerged.	The	sovereign	subject	would	be	reborn	in	the	performativity	of	the	critique,	in	quite	 a	 like	manner	 to	what	Hobbes	did	with	 sovereignty,	 that	 is	 to	bring	out	reason	from	the	state	of	nature	in	the	sanitation	of	man’s	relationship	with	war:		Without	the	control	of	criticism,	reason	is,	as	it	were,	in	a	state	of	nature,	and	can	only	 establish	 its	 claims	 and	 assertions	 by	 war.	 Criticism,	 on	 the	 contrary,	deciding	all	questions	according	 to	 the	 fundamental	 laws	of	 its	own	 institution,	secures	to	us	the	peace	of	law	and	order,	and	enables	us	to	discuss	all	differences	in	the	more	tranquil	manner	of	a	 legal	process.	 In	the	 former	case,	disputes	are	ended	by	victory,	which	both	sides	may	claim	and	which	is	followed	by	a	hollow	armistice;	 in	 the	 latter,	 by	 a	 sentence,	 which,	 as	 it	 strikes	 at	 the	 root	 of	 all	speculative	 differences,	 ensures	 to	 all	 concerned	 a	 lasting	 peace.	 The	 endless	disputes	of	a	dogmatizing	reason	compel	us	to	look	for	some	mode	of	arriving	at	a	 settled	 decision	 by	 a	 critical	 investigation	 of	 reason	 itself;	 just	 as	 Hobbes	maintains	that	the	state	of	nature	is	a	state	of	injustice	and	violence,	and	that	we	must	 leave	it	and	submit	ourselves	to	the	constraint	of	 law,	which	indeed	limits	individual	 freedom,	but	only	that	 it	may	consist	with	the	 freedom	of	others	and	with	the	common	good	of	all.	(Ibid.	502-503).		In	Kant,	reason	would	shine	in	its	raw	being	having	emerged	out	of	the	state	of	nature.	No	longer	plagued	by	the	aletheic	 illusions	of	war	that	 intruded	on	the																																																									7	As	Rousseau	says	in	L’état	de	guerre:	“If	the	natural	law	had	been	written	only	in	the	human	reason,	it	would	be	little	capable	of	directing	most	of	our	actions.	But	it	is	also	engraved	in	the	heart	of	man	in	inefficable	characters…	There	it	cries	to	him.”	(Rousseau	cited	in	Derrida	1997:	17).	
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rational	 faculty	 exposing	 the	 irreconcilability	 of	 ideas	 and	 the	 sensible	world,	the	 subject	would	 denounce	 the	 state	 of	war	 and	 pledge	 his	 allegiance	 to	 the	constraint	 of	 the	 universal	 law,	 giving	 up	 strife	 and	 the	war	 over	 reason.	 The	chimeras	 of	 reason	 had	 been	 exorcised,	 but	 only	 to	 leave	 the	 subject	 in	 the	naked	form	of	sovereignty’s	reference	to	life.	Now,	the	genealogist	cannot	rely	on	this	transcendental	subject	nor	will	he	make	flight	from	the	battle	over	reason	to	reinvent	a	peace	emergent	from	the	state	of	nature	that	answers	only	to	the	laws	of	metaphysics.	The	subject	lives	of	this	state	of	nature,	it	seems,	since	sovereignty,	conversely,	always	seems	to	be	in	the	need	of	this	belligerent	subject	in	order	to	put	an	end	to	injustice,	violence,	and	war.	The	genealogist	suspects	therefore	that	this	subject,	once	illuminated	by	 the	 arkhē	 of	 cosmos	 and	 since	 discovered	 in	 the	 eternal	 bliss	 of	 God	 and,	ultimately,	 given	 transcendence,	 might	 be	 involved	 in	 the	 problem	 of	 war.	Perhaps	 we	 should	 postulate,	 then,	 that	 the	 safe	 ground	 occupied	 by	 the	transcendental	 subject	 might	 be	 menaced	 by	 the	 ontology	 of	 operativity	 and	command	in	which	an	“I”	posits	itself	at	the	site	of	the	unchanging	origin	of	the	state	of	war.	 Since	we	 cannot	 rule	out	 this	possibility,	we	must	dispense	with	this	“I”	and	the	mode	of	being	that	animates	it,	the	subject:		One	has	 to	dispense	with	 the	constituent	subject,	 to	get	rid	of	 the	subject	 itself,	that’s	to	say	to	arrive	at	an	analysis	which	can	account	for	the	constitution	of	the	subject	within	 a	 historical	 framework.	 And	 this	 is	what	 I	would	 call	 genealogy,	that	 is,	 a	 form	of	history	which	can	account	 for	 the	 constitution	of	knowledges,	discourses,	 and	 domains	 of	 objects	 etc.,	without	 having	 to	make	 reference	 to	 a	subject	which	is	either	transcendental	in	relation	to	the	field	of	events	or	runs	in	its	empty	sameness	throughout	the	course	of	history.	(Foucault	1980:	117).		 Placing	 the	 safe	 ground	 of	 the	 subject	 in	 question,	 we	 shall	 refer	 the	category	of	the	subject	to	that	of	an	‘empty’	ontology	leaving	both	the	signifier	and	the	signified	in	suspension.8	A	minor	digression	into	semiotics	is	in	place	at	this	point.	Following	Saussure,	a	thing	is	rendered	intelligible	in	terms	of	a	sign,																																																									8	In	fact,	we	will	dismiss	the	traditional	question	of	ontology.	As	Heidegger	explains	in	the	
Introduction	to	Metaphysics,	the	question	of	ontology	has	a	history	of	its	own,	one	that	begins	in	the	seventeenth	century,	constituting	itself	on	the	belief	of	ordering	the	world	of	things.	(2000:	43-44).	
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a	sign	that	in	Saussure	is	divided	into	the	signifier,	which	is	the	utterance	of	the	word	that	denotes	the	thing	(its	 ‘sound-image’),	and	the	signified,	which	is	the	actual	content	of	the	thing.	According	to	Saussure,	the	relationship	between	the	signifier	 and	 the	 signified	 is	 arbitrary	 or,	 as	 Saussure	 says,	 the	 relationship	 is	unmotivated.	While	the	letters	 ‘w-o-m-a-n’	together	forms	the	assemblage	that	spells	 woman,	 they	 do	 not	 embody	 'womanness'.	 Accordingly,	 the	 French	‘mouton’	 is	 not	 similar	 to	 the	 English	 ‘sheep’	 since	 ‘mouton’	 means	 both	'mutton'	 and	 ‘a	 living	 sheep'.	The	 signifier	 in	other	words	does	not	 reflect	 the	signified	then.	On	the	contrary,	pace	Saussure,	the	relationship	is	arbitrary.	Now,	the	distinction	Foucault	introduces	to	the	theory	of	the	sign	and	signification	in	Saussure	is	basically	that	not	only	is	the	relationship	between	the	signifier	and	the	signified	arbitrary,	the	signifier	and	the	signified	are	themselves	arbitrary:		The	fact	that	two	enunciations	are	exactly	identical,	that	they	are	made	up	of	the	same	words	used	with	the	same	meaning,	does	not,	as	we	know,	mean	that	they	are	 absolutely	 identical.	 Even	 when	 one	 finds,	 in	 the	 work	 of	 Diderot	 and	Lamarck,	 or	 of	 Benoît	 de	 Maillet	 and	 Darwin,	 the	 same	 formulation	 of	 the	principle	of	evolution,	one	cannot	consider	that	one	is	dealing	in	each	case	with	the	 same	 discoursive	 event,	 which	 has	 been	 subjected	 at	 different	 times	 to	 a	series	of	repetitions.	(Foucault	2008b:	159).		In	 effect,	 pace	 Foucault,	 in	 the	 analysis	 of	 discoursive	 events	 both	 the	signifier	and	the	signified	must	be	 left	 in	suspension.	Leaving	the	signifier	and	the	 signified	 in	 suspension,	 the	 analysis	 must	 instead	 be	 made	 in	 terms	 of	statements	that,	at	the	site	of	a	contingent	historical	trajectory,	may	account	for	how	 the	 particular	 identities	 of	man	 and	war	 have	 come	 into	 being.	 Studying	war	and	the	subject	in	terms	of	their	historical	conditions	of	possibility	in	other	words	allows	us	to	escape	the	possible	entrapments	of	the	ruling	principle	and	the	 logic	of	operativity	and	command	that	appears	 inextricably	bound	up	with	the	 subject.	 Turning	 Kant’s	 subject	 on	 its	 head,	 the	 genealogical	 inquiry	resituates	the	analysis	on	the	battleground	of	historical	contingency.	Against	the	truth	 of	 the	 transcendental	 subject,	 once	withdrawn	 to	 an	 unattainable	world	where	 it	was	 ‘given	 the	double	 role	 of	 consolation	 and	 imperative’,	 genealogy	
	 45	
seeks	 the	 historical	 remedy	 of	 exposing	 transcendental	 truth	 to	war,	 showing	how	 such	 truth	 appropriates	 the	 right	 ‘to	 refute	 error	 and	 oppose	 itself	 to	appearance’	 (Foucault	 1971:	 77-79).	 In	 tracing	 a	 certain	 field	 of	 knowledge	concerning	war	to	the	ancients,	the	ambition	of	the	present	analysis	then	is	not	to	discover	the	true	subject	or	the	true	form	of	war.	I	do	not	mean	to	return	man	or	 war	 to	 the	 ‘domain	 of	 the	 original’.	 The	 objective	 is	 much	 less	 ambitious	however	 far	more	 difficult	 to	 achieve.	 Specifically,	 it	 is	 to	 extract,	 neither	 one	true	 form	of	war	nor	an	essence	of	being,	but	 rather	 to	map	 the	battlefield	 in	which	multiple	weapons,	one	pitted	against	the	other,	and	forged	from	several	discourses	and	practices	of	war,	slowly	constituted	an	order	of	war.	It	is	to	trace	‘the	 complex	 course	 of	 descent’,	 pace	 Foucault,	 maintaining	 ‘local	 battles’	 in	their	proper	historical	dispersion,	which	is	how,	while	taking	these	precautions	into	account,	we	must	now	give	a	more	positive	content	the	philosophical	ethos	of	problematisation.		As	 I	 will	 explain	 in	 the	 following,	 this	 involves,	 on	 the	 one	 hand,	archaeology,	and	on	the	other,	genealogy.	First,	it	is	important	to	note	that	while	the	archaeological	method	is	sometimes	considered	as	a	different	methodology	distinct	from	genealogy,	this	is	not	the	way	in	which	Foucault	thought	about	it.	It	is	true,	however,	that,	in	the	earlier	work	of	Foucault	in	The	Order	of	Things	and	
The	Archaeology	of	Knowledge,	 the	 archaeological	 analysis	 tended	 to	 focus	 on	rupture	 and	 epistemic	 shifts	while,	 in	 his	 later	work,	 Foucault	 seems	 to	 have	orientated	the	analysis	towards	a	reading	that	to	a	higher	degree	acknowledges	discoursive	formations	in	terms	of	intertextual	overlays	in	which	discoursivities	invoke	 one	 another	 and	not	 so	much	 in	 terms	 of	 epistemic	 ruptures.	 Another	important	distinction	 is	 that,	 in	his	 earlier	work,	problematisation	 in	Foucault	seems	 to	 concern	 epistemic	 shifts	 discretely,	 which	 are	 not	 so	much,	 at	 least	explicitly,	guided	by	concerns	of	the	present.	Not	before	his	inaugural	lecture	at	the	Collège	de	France	 in	1970,	published	in	French	as	L’ordre	du	discours	 [The	Order	 of	Discourse],	 do	we	 find	 an	 explicit	 orientation	 toward	 the	present.	 In	this	 lecture,	Foucault,	 in	extension	of	archaeology,	announces	a	new	analytical	project,	one	which	is	oriented	towards	the	writing	of	the	history	of	the	present,	a	project	he	designates	‘genealogy’.	
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Six	years	later,	Foucault,	in	his	lecture	series	at	Collège	de	France,	Society	
Must	be	Defended,	has	arrived	at	the	following	general	definition:	“Archaeology	is	 the	method	specific	 to	 the	analysis	of	 local	discoursivities,	 and	genealogy	 is	the	 tactic	 which,	 once	 it	 has	 described	 these	 local	 discoursivities,	 brings	 into	play	 the	 desubjugated	 knowledges	 that	 have	 been	 released	 from	 them.”	(Foucault	 2004:	 10).	 As	 it	 appears	 in	 the	 passage,	 Foucault	 did	 not	 consider	archaeology	and	genealogy	 to	be	alien,	but,	 on	 the	 contrary,	 to	 constitute	 two	congenial	modes	of	analysis	that	operationalise	problematisation.	In	Foucault’s	lecture	on	Kant’s	What	is	Enlightenment	the	relationship	between	genealogy	and	archaeology	is	further	delineated	here	in	the	context	of	problematisation:		[This	form	of]	criticism	is	not	transcendental,	and	its	goal	is	not	that	of	making	a	metaphysics	 possible:	 it	 is	 genealogical	 in	 its	 design	 and	 archaeological	 in	 its	method.	 Archaeological	 –	 and	not	 transcendental	 –	 in	 the	 sense	 that	 it	will	 not	seek	to	identify	the	universal	structures	of	all	knowledge	or	of	all	possible	moral	action,	 but	will	 seek	 to	 treat	 the	 instances	 of	 discourse	 that	 articulate	what	we	think,	 say,	 and	 do	 as	 so	 many	 historical	 events.	 And	 this	 critique	 will	 be	genealogical	 in	 the	 sense	 that	 it	will	 not	 deduce	 from	 the	 form	of	what	we	 are	what	it	is	impossible	for	us	to	do	and	to	know;	but	it	will	separate	out,	from	the	contingency	 that	 has	made	 us	 what	 we	 are,	 the	 possibility	 of	 no	 longer	 being,	doing,	or	thinking	what	we	are,	do,	or	think.	It	is	not	seeking	to	make	possible	a	metaphysics	that	has	finally	become	a	science;	it	is	seeking	to	give	new	impetus,	as	 far	and	wide	as	possible,	 to	 the	undefined	work	of	 freedom.	 (Foucault	1984:	42).		The	 relationship	 between	 archaeology,	 genealogy,	 and	 problematisation	could	 then	 be	 described	 as	 following.	 Proceeding	 from	 a	 problematisation	oriented	 toward	 present	 concerns,	 one	 begins	 by	 asking,	 genealogically,	 how	this	present	has	become	logically	possible.	Situated	in	the	present,	the	analytic	intention	of	the	analysis	is	posed	as	a	‘strategic’	and	diachronical	question	then.	To	 enable	 the	 analysis	 of	 the	 diachronical	 coming	 to	 presence	 of	 the	 present,	one	begins,	employing	the	method	of	archaeology,	by	analysing	synchronically	the	field	of	‘local	discoursivities’	in	which	one,	guided	by	the	strategic	analytical	interest	 of	 genealogy,	 seeks	 to	 uncover	 the	 unthought	 connections,	 patterns,	
	 47	
encryptions,	and	relations	that	make	up	the	fabric	of	what	Foucault	refers	to	as	‘subjugated	knowledges’.	In	turn,	subjugated	knowledges	are	brought	into	play	genealogically	as	desubjugated	knowledges	in	writing	the	history	of	the	present.	Now,	subjugated	knowledges	are	not	to	be	confused	with	 ‘suppressed’	or	‘repressed’	 opinion	 as	 such.	 It	 can	 well	 be	 that	 the	 excavated	 subjugated	knowledge	expresses	a	certain	marginalised	discourse,	but	nor	is	marginalised	discourse	 to	 be	 conflated	 with	 oppression	 or	 repression.	 These	 forms	 of	knowledge	 can	 just	 as	 well	 represent	 forgotten	 ideas,	 thoughts,	 opinions,	theories	 or	 practices	 that	 for	 one	 reason	 or	 another	 no	 longer	 appears	 in	 the	field	of	established	knowledge.	As	Foucault	explains	in	Society	Must	be	Defended:	“When	 I	 say	 “subjugated	 knowledges,”…	 I	 am	 referring	 to	 historical	 contents	that	 have	 been	 buried	 or	 masked	 in	 functional	 coherences	 of	 formal	systematizations…	 Subjugated	 knowledges	 are,	 then,	 blocks	 of	 historical	knowledges	 that	 were	 present	 in	 the	 functional	 and	 systemic	 ensembles,	 but	which	were	masked…”	(Foucault	2004:	7).	That	being	said,	Foucault	stresses	the	importance	of	 the	 functioning	of	 power	 in	 the	 formation	of	 discourse	 and	 the	constitution	of	knowledge,	and	this	is	the	second	way	in	which	he	conceives	of	subjugated	 knowledge:	 “When	 I	 say	 “subjugated	 knowledges,”	 I	 am	 also	referring	 to	 a	 whole	 series	 of	 knowledges	 that	 have	 been	 disqualified	 as	nonconceptual	 knowledges,	 as	 insufficiently	 elaborated	 knowledges:	 naïve	knowledges,	hierarchically	inferior	knowledges,	knowledges	that	are	below	the	required	level	of	erudition	or	scientificity…”	(Ibid.).	Knowledge,	 pace	 Foucault,	 is	 in	 other	 words	 always	 inscribed	 in	 power	relations,	 but	 power,	 most	 importantly,	 is	 neither	 to	 be	 understood	 as	essentially	oppressive	or	repressive,	nor	is	it	to	be	seen	as	a	general	system	of	domination,	 such	 as	 the	 state	 and	 its	 institutions.	 On	 the	 contrary,	 power,	Foucault	explains	in	a	famous	passage	of	the	Will	to	Knowledge,	is	a	relationship.	In	fact,	power	is	but	a	relationship	of	forces:		By	power,	I	do	not	mean	‘Power’	as	a	group	of	institutions	and	mechanisms	that	ensure	the	subservience	and	the	citizens	of	a	given	state.	By	power,	I	do	not	mean,	either,	a	mode	of	subjugation	which,	in	contrast	to	violence,	has	the	form	of	rule.	Finally,	 I	 do	 not	 have	 in	mind	 a	 general	 system	 of	 domination	 exerted	 by	 one	
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group	 over	 another,	 a	 system	 whose	 effects,	 through	 successive	 derivations,	pervade	 the	entire	social	body.	The	analysis,	made	 in	 terms	of	power,	must	not	assume	 the	 sovereignty	 of	 the	 state,	 the	 form	 of	 law,	 or	 the	 over-all	 unity	 of	 a	domination	 are	 a	 given	 in	 the	outset;	 rather,	 these	 are	 only	 the	 terminal	 forms	power	takes.	It	seems	to	me	that	power	must	be	understood	in	the	first	instance	as	 the	 multiplicity	 of	 force	 relations	 immanent	 in	 the	 sphere	 in	 which	 they	operate	 and	 which	 constitute	 their	 own	 organization:	 as	 the	 process	 which,	through	 ceaseless	 struggles	 and	 confrontations,	 transforms,	 strengthens,	 or	reverses	them…	(Foucault	1998:	92).		The	point	of	view	that	allows	one	to	analyse	power	then	is	not	to	be	sought	out	in	the	originary	existence	of	a	central	point	or	in	a	‘unique	source	of	sovereignty’,	but	rather,	says	Foucault,	in	“…	the	moving	substrate	of	force	relations	which,	by	virtue	of	their	inequality,	constantly	engender	states	of	power,	but	the	later	are	always	 local	 and	 unstable.”	 (Ibid.	 93).	 Local	 discoursivities	 always	 appear	immanent	 the	multiplicity	of	 force	relations,	which,	accordingly,	are	never	set,	but	 rather	 a	 constantly	moving	 tangle	 of	 patterns,	 of	 intertextual	 overlays,	 of	confrontations	and	struggles,	of	overlapping	terms,	of	new	interpretations,	and	the	 correlational	 ways	 in	 which	 these	 do	 not	 simply	 define	 a	 semantic	 field	formation,	but	also,	as	the	expression	of	a	certain	form	of	truth,	offer	a	resource	that	is	put	to	political	use.	This	is	how,	among	other	things,	local	discoursivities	are	 also	 a	 field	 of	 power,	 that	 is,	 a	 multiplicity	 of	 force	 relations	 that	 can	 be	invested	 strategically.	 Truth	 in	 other	words	 is	 part	 of	 a	 strategic	 game	where	discourse	 not	 only	 produces	 truth,	 but	 also,	 in	 effect	 of	 being	 inscribed	 in	 a	relationship	of	force,	displaces	and	refigures	other	forms	of	truth	as	subjugated	knowledge.	 Truth	 in	 Foucault	 then	 is	 aletheic	 truth	 in	 the	 sense	 of	 truth	 as	emergent	 in	 the	 relationship	 of	 struggle,	 opposition,	 and	 tension	 between	knowledge	and	subjugated	knowledge.	As	a	study	of	subjugated	knowledge,	understood	as	fragmented,	broken-up,	and	dispersed	knowledges	that	in	view	contemporary	systems	of	thought	have	lost	the	internal	connections	and	relations,	archaeology	necessarily	involves	an	inventive	and	experimental	process	of	recreating	lost	patterns	among	seemingly	unrelated	discoursivities.	 Since	 subjugated	knowledge	 is	defined	by	having	no	immediately	 intelligible	 form,	when	establishing	 the	 relationship	or	pattern	of	
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regularity	 among	 local	 discoursivities	 the	 archaeologist	 must	 therefore	 carry	out	an	experiment.	Among	other	things,	this	is	what	Foucault	has	in	mind	when	he	 speaks	 of	 the	 critical	 ontology	 of	 ourselves	 in	 terms	 of	 ‘an	 experiment’.	Schematising	a	great	deal,	one	could	say	that	the	archaeologist	‘fictions’	a	reality	not	 yet	 in	 existence,	 a	 certain	 regularity	which	 is	 not	 immediately	 intelligible,	and	then	articulates	this	fiction	in	the	form	of	a	hypothesis,	which	is	then	put	to	the	 test	 in	 the	 form	of	 exposing	 it	 to	history.	But	 on	 the	basis	 of	what	unit	 of	analysis	 does	 archaeology	 proceed	 then	 in	 order	 to	 dig	 out	 subjugated	knowledge?	First,	 it	 is	 important	 to	 note	 that,	 while	 archaeology	 is	 a	 method	 of	analysing	discourse,	 it	does	not	proceed	from	the	tenets	of	so-called	discourse	analysis	that	studies	sentences	and	propositions	on	the	basis	of	their	face	value	to	 infer	 from	 them	 the	hidden	meaning	of	why	certain	actors	might	do	or	 say	what	they	do.	Nor	is	it	to	be	confused	with	the	form	of	analysis	that	interprets	the	text	by	ascribing	to	it	a	certain	logic	from	the	outside	in	the	form	of	a	canon	or	in	the	form	of	the	tradition	in	which	the	author	supposedly	writes	and	on	the	basis	 of	which	 the	 text	must	 be	 read.	 Indeed,	 archaeology	 is	 not	 the	 study	 of	sentences	or	propositions,	subjects	or	objects,	nor	does	it	make	use	of	external	corrections.	On	the	contrary,	from	the	point	of	view	of	archaeology,	the	analysis	must	avoid	performing	external	interpretive	gestures,	which	are	there	to	fill	the	void	 that	 appears	 when	 present	 ordering	 codes	 no	 longer	 suffice	 in	 making	sense	of	the	text.	As	Foucault	explains,	they	are	“…	synthesizing	operations	of	a	purely	psychological	kind	(the	intention	of	the	author,	the	form	of	his	mind,	the	rigour	of	his	thought,	the	themes	that	obsess	him,	the	project	that	traverses	his	existence	 and	 gives	 it	 meaning)…”	 (Foucault	 2008b:	 32-33).	 To	 uncover	subjugated	 knowledge,	 archaeology	 concerns	 itself	with	 something	 altogether	different,	 that	 is,	statements,	which,	unlike	words,	propositions,	and	sentences,	do	not	become	intelligible	before	the	entire	discoursive	field	is	set	free	from	all	syntheses	of	the	above	mentioned	kind	that	are	accepted	without	question.	Following	Foucault,	we	could	describe	statements	as	 functional	 linguistic	containers	operating	at	the	level	of	discourse.	Statements,	therefore,	are	not	to	be	confused	with	words	or	propositions,	nor	are	they	to	be	understood	as	fixed	entities	or	identities.	By	virtue	of	being	immanently	inscribed	in	a	field	of	power,	
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statements	are	never	set.	This	is	how	one	should	rather	think	of	statements,	not	in	 terms	 of	 identity	 or	 essence,	 but	 in	 terms	 of	 performativity.	 In	 short,	statements	 function.	 The	 functioning	 or	 performativity	 of	 statements	 is	 that	which	gives	form	to	words	and	propositions	making	their	meaningful	utterance	possible.	 This	 is	 because	 statements,	 in	 contrast	 to	 words,	 propositions,	 and	phrases,	contain	their	own	function	of	subject,	object,	and	concept.	In	the	study	of	statements,	then,	language	is	untied	from	subjects	and	objects	and	treated	as	autonomous	 in	 its	 own	 functioning	 as	 discourse.	 This	 is	why,	when	 analysing	statements,	not	only	 the	point	of	view	of	 the	signified	must	be	suspended,	but	also	that	of	the	signifier	(Ibid.	111).	That	is	to	say,	the	study	of	statements	is	in	a	sense	 the	 study	 of	 autonomous	 functional	 variables	 insofar	 as	 they,	 in	 the	functioning	of	discourse,	produce	their	subject,	object,	and	concept.	This	also	to	say,	 most	 importantly,	 that	 statements	 have	 a	 veridical	 function	 or,	 put	differently,	 statements	produce	 truth	precisely	by	 establishing,	 re-establishing	or	 destroying	 certain	 relations	 between	 and	 among	 subjects,	 objects,	 and	concepts	by	which	they	become	intelligible	in	a	certain	way.	In	turn,	this	is	how	discourse	must	be	studied	 in	 terms	of	 fabrications	of	 truth	emergent	 from	the	active	 deployment	 of	 statements.	 In	 the	 study	 of	 statements,	 which	 together	with	other	statements	constitute	a	discourse,	being	and	truth	are	consequently	objects	of	 inquiry	rather	than	points	of	departure,	 the	analytical	vantage	point	being	 the	 constant	 formation	 or	 coming	 into	 being	 in	 the	 autonomous	functioning	of	discourse	of	both	the	speaker	and	the	objects	of	which	he	speaks.	Now,	 having	 embarked	 on	 the	 study	 of	 statements	 and	 thus	 dispensed	with	 the	body	of	preconceived	knowledge	and	any	 ‘psychological’	 interpretive	gesture,	one	obviously	begins	from	a	vast	field	of	knowledge,	a	field	constituted	in	 the	 totality	 of	 accepted	 and	 subjugated	 knowledges.	 This	 is	 defined,	 pace	Foucault,	 as	 “…	 the	 totality	 of	 all	 effective	 statements	 (whether	 spoken	 or	written),	 in	 their	dispersion	as	 events	 and	 in	 the	occurrence	 that	 is	proper	 to	them.”	(Ibid.	29).	Following	Foucault,	one	is	then	led	to	the	project	of	studying	discourse	 in	 terms	 of	 events	 or,	 as	 Foucault	 says,	 the	 ‘pure	 description	 of	
discursive	events’	that	seeks	‘to	steer	clear	of	all	interpretation’	(Ibid.	29).	This	is	to	 say;	 to	 the	 archaeologist	 one	 must	 rely	 on	 the	 discoursive	 event	 in	 itself	rather	than	trying	to	interpret	the	event	from	a	position	situated	outside	of	it.	In	
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archaeology,	then,	one	does	not,	as	in	hermeneutics,	employ	interpretation	as	a	heuristic	 tool	 by	which	 one	 can	 obtain	 the	 truth	 of	 statements.	 Interpretation	relies	on	the	notion	of	context,	which	introduces	elements	that	may	not	belong	to	 the	 discursive	 event.	 But	while	 statements	 cannot	 be	 brought	 to	 enunciate	their	meaning	by	aligning	 them	 to	 context	 through	 interpretation	nor	 is	 there	any	reason	to	attempt	at	doing	so.	The	discursive	event	contains	in	itself	the	full	meaning,	whereas	context	remains	outside	of	the	discursive	event	and	as	such	has	no	given	truth-value.		When	 trying	 to	 establish	 the	 meaning	 of	 discursive	 events,	 the	archaeological	method	involves	a	different	approach.	Drawing	on	the	notion	of	‘palimpsestuous	reading’,	as	articulated	by	Sarah	Dillon,	we	can	further	explain	the	archaeological	task	of	making	sense	of	statements	and,	in	turn,	connect	it	to	genealogy.	Schematising	a	great	deal,	we	can	say	that	Foucaultdian	reading	is	a	form	a	palimpsestuous	reading	in	the	sense	that	both	treat	the	discoursive	event	as	a	palimpsest,	that	is,	as	a	site	at	which	meaning	is	produced	in	the	recurrent	intertextual	articulation,	which	is	discourse.	A	palimpsest	 is	the	site	where	the	‘original’	text	is	simultaneously	erased	by	an	overlaid	inscription	and	preserved	as	 fragments	 of	 the	 original	 text	 are	 reinscribed	 intertextually.	 With	 perfect	lucidity	 Dillon	 explains	 how,	 when	 making	 sense	 of	 the	 palimpsest,	 a	palimpsestuous	 rather	 than	 palimpsestic	 reading	 is	 called	 for.	 Since	 the	palimpsest	 structure	 is	 not	 constituted	 as	 a	 simple	 compilation	 of	 texts,	 one	must	 “…	 seek	 to	 trace	 the	 incestuous	 and	 encrypted	 texts	 that	 constitute	 the	palimpsest’s	 fabric.	Since	 those	 texts	bear	no	necessary	relation	 to	each	other,	palimpsestuous	 reading	 is	 an	 inventive	 process	 of	 creating	 relations	 where	there	 may,	 or	 should,	 be	 none;	 hence	 the	 appropriateness	 of	 its	 epithet’s	phonetic	 similarity	 to	 the	 incestuous”	 (Dillon	 2007:	 83).	 By	 contrast,	 the	‘palimpsestic’	reading,	pace	Dillon,	treats	the	palimpsest	as	a	mere	compilation	of	 knowledge	 that	 can	 be	 deciphered	 or	 unravelled	 in	 order	 to	 discover	 its	hidden	meaning	in	the	kind	of	erroneous	quest	Foucault	calls	the	search	for	the	origin.	Most	importantly,	and	this	is	a	critically	important	distinction,	similar	to	Foucaultdian	problematisation	as	 the	pure	description	of	discoursive	events,	a	palimpsestuous	 reading	 necessarily	 involves	 an	 experiment	 in	 the	 sense	 of	creating	 relations	 where	 apparently	 there	 is	 none.	 Dillon	 accurately	 captures	
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this	 a	 process	 in	 which	 one	 “attempts	 to	 negotiate	 and	 do	 justice	 to	 the	interrelatedness	of	the	texts	on	the	palimpsest’s	surface.”	(Ibid).	Now	what	guides	this	process	of	negotiation	is	what	Foucault	refers	to	as	establishing	 the	 ‘logical	 space’,	 which	 can	 be	 understood	 as	 a	 sort	 of	 grid	 of	intelligibility	or	 system	of	 correlation	 for	 the	 formation	and	 transformation	of	discourse.	 This	 is	 done	 at	 the	 level	 of	 discourse,	 that	 is,	 at	 the	 palimpsest’s	surface	 rather	 than	 at	 the	 superimposed	 level	 of	 ‘context’.	 In	making	 sense	 of	statements,	 archaeology	 replaces	 the	 notion	 of	 context	with	 the	 notion	 of	 the	logical	space.	Contrary	to	the	analysis	that	relies	on	context	to	produce	meaning,	the	 logical	 space	 contains	 in	 itself	 the	 meaning	 of	 statements,	 which	 in	 the	notion	of	context	is	ascribed	from	outside	precisely	by	interpretation.	A	logical	space	is,	in	other	words,	the	logic	that	can	be	deciphered	from	discourse	at	the	level	of	 the	discourse.	At	 this	point,	we	can	now	close	 the	circle	and	return	 to	genealogy.	Genealogy	 is	 precisely	 the	 term	Foucault	 introduces	 to	 account	 for	how,	once	a	 logical	space	 is	established,	one	must	 then	relate	 it	diachronically	thus	 bringing	 into	 play	 the	 desubjugated	 knowledges	 of	 the	 past	 in	 order	 to	explain	 how	 a	 particular	 state	 of	 affairs	 has	 become	 logically	 possible	 in	 the	present	(Foucault	1980:	193).	In	terms	of	the	present	study,	we	could	say	that	archaeology	is	a	method	of	desubjugating	the	knowledge	of	war	and	the	subject	by	putting	them	back	into	the	semantic	field	of	formation	from	which	they	emerged,	whereas	genealogy	is	the	 tactic	 that	 then	 brings	 the	 subjugated	 knowledges	 together	 in	 order	 to	explain	 the	 emergence	 and	 succession	 of	 the	 ontology	 of	 operativity	 and	command.	 In	 tracing	 the	 succession	and	displacement	over	 time	of	 the	 logical	spaces	involved	in	this	genealogy,	the	genealogist	divides	history	into	‘episodes’	or	‘effective	history’	to	show	the	trajectory	of	specific	historical	formations	and	their	development.	This	is	what	I	meant	when,	in	the	beginning	of	this	chapter,	I	said	that	the	intention	is	not	to	convey	the	full	density	or	historical	thickness	of	the	epochs	 involved.	The	genealogist	 is	not	under	 the	 impression	that	such	an	analysis	is	indeed	possible,	and,	more	importantly,	it	is	not	the	aim	of	genealogy.	The	 genealogical	 analysis	 studies	war	 and	 the	 subject	 in	 terms	 of	 episodes	 in	order	 to	 reconstruct	 their	 ‘effective	history’	 of	 the	 specific	 truth,	 identity,	 and	reality,	which	have	come	 to	govern	our	understanding	 in	 the	present.	Now,	 to	
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substantiate	 these	 formations	 of	 truth,	 that	 is,	 to	 produce	 ‘evidence’	 of	 this	effective	history,	genealogy	proceeds	by	means	of	demonstration	and	example,	using	 examples	 that	 when	 grouped	 together	 in	 a	 series	 of	 logical	 spaces	constitute	episodes.	The	example	 is	 in	other	words	central	 to	 the	genealogical	argument,	 wherefore	 it	 is	 useful	 to	 further	 explain	 its	 function	 in	 genealogy.	Since	genealogy	sets	out	to	study	formations	of	truth	rather	than	fixed	identities	or	 essences,	 it	 follows	 that	 an	 example	 is	 not	 selected	on	 the	basis	 of	what	 is	commonly	held	as	the	truth	of	things.	On	the	contrary,	an	example	is	selected	on	the	basis	of	 the	hypothesis	 it	 is	 intended	 to	exemplify:	 “An	example	 is	not	 cut	out	of	a	corpus	of	evidence	on	the	basis	of	its	representativeness	in	relation	to	a	preconstituted	 field,	 since	 what	 is	 to	 be	 represented	 is	 a	 matter	 of	 what	 is	exemplified.	Rather,	and	as	with	Aristotle,	an	example	is	selected	on	the	basis	of	its	multiplicity	and	excess	within	a	hypothetically	determined	field;	an	example	is	 chosen	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 a	 hypothetical	 rule	 which	 governs	 the	 formation	 of	examples	 within	 this	 field,	 and	 then	 used	 to	 support	 the	 hypothesis	 of	 such	general	rule.”	(Bartelson	1995:	8).	The	example,	then,	functions	to	provide	evidence	of	the	hypothesis	of	the	general	 rule	 and	 the	 logical	 space	 in	 question	 rather	 than	 affirming	 an	established	truth	belonging	to	a	preconstituted	field	of	knowledge.	This	is	why,	in	a	genealogical	 inquiry,	one	should	not	 look	for	the	 ‘evidence’,	at	 least	 in	the	common	historical	or	empiricist	sense	of	exhaustiveness	and	compilation,	upon	which	 the	 examples	 used	 are	 based.	 Doing	 genealogy	 means	 to	 provide	 an	exemplary	and	episodically	oriented	analysis,	which,	in	contrast	to	the	inductive	analysis	 that	 reverses	 the	 relationship	 between	 theory	 and	 truth,	 because	 it	relies	on	history,	 tradition	or	canon	 to	provide	 the	hypothesis,	uses	history	 to	test	 and	 exemplify	 a	 hypothetically	 determined	 field.	 While	 this	 analytical	strategy	 may	 seem	 idiosyncratic,	 it	 arises	 from	 the	 strict	 methodical	 vantage	point	 of	 genealogy	where	 text	 is	 studied	 as	 a	 source	 of	 examples	 rather	 than	read	as	a	container	of	truth	(Ibid.).	In	doing	so,	my	selection	of	texts	and	the	use	of	examples	may	often	seem	 to	 reverse	 the	central	 and	 the	peripheral.	This	 is	not	because	the	different	or	the	exotic	constitutes	a	value	in	itself.	It	is	because	a	reversal	of	what	is	held	to	be	central	and	peripheral	often	occurs	when	one,	in	striving	 for	 a	 pure	 description	 of	 discursive	 events	 that	 seeks	 to	 avoid	
	 54	
interpretation,	 studies	 the	 actual	 statement.	 Any	 apparent	 reversal,	 then,	 is	reflective	 of	 a	 decision	 to	 analyse	 truth	 and	 knowledge	 as	 delineated	 in	 this	chapter,	 and	 from	 the	 point	 of	 view	 of	 what	 is	 central	 to	 the	 writing	 of	 a	genealogy	 of	 how	 war	 and	 the	 subject	 have	 been	 constituted	 in	 Western	politico-philosophical	thought	through	an	ontology	of	operativity	and	command.	Far	from	expressing	an	arbitrary	or	idiosyncratic	conviction,	it	is	an	attempt,	as	Foucault	once	called	for	in	a	passage	of	The	Use	of	Pleasure	(Foucault	1992:	8-9),	at	carrying	out	a	methodically	rigorous	and	self-conscious	inquiry	into	how	and	to	what	 extent	 it	may	be	possible	 to	 think	differently	 rather	 than	 legitimating	what	we	already	know.	Summing	 up,	 Foucaultdian	 archaeology	 and	 genealogy	 are	 congenial	methods	 employed	 in	 this	 study	 to	 operationalise	 problematisation.	Archaeology	 and	 genealogy	 are	 not	 about	 doing	 a	 so-called	 close	 reading	 of	 a	select	few	authors	whose	texts	are	selected	on	the	basis	of	a	preconceived	canon,	such	 as	 in	 some	 traditions	 within	 International	 Relations	 wherein	 one	 is	allowed	 to	 invest	 in	 the	 (from	 a	 Foucaultdian	 perspective)	 inherently	idiosyncratic	and	methodologically	problematic	belief	that	one	can	meaningfully	cherry	 pick	 e.g.	 three	 authors	 and	 then	 examine	 them	 on	 the	 basis	 that	 they	supposedly	belong	to	a	certain	tradition,	even	if	the	tradition	in	question	had	no	existence	by	the	time	one	or	several	of	the	texts	selected	were	actually	written.	On	the	contrary,	working	on	the	basis	of	Foucault,	 ‘cherry	picking’	 is	what	one	appears	 to	 be	 doing	 when	 piecing	 together,	 palimpsestuously,	 statements	 to	analyse	 a	 semantic	 field	 of	 formation.	 This	 involves	 a	 more	 complex	cartographic	analysis,	since	a	semantic	field	of	formation	cannot	be	referred	to	any	single	author	or	text	nor	can	it	be	referred	back	to	any	privileged	point	of	articulation	 or	 origin.	 Foucaultdian	 analysis	 consists	 precisely	 in	 the	 piecing-together	 of	 the	 network	 of	 statements	 made	 by	 several	 authors	 where	 one	author	 is	 no	 more	 ‘true’	 or	 ‘originary’	 than	 the	 other.	 On	 the	 contrary,	 it	 is	precisely	 the	 co-variance	 of	 the	 statements	 made	 by	 several	 authors	 that	constitute	 proof	 of	 the	 hypothesis	 the	 analysis	 is	 intended	 to	 demonstrate.	 In	piecing	 together	 statements	 to	 establish	 the	 logical	 space	 or	 system	 of	correlation,	statements	are	selected	as	examples	on	the	basis	of	the	hypothesis	they	are	intended	to	exemplify.	This	is	to	say	that	an	example	is	chosen	on	the	
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basis	 of	 a	 hypothetical	 rule,	 which	 governs	 the	 formation	 of	 examples	within	this	field,	and	then	used	to	support	the	hypothesis	of	such	general	rule.	Concerning	 literature	 and	 the	 selection	 of	 texts	 in	 Foucaultdian	method,	looking	at	 the	character	of	 the	secondary	 literature	 listed	by	Foucault	one	can	gain	 insight	 into	what	 guides	 the	archaeological	 and	genealogical	 inquiry.	The	literature	cited	by	Foucault	is	often	marginal	or	peripheral.	It	is	also	somewhat	sparse.	This	is	neither	because	Foucault	was	not	familiar	with	the	literature	nor	because	of	some	strange	or	idiosyncratic	conviction	not	to	cite	authority.	On	the	contrary,	 the	 apparent	 absence	 of	 secondary	 sources,	 on	 which	 arguments	purportedly	are	to	be	build	 following	the	conventions	of	empiricist	positivism,	happens	precisely	because	of	the	methodological	conviction	that	text,	that	is	to	say	primary	text,	is	analysed	for	the	semantic	value	of	statements	that	contain	in	themselves	 the	 full	 discursive	 event.	 In	 other	 words,	 Foucault	 rarely	 cites	authority	simply	because	it	distorts	the	‘pure	description	of	discoursive	events’.	In	fact,	one	runs	the	risk	of	destroying	the	palimpsest	and	of	putting	the	analysis	on	 the	 path	 which	 marks	 the	 return	 of	 the	 blessed	 circle.	 Accordingly,	 the	selection	 of	 texts	 or,	 more	 precisely,	 the	 selection	 of	 discoursive	 events,	 that	inform	the	present	inquiry	is	not	made	on	the	basis	of	their	belonging	to	a	pre-existing	body	of	work,	be	it	a	canon,	tradition	or	even,	pace	Foucault,	‘the	book	itself’.	On	the	contrary,	having	dispensed	with	‘the	book’,	discoursive	events	are	selected	 with	 a	 view	 to	 providing	 exemplifications	 in	 support	 of	 the	 general	hypothesis.	 Since	 the	 selection	made	 does	 not	 pretend,	 either,	 to	 exhaust	 the	field	 of	 knowledge	 that	 defines	 a	 tradition,	 one	 could	 argue	 that	 providing	justification	for	the	selection	of	text	has	a	limited	added	value,	since	justification	is	 provided	 precisely	 in	 the	 possibility	 of	 establishing	 the	 logical	 space	 or	system	 of	 correlation,	 which	 through	 exemplification	 demonstrates	 and	supports	the	hypothesis.	When	I,	nonetheless,	will	explain	what	has	guided	my	selection,	it	is	with	a	view	to	providing	signpost	of	how	the	selections	made	provide	exemplifications	in	 support	 of	 the	 thesis.	 Specifically,	 concerning	 Greek	 texts	 the	 following	grounds	 are	 provided	 as	 justification.	 I	 read	 Homer’s	 Iliad	 because	 it	 is	exemplary	in	the	way	it	demonstrates	how,	in	the	world	of	archaic	Greece,	the	relationship	between	man	and	war	does	not	know	either	the	idea	of	the	subject	
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who	has	a	mind	 [nous]	and	a	 soul	 [psukhē]	or	 the	 idea	of	 the	 ruling	principle	[arkhē].	Moreover,	taken	together	with	the	Fragments	of	Heraclitus,	it	provides	exemplification	of	the	experience	of	polemos	as	a	means	of	providing	access	to	another	figure	of	truth	of	war	and	man.	In	turn,	the	archaeology	of	polemos	then	serves	 the	 double	 purpose	 of	 also	 constituting	 a	 point	 of	 articulation	 that	situates	the	genealogical	critique.	I	move	on	from	the	oratory	tradition	of	Homer	to	study	genealogically	 the	coming	to	presence	of	a	different	understanding	of	the	 relationship	 of	 man	 and	 war	 in	 tragedy.	 I	 read	 the	 classical	 tragedies	 of	Sophocles	Ajax	and	Antigone	not	in	the	belief	of	having	exhausted	either	texts	or	the	rich	and	diverse	tradition	of	Greek	tragedy,	but	in	providing	evidence	of	the	semantic	shift	that	occurs	in	these	texts.	I	read	Ajax	because	it	is	one	of	the	first	examples	 in	 which	 we	 can	 see	 how	 tragedy	 inquires	 into	 the	 relationship	between	 man	 and	 war	 as	 form	 of	 concern	 or	 problematisation	 of	 the	relationship,	at	 the	point	 in	 time	when	the	 individual	has	not	yet	acquired	the	consistency	 of	 the	 Aristotelian	 psukhē	 capable	 of	 will	 [boulēsis],	 and	 yet	gradually	 begins	 to	 refigure	 the	 ordering	 codes	 of	war	 and	 being.	Antigone	 is	read	 for	 several	 purposes.	 First,	 it	 is	 read	 as	 an	 example	 of	 how	 the	 new	relationship	 of	 man	 and	 war	 is	 rewritten	 in	 the	 shift	 that	 occurs	 with	 the	emergence	 of	 the	 idea	 of	 ruling	 by	 decree	 [kērugma]	 rather	 than	 nomos	[custom]	in	which	we	find	one	of	the	first	vague	expressions	of	the	principle	of	ruling	 by	 command	 emergent	 in	 the	 sovereign’s	 pursuit	 of	 the	 good.	 Second,	
Antigone	is	read	for	the	insight	the	text	offers	as	a	semantic	field	of	formation	on	how	a	new	apolitical	subject	emerges	out	of	the	struggle	between	the	sovereign	[arkhōn,	 leader],	who	 intervenes	 in	 the	 relations	 of	 forces	 beyond	his	 rightful	sphere	of	influence,	and	the	hērōinē	who	brings	a	fury	to	bear	on	the	sovereign	activity	 of	 command.	 What	 emerges	 is	 the	 theme	 of	 the	 individual	 who	 is	without	a	polis	[apolis],	a	theme	that	will	play	a	critical	role	in	classical	political	thought,	most	importantly,	in	Aristotle’s	definition	of	man.	I	read	Thucydides’	History	of	the	Peloponnesian	War	because	in	it	we	find	one	of	the	first	clearly	delineated	articulations	of	the	classical	political	economy	of	 war	 and	 the	 subject.	 At	 stake	 is	 no	 longer	 so	 much	 the	 singular	 warrior	fighting	in	a	rage,	but	rather	the	citizen	soldier	and	the	general	governed	by	the	relationship	 of	 command.	 Also	 I	 read	 Thucydides	 to	 study	 the	 entry	 of	 the	
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knowledge	 of	 war	 into	 a	 new	 system	 of	 thought,	 in	 which	 history	 begins	 to	acquire	continuity	with	the	political	economy	of	war	and	the	subject	in	the	birth	of	the	first	politico-historical	discourse.	Classical	politico-philosophical	texts	are	read	as	a	means	of	exemplification	of	the	emergence	of	the	idea	of	steering	war	and	 how	 the	 principle	 of	 command	 and	 operativity	 came	 to	 invest	 political	order,	 war,	 and	 the	 subject.	 Latin	 texts	 are	 read	 for	 the	 value	 they	 offer	 on	informing	of	the	transformation	of	the	ruling	principle	within	the	idea	of	divine	governance,	which	opens	up	the	terrain	for	the	emergence	of	the	modern	idea	of	sovereignty.	From	the	point	of	view	of	what	might	constitute	central	texts	in	the	corpus	 of	 knowledge	 that	 makes	 up	 classical	 political	 thought,	 there	 are	obviously	certain	omissions.	For	example,	I	could	have	carried	out	an	analysis	of	the	political	culture	of	the	Cynics	and	Foucault’s	analysis	on	the	potentiality	of	subjectivation	 in	 the	 truth-telling	 practices	 of	 Parrhesia.	 I	 could	 also	 have	carried	 out	 a	 study	 Plato’s	 Statesman	 to	 provide	 for	 a	 more	 nuanced	 and	elaborate	 analysis	 of	 the	 discontinuities	 in	 the	 account	 of	 the	 ruling	 principle	and	 the	 richness	 of	 classical	 politico-philosophical	 culture.	However,	 the	 texts	chosen	or	rather	the	statements	chosen	are	selected	with	a	view	to	providing	an	account	 of	 the	 specific	 archaeology	 of	 the	 ruling	 principle	 and	 the	 effective	history	of	the	genealogical	coming	to	presence	of	the	ontology	of	operativity	and	command.			Finally,	 a	word	 on	 the	 Greek	 and	 Latin	 texts	 studied	 in	 this	 dissertation	and	how	they	are	read	 to	support	 the	 thesis	 is	 appropriate.	As	stated	 in	 these	pages,	 the	 analytical	 interest	 of	 the	 present	 dissertation	does	 not	 concern	 the	Greeks.	The	dissertation	is	not	so	much	a	philological	inquiry	into	the	Greeks,	as	it	is	an	inquiry	into	the	history	of	present.	However,	to	trace	the	semantic	fields	of	formation,	the	dissertation	interrogates	certain	key	terms	drawing	on	official	translations	(sourced	from	the	Perseus	Digital	Library	unless	otherwise	noted).	Key	 terms	 in	 Greek	 are	 put	 in	 square	 brackets	 to	 provide	 signpost	 of	 the	semantic	field	of	formation.	Take	for	example	the	word	agein	[action],	which	in	archaic	Greece	has	no	relation	to	the	form	of	a	conscientious	mind	acting	in	the	world.	 I	 refer	 to	 the	 original	 word	 in	 order	 to	 demonstrate	 how	 it	 is	rearticulated	 through	 intertextual	 overlays	 to	 attain	 a	 different	 meaning	 in	classical	philosophy,	as	something	the	mind	is	capable	of	by	means	of	a	certain	
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sense	of	will	 [boulēsis].	Another	example	could	be	drawn	 from	the	analysis	of	Aristotle’s	 definition	 of	man.	 In	 this	 reading	 of	 Aristotle,	 original	 Greek	 terms	are	 listed	 when	 articulating	 the	 logical	 space	 in	 which	 Aristotle’s	 definition	appears	and,	in	turn,	listed	as	references	of	subjugated	knowledge	in	support	of	the	hypothesis	the	example	is	intended	to	demonstrate.	Unless	otherwise	noted,	original	Greek	and	Latin	quotations	are	 sourced	from	the	Perseus	Digital	Library.	Greek	is	translated	directly	into	English	rather	than	via	Latin	transliteration.	In	terms	of	most	proper	names,	however,	I	use	the	Latin	transliteration	since	this	is	likely	how	they	are	familiar	to	the	reader.		
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 How,	when	and	why	was	it	noticed	or	imagined	that	what	is	going	on	beneath	and	 in	 power	 relations	 is	 a	war?	When,	 how	 and	why	 did	 someone	 come	 up	with	the	idea	that	it	is	a	sort	of	uninterrupted	battle	that	shapes	peace,	and	that	the	civil	order	–	its	basis,	its	essence,	its	essential	mechanisms	–	is	basically	an	order	of	battle?	Who	came	up	with	the	idea	that	civil	order	is	an	order	of	battle?	[…]	Who	saw	war	just	beneath	the	surface	of	peace;	who	sought	in	the	noise	and	confusion	 of	 war,	 in	 the	 mud	 of	 battles,	 the	 principle	 that	 allows	 us	 to	understand	order,	the	State,	its	institutions,	and	its	history?	(Foucault	2004:	47).		
1.1	So	Foucault	situates	the	problem	to	be	investigated	in	the	course	of	his	1976	lecture	 series	 at	 Collège	 de	 France,	 Society	 Must	 be	 Defended,	 a	 question	 he	would	 pursue	 in	 the	 attempt	 at	 finding	 a	way	 out	 of	 the	 problem	 of	war	 and	political	modernity	he	had	articulated	with	the	thesis	of	biopolitics	in	The	Will	to	
Knowledge.	 Specifically,	 in	 these	 pages	 Foucault	 pursues	 a	 methodology	 that	would	 enable	 the	 analysis	 to	 disengage	 the	 mode	 of	 subjectivity	 from	 the	procedures	and	techniques	of	subjectification	by	which	life,	in	biopolitics,	comes	to	 be	 simultaneously	 pacified,	 mobilised,	 and	 put	 to	 use	 in	 the	 various	economies	of	the	state,	 in	particular	those	of	war	and	economy.	In	this	 lecture	series,	then,	we	find	Foucault	stating	the	intention	of	this	year’s	lecture	to	study	modern	 power	 in	 terms	 of	 an	 analytic	 that	 escapes	 the	 ‘economic’	 model	 of	power	 prevalent	 at	 the	 time,	 in	 particular,	 in	 Marxist	 theory.	 The	 economic	model	of	power,	Foucault	explains,	entails	a	mode	of	analysis	that	pertain	to	the	notion	of	power	being	essentially	repressive	and	as	having	a	certain	substance	as	something	that	can	be	“…	given,	exchanged	or	taken	back,	that	it	is	something	that	 is	exercised	and	that	 it	exists	only	 in	action.”	(Ibid.	14).	But	 if	power	 is	 in	fact	 the	 implementation	 and	 deployment	 of	 a	 relationship	 of	 force,	 Foucault	argues,	then	perhaps	one	should	not	try	to	analyse	power	in	terms	of	the	system	
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of	correlation	that	in	fact	enables	and	sustains	the	economic	model,	but	rather	in	 terms	 what	 precedes	 it	 in	 the	 struggle	 that	 came	 before	 this	 particular	arrangement,	that	is,	to	study	power	in	terms	of	war:		 Rather	than	analyzing	it	[power]	in	terms	of	surrender,	contract,	and	alienation,	or	rather	than	analyzing	it	in	functional	terms	as	the	reproduction	of	the	relations	of	production,	shouldn’t	we	be	analyzing	it	first	and	foremost	in	terms	of	conflict,	confrontation,	and	war?	(Ibid.	15)		 Foucault	 contends:	 “Power	 is	 war,	 the	 continuation	 of	 war	 by	 other	means”,	Foucault	argues	as	he	inverts	Clausewitz’s	famous	proposition	to	state	that	politics	 is	 the	continuation	of	war	by	other	means	 (Ibid).	Now,	displacing	the	 axis	 of	 analysis	 to	 look	 at	 power	 from	 the	 vantage	 point	 of	war,	 Foucault	traces	an	itinerary	on	the	subjugated	knowledge	of	the	discourse	on	private	war,	as	it	appeared	before	the	institution	of	the	state.	Foucault	explains	how	society,	according	to	this	discourse,	was	considered	as	completely	permeated	by	warlike	relationships;	that	war	was	regarded	as	a	social	relationship	and	the	primal	and	basic	 state	 of	 affairs.	Here,	 Foucault	 embarks	 on	detailed	 genealogical	 inquiry	into	the	struggles	of	seventeenth-century	England	while	extending	the	analysis	into	 premodern	 history	 to	 demonstrate	 the	 pattern	 of	 how	 politico-historical	knowledge,	 as	 a	 form	of	 subjugated	knowledge,	 tells	 the	history	of	how	 truth,	law	and	order	have	come	into	being	from	conquests	and	pillages,	how	the	‘law	was	 born	 in	 burning	 towns	 and	 on	 ravaged	 fields’;	 in	 fact,	 how	 history	 has	progressed	 from	struggle	 to	 struggle	 in	 the	writing	and	 rewriting	of	 the	 same	war.	 The	discovery	by	Foucault	of	this	historico-political	knowledge	of	war	and	the	subject	as	an	agent	of	private	war,	 in	turn,	enables	Foucault	to	look	at	war	and	 the	 subject,	 as	 they	 are	 represented	 in	 the	 major	 traditions	 of	 political	theory,	 from	 the	 opposite	 side	 of	 the	 system	 of	 correlation	 of	 the	 law,	sovereignty	 and	 the	 contract	 that	 sustains	 this	 representation.	 Reading	Machiavelli	and	Hobbes	from	the	point	of	view	of	war,	Foucault	challenges	the	traditional	 readings	 of	 The	 Prince	 and	 Leviathan.	 While	 Hobbes,	 Foucault	explains,	has	been	understood	as	if	not	a	theoretician	of	war	then	at	least	as	the	
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protagonist	of	war	seen	as	an	omnipresent	state	given	by	nature.	Far	from	being	the	protagonist	of	private	war,	Foucault	explains,	the	primitive	state	of	the	‘war	of	every	man	against	every	man’	in	Hobbes’s	state	of	nature	must	rather	be	seen	as	 a	 discourse	 on	 peace,	 law	 and	 order.	 Contrasting	 Hobbes	 with	 the	 now	desubjugated	 knowledge	 of	 historico-political	 discourse	 that	 claims	war	 to	 be	the	irreducible	and	permanent	relationship	of	forces	in	which	society	and	social	relations	consist,	Foucault	explains	how,	in	Hobbes,	the	state	of	nature	exists	as	a	fictional	principle	that	allows	for	the	justification	of	the	theory	of	the	State	(the	principle	 of	 sovereignty,	 the	 monopoly	 on	 war,	 the	 teleology	 of	 peace).	 The	discourse	of	Hobbes,	then,	is	the	exact	opposite	of	the	discourse	on	private	war	that	claims	war	cannot	belong	to	the	State.	This	argument,	in	turn,	has	Foucault	arguing	most	convincingly	that	in	making	recourse	to	the	principle	of	the	state	of	nature	in	the	constitution	of	political	sovereignty	and	the	monopolisation	of	war,	the	state	does	in	fact	not	put	an	end	to	war.	Rather,	war,	in	the	sense	of	the	Hobbessian	 state	 of	 nature,	 is	 contained	 in	 its	 virtuality	 in	 the	 principle	 of	sovereignty	as	the	cipher	of	the	form	of	peace	that	modern	societies	realise.	Now,	 the	 discovery	 of	 counter-state	 strategic	 discourse,	 while	 initially	opening	up	 to	problematisation	 the	 field	of	knowledge	 that	governs	 the	 state-centric	ontology	of	war	and	the	subject,	is	not	entirely	reassuring	to	Foucault.	In	fact,	it	would	be	mistaken,	Foucault	realises,	to	conceive	of	this	discourse	simply	in	terms	of	a	certain	deliberative	potential.	Foucault	realises	this	when	tracing	the	complex	course	of	descent	of	history	in	which	he	uncovers	the	idea	of	‘race’	as	the	point	of	articulation	of	the	counter-state	discourse.	In	its	original	setting,	Foucault	 explains,	 race	 denoted	 nothing	 but	 a	 distinction	 between	 different	peoples,	which	for	historical	reasons	have	come	to	find	themselves	on	one	side	in	a	struggle	against	another	race	or	people.	Later,	as	 the	discourse	on	race	 is	adopted	 by	 the	 French	 aristocracy	 at	 the	 end	 of	 the	 reign	 of	 Louis	 XIV,	 it	 is	refigured	 into	 a	 hierarchical	 discourse	 of	 domination	 and	 submission	 that	claims	the	superiority	of	the	aristocratic	race,	and	how	history	has	bequeathed	to	this	race	certain	rights	and	privileges.	At	this	point,	 in	the	historico-political	discourse	 on	 private	 war,	 private	 war	 turns	 into	 a	 struggle	 between	 races,	 a	struggle	which,	ultimately,	is	turned	against	the	state	as	counter-state	strategic	discourse	 at	 the	 point	 in	 time	 when	 the	 rights	 and	 privileges	 of	 the	 nobility,	
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including	the	right	of	private	war,	are	usurped	by	the	state.	What	happens,	then,	Foucault	 is	careful	to	explain	 is	not	the	state	putting	an	end	to	the	war	among	races.	Rather,	and	this	is	a	critical	distinction	for	Foucault,	in	the	monopolisation	of	war	 the	modern	state	 colonises	 the	counter-state	discourse	and	assimilates	the	 discourse	 on	 race	 war	 inverting	 it	 to	 its	 own	 ends.	 As	 the	 state	 assumes	control	over	war,	the	discourse	on	 ‘race	war’	 is	 in	other	words	not	suspended,	but	 refigured	 into	 a	 discourse	 that	 no	 longer	 speaks	 of	 race	 in	 terms	 of	 the	‘battle	that	has	to	be	waged	between	races’,	but	rather	of	race	“…	portrayed	as	the	one	true	race,	the	race	that	holds	power	and	is	entitled	to	define	the	norm,	and	against	those	who	deviate	from	the	norm,	against	those	who	pose	a	threat	to	the	biological	heritage…”	(Ibid.	61).	Writing	in	The	Will	to	Knowledge,	 it	was	precisely	under	the	theme	of	race	that	Foucault	in	the	thesis	of	biopolitics	came	to	 argue	 that	 it	 as	 ‘managers	 of	 life	 and	 survival,	 of	 bodies	 and	 the	 race’	 that	modern	political	regimes	have	been	able	to	wage	so	many	wars	in	defence	of	the	biological	heritage	and	the	species	life.	The	counter-state	strategic	discourse,	in	which	Foucault	situated	his	own	project	at	the	outset	of	the	lecture	series,	must	in	other	words	also	be	held	accountable	for	the	emergence	of	biopolitical	war.		Recognising	how	the	counter-state	strategic	discourse	on	war	has	in	fact	been	 constitutive	 of	 those	 very	power	 relations	 Foucault	 sought	 to	 dismantle,	Foucault’s	project	is	cast	into	crisis.	In	fact,	Foucault	seems	to	abandon	us	on	the	question	of	how	to	think	beyond	the	ontology	of	politics	as	the	continuation	of	war,	which,	despite	of	the	potential	for	desubjugation,	is	the	very	principle	that	allows	 biopolitical	 regimes	 the	 practice	 of	 racial	 techniques	with	which	 life	 is	rendered	 governable	 and	 put	 to	 use	 in	 the	 waging	 of	 war	 as	 well	 as	 in	 the	economic	circulation	of	forces	extracted	from	subjects.	The	project	of	finding	a	way	out	of	the	ontological	account	of	politics,	war	and	life	in	biopolitics	is	then	seemingly	abandoned	in	favour	of	the	study	of	modes	of	subjectivation	in	Greco-Roman	Antiquity.	The	period	from	1976	to	1984	that	separates,	on	the	one	hand,	Foucault’s	 work	 on	 biopolitics	 in	 The	Will	 to	 Knowledge	 and	 Society	 Must	 be	
Defended	and,	on	the	other,	the	inquiry	into	the	government	of	self	in	The	Use	of	
Pleasure,	 in	 other	 words	 seems	 to	 mark	 a	 reorientation	 of	 the	 intellectual	itinerary	pursued	by	Foucault.	With	the	simultaneous	publication	in	1984	of	The	
Use	 of	 Pleasure	 and	 The	 Care	 of	 the	 Self,	 the	 eight-year	 silence	 of	 Foucault	 is	
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broken	with	the	announcement	of	 the	 inquiry	 into	the	problematisation	of	 the	subject	in	Antiquity.	The	 problem	 of	 political	 modernity	 is	 to	 be	 approached	 from	 different	pathways	than	the	one	that	put	Foucault’s	own	project	on	the	track	of	modern	counter-state	discourse.	The	problematic	of	biopolitics,	however,	is	not	entirely	abandoned.	 In	 1980	 Foucault	 delivered	 a	 course	 at	 Collège	 de	 France	On	 the	
Government	 of	 the	 Living.	 While	 the	 course	 seems	 to	 constitute	 a	 first	reorientation	of	his	work,	it	follows	on	the	lectures	series	from	1978-1979	The	
Birth	 of	 Biopolitics.	 In	 the	 1980	 course,	 we	 find	 Foucault	 inquiring	 into	 the	Christian	 ritual	 of	 confession	 and	 the	 procedures	 that	 tie	 a	 subject	 to	 a	 truth	internalised	as	the	form	of	subjectivity	by	means	of	which	he	can	be	governed.	What	 interests	 Foucault	 is	 the	 genealogy	 of	 the	 techniques	 with	 which	 the	modern	 state	 assumes	 the	 role	 of	 managing	 life	 and	 survival	 by	 integrating	objectifying	 procedures	 of	 the	 care	 of	 the	 natural	 life	 of	 population	 with	processes	 by	which	 the	 individual	 comes	 to	 bind	 himself	 to	 an	 identity	 and	 a	consciousness	of	his	own	and,	at	the	same	time,	to	an	external	power.	However,	 in	 the	 texts	 of	 Cassian,	 in	 which	 these	 monastic	 practices	 of	spiritual	 direction	 that	 constitute	 the	 relationship	of	 command	and	obedience	between	 the	 tyrannical	 spiritual	 director	 and	 the	 subject	 being	 directed	 by	command,	 as	 he	 would	 be	 by	 the	 Word	 of	 God,	 Foucault	 encounters	 an	unexpected	point	of	articulation	of	resistance.	In	these	texts,	Foucault	discovers	a	counter-discourse	as	emergent	in	the	techniques	of	existence	of	late	Antiquity.	In	Marcus,	 Seneca,	 and	 Aurelius	 Foucault	 discovers	 a	most	 different	mode	 of	relationship	that	ties	the	subject	not	to	an	external	truth,	as	in	Christianity,	but	rather	 to	 itself	 in	 the	 sense	 of	 practices	 of	 self	 that	 pertain	 to	 an	 irreducible	choice	of	existence.	It	would	be	under	this	theme	of	Greco-Roman	techniques	of	existence	 and	 the	 government	 of	 self	 that	 Foucault	 would	 offer	 a	 strong	counterpoint	 to	 the	 totalising	 aspirations	 of	modern	 biopolitical	 regimes.	 The	trajectory	of	thought	delineated	in	Foucault’s	inquiry	into	monastic	practices	in	which	the	subject	comes	to	bind	himself	to	the	command	of	the	spiritual	doctor	is	 moved	 to	 the	 background.	 However,	 in	 view	 of	 the	 stated	 intention	 of	 the	present	 study,	as	a	pursuit	of	Foucault’s	 reflection	on	 the	problem	of	war	and	biopolitical	 modernity,	 one	 is	 led	 to	 investigate	 the	 governmental	 practices	
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emergent	in	the	relationship	of	command.	As	stated,	this	requires	a	return	to	the	Greeks.	In	his	 famous	work,	Homo	Sacer	–	Sovereign	Power	and	Bare	Life,	Giorgio	Agamben	has	attempted	an	 inquiry	 into	 the	 relationship	between	 the	political	model	of	the	Greeks	and	biopolitical	modernity.	Contrary	to	the	analysis	we	find	in	Foucault,	Agamben	argues	that	the	conditions	of	possibility	of	the	biopolitical	articulation	of	life	must	precisely	be	located	as	an	emergence	that	can	be	traced	to	 the	classical	heritage,	 in	particular,	 to	Aristotle.	According	 to	Agamben,	one	must	recognise	the	idea	of	political	life	and	the	end	of	the	polis,	emergent	from	the	inclusion	of	‘simple	natural	life’	[zēn]	in	the	political	realm,	as	consubstantial	with	 biopolitics:	 “Placing	 biological	 life	 at	 the	 centre	 of	 its	 calculations,	 the	modern	 State	 therefore	 does	 nothing	 other	 than	 bring	 to	 light	 the	 secret	 tie	uniting	power	and	bare	life.”	(Agamben	1998:	6).	Referring	to	the	distinction	in	Aristotle	 between	 ‘simple	 natural	 life’	 [zēn]	 of	 the	 animal	 and	 the	 ‘politically	qualified	 life’	 [eu	 zēn]	 of	 man,	 Agamben	 then	 calls	 for	 a	 revision	 of	 the	Foucaultdian	 thesis	 of	 biopolitics	 on	 the	 grounds	 of	 an	 inquiry	 into	 the	Aristotelian	 sense	 of	 man’s	 capacity	 for	 a	 political	 existence:	 “In	 Foucault’s	statement	according	 to	which	man	was,	 for	Aristotle,	 a	 ‘living	animal	with	 the	additional	capacity	for	political	existence,’	it	is	therefore	precisely	the	meaning	of	this	‘additional	capacity’	that	must	be	understood	as	problematic.”	(Ibid.	7).	As	I	will	explain	in	chapter	four,	while	offering	important	insights	into	the	principle	of	sovereignty,	Agamben’s	thesis	of	biopolitics	cannot	be	sustained	in	view	 of	 how	 Foucault	 thought	 about	 biopolitics	 let	 alone	 how	 Foucault	conceived	 of	 the	 classical	 heritage.	 However,	 in	 his	 attempt	 at	 tracing	 an	itinerary	from	the	classical	articulation	of	being	political	to	biopolitics,	Agamben	seems	 to	have	pointed	 to	an	 important	perspective	 that	appears	 to	have	been	left	 unexplored	by	 Foucault.	While,	 in	 Foucault,	 the	 sense	 of	 being	political	 in	Aristotle	 is	 the	 very	 antithesis	 of	 biopolitics,	 in	 view	 of	 the	 ontology	 of	operativity	 and	 command	delineated	 in	 the	 present	 study	 the	 hypothesis	 that	there	might	exist	a	certain	relation	among	these	most	different	forms	of	political	being	 cannot	 be	 dismissed,	 but	 must	 be	 further	 studied.	 Interestingly,	 while	arguing	 that	 Aristotle’s	 definition	 of	 man	 marks	 the	 originary	 site	 of	 the	biopolitical	 reference	 to	 life,	 an	 inquiry	 into	 the	 actual	 content	 of	 the	
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Aristotelian	 idea	 of	 man	 as	 a	 politikon	 zōon	 remains	 absent	 in	 the	 study	 of	Agamben.	This	is	all	the	more	surprising	since	the	problematisation	of	this	idea	is	what	 forms	gist	 of	 his	 argument.	 In	 an	 equally	 striking	 fashion,	 rather	 than	inquiring	 into	 the	 actual	 practices	 that	 informed	 the	 classical	 sense	 of	 being	political,	Agamben,	drawing	on	the	work	of	Walter	Benjamin,	concerns	himself	almost	exclusively	with	an	extensive	analysis	of	the	logic	of	sovereignty	and	the	juridical	 model	 of	 power	 claiming	 the	 juridico-institutional	 model	 and	 the	biopolitical	 model	 of	 power	 to	 be	 congenial,	 that,	 in	 fact,	 the	 two	 models	intersect	in	the	exceptio	as	the	logic	that	unites	power	and	bare	life.	In	 any	 case,	 if	we	 are	 to	 inquire	 further	 into	 the	 hypothesis	 of	 a	 certain	relationship	between	the	classical	heritage	and	biopolitics,	we	must	first	take	up	Foucault’s	suggestion	to	try	to	think	beyond	the	biopolitical	ontology	of	war	and	the	 subject.	 Such	 an	 inquiry,	 however,	 requires	 that	 we	 first	 provide	 an	examination	 of	 the	 Foucaultdian	 thesis	 of	 biopolitics.	 In	 this	 reading	 I	 will	propose	 that	 the	 fact	 that	 Foucault	 seems	 to	 have	 dismissed	 any	 relation	between	 the	 ancients	 and	 biopolitical	 modernity,	 in	 fact	 even	 opposing	biopolitics	to	Aristotle’s	definition	of	man,	has	its	logical	grounds	in	the	problem	Foucault	 encountered	 when,	 in	 Society	 Must	 be	 Defended,	 he	 attempted	 at	 a	reading	of	power	and	politics	in	terms	of	war.	Specifically,	in	situating	his	own	genealogical	method	within	 the	counter-state	 strategic	discourse	at	 the	 site	of	an	 inversion	 Clausewitz’s	 proposition	 on	 war	 and	 politics,	 Foucault	 came	 to	situate	 his	 project	 precisely	 at	 the	 site	 of	 the	 ontology	 of	 operativity	 and	command,	 as	 delineated	 in	 the	 present	 thesis.	 The	 proposition	 in	 Clausewitz,	often	 referred	 to	 as	 the	 concept	 of	 war	 –	 a	 proposition	 Foucault	 does	 not	question,	but	rather	inverts	–	in	fact	has	its	conditions	of	possibility	precisely	in	the	 idea	of	 steering	war	 once	discovered	by	 the	Greeks	 that	 since	 formed	 the	terrain	for	the	investment	of	war	in	the	relations	of	forces	through	the	ontology	of	 operativity	 and	 command.	 In	 turn,	 if	 this	 is	 so	 then	 this	may	 explain	 how,	other	than	the	obvious	and	vast	differences	between	the	government	of	self	 in	classical	political	culture	and	the	government	of	life	in	modern	politics,	Foucault	seems	 to	 have	made	 no	 connections	 between	 his	 inquiry	 into	 classical	 Greek	Antiquity,	which	nonetheless	uncovered	the	congeniality	of	the	ruling	principle	
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and	the	government	of	self,	and	his	study	of	biopolitics.	At	this	point,	 then,	we	must	attend	to	a	reading	of	the	thesis	of	biopolitics.	Turning	 the	 attention	 from	 the	 study	 of	 disciplinary	 power	 in	Discipline	
and	 Punish,	 Foucault	 shift	 focus	 in	 The	Will	 to	 Knowledge	 to	 pursue	 a	 line	 of	thought	on	the	emergence	of	a	form	of	power	concerned	with	exerting	a	positive	influence	 over	 life,	 a	 power	 that	 seeks	 the	 promotion	 of	 life	 and	 assumes	 the	role	 of	managing	 and	 developing	 the	 forces	 of	 the	 social	 body,	 ‘making	 them	grow’.	 Immediately,	 Foucault	 encounters	 the	 enigma	 that	 seems	 to	 haunt	political	 modernity.	 Namely,	 how	 is	 it	 that	 modern	 liberal	 regimes	 organised	around	the	idea	of	the	promotion	of	life	and	peaceful	civil	societies	have	in	fact	engendered	 the	most	bestial	practices	of	war	ever	known	to	Western	history?	According	 to	 Foucault,	 one	 must	 pay	 attention	 here	 to	 the	 shift	 in	 the	orientation	of	power	 from	the	old	sovereign	principle	 that	asserts	 the	right	of	death	to	an	exertion	of	control	over	life.	As	Foucault	explains:			Wars	 are	 no	 longer	waged	 in	 the	 name	 of	 a	 sovereign	who	must	 be	 defended;	they	 are	 waged	 on	 behalf	 of	 the	 existence	 of	 everyone;	 entire	 populations	 are	mobilized	 for	 the	 purpose	 of	wholesale	 slaughter	 in	 the	 name	 of	 life	 necessity:	massacres	have	become	vital.	It	is	as	managers	of	life	and	survival,	of	bodies	and	the	race,	that	so	many	regimes	have	been	able	to	wage	so	many	wars,	causing	so	many	men	to	be	killed.	(Foucault	1998:	137)				 One	must	pay	attention	here	to	the	distinction	Foucault	makes	in	terms	of	how	sovereign	power	relates	to	biopolitical	power.	The	argument	in	Foucault	is	not	that	the	reorientation	of	power	entails	that	the	old	sovereign	power	and	the	right	 to	 kill	 disappears	 with	 the	 emergence	 of	 biopolitics	 and	 the	 idea	 of	managing	life	and	survival.	On	the	contrary,	Foucault	finds	that	a	kind	of	parallel	shift	 occurs	 in	 the	 role	 of	 the	 right	 to	 kill	 in	 the	 functioning	 of	 power	 that	resituates	 the	 axis	 on	 which	 power	 refers	 to	 life.	 This	 resituation,	 Foucault	explains,	has	to	do	with	the	discovery	of	a	form	of	political	subject	unknown	to	the	 old	 form	 of	 sovereign	 power,	 that	 is,	 the	 subject	 of	 population,	 and	 how	power	 then	 begins	 to	 function	 by	 means	 of	 ‘double	 bind’	 tying	 together	
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disciplinary	techniques	targeting	the	individual	with	the	regulatory	controls	of	population:		 Power	over	 life	evolved	 in	 two	basic	 forms;	 these	 forms	were	not	antithetical,	however;	they	constituted	rather	two	poles	of	development	linked	together	by	a	whole	 intermediary	 cluster	 of	 relations.	 One	 of	 these	 poles	 –	 the	 first	 to	 be	formed,	 it	 seems	 –	 centered	 on	 the	 body	 as	 a	 machine:	 its	 disciplining,	 the	optimization	of	 its	capabilities,	 the	extortion	of	 its	 forces,	 the	parallel	 increase	of	 its	 usefulness	 and	 its	 docility,	 its	 integration	 in	 efficient	 and	 economic	controls,	all	this	was	ensured	by	the	procedures	of	power	that	characterized	the	
disciplines:	an	anatomo-politics	of	the	human	body.	The	second…	focused	on	the	species	 body,	 the	 body	 imbued	with	 the	mechanics	 of	 life	 and	 serving	 as	 the	basis	of	the	biological	processes:	propagation,	births	and	mortality,	the	level	of	health,	 life	expectancy	and	 longevity…	Their	supervision	was	effected	 through	an	 entire	 series	 of	 interventions	 and	 regulatory	 controls:	 a	 biopolitics	 of	 the	
population.	(Ibid.	139).		In	 assuming	power	over	 life,	 biopolitics	 produces	 a	 kind	of	 bifurcation	within	the	social	fabric	of	society	with	important	consequences	for	the	problem	of	war.	Through	the	deployment	of	disciplinary	techniques,	biopolitical	regimes	acquire	new	means	of	 control	over	 the	 individual	body.	The	 ‘docile’	body	subjected	 to	discipline	provides	them	with	the	ability	to	secure	an	absence	of	war	within	the	state	 called	 civil	 society.	 However,	 through	 the	 deployment	 of	 regulatory	controls,	targeting	the	assemblage	of	bodies	of	populations,	biopolitical	regimes	simultaneously	 create	 the	 conditions	 of	 possibility	 for	 a	 new	 assemblage	 of	forces	 to	 be	mobilised	 in	war.	 This	 is	 how	we	 can	 now	 revisit	 the	 passage	 in	which	Foucault	mentions	 the	 shift	 in	 the	orientation	of	 power	 to	 explain	how	war	 at	 the	 threshold	 of	 biopolitical	 modernity	 comes	 to	 appear	 in	 its	 most	atrocious	form:		 [T]he	existence	in	question	is	no	longer	the	juridical	existence	of	sovereignty;	at	stake	is	the	biological	existence	of	a	population.	If	genocide	is	indeed	the	dream	of	modern	powers,	this	is	not	because	of	a	return	of	the	ancient	right	to	kill;	it	is	
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because	power	is	situated	and	exercised	at	the	level	of	life,	the	species,	the	race,	and	the	large-scale	phenomena	of	population.	(Ibid	137).		 The	distinction	Foucault	makes	here	is	that,	in	the	old	form	of	sovereignty	as	it	appears	in	medieval	society,	war	functioned	as	a	means	of	settling	disputes	between	 princes	 or	 kings.	 The	 relationship	 of	 the	 king	 to	 the	 subject	 was	 a	fundamentally	asymmetrical	relation	in	which	the	sovereign	could	‘take	life	and	let	 live’	 if	 the	 subject	 opposed	him.	Moreover,	 the	 sovereign	 had	 the	 negative	right	of	seizure	of	the	subject’s	body	to	mobilise	the	subject	in	the	defence	of	the	sovereign.	 In	 biopolitics,	 however,	 the	 subject	 who	 must	 be	 defended	 is	 no	longer	the	sovereign	in	the	real	physical	sense	of	the	king’s	body,	whose	life	and	death	would	demarcate	 the	boundary	of	war.	When	power	 is	 exercised	at	 the	level	of	the	life	of	populations,	the	old	boundary	of	sovereignty	is	transgressed,	as	war	becomes	a	matter	of	the	struggle	for	existence	of	the	life	of	population.	Since	war	 now	 concerns	 the	 existence	 and	well	 being	 of	 the	 population,	war	 is	 untied	 from	 the	 confinement	 to	 the	 old	 sovereign	 right	 of	 seizure.	 In	effect,	 the	 activity	 of	war	 comes	 to	 be	 seen,	 not	 as	 a	 necessary	 evil	 one	must	carry	out	in	the	defence	of	the	sovereign,	but	rather	as	a	positive,	life-affirming	act.	 It	 is	 on	 this	 terrain	 of	 the	 practice	 of	 war	 as	 a	 life-affirming	 act	 that	 we	encounter	the	so-called	‘enigmas’	modernity	has	proposed	to	historical	reason,	beginning	with	the	Napoleonic	Wars	and	reaching	its	cataclysmic	highpoint	with	the	‘atomic	situation’	of	the	Cold	War.	As	the	state	assumes	the	role	of	managing	life	 and	 survival,	 pace	 Foucault,	 war	 transgresses	 the	 old	 boundaries	 and,	overflowing	 outside	 them,	 begins	 to	 coincide	 with	 the	 normal	 order	 as	 a	condition	of	possibility	for	existence	of	the	population	and	the	species	life.	What	is	at	stake	is	no	longer	the	defence	of	the	medieval	sovereign,	nor	is	it	the	kind	of	private	war	that	preceded	it,	as	in	Plato	or	Aristotle,	in	which	man	once	found	a	capacity	for	a	government	of	self	as	the	conditions	of	possibility	of	political	life.	What	is	at	stake	is	a	politics	of	life,	in	which	war	and	the	problem	of	government	will	be	seen	not	as	a	private	matter,	but	as	a	matter	of	state	and	the	subject	of	population	implying	a	complete	reversal	of	the	classical	political	model:		
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For	millennia,	man	remained	what	he	was	for	Aristotle:	a	living	animal	with	the	additional	 capacity	 for	 a	 political	 existence;	 modern	 man	 is	 an	 animal	 whose	politics	places	his	existence	as	a	living	being	in	question	(Foucault	1998:	143).		In	his	politics	 of	managing	 life,	 says	Foucault,	modern	man	displaces	 the	 very	sense	 and	mode	 of	 being	 political	 that	 once	 allowed	 Aristotle	 to	 discover	 his	
politikon	zōon	in	the	great	chain	of	beings	wherein	man	for	a	long	time	dwelled	among	all	the	other	gregarious	animals.		 And	yet,	can	we	say	beyond	the	shadow	of	doubt	that	there	is	in	fact	no	relation	 to	 be	 found	 between	 the	 conditions	 of	 possibility	 of	 the	 biopolitical	mobilisation	of	populations	 for	war	and	 the	 logic	of	operativity	and	command	emergent	in	the	military	practices	of	the	army	in	classical	Greece,	in	which	the	subject	as	stratiōtēs	 [a	citizen	bound	to	military	service],	 in	his	government	of	self,	 simultaneously	 came	 to	 bind	 himself	 to	 the	 command	 of	 the	 stratēgos	[general]?	 Indeed,	 is	 it	 not	 possible	 in	 fact	 to	 establish	 a	 line	 of	 flight	 that	connects	 disciplinary	 power,	 sovereignty	 and	 biopolitics	 horizontally	 through	the	apparatus	we	refer	to	with	the	concept	of	war,	that	is,	the	pertinacious	ideas	that	war	can	be	steered	and	that	subjectivity	is	the	command	of	the	other,	that	is,	the	 twin-ideas	 emergent	 from	 the	 notion	 of	 the	 perpetual	 war	 that	 must	 be	suspended,	but	remains	contained	in	virtuality	in	both	the	subject	and	the	state;	in	 short,	 the	 ontology	 of	 operativity	 and	 command?	Writing	 in	Discipline	 and	
Punish,	 Foucault	 in	 fact	 seems	 to	 have	 made	 an	 affirmative	 suggestion	 in	reflecting	upon	the	proposition	in	Clausewitz	on	war	and	politics,	a	proposition	he	would	 since	pursue	 albeit	 differently	 in	 both	Society	Must	be	Defended	 and	
The	 Will	 to	 Knowledge.	 “It	 may	 be”,	 Foucault	 contends	 while	 inverting	Clausewitz,		that	war	as	strategy	is	a	continuation	of	politics.	But	it	must	not	be	forgotten	that	‘politics’	has	been	conceived	as	a	continuation,	if	not	exactly	and	directly	of	war,	at	least	of	the	military	model	as	a	fundamental	means	of	preventing	civil	disorder.	(Foucault	1991:	168).		
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What	 is	 at	 issue	 for	 Foucault,	 then,	 is	 not	 so	 much	 a	 discussion	 of	 the	concept	of	war	as	the	possibility	of	its	inversion,	but	nor	is	it	his	stated	intention.	What	 interests	 Foucault	 is	 how	 an	 understanding	 of	 the	 model	 of	 military	organisation	 could	 inform	 of	 the	 tactics	 by	which	 societies	 came	 to	 assume	 a	certain	order	by	means	of	war.	 In	any	case,	 in	The	Will	to	Knowledge	Foucault	revisits	the	observation	first	presented	in	Discipline	and	Punish.	Here,	however,	he	reformulates	the	observation	in	the	form	of	a	question:		[S]hould	 we	 turn	 the	 expression	 around,	 then,	 and	 say	 that	 politics	 is	 war	pursued	by	other	means?	If	we	still	wish	to	maintain	a	separation	between	war	and	 politics,	 perhaps	 we	 should	 postulate	 rather	 that	 this	 multiplicity	 of	 force	relations	can	be	coded	–	in	part	but	never	totally	–	either	in	the	form	of	‘war’,	or	in	 the	 form	 of	 ‘politics’;	 this	would	 imply	 two	 different	 strategies	 (but	 the	 one	always	 liable	 to	 switch	 into	 the	 other)	 for	 integrating	 these	 unbalanced,	heterogeneous,	unstable	and	tense	force	relations.	(Foucault	1998:	93).		Again,	Foucault	does	not	question	the	intrinsic	logic	of	the	concept	of	war.	Rather,	 he	 turns	 his	 attention	 to	 how	 war	 (that	 is,	 the	 concept	 of	 war)	 is	invested	by	means	of	a	certain	 ‘strategic	model’	 in	providing	an	explanation	of	how	 “one	 of	 the	 essential	 traits	 of	 Western	 societies	 is	 that	 the	 force	relationships	which	for	a	long	time	had	found	expression	in	war,	in	every	form	of	 warfare,	 gradually	 became	 invested	 in	 the	 order	 of	 political	 power.”	 (Ibid.	102).	Here	we	can	see	the	difference	between	the	observation	in	Discipline	and	
Punish,	 which	 concerns	 how	 tactical	 models	 emergent	 from	 the	 military	organisation	for	war	came	to	be	invested	indirectly	in	the	relations	of	force,	as	a	kind	of	Hobbessian	schema	of	peace	and	order	projected	over	the	multitude	of	disordered	subjects.	By	contrast,	 in	elaborating	 the	 thesis	of	biopolitics	 in	The	
Will	 to	 Knowledge,	 Foucault	 contends	 that	 war	 (again	 the	 concept	 of	 war)	invests	 the	 order	 of	 political	 power	 immanently.	 The	 functioning	 of	 war,	 in	which	we	may	now	read	 the	ontology	of	 command	and	operativity,	 cannot	be	reduced	to	the	indirect	and	discrete	influence	of	the	military	institution.	On	the	contrary,	 war	 must	 be	 recognised	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 “…	 multiplicity	 of	 force	relations	 immanent	 in	 the	 sphere	 in	which	 they	operate	 and	which	 constitute	their	own	organisation”	(Ibid.	92).	
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War,	 in	 other	 words,	 must	 be	 understood	 as	 a	 source	 that	 engenders	particular	 forms	 of	 force	 relations	 that	 are	 constitutive	 of	 power	 relations.	 In	biopolitics,	 Foucault	 explains,	 war	 becomes	 the	 source	 that	 accounts	 for	 the	forms	 of	 life	 that	 engender	 and	 sustain	 power	 relations.	 No	 doubt	 a	 most	disquieting	diagnosis,	biopolitics	 in	other	words	not	only	discretely	engenders	the	 functioning	 of	 tactics	 in	 the	 individuation	 of	 bodies	 via	 discipline	 or	 the	operation	of	strategies	in	the	constitution	of	populations	biopolitically:	“Rather,	one	must	conceive	of	the	double	conditioning	of	a	strategy	by	the	specificity	of	possible	tactics,	and	of	tactics	by	the	strategic	envelope	that	makes	them	work”	(Ibid.	 100).	 In	 turn,	 biopolitics	 not	 only	 seeks	 out	 peace	 in	 the	deployment	 of	tactical	 schemas	 over	 societies,	 biopolitical	 regimes	 employ	 exactly	 the	 same	principles	of	power	over	life	to	carry	out	strategies	for	the	mass	mobilisations	of	societies	in	war.	But	here	again	we	are	abandoned	on	the	logic	of	the	concept	of	war	to	 informs	of	 the	nature	 is	 this	relationship	 in	which	war	seems	to	 imbue	life	with	certain	tactical	and	strategical	aspirations.	However,	in	view	of	the	argument	to	be	put	forward	for	reflection	in	this	dissertation,	we	 could	 say	 that	 it	may	well	 be	 that	 biopolitics	 affords	modern	regimes	a	new	assemblage	of	 forces	 to	be	deployed	 in	a	struggle	 for	existence	while	simultaneously	permeating	the	very	capillaries	of	societal	peace,	but	one	must	not	 forget	 that	 this	would	not	be	possible	without	 either	 the	war	or	 the	subject	 once	 discovered	with	 the	 political	 idea	 of	 steering	war	 as	 a	means	 of	rendering	life	governable.	In	other	words,	it	remains	a	blind	spot	in	the	analysis	of	Foucault	how,	in	the	first	place,	it	became	possible	for	the	subject	to	submit	to	the	 military	 tactics	 in	 the	 individuation	 of	 bodies	 via	 discipline,	 which	 then	would	be	reinvested	in	the	strategies	in	which	the	individuals	are	mobilised	as	populations	for	war.	 In	fact,	 this	may	be	how	Foucault,	 inverting	Clausewitz	 in	
Society	Must	be	Defended,	 came	 to	 situate	his	project	 exactly	 at	 the	 site	where	the	 concept	 of	war	 and	 the	 ontology	 of	 operativity	 and	 command	 incessantly	renew	one	another.	 Inversion	or	no	 inversion,	 it	comes	down	to	the	same	war	once	discovered	by	man	as	he	crossed	the	threshold	of	metaphysics	to	assume	the	 task	 of	 steering	 war.	 In	 short,	 what	 remains	 to	 be	 interrogated	 in	 the	Foucaultdian	 thesis	 of	 biopolitics	 is	 the	 connection	 between	 war	 and	 the	
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practices	 that	 tie	 the	 subject	 to	 a	 certain	 truth	 internalised	 as	 the	 form	 of	subjectivity	by	means	of	which	he	can	be	governed.	Now	 I	 have	 used	 the	 term	 ‘ontology	 of	 operativity	 and	 command’	throughout	 these	 pages	without	 referring	 it	 to	 its	 author	 proper.	 The	 term	 is	coined	 by	 Agamben	 in	 his	 archaeology	 of	 duty,	Opus	Die,	 but	 here	 employed	differently.	 In	his	 inquiry,	Agamben	traces	 the	 idea	of	being	as	effectiveness,	a	theme	 which	 however	 is	 clearly	 related	 if	 not	 congenial	 to	 the	 teleology	 of	steering	 through	virtue.	 In	 an	acutely	more	archaeologically	 sensitive	analysis	than	 that	 of	 the	 author	 of	 Homo	 Sacer,	 Agamben,	 taking	 his	 cue	 from	 the	Aristotelian	distinction	between	dynamis	and	energeia,	argues	that	this	division	of	 being	 inscribes	 the	 primacy	 of	 energeia	 over	dynamis	 thus	 informing	 of	 an	orientation	 of	 being	 toward	 operativity.	 I	 will	 not	 try	 to	 do	 justice	 to	 the	excellent	 analysis	 developed	 in	 Opus	 Die,	 but	 simply	 note	 that	 the	 present	analysis	cites	with	the	Agamben	of	Opus	Dei	to	explore	the	possibility,	as	stated	at	 the	 end	 of	 his	 inquiry,	 of	 thinking	 beyond	 the	 ontology	 of	 operativity	 and	command.	 Like	 Foucault,	 however,	 Agamben	 curiously	 never	 dwells	 on	 the	exemplary	place	of	this	account	of	being	in	the	military	organisation.	However,	if	we	are	to	understand	how	it	once	became	possible	for	being	to	enter	into	the	site	 of	 indistinction	 to	 effectiveness,	 then	 we	 must	 turn	 the	 attention	 to	 the	terrain	 of	polemos.	 Taking	up	Foucault’s	 suggestion	 stated	 at	 the	beginning	of	this	 chapter,	 I	will	 study	when	 and	why	 it	was	 first	 noticed	 or	 imagined	 that	what	is	going	on	beneath	and	in	power	relations	is	a	war;	that	is,	how	and	why	someone	came	up	with	the	idea	that	a	sort	of	uninterrupted	battle	shapes	peace.				
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§ 2 Philopolemos – The Friendship of War 
 
 
 		 With	these	words	he	called	out	to	the	Trojans	in	a	loud	voice:	‘Trojans,	Lycians	and	 you	 Dardanians	 that	 like	 your	 fighting	 hand	 to	 hand,	 be	 men,	 my	comrades,	 and	 call	 up	 that	 fighting	 spirit	 of	 yours!	 I	 am	 going	 to	 put	 on	 the	armour	 of	matchless	 Achilles,	 the	 fine	 armour	 I	 took	 from	mighty	 Patroclus	when	 I	 killed	 him.’	With	 these	 words	 Hector	 of	 the	 flashing	 helmet	 left	 the	battlefield…	Then	he	changed	his	arms,	standing	far	from	the	battlefield	with	all	its	tears,	telling	his	war-loving	Trojans	to	take	his	own	arms	to	sacred	Ilium	and	putting	on	 the	 imperishable	armour	of	Achilles,	which	 the	Sky-gods	had	given	to	his	 father	Peleus…	The	armour	 fitted	Hector’s	body	well,	 the	savage	spirit	 of	 the	 terrible	War-god	 now	 entered	 him	 and	 power	 and	 fresh	 vigour	filled	 his	 limbs.	 Uttering	 his	 piercing	 war-cry,	 he	 went	 in	 search	 of	 his	renowned	allies	and	presented	himself	before	all	of	 them,	resplendent	 in	the	armour	of	great-hearted	Achilles.	To	rouse	their	spirits	he	went	up	and	spoke	to	each	of	them	in	turn:	to	Mesthles	and	Glaucus;	to	Medon	and	Thersilochus;	to	 Asteropaeus,	 Deisenor	 and	 Hippothous;	 to	 Phorcys	 and	 Chromis	 and	Ennomus	the	prophet…	The	Trojans	advanced	in	a	mass,	and	Hector	led	them.	As	a	great	wave	roars	against	the	current	flowing	out	of	the	mouth	of	a	sky-fed	river,	and	the	seashore’s	headlands	on	either	side	boom	thunderously	as	 the	sea	washes	back	–	with	such	a	roar	did	the	Trojans	advance.	(Iliad	XVII:	184-196;	210-219;	263-267).		
2.1.	So	sang	the	poet	of	Hector	who	was	aroused	by	the	dreadful	Warlike	Arēs	[Arēs	 deinos	 enualios],	 the	 terrible	War-god	 inspiring	 in	 the	 soul	 of	 man	 the	divine	 exaltation	 of	 rage	 [menis]	 and	 affect	 [thumos]	 satiating	 the	 body	with	vigour	[sthenos]	–	a	catatonic	eruption	and	abrupt	disappearance	of	force	[bia].	Intoxicated	 spirits	 of	 Arēs,	 the	 Trojan	 friends	 of	war	 [Trōsi	 philoptolemoisin]	charge	with	the	force	of	a	wave	thrusting	against	the	seashore,	having	been	fed	by	Zeus	the	mighty	Sky-god.	War	[polemos]	is	immanent	man	as	it	is	immanent	the	 kosmos:	 the	 spirit	 mirrors	 the	 sky,	 the	 rage	 of	 the	 fierce	 warm-blooded	warrior	 [polemistēs]	 echoes	 Aithon	 [Red-fire],	 Phlogeus	 [Flame],	 Konabos	[Tumult]	and	Phobos	 [Panic-fear],	 the	 fire-breathing	 immortal	stallions	driving	
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the	chariot	of	Arēs.	Blissfully	blood	thirsty,	Trojan	beasts	of	prey	run	about	on	the	stage	of	existence,	a	 firestorm	of	 flashing	helmets,	of	glittering	spearheads	and	shining	blades,	of	bronze	shields	and	armours	glowing	in	the	sun.	Up	until	the	fifth	century	BC,	the	oratory	tradition	guided	the	exegesis	and	interpretation	of	war	[polemos].9	The	world	is	folded	upon	signs	that	find	their	similitude	 in	war:	war	 speaks	 to	man	 through	 the	hymns	of	 the	poet,	 and	 the	gods	 speak	 to	 men	 through	 war.	 War	 reveals	 men	 in	 their	 ‘unconcealdness’	[alētheia],	 and	 things	 reveal	 themselves	 to	 man	 in	 the	 form	 of	 war,	 as	oppositions	of	contraries	forming	relationships	of	conflict	and	tension.	All	things	find	 their	 resemblance	 in	polemos	 constituting	 relationships	 of	 opposites;	 day	and	 night	 resemble	 male	 and	 female,	 famine	 and	 plenty.	 War	 is	 a	 sign	 of	similitude,	which	is	doubled	and	multiplied	in	an	infinite	series	of	relationships	of	 tension:	 so	 the	 Oracle	 of	 Delphi	 does	 not	 speak,	 but	 relies	 on	 signs	 that	juxtaposes	 opposites,10	and	 so	 truth	 [alētheia]	 enunciates	 itself	 through	 signs	[tekmērion]11	that,	by	the	perpetual	motion	of	being	pulled	together	and	drawn	apart	 by	 war	 constitute	 a	 vibrant	 harmony	 of	 opposites,	 and	 by	 this	juxtaposition	 of	 opposites	 the	 kosmos	 is	 linked	 together	 in	 a	 chain	 of	resemblances.12	War	appears	in	the	vibrating	tension	of	the	seven-stringed	lyre	that	when	played	emits	 the	 sound	of	 the	kosmos,13	the	kosmos	 resonating	 in	 a	harmony	of	tension,	an	invisible	harmonia	like	the	continuous	tug-of-war	within	the	bow	bent	upon	 itself	 by	 the	 force	 of	 the	 string:	 “…	being	 at	 variance	with	itself	 it	 agrees	with	 itself,	 an	attunement	 [harmonia]	of	opposite	 tensions,	 like	that	of	the	bow	and	lyre.”14	The	sign,	in	itself	a	conjunction	of	opposites,	always	appears	 in	 the	 relationship	of	polemos.	The	 sign	bares	 the	markings	of	war;	 it																																																									9	See	Nietzsche	in	Homer	and	Classical	Philology	(2006:	1).	10	According	to	Heraclitus’	fragment	93:	“The	Lord	who	owns	the	oracle	at	Delphi	neither	speaks	nor	hides	his	meaning	but	indicates	it	by	a	sign”.	11	In	some	cases,	the	Greeks	distinguished	between	sēmeion	and	tekmērion	as	in	Euripides’	
Electra	(511-580),	where	sēmeion	could	be	arbitrary	in	contrast	to	tekmērion,	which	signifies	a	sign	of	greater	certainty.	12	The	metopes	that	decorated	the	walls	of	the	early	Greek	temple	depict	the	cosmos	in	terms	of	a	series	of	polarities	analogous	to	each	other;	Heracles	battling	Geryon,	Theseus	fighting	Sciron	etc.	(DuBois	1999:	89).		13	According	to	Hippolytus:	“In	this	way	Pythagoras	showed	the	monad	to	be	god,	and	having	made	profound	study	of	the	nature	of	number	he	asserted	the	cosmos	sings	and	is	harmoniously	constructed,	and	he	was	the	first	to	reduce	the	motion	of	the	seven	planets	to	rhythm	and	melody”.	(Refutatio	I:	2.2).	14	Heraclitus	fr.	51.	
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cannot	escape	war.	The	kosmos	and	all	things	united	in	their	hidden	harmonia	of	conflict	 are	 steered	 [kubernaō]15	by	 polemos.	 War	 functions:	 without	 polemos	the	kosmos	would	disintegrate	and	perish,	 for	without	 the	harmony	of	conflict	the	bow	is	unstrung,	the	strings	of	the	lyre	numb	and	the	perpetual	movement	of	the	seven	planets	ceased.	In	 Archaic	 Greece	 and	 for	 most	 of	 the	 classical	 period,	 listening	 to	 the	Homeric	hymns	of	heroes,	their	deeds	and	acts,	still	invokes	in	the	souls	of	men	the	intimate	sense	of	resemblance	that	binds	man	to	kosmos	and	with	it	love	and	happiness	to	war.	The	adjective	philopolemos	[lover	of	or	friend	of	war]	occurs	most	 frequently	 in	Homer	 and	 is	 sometimes	used	 interchangeably	with	arēios	[the	 adjective	 form	 of	 Arēs,	 god	 of	 war]	 and	 arētē	 [excellence,	 honour],16	expressing	 the	 highest	 praise	 in	 Homer	 placing	 the	 strife	 of	 the	 warrior	[polemistēs]	 among	 the	 deeds	 and	 acts	 of	 gods.	 The	 archaic	 sense	 of	 being	
philopolemos	 is	 very	 difficult	 to	 render	 accurately,	 since	 nothing	 either	 in	 our	experience	 or	 language	 quite	 recalls	 this	mode	 of	 being.	 It	 is	 so	 far	 removed	from	the	mode	of	self-relationship	that	would	come	to	guide	modern	man	who	has	 his	 desires	 and	 his	 pleasures.	 Being	 philopolemos	 is	 beyond	 what	psychoanalysis	with	 Lacan	would	 discover	 under	 the	 theme	 of	 jouissance	 and	the	 crude	 mechanics	 of	 the	 pleasure	 principle. 17 	It	 applies	 to	 different	coordinates	of	time,	a	different	order	of	temporality,	than	what	pertains	to	the	modern	experience	of	feeble	emotions	wherein	one	could	find	pleasure	in	pain.	In	 the	attempt	of	approaching	an	experience	that	may	remain	closed	off	 to	us,	we	could	draw	a	very	vague	sketch	and	say	that,	in	the	friendship	with	war,	it	is	not	man	that	has	desires	or	passions,	but	rather	the	passions	that	have	man.	It	is	the	 overwhelming	 sway,	 which,	 as	 it	 enters	 into	 openness,	 appears	 as	 a	 sign	written	 on	 the	 body	 of	 the	 singular	 polemistēs	 [warrior].	 It	 is	 the	 fleeting	moment	of	the	vigorous	display	of	bia	[force]	and	kratos	[power];	an	instant	act	of	 becoming	 that	 realises	 all	 potentialities	 of	man,	which	 then	withdraws	 and																																																									15	Both	the	verbs	kubernaō	and	oiakizō	meaning	‘to	steer’	frequently	appear	in	fifth	century	texts,	for	example,	in	Diogenes	Apollonia’s	fr.	5	and	in	Heraclitus’	fr.	41.	16	Homer	often	uses	the	adjective	arētē	to	describe	the	male	hērōs	or	polemistēs,	however,	arētē	also	occurs	in	the	context	of	female	figures	such	as	Penelope	in	which	case	it	takes	on	a	broader	sense	of	excellence	in	terms	of	using	all	faculties	to	their	greatest	potential;	strength,	courage,	wit,	and	deceptiveness.	17	See	Lacan	(2008:	235-68).	
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falls	back	into	the	world.	It	is	the	profound	sensation	of	vigour,	happiness,	and	bliss	[makaria],	which	is	felt	under	the	dark	horizon	of	combat	[makhē].	When,	in	several	passages	of	 the	hymns,	Homer	verses	on	either	the	Achaeans	or	the	Trojans	in	terms	of	having	arētē	or	being	philopolemos,	he	adheres	to	a	mode	of	being	 in	 which	 the	 divine	 propinquity	 of	 love	 [philo],	 rage	 [menis],	 and	spiritedness	 [thumos]	 find	 their	 attunement	 [harmonia]	 in	 the	 steering	 by	
polemos	of	kosmos;	it	is	the	site	where	life	most	intense,	most	honourable,	most	divine,	and	most	worthy	of	praise	–	the	 life	of	the	hērōs	–	shines	 in	the	abrupt	emptiness	of	death.	To	the	Archaic	Greeks,	life	or	being	[phusis]	is	precisely	also	not	 to	 be	 [existasthai]	 (Heidegger	 2000:	 67),	 since	 phusis	 expresses	 the	relationship	of	opposites	found	in	polemos.	The	friendship	with	war,	then,	is	also	the	absolute	proximity	of	phusis	to	existasthai.	This	is	how	Achilles,	best	among	the	Achaeans,	not	only	resembles	the	Olympian	gods	in	his	deeds	and	acts,	but	also	 in	 the	 sense	 that	 he,	 as	 hērōs,	 traverses	 a	 realm	 beyond	 mere	 men,	 the	realm	of	the	demi-gods	to	whom	the	friendship	with	war	is	always	bought	at	the	loss	of	life.	Death	meets	the	hērōs	early.	This	too	belongs	to	the	sense	and	mode	of	being	philopolemos.	However,	 this	 is	 not	 to	 say	 that	 tragodia	 [tragedy]	 accompanies	 the	friendship	 with	 war	 in	 the	 Greek	 oratory	 tradition.	 Unlike	 the	 hērōs	 of	 the	classical	world,	in	whom	the	friendship	with	war	would	be	caught	in	the	endless	cycle	of	hubris-atē-hamartia-nemesis	[hubris-seduction-misjudgement-nemesis]	and	put	on	display	at	the	Athenian	theatre	of	Dionysus	in	its	profoundly	archaic	stature,	 the	 Homeric	 polemistēs	 moves	 within	 a	 world	 where	 act	 [agein]	 and	becoming	 still	 have	 a	 positive	 relation	 to	 rage	 [menis]	 and	 spiritedness	[thumos].	In	a	world	steered	by	polemos,	menis	is	like	the	upsurge	of	fire	[pur]	of	which	 the	world	 is	made,18	the	 tense	 force	 relations	 that	 by	 their	 conjunction	[logos]	 ignite	and	explode	 lighting	up	 the	 theatre	of	being	 [phusis];	 it	 is	 like	a	storm	or	a	wave	 that	 carries	 the	polemistēs	 and	hērōs	 in	his	deeds	and	acts,	 a	force	 that	 fills	 his	 limbs	 with	 vigour	 as	 the	 vehicle	 of	 divine	 creation	 and	destruction.	 To	 the	 archaic	 warrior,	 menis	 is	 what	 a	 first	 principle	 would	become	to	the	classical	philosopher.	It	is	like	a	substance	out	which	the	world	is	made	and	set	 in	motion,	 the	world	equalling	 the	sum	of	an	 infinite	number	of																																																									18	Heraclitus	fr.	30.	
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battles	going	on	within	it.	Rage	resembles	the	ever-living	fire	of	kosmos,	because	it	is	similar	to	the	fire	that	originates	movement	in	all	things.	Rage	flares	up	in	the	hērōs	and	carves	out	an	opening	–	a	clearing	–	 into	what	would	otherwise	always	be	re-absorbed	by	the	invisible	harmonia	of	conflict,	the	constancy	of	life	[zoē]	limited	by	the	struggle	of	nature	[phusis]	that	lends	it	a	kind	of	thickness.	This	is	to	say	that	in	a	world	steered	by	polemos,	menis	and	thumos	make	action	[agein]	 possible,	 but	 not	 in	 the	 sense	 of	 the	 conscientious	mind	 acting	 in	 the	world.	Rather,	they	animate	the	ever-living	fire	found	in	the	steering	of	kosmos	by	polemos,	which	brings	into	presence	these	tense	force	relations	in	the	deeds	and	acts	of	the	hērōs.	Without	menis	and	thumos,	the	hērōs	would	not	be	able	to	perform	his	role	in	the	great	cosmic	spectacle	of	the	theatre	of	being.	In	 fact,	 he	 could	 no	 longer	 be	what	 the	 Greeks	 referred	 to	 as	 agōnistes,	which	is	what	we	recognise	as	the	substantive	form	of	agōnia	[struggle	between	equals	or	resemblances]	although	no	such	clear	grammatical	distinction	existed	at	this	point	in	time.	Agōnistes	is	a	predication	that	refers	to	a	condition	of	being	[phusis]	rather	than	the	identity	of	a	subject.	This	is	attested	to	also	in	how	the	Greeks	 conceived	 of	 the	 event	 of	 action	 grammatically.	Agōnistes	 is	 the	 same	word	we	find	in	what	we	see	as	the	form	of	an	adverb,	agein,	a	word	that	could	take	on	a	variety	of	meanings,	but	is	often	translated	as	to	lead,	to	guide,	to	set	in	 motion,	 and	 to	 carry	 off.	 Here,	 however,	 we	 cannot	 follow	 the	 later	grammarians,	since	what	we	would	understand	as	the	fundamental	relationship	between	noun	and	verb	has	not	been	worked	out	at	this	point	in	time.	What	was	understood	 by	 agein	 was	 not	 the	 logic	 ascribed	 to	 action	 in	 syntax,	 as	 in	 the	event	of	man	acting	in	the	world.	This	would	not	be	done,	and	only	so	in	a	rather	rudimentary	 manner,	 before	 Plato	 (Heidegger	 2000:	 60-61).	 In	 the	 archaic	world,	action	 is	disclosed	 in	being	as	 the	emergent	sway	of	 the	conjunction	of	opposites;	agōnia	is	phusis	engendered	by	the	forces	of	menis	and	thumos	so	as	to	constitute	what	we	would	see	as	action.	But	as	the	wide	semantic	fields	of	the	words	agein	and	agōnia	also	attest	to,	action	is	not	what	emerged	from	the	site	of	 the	mind	(Snell	1982:	31).	 It	 is	rather	the	effect	of	certain	forces,	which	are	channelled	through	the	divine	passages	of	menis	and	thumos	that	in	Homer	bind	man	to	the	will	of	gods	and,	in	Heraclitus,	to	the	Logos	of	polemos.	
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This	is	also	how	the	deed	of	the	hērōs,	as	he	triumphantly	raises	his	sword	over	the	dead	body	of	his	opponent,	is	not	considered	by	the	hērōs	as	the	effect	of	his	own	decision.	Rather,	he	senses	that	certain	forces,	which	are	never	in	his	possession	 and	 which	 have	 no	 origin	 in	 him,	 shape	 his	 course.	 As	 such	 his	actions	 merely	 express	 continuity	 with	 the	 world.	 Moreover,	 they	 do	 not	establish	any	permanent	difference	out	of	what	 is	 essentially	 life	at	 level	with	the	 world.	 Difference	 certainly	 emerges	 out	 of	 the	 relationship	 of	 opposites	found	in	the	agonistic	struggle	to	the	death	between	hērōs	and	hērōs,	but	always	in	 a	 provisional	way.	 “War	 is	 father	 of	 all	 and	 king	 of	 all”,	which	 is	 how	war,	Heraclitus	says	in	fragment	53,	reveals	some	men	as	gods,	others	as	men,	some	he	makes	slaves,	others	free.	Polemos	gives	birth	to	the	difference	between	god	and	man,	 the	slave	and	the	 free,	but	 there	 is	no	 finality	at	stake	here.	Polemos	does	not	disclose	god	and	man	 in	 the	 shadowless	night	of	 the	 final	battle,	 the	kind	 of	 ideal	 war	 the	 philosophers	 and	 jurists	 in	 time	would	 come	 to	 dream	about.	Polemos	continuously	engenders	new	relationships	of	forces,	because	it	is	in	 itself	 similar	 to	 the	 infinite	 relativity	 of	 difference,	 which	 originates	movement	in	all	things	and	what	the	Greeks	saw	as	the	steering	of	the	kosmos.	Inequalities	and	divisions	appear,	but	always	in	a	transitory	manner;	in	war,	the	
hērōs	dies,	new	gods	appear,	and	the	slave	becomes	the	master	of	the	free	man.	This	 is	also	to	say,	 then,	 that	polemos	 cannot	be	ascribed	to	any	being	or	referred	to	any	unique	source	of	sovereignty	from	where	power	would	emanate	and	descend	upon	man.	Polemos	cannot	be	acquired,	seized,	or	shared,	and	it	is	not	a	certain	force	that	appears	exclusively	in	the	hērōs.	Do	we	need	to	say	that	
polemos	 is	 everywhere,	 and	 thus	 anticipate	what	 power	would	 achieve	when	Foucault	 ‘calligraphied’	the	social	sciences?	Continuing	this	line	of	thought,	the	sign	hērōs	does	not	refer	to	the	privileged	place	of	power	embodied	in	man,	but	rather	to	a	state	of	potentiality	that	turns	into	actuality	as	rage	flashes	up	in	the	steering	of	the	polemistēs	by	polemos.	Like	the	animal	that	brings	down	its	rival,	the	hērōs	who	slays	his	opponent	has	simply	found	himself	in	a	particular	set	of	circumstances,	 and	 as	 such	 is	 nothing	 more	 than	 the	 actualisation	 of	 certain	potentialities,	the	bare	manifestation	of	the	Logos	according	to	which	all	things	
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come	 to	pass.19	However,	unlike	 the	animal	whose	apathetic	gaze	after	mortal	combat	expresses	the	mere	monarchy	of	nature,	the	hērōs	knows	the	gods	were	in	his	favour	and	his	rage	and	savagery	the	manifestation	of	a	divine	inspiration	born	out	of	the	harmonia	of	kosmos.	The	hērōs	slays	his	opponent,	not	because	his	is	compelled	to	do	so	by	any	mortal	being	or	because	of	a	conscientious	mind	that	calls	upon	him	to	act,	but	because	the	dreadful	Warlike	Arēs	has	entered	his	spirit.	 Sloterdijk	 captures	 this	 most	 accurately,	 as	 he	 explains	 how	 the	 early	Greek	hērōs	must	be	understood	as	‘a	vessel	for	the	abrupt	flow	of	energy	from	the	 gods’	 (2010:	 8).	 This	 is	 precisely	 how	 we	 must	 understand	 agein	 as	 it	appears	 in	 the	 figure	 of	 the	 Archaic	 Greek	 hērōs.	 In	 this	 world,	 there	 are	 no	subjects	who	act	on	objects.	On	the	contrary,	agein,	in	the	sense	of	agōnia,	is	the	flow	 of	 rage	 and	 spiritedness	 that	 gathers	 in	 the	 hērōs	 who	 conducts	 these	forces	 in	 the	 intense	 mediation	 between	 immortals	 and	 mortals.	 In	 a	 world	without	 rage	 and	 spiritedness,	 man,	 along	 with	 the	 gods,	 would	 regress	 and	disappear	 into	 the	 senseless	 emptiness	 of	 an	 eternal	 silence	with	 no	 steering	[kubernaō]	or	meaning,	that	is,	if	we	are	to	apply	a	more	familiar	term	to	what	the	Greeks	thought	of	in	terms	of	gathering	[logos]	as	truth	[alētheia].	Now,	this	immediate	proximity	to	the	divine	in	the	cosmic	event	of	agōnia	is	also	what	makes	 this	a	happening	worthy	of	song	and	praise	by	 the	poet	 in	whom	 it	 becomes	 deed	 and	 act.	 The	 rage	 and	 fury	 of	 the	hērōs	 read	 as	 signs	marked	by	the	gods,	and	the	poet	is	he	who	will	gather	these	signs	and	let	them	enter	 into	openness.	The	poet	 is	he	who,	 in	 listening	to	the	Logos	of	polemos20	catches	that	‘other	language’,	without	words	or	discourse,	the	language	in	which	the	gods	speak	to	man	through	the	signs	that	bare	the	markings	of	war.	As	the	
agōnia	 of	 the	 hērōs	 enters	 into	 language	 and	 becomes	 deed	 and	 act,	 man	encounters	 the	 illuminated	glow	of	 the	hērōs,	 as	he	 sets	 forth	 into	 the	unsaid,	breaks	 into	 the	 unthought,	 compels	 what	 has	 never	 happened,	 and	 makes	appear	what	was	unseen.	The	poet	opens	his	mouth	to	let	the	signs	speak	their	similitude	 and	 let	 the	 language	 be	 known	 in	which	 love,	 rage,	 and	 happiness	glitter	 in	 the	 universal	 resemblance	 with	 war.	 But	 with	 the	 poet’s	 song,	 the	Greeks	 also	 discovered	what	 seems	 to	 pertain	 to	 every	deed	 and	 act	whether																																																									19		“…	all	things	come	to	pass	in	accordance	with	this	Logos...”	(Heraclitus	fr.	1).	20	“Listen	not	to	me	but	to	the	Logos…”	(Heraclitus	fr.	50).	
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accompanied	by	poets,	philosophers,	 or	 statesmen.	As	Heidegger	explains,	 the	Greeks	 would	 discover	 the	 dangerous	 forces	 of	 the	 deinon,	 the	 uncanny	ambiguity	that	traverses	the	opposed	confrontations	of	polemos:	“The	deinon	is	the	 terrible	 in	 the	 sense	of	 the	overwhelming	 sway,	which	 induces	panic-fear,	true	 anxiety,	 as	 well	 as	 collected,	 inwardly	 reverberating,	 reticent	 awe”	(Heidegger	 2000:	 114-15).	 This	 too	 belongs	 to	 the	 poet’s	 song	 or,	 more	precisely,	the	poet’s	song	belongs	to	it,	to	the	terrible	and	the	dreadful.	The	poet	sings	 of	 the	 fury	 that	 sparks	 across	 the	kosmos	 as	 the	 terrible	War-god	 [Arēs	deinos	enualios]	rides	his	chariot	pulled	by	the	fire-breathing	immortal	stallions.	The	 poet	 makes	 known	 how	 man,	 under	 the	 influence	 of	 Arēs,	 becomes	 to	
dainotaton	knowing	“…	no	kindness	and	conciliation	(in	the	ordinary	sense),	no	appeasement	 and	 mollification	 by	 success	 or	 prestige	 and	 by	 their	confirmation…”	(Ibid.	125).	At	the	same	time,	the	poet’s	song	is	itself	the	very	workings	of	the	deinon21	since	 there	 is	 no	 separation	 between	 agōnia	 and	 the	 poet	 who	 recounts	 the	event.	 Just	as	 there	 is	no	subject	at	stake	 in	 the	Homeric	hērōs	and	polemistēs,	the	poiitis	[poet]	simply	considers	his	spirit	to	be	a	medium	of	the	awe-inspiring	forces	of	kosmos,	which	he	can	never	master,	but	only	convey.	In	fact,	this	is	how	the	Iliad,	as	a	text,	is	written	in	the	codes	of	rage.	For	the	hero	and	the	poet	who	recounts	his	deeds	and	acts,	 the	dreadful	and	 the	 terrible	are	 the	deepest	and	broadest	affirmation	of	the	overwhelming	sway	of	polemos.	In	time,	tragedy	will	want	 the	 arrest	 of	 the	 hero	 and	 his	 friendship	with	war,	 but	 in	 the	 period	 of	archaic	 Greece	 knowledge	 supports	 a	 world	 without	 any	 boundaries,	 but	
polemos.	It	supports	the	knowledge	of	polemos,	because	it	runs	with	the	grain	of	rage,	 suffering,	 and	happiness.	 Like	 the	 sign	 life	 shares	 its	 name	–	bios	–	with	that	of	the	bow	whose	work	is	death,22	so	the	terrible	expresses	the	divinity	of	
polemos	 in	which	 life	 cannot	 be	 known	but	 in	 conjunction	with	 death.	 This	 is	also	to	say	that,	at	this	point	in	time,	the	knowledge	of	war	does	not	include	any	notion	of	the	consequences	of	failing	to	recognise	war	on	the	side	of	violence.	As																																																									21	Heidegger	uses	the	term	deinon	in	an	ontological	sense	of	artistic	creation	through	destruction,	which	entails	a	form	of	being	that	stands	at	all	times	in	a	position	of	daring,	a	form	of	being	through	creation	that	knows	no	appeacement.	I	will	be	referring	to	it	in	the	historically	contingent	sense,	as	it	occurs	in	discourse.	22	“The	bow's	name	is	life	[bios],	though	its	work	is	death.”	(Heraclitus	fr.	48).	
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long	 as	 the	 subject	 remains	 absent	 in	 the	 world	 of	 beings,	 violence	 does	 not	appear	 in	 the	 vocabulary	 of	 the	 ancients,	 simply	 because	 the	 sublime	 and	terrible	 forces	of	war	 are	never	 recognised	as	 the	 effect	 of	decisions	made	by	man.	When	the	Goddess	sings	of	the	rage	of	the	son	of	Peleus,	it	is	therefore	not	so	much	a	plea	 for	man	 to	 curb,	 attenuate,	 or	 rule	over	his	passions	 as	 it	 is	 a	matter	 of	making	 the	 order	 of	 things	 be	 known,	 to	 let	 the	 divinity	 of	 rage	 be	known;	to	let	the	signs	of	polemos	be	heard	in	their	attunement	to	voice.	In	this	sense,	the	song	of	the	Goddess	is	nothing	more	than	an	account	of	the	steering	of	being	 and	 kosmos,	 as	 engendered	 by	 man’s	 friendship	 with	 polemos.	 The	positive	 ground	 of	 knowledge,	 rage	 and	 spiritedness	 function	 as	 primary	sources	 of	 both	 deed	 and	 suffering	 by	whose	 kinship	with	 war	 knowledge	 is	recounted	 and	 disseminated.	 In	 fact,	 this	 is	 also	 how	 the	 story	we	 find	 in	 the	Goddess’	song	becomes	possible.	I	say	story	because	it	is	not	an	actual	discourse,	at	 least	 in	 the	 modern	 sense.	 It	 is	 a	 tale	 and	 one	 that	 speaks	 in	 crude	resemblances	 and	 odd	 similes.	 It	 is	 not	 an	 erudite	 account,	 then,	 if	 we	 by	erudition	mean	a	certain	form	of	scholarly	rigorousness	and	the	application	of	scientific	method.	Nor	does	it	seem	to	pay	attention	to	detail	or	accuracy,	and	it	appears	to	have	no	account	of	time	and	space.	From	our	perspective,	the	poiitis,	who	as	logographos	[storyteller]	recounts	the	Logos,	appears	to	be	situated	in	a	kind	of	permanent	suspension	from	where	he	delivers	his	message,	fatally	and	solemnly,	 like	 a	 plea	 that	 cannot	 be	 refuted.	 But	 this	 account	 [logos]	 is	 of	 the	same	 order	 of	 reality	 as	 the	Logos	 it	 recounts.	 The	 poet’s	 song	 gathers	 in	 the	spirit	 of	 man	 like	 a	 gift	 that	 cannot	 be	 refused;	 a	 gift	 in	 the	 sense	 that	 the	message	of	the	poet’s	song	is	already	predicated	by	language.	In	fact,	so	much	so	that	the	message	his	song	recounts,	the	order	it	depicts,	and	its	fabrication	into	signs	are	so	similar	that	they	are	captured	by	the	same	word;	logos.23	What	is	this	logos	[story]	saying	then?	Well,	obviously	there	is	the	account	of	Paris	running	off	with	Helen,	which	sets	the	relations	of	forces	in	motion	by	setting	off	 rage.	The	 infuriated	Menelaus	and	 the	Achaeans	 find	 themselves	 in																																																									23As	Guthrie	shows,	in	the	archaic	period,	and	for	much	of	the	classical,	the	word	logos	had	a	wide	semantic	field	and	could	attain	a	variety	of	meanings	denoting	anything	said,	a	story	or	narrative,	an	account	or	explanation,	a	speech,	an	opinion,	worth	or	esteem,	rumour,	report	and	several	more	meanings	(Guthrie	2003:	420-424).	
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the	 condition	 of	 agōnia	 with	 Troy	 compelled	 to	 win	 back	 Helen.	 And	 so,	 the	Troyan	War	begins	with	the	apparent	theft	of	a	woman,	a	theme	which	actually	also	 figures	 in	 other	 Greek	 sources.24	After	 ten	 years	 and	 the	 deaths	 of	many	heroes	on	both	sides,	including	Achilles	and	Ajax,	Hector	and	Paris,	the	city	falls	to	the	ploy	of	the	cunning	Achaeans,	the	infamous	Trojan	Horse.	Having	held	out	the	 Achaean	 siege	 for	 ten	 years,	 in	 the	 end,	 the	 Trojans	 who,	 albeit	 by	 the	intervention	 of	 the	 gods,	 brought	 the	war	 upon	 themselves	 by	 ‘carrying	 off	 a	woman’	are	unable	to	escape	a	miserable	death,	as	war	is	decided	not	so	much	by	 force,	 but	 out	 of	 accident,	 deceit,	 and	misjudgement.	 But	 there	 is	 another	
logos	to	be	found	in	the	poet’s	song,	one	that	is	also	recounted	under	the	theme	of	 ‘women-stealing’.	As	we	know,	much	of	the	Iliad	revolves	around	the	efforts	of	 bringing	 Achilles	 back	 into	 the	 fight	 after	 Agamemnon,	 basileus	 [king]	 and	
arkhōn	[leader],	has	laid	claim	to	the	fair-cheeked	Briseis	(whose	name	literally	means	 the	 ‘tight-belted’),	 although	 she	had	been	awarded	Achilles	 as	his	war-prize.	Achilles	then	refuses	to	fight	for	the	Achaeans.	In	fact,	he	turns	against	the	Achaeans	unleashing	rage	and	fury	on	his	own	folk	sparing	no	soul.	Perching	in	his	 tent	 and	 bristling	with	 anger,	 he	 remains	 outside	 of	 the	 battlefield	 to	 the	detriment	of	the	Achaean	forces	until	Hector	by	mistake	kills	Patroclus,	the	dear	friend	of	Achilles.	Achilles	now	takes	his	arms,	has	another	armour	crafted	by	the	forces	of	the	underworld,	and	is	carried	off	to	combat,	not	by	the	command	of	 any	 king	 or	 leader,	 but	 by	 the	 raging	 forces	 of	polemos	 according	 to	which	kinship	everyone	who	is	a	true	philopolemos	must	to	return	a	‘favour’	[charis]	to	a	fellow	polemistēs.25	
																																																								24	At	the	beginning	of	his	Histories	(1.4),	Herodotus	discusses	the	theme	of	‘carrying	women	off’	[harpazein	gunaikas]	tracing	the	origin	of	hostilities	between	the	Greeks	and	the	Persians	to	the	robbery	[harpagas]	of	a	certain	Lacedaemonian	woman.	The	Phoenicians	stole	Io,	the	Greeks	carried	off	Europa,	then	Medea,	and	Paris	ran	off	with	Helen,	Herodotus	explains	and	continues:	“So	far	it	was	a	matter	of	mere	robbery	on	both	sides.	But	after	this	(the	Persians	say),	the	Greeks	were	very	much	to	blame;	for	they	invaded	Asia	before	the	Persians	attacked	Europe.	‘We	think,’	they	say,	‘that	it	is	unjust	to	carry	women	off.	But	to	be	anxious	to	avenge	rape	is	foolish:	wise	men	take	no	notice	of	such	things.	For	plainly	the	women	would	never	have	been	carried	away,	had	they	not	wanted	it	themselves.	We	of	Asia	did	not	deign	to	notice	the	robbery	of	our	women;	but	the	Greeks,	for	the	sake	of	a	Lacedaemonian	woman,	recruited	a	great	armada,	came	to	Asia,	and	destroyed	the	power	of	Priam.	Ever	since	then	we	have	regarded	Greeks	as	our	enemies’.”	25	In	Homer,	to	help	or	avenge	a	fellow	polemistēs	is	an	obligation;	it	is	to	do	him	a	favour	[charis]	(Iliad	I.152-60;	IIII.95-96).	
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While	the	theme	of	women-stealing	is	certainly	topologically	important	in	the	world	of	ancient	Greece,	 it	 appears	here	 to	demonstrate	a	 certain	 logos.	 It	sets	 the	 scene	 for	 a	 chain	 of	 events	 to	 unfold	 from	 the	 setting-into-motion	[agein]	 of	 the	workings	 of	polemos.	 I	 say	 setting-into-motion	here	 rather	 than	violation,	because,	at	this	point	in	time,	tragedy	has	yet	to	recount	the	 logos	 in	terms	of	 the	codes	of	nomos	 [law]	and	 justice	[dikē].	Agamemnon	and	Achilles	are	neither	protagonists	nor	 antagonists	 of	 the	 sense	of	 justice	we	 find	 in	 the	idea	 of	 dikē,	 which,	 as	 it	 appears	 in	 the	 classical	 political	 discourse	 of	 Plato,	concerns	a	matter	of	 the	 relationship	between	 the	 ‘well-ordered’	 soul	 and	 the	laws	of	political	community.	However,	in	the	archaic	oratory	tradition	we	do	not	find	 the	 kind	 of	 logos,	 which	 would	 be	 derived	 from	 the	 sense	 of	 justice	 of	classical	philosophy,	the	logos	in	which	an	unfortunate	chain	of	events	occurs	as	the	effect	of	misguided	souls.	Rage	and	spiritedness	appear,	but	are	never	made	a	matter	 that	 concerns	 the	 proper	 order	 of	 the	 soul.	 In	 fact,	 this	 logos	 has	 no	need	to	be	affirmed	by	recourse	to	the	originarity	of	the	soul,	as	when	Plato,	in	book	ten	of	the	Laws,	undertakes	to	dismantle	the	Sophistic	opposition	between	
phusis	[nature]	and	nomos	[custom].	It	knows	no	separation	between	phusis	and	
nomos,	because	 it	has	no	privileged	origin	 in	 the	soul	and	no	originarity	other	than	what	is	given	by	polemos	as	the	disclosure	of	that	which	is	[phusis].	This	is	how	 the	 conflict	between	Agamemnon	and	Achilles,	 the	arkhōn	 and	 the	hērōs,	appears	as	a	man-to-man	relation	of	enmity	unmediated	by	justice	in	the	sense	of	 dikē.	 It	 is	 equally	 important	 to	 note,	 however,	 that	 this	 struggle	 is	 not	 the	agonistic	struggle	among	equals,	as	in	the	metope-like	encounter	of	hērōs	versus	
hērōs	 that	 appears	between	Achilles	 and	Hector.	 It	 is	 rather	 that	 of	 enmity	 as	antagonism	 [neikos]	 that	 surfaces	 as	 a	 disturbance	 of	 the	 order	 of	 things,	 a	transgression,	not	in	the	sense	of	a	violation	that	will	be	sanctioned	by	law,	but	rather	as	an	event	that	will	simply	meet	the	course	of	war.	Beneath	the	grand	tale	of	epic	battles	between	gods,	heroes,	and	kings,	we	find	the	story	of	a	certain	course	of	events,	then,	or,	more	accurately,	a	certain	
logos	of	war.	It	is	a	logos	that	bares	witness	to	a	condition	in	which	the	forces	of	war	have	yet	 to	become	 integrated	 in	a	politico-juridical	order	at	which	point	the	arkhōn	will	come	to	occupy	the	privileged	position	of	the	stratēgos	[general]	who	by	principle	rules	over	men	by	command	[arkhein].	The	relation	between	
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Agamemnon	 and	 Achilles	 clearly	 shows	 no	 traces	 of	 such	 principle,	 which	 is	how	 Agamemnon	 can	 only	 hope	 to	 influence	 the	 course	 of	 Achilles	 indirectly	through	sanctions.	Moreover,	his	attempt	of	manipulating	the	relations	of	forces	that	 govern	 the	hērōs	 never	 succeeds.	Deleuze	 and	Guattari	 (2007:	 388)	 have	suggested	 that,	 from	 the	 point	 view	 of	 the	 sovereign,	 the	 course	 of	 Achilles	seems	to	read	as	a	betrayal	of	the	politico-juridical	order,	the	pact,	and	the	bond.	This	 is	 certainly	 true,	 though	not	 entirely	 accurate.	Achilles	 cannot	betray	 the	pact	and	the	bond	for	the	same	reason	that	Agamemnon	cannot	succeed	in	his	strategic	attempt	of	manipulating	the	hērōs,	the	reason	being	that	dikē	has	yet	to	be	 discovered	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 well-ordered	 soul	 as	 the	 principle	 of	 political	order.	The	absence	of	the	classical	politico-juridical	idea	of	order	is	striking	in	the	behaviour	 of	 Achilles,	 but	 actually	 no	 less	 so	 in	 the	 event	where	Agamemnon	lays	claim	to	the	war-prize	of	Achilles.	Agamemnon	says:	“…	I	will	myself	come	to	 your	 tent	 and	 take	 the	 fair-cheeked	 Briseis,	 your	 prize,	 so	 that	 you	 will	understand	 how	much	mightier	 I	 am	 than	 you,	 and	 another	may	 shrink	 from	declaring	himself	my	equal	and	likening	himself	to	me	to	my	face.”	(Iliad	I:	182-186).	Here,	bia	 [force]	 and	kratos	 [power]	 function	as	 claims	 to	authority.	We	are	 in	a	basic	relationship	of	dominance	 then	rather	 than	one	where	 the	well-ordered	soul	obeys	and	 follows	 the	command	of	 the	sovereign.	Moreover,	and	precisely	because	of	this,	Agamemnon’s	claim	constitutes	a	violation	at	the	most	fundamental	 level,	 since	 the	 one	 who	 is	 first	 by	 rank	 of	 king	 or	 war	 leader	cannot	claim	a	right	to	authority	over	the	one	who	is	phertatos	[best,	bravest]	by	force,	honour,	and	excellence	[arētē].	Conversely,	what	reads	as	the	betrayal	by	Achilles	of	the	bond	and	the	pact	actually	reflects	the	fact	that	the	hērōs	answers	to	 a	 different	 order	 of	 things	 in	 which	 the	 classical	 idea	 of	 arkhein	 is	 not	known.26	This	 is	 also	how	 the	 raging	 forces	of	war	of	 the	hērōs	 appear,	not	as	sanctioned	 from	 the	outside	by	 command.	 It	 is	 how,	 in	 fact,	war	 cannot	 come	into	 being	 by	 command,	 but	 simply	 appears.	 It	 appears	 because	 in	 it	polemos	agrees	with	itself,	a	harmonia	of	opposite	tensions	that	arises	as	relationships	of																																																									26	Here,	Deleuze	and	Guattari	come	close	in	their	reflection	on	ideal-typical	forms	of	the	warrior	and	the	sovereign	in	Indo-European	mythology,	the	‘war	machine’	and	the	‘state	apparatus’:	“In	every	respect,	the	war	machine	is	of	another	species,	another	nature,	another	origin	than	the	State	apparatus.”	(2007:	389).	
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power	and	resistance,	which	are	given	by	 the	potentialities	of	 rage,	 force,	 and	spiritedness.	We	have	noted	that	the	course	of	the	archaic	hērōs	must	be	read	in	terms	 of	 signs	 that	 bare	 the	 markings	 of	 war.	 Arētē	 and	 arēios	 [honour,	excellence]	are	such	marks	that,	by	virtue	of	their	immediate	proximity	to	Arēs,	function	as	 inviolable	sources	of	 the	order	 that	guides	 the	course	of	 the	hērōs.	This	is	what	steers	the	hērōs	in	the	particular	mode	of	being	that	belongs	to	the	one	who	is	philopolemos.	 In	the	friendship	with	war,	 the	course	of	 the	hērōs	 is	bound	to	the	relationship	of	forces,	which	is	polemos.		But	 what	 logos,	 then,	 is	 the	 poet	 trying	 to	 convey	 to	 mankind	 in	 these	primordial	words	of	the	Western	tradition?	Well,	if	we	look	beneath	the	obvious	and	reassuring	message	of	early	Western	civilisation	that	bad	things	happen	if	one	carries	off	women,	what	is	at	stake	in	the	conflict	between	the	arkhōn	and	the	hērōs	concerns	precisely	the	relationship	between	order	and	the	friendship	with	war.	To	us	the	archaic	idea	of	being	philopolemos	might	seem	to	read	as	a	certain	 affirmation	 of	 order	 as	 emergent	 from	 an	 immanent	 relationship	 of	resistance	 and	 right.	 Indeed,	 it	 seems	 that	 the	 friendship	with	war	 expresses	this	certain	sense	of	right,	a	right	of	private	war,	a	right	of	resistance.	The	logos	we	find	appears	to	be	saying	this:	no	matter	what,	war	remains	a	private	matter.	It	is	given	by	man’s	friendship	with	war	and	no	one,	neither	king	nor	war	leader,	would	be	wise	in	thinking	that	war	could	be	steered	and	the	polemistēs	or	hērōs	made	subject	to	command.	Such	hubris	awakens	the	wrath	of	the	gods	and	sets	in	motion	 an	 ill-fated	 chain	 of	 events.	 However,	 this	would	 be	 to	 assume	 too	much	all	the	while	that	there	is	no	moral	account	of	things	so	long	as	the	ruling	principle	 of	 arkhē	 remains	 absent.	 Then	 the	 philosophers	 will	 postulate	 the	originarity	of	 the	soul	as	 the	cipher	of	virtue	and	 justice.	Then	these	souls	are	supposed	 to	have	 their	passions	and	acquire	a	 certain	moral	 consciousness	 in	order	to	master	them,	to	rule	over	them.	However,	 in	 the	 archaic	 world,	 there	 is	 no	 such	 account	 of	 things.	 To	understand	the	logos	that	appears	in	these	early	words	of	the	Western	tradition,	we	therefore	have	to	abandon	the	safe	ground	of	morality.	In	fact,	the	logos	we	find	 in	 the	poet’s	 song	 is	 simply	 the	workings	of	 the	order	of	polemos.	 It	 is	an	account	of	what	happens	when	the	order	of	polemos	is	set	into	motion	with	the	sovereign	 intervention	 of	 the	basileus	 in	 the	 friendship	with	war.	 Specifically,	
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the	 poet	 recounts	 the	 course	 of	 events	 that	 follows	 from	 the	 attempt	 of	 the	
basileus	 to	 subvert	 the	 divine	 resemblance	 bestowed	 upon	 the	 hērōs	 who	follows	no	man,	 acting	only	 in	accordance	with	 the	 steering	by	polemos	 of	his	fleeting	order	of	 self.	 So,	 in	essence,	what	 logos	 appears	 in	 this	Greek	gift	 that	cannot	be	refused?	It	seems	to	me	that	it	is	harmonia	not	in	the	classical	sense	of	peace	[eirene]	as	what	appears	at	the	other	side	of	polemos,	but	in	the	aletheic	sense	of	 truth,	 the	 irreducible	duality	of	struggle	 found	 in	 the	steering	of	man	and	kosmos	in	the	overwhelming	sway	of	polemos.	As	 the	 hymn	makes	 clear	 already	 in	 the	 opening	 verse,	 this	would	 send	many	valiant	souls	into	Hades	(Iliad	I:	1-4),	but	in	the	archaic	world	the	poet	has	yet	to	dwell	on	the	poor	souls	of	the	famous	innocents	who	died	at	break	of	day,	a	theme	which	would	come	to	figure	as	a	central	element	when	tragedy,	in	the	classical	 period,	 discovers	 order	 through	 the	 violation	 of	nomos	 [custom]	 and	public	 right	 [dikē].	 Though	 before	 that	 time	would	 come,	 tragedy	would	 first	witness	the	gradual	decline	of	the	continuity	between	language	and	polemos.	In	the	period	of	the	Peloponnesian	War,	 it	would	witness	their	vast	dispersion	as	the	old	order	of	resemblances	found	in	polemos	enters	into	a	new	kinship,	that	of	error	and	illusion.	However,	in	the	archaic	world,	man	has	yet	to	discover	the	transgression	 of	 law	 or	 the	 deceiving	 words	 that	 accompanies	 faithless	 gifts,	such	 as	 the	 one	 the	 Achaeans	 present	 to	 the	 unsuspecting	 Trojan	 horse-breeders.27	The	great	speculation	about	truth,	order	[arkhē],	 justice	[dikē],	and	law	 [nomos],	 and	 the	 vast	 divide	 that	 would	 emerge	 out	 of	 it	 between	 the	atrocities	of	war	and	the	serenity	of	eirene	[peace],	has	not	begun.	Language	is	still	attuned	to	the	Sovereignty	of	the	Same	in	which	harmonia	is	both	war	and	peace.28	Poetry	 therefore	dwells	 on	 the	wound	of	 the	 similar.	 It	 dwells	 on	 the	repeated	injury	that	is	inflicted	on	the	body	of	the	hērōs	and	singular	polemistēs	who	derives	his	mode	of	being,	his	sovereignty,	not	from	any	mere	mortal,	but	from	signs	that	mark	the	resemblances	of	polemos.	
																																																								27	Though	allegedly,	Cassandra	did	warn	against	keeping	the	Trojan	Horse	according	to	a	later	anonymous	source.	Epitome	5.17	of	the	Bibliothēkē	[library]	says	that	Cassandra	warned	of	an	armed	force	inside	the	horse,	and	that	Laocoon	agreed.	28	“Polemos	is	both	war	and	peace	[harmonia]”	(Heraclitus	fr.	53,	67).	
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2.2.	 At	 the	 beginning	 of	 the	 fourth	 century,	 war	 is	 yet	 represented	 in	poetic	 and	 lyrical	 form,	 and	 the	 syntax29	is	 still	 governed	 by	 signs	 that	 are	brought	 to	 enunciate	 their	 meaning	 by	 linking	 together	 contraries	 forming	relationships	of	tension.30	However,	during	the	fourth	century	the	knowledge	of	war	would	gradually	be	relinquished	from	its	relation	to	the	oratory	tradition	in	which	polemos	is	celebrated	as	the	force	that	preserves	the	harmonia	of	kosmos	and	 liberates	 both	 man	 and	 lyre	 from	 numbness	 and	 impotentiality.	 In	 the	classical	 world,	 the	 discourse	 on	 polemos	 would	 undergo	 at	 least	 three	significant	displacements:	 the	 first	 is	 traceable	as	a	 transformation	 in	 tragedy,	the	 second,	 which	 is	 roughly	 contemporary	 to	 the	 classical	 tragedians,	 is	 the	transition	 from	 tragedy	 to	 history	 [historia],	 and	 the	 third	 happens	 with	 the	emergence	 of	 classical	 politico-philosophical	 discourse.	 This	 is	 not	 to	 say	 that	the	poetic	 representation	ceases	 to	exist,	but	 rather	 that	different	knowledges	begin	to	overlay	it.31		In	tragedy,	the	knowledge	of	war	will	be	discovered	from	pathways	most	different	from	the	channels	of	love	and	affect	that	run	through	the	poet’s	mind,	and	by	which	the	gods	influence	the	soul	of	man	through	the	dreadful	but	sacred	passages	of	polemos.	A	concern	about	war	creeps	into	the	souls	of	men.	By	the	time	the	great	political	treatises	appear	with	Plato	and	Aristotle,	the	friendship	with	war	will	 read	 as	 signs	 of	 a	 different	 order	 of	 reality.	 In	 fact,	 the	 archaic	word	philopolemos	 no	 longer	 occurs.	 Instead,	we	 find	 the	 peculiar	 expression	
polemou	epithumētēs.	This	expression	has	a	distinctively	different	meaning	that,	though	 it	 is	 difficult	 to	 convey	 accurately,	 can	 be	 rendered	 as	 ‘his	 desire	 is	dominated	 by	 war’	 expressing	 a	 certain	 ill-fated	 state	 of	 mind	 [nous].	 It	 is	classical	thought	dispelling	the	chimeras	of	the	old	world,	as	the	old	kinship	of	man	and	war	is	problematised.	Tragedy,	which	will	discover	the	concern	about	war	 and	 sense	 of	 responsibility,	 stands	 at	 the	 intersection	 between	 the	 old																																																									29	See	Lebow’s	considerations	on	the	syntax	and	grammar	of	the	oratory	tradition	(Lebow	2003:	72).	30	In	a	passage	of	the	Eudemian	Ethics,	for	example,	Aristotle	says:	“For	there	would	be	no	attunement	[harmonia]	without	high	and	low	notes	or	any	animals	without	male	and	female,	both	of	which	are	opposites.”	(1235a:	25).	31	Clearly,	the	poetic	representation	was	succeeded	with	the	classical	tragedians	among	whom	Aeschylus	seems	to	have	carried	onto	the	form	of	tragedy	the	relationship	of	opposition	found	in	war,	raising	according	to	Aristotle	in	his	Poetics	(1449a)	‘the	number	of	the	actors	from	one	to	two’	and	‘curtailing	the	chorus	giving	the	dialogue	the	leading	part’.	
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world	 that	 knows	 no	 sense	 of	 the	 mind	 [nous]	 and	 classical	 politico-philosophical	thought	 in	which	the	 idea	of	the	mind	and	the	well-ordered	soul	provides	the	ordering	codes	of	being:		[The]	 tragic	 sense	 of	 responsibility	makes	 its	 appearance	 at	 the	 point	when,	 in	human	action,	a	place	is	given	to	internal	debate	on	the	part	of	the	subject	[sic],	to	intention	 and	 predetermination,	 but	 when	 this	 human	 action	 still	 has	 not	acquired	enough	consistency	and	autonomy	to	be	entirely	self-sufficient.	The	true	domain	 of	 tragedy	 lies	 in	 that	 border	 zone	 where	 human	 actions	 are	 hinged	together	with	 the	 divine	 powers,	where	 –	 unknown	 to	 the	 agent	 –	 they	 derive	their	true	meaning	by	becoming	an	integral	part	of	an	order	that	is	beyond	man	and	that	eludes	him.	(Vernant	&	Vidal-Naquet	1988:	46-47).		It	is	perhaps	not	surprising	then	that	it	is	under	the	theme	of	madness	and	imagination	that	the	concern	about	war	begins	to	appear.	In	the	representation	of	the	hērōs	in	tragedy,	we	will	find	an	example	of	how	the	friendship	with	war	will	come	to	resemble	the	delusional	state	of	the	disordered	soul,	the	soul	that,	defeated	 by	 crude	 force	 [bia]	 and	 blinded	 by	 spiritedness	 [thumos],	 cannot	seem	 to	 rule	over	desire	 [epithumia].	 It	will	 be	under	 the	 theme	of	 corrupted	souls	and	delusional	minds	that	the	political	ethos	of	the	West	will	announce	its	coming	 and	 discover	 its	 calling.	 The	 great	 sanitation	 of	 the	 old	 order	 of	 war	begins.	The	weapons	of	the	warrior	will	become	the	tools	of	the	polis,	rage	will	read	as	signs	of	madness,	and	the	spiritedness	of	man	will	be	in	the	ever-present	danger	of	being	caught-up	in	the	resemblances	of	excess	and	abuse;	the	entire	economy	of	affect,	once	written	in	the	codes	of	war,	will	be	transformed	into	an	economy	of	desire	written	in	the	codes	of	order	[arkhē].	Deleuze	and	Guattari	have	accurately	captured	this	shift	as	a	displacement	of	the	balance	of	power	between	the	hērōs	and	the	basileus:	“The	descendants	of	Hercules,	 Achilles,	 then	 Ajax,	 have	 enough	 strength	 to	 proclaim	 their	independence	from	Agamemnon,	a	man	of	the	old	State.	But	they	are	powerless	when	it	comes	to	Ulysses	[Gr.	Odysseus],	a	man	of	the	nascent	modern	State,	the	first	man	of	the	modern	State.	And	it	is	Ulysses	who	inherits	Achilles’	arms,	only	to	 convert	 them	 to	other	uses,	 submitting	 them	 to	 the	 laws	of	 the	 State	 –	not	Ajax,	who	is	condemned	by	the	goddess	he	defied	and	against	whom	he	sinned.”	
	 89	
(Deleuze	&	Guattari	2007:	391-392).	The	reference	here	is	of	course	Sophocles’	
Ajax,	 which	 is	 an	 instructive	 example	 of	 the	 displacement	 that	 occurs	 at	 the	beginning	 of	 the	 classical	 age.	 At	 the	 onset	 of	 the	 play,	 Ajax	 is	 enraged	when	Agamemnon	 awards	 the	 imperishable	 armour	 of	 dead	 Achilles	 to	 Odysseus	rather	 than	 to	 him.	 Driven	 by	 a	 sense	 of	 rage,	which	 now	 seems	 to	 have	 lost	continuity	with	 the	 form	of	 vigilant	 force	 and	 honour,	 and	 instead	 acquired	 a	certain	familiarity	with	vanity	and	hubris,	he	swears	an	oath	to	kill	the	basileus	and	the	other	Achaeans	who	have	so	disgraced	him.	Though	before	he	can	enact	his	revenge,	Athena	tricks	him	into	believing	that	the	sheep	and	cattle	that	were	taken	 by	 the	 Achaeans	 as	 spoils	 of	 war	 are	 in	 fact	 his	 wrongdoers.	 Rage,	 no	longer	fed	out	of	a	blood-red	sky,	but	out	of	a	spirit	of	resentment	reminiscent	of	what	Nietzsche	once	spoke	of,	turns	to	revenge	as	Ajax	slaughters	some	of	them,	and	takes	the	others	back	to	his	home	to	torture,	including	a	ram	he	believes	to	be	his	rival,	Odysseus.	With	Sophocles’	Ajax,	classical	tragedy	begins	to	make	an	endless	sport	of	the	archaic	hērōs,	because	in	it	language	breaks	off	its	old	kinship	with	war	and	enters	 into	 a	 new	 chain	 of	 resemblances	 from	where	 the	 friendship	with	war	will	 reappear	 in	 its	 delusional	 intensities.	 The	 hērōs	 becomes	 the	 disordered	player	of	the	Same	and	the	Other.	He	takes	things	for	what	they	are	not,	animals	for	people,	and	slay	them	in	mad	fury.	He	thinks	the	gods	have	inspired	his	rage,	when	in	fact	they	have	not	only	turned	against	him,	but	also	led	him	astray	with	trickery	and	deceit.	He	thinks	the	gods	will	award	him,	when	in	fact	he	will	be	punished	 and	 humiliated.	 He	 is	 not	 even	 able	 to	 commit	 the	 atrocities	 of	murdering	 the	 basileus	 and	 his	 allies,	 but	 is	 consigned	 by	 the	 gods	 to	 the	ridiculous	and	disgraceful	act	of	killing	what	could	be	children’s	playthings.	The	relationship	 of	 bia	 and	 kratos	 that	 once	 gathered	 in	 the	 hērōs,	 as	 primary	sources	 of	 authority,	 is	 reversed,	 put	 on	 a	 pedestal	 and	 displayed	 as	 mere	impotence,	which	is	doubled	and	multiplied	in	the	mirror-image	of	delusion	and	madness.	At	the	end	of	the	play,	the	figure	of	the	hērōs	will	receive	the	final	blow.	Sophocles	 has	 Ajax	 relieved	 of	 his	 spell,	 but	 only	 so	 that	 he	 can	 realise	 his	delusional	ravings.	From	his	now	sanitised	position	of	self-relationship,	he	can	only	regain	honour	[arētē]	by	turning	against	himself.	Ajax	commits	suicide	as	
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Sophocles	has	him	put	down	like	a	mad	dog.	The	circle	of	cruel	reason	is	closed:	
hubris,	atē,	hamartia,	nemesis.	Sophocles	 tragedy	 on	 Ajax	 is	 in	 other	 words	 an	 example	 of	 how	 truth	would	now	be	told	from	a	sanitised	position	within	language	and	taught	in	the	practice	of	moderation	and	self-restraint	[sōphrosynē],	as	knowledge	no	longer	supports	man’s	friendship	with	war,	at	least	in	the	archaic	sense.	Obviously,	this	is	not	a	transformation	that	happens	overnight,	but	it	is	clear	that	a	remarkable	change	occurs	in	the	course	of	a	few	centuries	during	which	the	glorious,	heroic	achievements	 of	 the	 man	 of	 war	 comes	 to	 be	 seen	 in	 a	 different	 light.	 The	nascent	 political	 economy	 of	 the	 classical	 age	 will	 appear	 then	 first	 as	 an	interrogation	by	the	tragedians	of	the	old	order	and	its	breakdown.	As	we	saw	in	Sophocles,	the	caricature	of	the	archaic	hērōs	will	constitute	an	indispensable	cultural	function	in	this	interrogation,	as	the	image	of	the	man	of	the	primitive	and	distorted	resemblances	who	belongs	to	the	old	world.	It	is	a	discourse	bend	on	telling	a	different	truth	about	the	figure	of	the	hērōs,	a	discourse	that	tries	to	unmask	him,	to	peal	of	his	divine	glow,	layer	by	layer,	and	gaze	into	the	ruins	of	what	once	read	as	signs	of	man’s	friendship	with	war.	This	discourse	says	that	the	deeds	and	acts	of	the	hērōs	are	born	in	burning	towns	and	on	ravaged	fields.	They	 are	 the	 sad	 brainchild	 of	 the	 delusional	 mind	 and	 the	 corrupted	 soul	whose	 desire	 is	 dominated	 by	 war	 [polemou	 epithumētēs].	 The	 warrior,	 no	longer	hērōs,	is	the	murderer	of	his	own,	the	torturer	of	innocents	and	the	crude	taker	of	women,	 even	 those	of	 royal	blood.	 So	we	 learn	 in	Euripides’	Troades,	which	takes	place	after	the	battle	of	Troy.	Tragedy	now	tells	the	story	of	how	the	Trojan	women	suffered	in	the	aftermath	of	the	battle,	and	how	their	grief	over	the	 loss	 of	 their	 husbands	 and	 their	 city	 is	 exchanged	 for	 horror	 when	 the	Achaeans	dole	out	additional	deaths	and	divide	 their	 shares	of	women	among	them.	Again	Ajax	 appears,	 this	 time	dragging	 Cassandra,	 the	 daughter	 of	King	Priam	and	Queen	Hecuba,	away	from	the	temple	of	Apollo,	having	 ‘carried	her	off’.	At	 this	point,	 the	expression	harpazein	meaning	 ‘to	carry	off’	has	attained	strong	 connotations	 to	 rape,	 and,	 as	 the	 correlative	 to	 this	newfound	 sense	of	moral	transgression,	tragedy	has	discovered	the	corrupted	soul	responsible	for	such	 cruelty.	 The	 economy	 of	 desire	 [epithumia]	 now	 provides	 the	 cipher	 of	truth,	 as	 the	 old	 kinship	 of	 war	 and	 affect	 is	 exorcised	 and	 its	 resemblances	
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scattered.	 Order	 is	 no	 longer	 written	 in	 the	 archaic	 codes	 of	 menis,	 just	 as	
thumos,	bia,	and	kratos	more	and	more	often	appear	as	signs	of	the	dangerous	forces	of	epithumia	that	have	become	permanent	residents	of	the	unruly	soul.	Is	it	a	newfound	cruelty	that	now	compels	the	classical	tragedian	to	deliver	the	hērōs	over	to	the	mockery	of	the	crowd,	to	leave	him	to	dwell	in	his	solitary	sovereignty	 that	puts	him	on	 the	path	of	madness,	delusion,	 and	 suicide?	As	 I	said,	what	appears	in	tragedy	is	rather	the	transformation	of	the	idea	of	order,	as	 it	occurs	 in	 the	transition	 from	the	Logos	of	polemos	 to	 the	 idea	of	order	as	
arkhē.	In	this	shift,	archaic	menis	will	be	externalised	as	mania	and	referred	to	a	relationship	 of	 opposition	 to	 political	 order.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 it	 will	 be	internalised	as	‘domesticated’	rage,	which	is	put	to	use	in	various	affairs	of	the	citizen,	such	as	the	militia	[military]	and	the	stratia	[army],	where	it,	guided	by	self-restraint	 [sōphrosynē],	 will	 be	 seen	 as	 part	 of	 the	 virtue	 of	 courage	 and	manliness	 [andriea].	 Agōnia	 moves	 from	 the	 battlefield	 and	 into	 the	 soul	 as	order	becomes	contingent	on	a	battle	for	power	over	oneself.	The	discovery	of	war	in	the	soul	would	be	one	of	the	first	signs	in	which	the	order	of	the	ruling	principle	of	arkhē	shows	itself	to	man,	signs	which	would	then	be	written	on	the	world	for	man	to	recognise,	imitate,	and	partake	in	as	protagonistēs	of	the	new	order	 of	 love	 and	 war.	 We	 find	 this	 emergent	 order	 in	 tragedy,	 but	 also,	 for	example,	 in	 the	 elaborate	 art	 carved	 out	 on	 the	 Athenian	 treasury	 at	 Delphi.	Here,	 the	 image	 of	 the	hērōs	 Theseus	 battling	 the	Amazon	 queen	 appears.	No	longer	 ruled	 by	 the	 love	 and	 friendship	 of	 war,	 combat	 arrives	 to	 the	 hērōs	through	the	simultaneous	inclusion	of	struggle	in	the	soul	and	exclusion	of	the	raging	forces	of	polemos.	Archaic	rage	will	appear	on	the	side	of	this	exclusion	as	the	Other,	the	Amazon,	in	whom	the	love	and	friendship	of	war	will	persist	as	a	society	in	which	order	remains	coded	entirely	in	polemos	distributing	new	lines	of	flight	back	into	the	old	world.	It	is	easy	to	see,	though,	that	the	access	to	this	pathway	is	precisely	what	is	at	 stake	 in	 this	 struggle	 between	 the	hērōs	 and	 the	 Amazon.	We	 are	 still	 in	 a	relationship	of	agōnia	in	the	sense	of	the	irreducible	relationship	of	opposites	–	the	 sanitised	 position	 of	 the	 hērō	 as	 opposed	 to	 the	 warring	 position	 of	 the	Amazon.	However,	in	the	archaic	sense,	Theseus	is	actually	not	really	agonistēs,	but	 rather,	 as	 protector	 of	 the	 order	 of	 the	 polis,	 he	 is	 protagonistēs	 (the	
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conjunction	of	protos	[first]	and	agonistēs).	He	fights,	not	because	the	forces	of	
kosmos	have	gathered	in	him,	but	because	the	ruling	principle	of	command	calls	upon	his	soul	and	body	to	act	as	a	vessel	of	the	order	of	the	polis	and	the	hearth,	which	are	to	be	defended	from	the	invasion	of	the	ferocious	Amazons.	The	polis	is	to	be	defended	form	these	dangerous	women	who	have	no	polis	[apolis]	in	the	true	sense	and	no	soundness	of	mind	at	 least	 in	 the	classical	sense.	As	duBois	has	 noted,	 amazonomachiai	 [Amazon	 battle]	 was	 a	 very	 popular	 subject	 on	classical	 vase	 paintings.	 Along	 with	 centauromachiai	 [Centaur	 battle],	
amazonomachiai	 articulates	 the	 site	 on	 which	 the	 citizen	 warrior	 comes	 to	discover	his	role	as	the	defender	of	the	polis	against	the	multitude	of	profoundly	affective	 creatures,	 some	 real	 others	 the	 work	 of	 fable,	 that	 loom	 in	 the	dimension	of	a	crude	archaic	past,	a	horizon	that	must	permanently	be	pushed	back	over	the	threshold	by	meeting	this	tremendous	enemy	force	in	battle.	At	the	site	of	heterotopia,	classical	man	will	do	battle	with	the	Other,	32	but	gradually	 the	 powerful	 forces	 of	 polemos	 that	 belong	 to	 this	 strange	 host	 of	intense,	virile,	and	hostile	creatures	will	be	tamed	and	their	alluring	otherness	dry	up	in	the	codes	of	order,	as	these	heterogeneous	forces	become	fixed	under	the	theme	of	being	without	polis	[apolis]	and	without	hearth	[anestios],	a	theme	that	will	occur	 frequently	 in	classical	political	discourse.	The	possibility	of	 the	dangerous	coagulations	of	the	Same	and	the	Other	is	avoided,	even	if,	for	some	time,	the	Cynics	would	in	fact	use	this	epithet	and	refer	to	themselves	as	apolis	while	living	among	the	citizens	of	the	classical	polis.	But	in	the	generation	that	passes	 from	 Plato	 to	 Aristotle,	 the	 figure	 of	 the	 one	who	 is	without	polis	 will	move	from	the	margins	of	society	and	once	again	appear	on	the	outside.	He	will	slip	 into	 these	 borderlands	 to	 be	 reborn	 as	 a	 strikingly	 dissociated	 figure,	stripped	of	any	riveting	beauty	or	vigilance	of	those	otherworldly	creatures	the	
hērōs	met	in	battle.	In	Aristotle,	then,	the	one	who	by	nature	[kata	phusin]	is	apolis	or	anestios	will	 eventually	be	 seen	as	either	a	 ‘bad	man’	or	 something	 ‘unnatural’	beyond	men	and	the	mundane	sphere	of	mortals;	he	will	be	likened	to	the	man	who	is	
																																																								32	As	duBois	explains:	“The	others	–	barbarian,	Centaur,	woman/barbarian/animal	–	were	all	represented	in	tragedy,	shown	in	changing	postures	of	resistance	to	the	polis	culture.”	(duBois	1999:	151).	
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dominated	by	war	[polemou	epithumētēs].	Trapped	on	the	other	side	of	order,	the	old	kinship	of	man	and	war	 is	dispelled	and	reduced	 to	something	merely	unnatural.	At	 the	 site	of	 an	absolute	distance	 to	 the	old	 friendship	of	war,	 the	citizen	 warrior	 will	 be	 called	 upon	 to	 struggle	 against	 the	 bad	 forces	 within	himself	 as	 well	 as	 those	 that	 appear	 on	 the	 outside.	 By	 then,	 the	 sign	 hērōs	carved	 out	 on	 the	 great	 halls	 of	 the	 polis,	 where	 he	 defended	 the	 polis	 from	chimeras	 and	other	 theriomorphous	beings,	will	 seem	 increasingly	outmoded.	Theseus	 struggle	 against	 the	 Amazon	 stands	 between	 these	 two	 worlds,	 the	archaic	and	the	classical.	His	struggle	is	not	a	fight	against	the	unnatural	or	the	bad	 as	 such,	 since	 the	 thērion	 [wild	 beast],	 but	 rather	 the	 expression	 of	 the	growing	awareness	that	polemos	must	be	subjected	to	steering.	In	 this	process,	 tragedy	has	gradually	begun	to	 function	as	a	correlate	 to	
arkhē,	but	 this	 is	by	no	means	a	 fixed	or	coherent	 form.	 It	 is	a	highly	mutable	form	that	functions,	not	only	as	a	means	of	exposing	the	breakdown	of	the	old	order,	 but	 also	 as	 a	 contestation	 of	 the	 new	 order	 as	 it	 transgresses	 the	 old	boundaries	of	custom	[nomos].	So	before	the	practice	of	a	self-relationship,	with	the	proper	use	of	 the	pleasures	and	the	cultivation	of	 the	affects,	 is	 integrated	into	a	political	economy	of	the	good,	tragedy	will	bear	witness	to	the	resurgence	of	the	terrible	[deinon].	Tragedy	will	recount	how	the	first	long	shadow	that	fell	upon	 the	 old	 order	 came	 from	 the	 early	 protagonists	 of	 the	 ruling	 principle;	from	the	arkhōn	and	the	stratēgos	[general]	that	seek	to	rule	in	accordance	with	‘the	best	and	wisest’	of	plans.	We	are	in	other	words	close	to	the	classical	notion	of	 the	 good,	 but	 rather	 than	 praising	 the	 wise	 ruler	 who	 seeks	 the	 good	 of	political	community,	as	the	classical	philosophers	would	do,	tragedy	will	expose	how	the	activity	of	ruling	by	the	stratēgos	violates	nomos.	At	the	site	of	war,	the	attempt	to	do	good	in	ruling	by	command	will	bring	about	the	terrible.	One	such	moment	appears	with	Antigone.	 It	 is	a	very	rich	 text,	a	work	of	overwhelming	rigor,	which	I	will	not	try	to	convey	in	its	full	significance.	It	is	an	important	text,	though,	so	I	will	try	to	give	it	the	appropriate	attention.	In	any	case,	the	play	sets	off	with	the	dialogue	between	Antigone	and	her	sister	Ismene.	In	Antigone’s	first	lines	we	learn	that	ruin,	shame,	and	dishonour	have	fallen	upon	their	 family	as	the	stratēgos	Creon	has	 issued	a	decree	 in	the	
polis	declaring	that	Polynices,	the	brother	of	Antigone,	shall	be	left	unburied	on	
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the	battlefield,	‘for	the	birds	a	pleasing	store	as	they	look	to	satisfy	their	hunger’.	So	 says	Antigone,	 stricken	with	 grief.	 In	 the	 first	 lines	of	 the	 chorus,	we	 learn	that	it	was	the	‘strife-filled	claims’	[artheis	neikeōn	ex	amphilogōn]	of	Polynices	that	led	to	the	outbreak	of	the	Theban	civil	war.	Polynices	is	a	traitor	of	Thebes,	then,	who,	in	the	mind	of	the	arkhōn,	cannot	be	honoured	with	a	proper	burial,	that	is,	if	the	honour	of	those	who	died	defending	Thebes	from	its	enemies	is	to	be	 retained.	 In	 secrecy,	 however,	 Antigone	 performs	 the	 funeral	 ritual	 on	 the	dead	body	of	Polynices	defying	the	decree.	When	Creon	discovers	the	deceit	of	Antigone,	he	buries	her	alive	 in	cave.	By	word	of	 the	poet	Tiresias,	Creon	now	learns	 that	 the	 gods	 are	 displeased	 by	 his	 actions	 and	 refuse	 to	 accept	 any	sacrifices	or	prayers	from	Thebes.	So	he	sets	out	to	undo	his	mistakes	and	see	to	it	that	Polynices	has	his	proper	burial.	But	Creon	is	too	late.	His	rage	has	set	in	motion	 things	 that	 cannot	 be	 undone	 –	 he	 has	 crossed	 the	 limits	 of	 atē	 and	
harmatia,	 and	 so	 he	 not	 only	 fails	 to	 alleviate	 his	 punishment	 over	 Antigone,	who	commits	suicide	before	Creon’s	men	can	get	 to	her,	he	also	 loses	his	own	son	 and	 wife	 both	 of	 whom	 take	 their	 own	 lives,	 one	 because	 of	 his	 loss	 of	Antigone,	the	other	because	of	the	loss	of	her	son.	In	seeking	out	order	[arkhē]	by	issuing	the	decree	that	consigns	Polynices	to	public	shame	and	humiliation,	as	 he	 leaves	 his	 body	 to	 be	 devoured	 by	 vultures	 under	 the	 open	 sky,	 Creon	makes	a	fatal	misjudgement	[harmatia].	He	violates	custom	[nomos]	according	to	which	no	one	can	refuse	a	man	his	proper	burial.	Consumed	by	the	desire	to	strike	 at	 his	 opponent	 beyond	 the	 sphere	 where	 he	 as	 king	 could	 rightfully	punish	him,	Creon	has	crossed	the	limit	and	fallen	prey	to	hubris.	In	his	seminar	on	Antigone,	Lacan	has	remarked	that	the	misjudgement	of	Creon	consists	 in	the	fact	that	he,	as	ruler,	seeks	to	promote	the	good.	Not	the	Supreme	Good,	Lacan	 is	 careful	 to	explain,	 all	 the	while	 that	Plato	has	not	yet	formulated	 this	 idea.	However,	as	he	who	 leads	 the	community,	Creon	acts	 ‘to	promote	 the	 good	of	 all’,	 says	Lacan,	 as	he	 evokes	 the	notion	of	 the	Begriff	 in	allusion	 to	 Kant	 and	 the	 idea	 of	 practical	 reason:	 “Note	 that	 his	 language	[Creon’s]	 is	 in	 perfect	 conformity	 with	 that	 which	 Kant	 calls	 the	 Begriff	 or	concept	of	the	good.	It	is	the	language	of	practical	reason.	His	refusal	to	allow	a	sepulchre	for	Polynices,	who	is	an	enemy	and	a	traitor	to	his	country,	is	founded	on	the	fact	that	one	cannot	at	the	same	time	honour	those	who	have	defended	
	 95	
their	 country	 and	 those	 who	 have	 attacked	 it.”	 (Lacan	 2008:	 318-319).	 Now,	Lacan	continues,	this	is	where	tragedy	reveals	to	us	a	‘first	objection’:	“The	good	cannot	reign	over	all	without	an	excess	emerging	whose	fatal	consequences	are	revealed	to	us	in	tragedy.”	(Ibid.).	The	‘Kantian’	alliance	of	reason	and	the	good,	which	 in	 time	would	make	 clear	 the	 identity	 of	 law	 and	 reason,	 becomes	 the	bête	noire	of	Creon,	Lacan	argues.	Lacan	certainly	seems	right	in	his	diagnosis	of	our	patient	Creon.	When	one	reads	the	text,	the	idea	of	the	good	clearly	appears	to	be	present	in	Creon	as	when	he	remarks	that	‘anyone	who	directs	the	entire	
polis	 should	 observe	 the	 best	 and	 wisest	 [aristōn]	 plans’	 (Antigone	 179).	Moreover,	Lacan	shows	an	acute	sensitivity	to	the	fundamental	displacement	at	stake	in	the	relationship	of	the	ruler	to	nomos.	In	his	pursuit	of	the	good,	Lacan	explains,	 Creon	passes	over	 into	 another	 sphere.	 It	 is	 the	 sphere	 that	 appears	beyond	nomos,	 opening	 up	 the	 terrain	 of	 the	 ‘sovereign	 law’;	 ‘to	 promote	 the	good	of	all	as	the	law	without	limits,	the	sovereign	law,	the	law	that	goes	beyond	or	 crosses	 the	 limit’	 (Lacan	 2008:	 318).	 One	 might	 think	 that	 one	 has	 said	enough,	 then,	 when	 one	 has	 interpreted	 the	 play	 as	 the	 expression	 of	 the	objection	by	tragedy	to	the	principle	of	the	sovereign	law.	However,	we	must	be	careful	 not	 to	 seek	 the	 logos	 the	 poet	 recounts	 in	 our	 contemporary	 realm	 of	ideas.	As	Lacan	in	fact	notices,	Creon	is	obviously	unaware	that	his	actions	have	carried	 him	 onto	 a	 new	 terrain	 where,	 in	 time,	 the	 ruling	 principle	 of	 arkhē	would	 gradually	 expand	 the	 boundaries	 of	 authority	 under	 the	 theme	 of	 life	according	 to	 the	 good.	 This	 is	 also	 to	 say	 that	 the	 story	 of	Antigone	 does	 not	unfold	at	the	site	of	the	sovereign	law;	it	all	does	not	begin	with	sovereignty,	the	idea	 life	 according	 to	 the	 good,	 or	 the	 kind	 of	 perfect	 community	 the	philosophers	will	come	to	dream	about.	It	begins	with	war.	Specifically,	the	play	takes	 place	 in	 the	 aftermath	 of	 war	 and	 sets	 off	 as	 the	 stratēgos	 attempts	 at	ruling	 over	 the	 exigencies	 of	war	 by	 arresting	 the	 forces	 of	polemos.	War	 has	now	advanced	to	a	point	where	the	deinon	has	become	the	concern	of	the	ruler.	As	Creon	 issues	 the	decree,	he	 is	 trying	 to	steer	polemos	by	 intervening	 in	 the	relations	of	forces	so	as	to	make	the	nomos	of	custom	abandon	one	side	in	the	struggle,	while	giving	the	power	to	the	other.	In	doing	so,	he	does	not	seek	the	good.	He	 is	rather	 trying	 to	steer	 the	course	of	events	 in	which	 ‘the	Fire-god’s	
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[Arēs]	 pine-fed	 flame’	 had	 almost	 seized	 the	 crown	 of	 Thebes’	 towers.	 He	 is	trying	to	prevent	the	dreadful	War-god	from	making	a	return:		Shaft	of	the	sun,	fairest	light	of	all	that	have	dawned	on	Thebes	of	the	seven	gates,	you	have	shone	forth	at	 last,	eye	of	golden	day,	advancing	over	Dirce's	streams!	You	have	 goaded	with	 a	 sharper	bit	 the	warrior	 of	 the	white	 shield,	who	 came	from	Argos	in	full	armour,	driving	him	to	headlong	retreat.	He	set	out	against	our	land	because	of	the	strife-filled	claims	of	Polynices,	and	like	a	screaming	eagle	he	flew	over	into	our	land,	covered	by	his	snow-white	wing,	with	a	mass	of	weapons	and	 crested	 helmets…	 he	 gaped	 around	 our	 sevenfold	 portals	 with	 spears	thirsting	for	blood;	but	he	left	before	his	jaws	were	ever	glutted	with	our	gore,	or	before	 the	 Fire-god's	 [Arēs]	 pine-fed	 flame	had	 seized	 our	 crown	of	 towers.	 So	fierce	was	the	crash	of	battle	swelling	about	his	back,	a	match	too	hard	to	win	for	the	rival	of	the	dragon.	(Antigone	100-125).		One	 will	 notice	 that	 the	 knowledge	 of	 war	 no	 longer	 so	 much	 appears	 as	 a	celebration	 of	 the	 sudden	 rupture	 of	 rage	 inspired	 by	 the	 gods.	 Rather,	 it	appears	 as	 an	 account	 that	 seems	 to	 interrogate	war	 to	 seek	 out	 an	 origin.	 A	slight	shift	has	occurred	in	the	knowledge	of	war.	A	concern	about	the	dreadful	and	the	terrible	seem	to	appear	at	the	level	of	the	world	of	mere	mortals.	War	came	 to	 the	 Thebans,	 the	 chorus	 tells	 us	 in	 the	 first	 lines,	 not	 because	 the	dreadful	War-god	had	inspired	fire	in	the	souls	of	men.	On	the	contrary,	it	was	the	‘strife-filled	claims’	of	Polynices	that	brought	about	the	raging	forces	of	the	War-god.	The	dangerous	forces	of	polemos	have	caught	the	attention	of	man.	An	attempt	of	localising	them	seems	to	appear,	as	they	are	traced	to	an	origin	in	the	strife-filled	soul,	which	now	must	be	held	accountable	for	war.	The	soul	has	in	other	words	become	a	principle	of	 intelligibility	of	polemos,	 if	only	 in	a	 rather	hazy,	 ambiguous	 sense	 all	 the	 while	 that	 polemos	 has	 yet	 to	 be	 identified	 in	terms	 of	 the	 singular	 identity	 of	 war.	 Perhaps	 it	 is	 no	 coincidence,	 then,	 that	Polynices	 [Polyneikes],	 which	 literally	 means	 ‘multiple	 strife’,	 resembles	 the	indistinction	 of	polemos	 –	polemos	 has	 yet	 to	 be	 tamed	 by	 the	 identity	 of	 the	signified.	In	 any	 case,	with	 the	death	of	Polynices,	 justice	has	been	done	upon	 the	polemicist,	 ‘for	 Zeus	 detests	 above	 all	 the	 boasts	 of	 a	 proud	 tongue’.	 Still,	 the	dreadful	memory	of	battle	fills	the	air	with	a	foul	stench.	It	is	in	the	minds	of	all	
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Thebans	 covering	 their	 souls	 in	 darkness,	 as	 if	 the	 chimera	 of	 the	 dragon	[drakōn]	still	lingered	on,	hovering	above	the	city	with	the	seven	gates.	Antigone	is	marked	by	war.	It	is	trying	to	get	away	from	war:	“let	us	make	for	ourselves	forgetfulness	 after	 the	 recent	wars,	 and	 visit	 all	 the	 temples	 of	 the	 gods	with	night-long	dance	and	song.	And	may	Bacchus,	who	shakes	the	earth	of	Thebes,	rule	our	dancing”,	 the	chorus	sings	(150-54).	So,	 it	all	does	not	begin	with	the	sudden	 arrival	 on	 stage	 of	 Creon	 as	 the	 protagonistēs	 of	 life	 according	 to	 the	good.	What	appears	 is	rather	the	site	of	war	on	which	the	stratēgos	will	 try	to	contain	and	steer	the	exigencies	born	out	of	the	last	battle	that	has	been	fought.	As	we	will	see,	this	is	clearly	related	to	theme	of	the	good,	it	is	in	fact	intrinsic	to	it,	 but	what	makes	Creon	 cross	 the	 limit	 that	marks	 the	 threshold	 to	 the	new	order	is	not	to	be	found	in	any	elaborate	will	to	do	good.	In	fact,	 it	 is	not	even	the	effect	of	a	conscientious	calculation,	if	we	by	conscientious	calculation	are	to	understand	the	logic	of	practical	reason	or	for	that	matter	what	Aristotle	would	later	define	as	the	logos;	a	certain	rational	faculty	that	enables	the	subordination	of	 the	 passions	 by	 the	 mind	 in	 accordance	 with	 the	 virtue	 of	 moderation	[sōphrosynē].	The	character	of	Creon	 is	 far	 from	the	 ideal	of	 the	virtuous	man	we	will	 learn	of	 in	Aristotle.	He	is	actually	closer	to	the	man	of	passions	of	the	old	world.	This	is	a	critical	distinction.	Just	as	Creon	does	not	arrive	on	stage	as	the	wise	ruler	who	seeks	the	good,	so	the	course	of	events	cannot	be	analysed	in	terms	of	the	mimetic	function	of	subjects	acting	in	the	world.	Tragedy	happens,	not	because	of	the	actions	of	conscientious	subjects,	but	rather	out	of	accident,	error,	and	succession.	Action	is	bound	to	a	chain	of	events,	which	is	beyond	the	control	 of	 the	 fleeting	 sense	 of	 selves	we	 find	 in	 Creon	 and	Antigone.	Atē	 has	taken	possession	over	both	and	put	them	on	the	path	of	disaster.	It	is	important	to	note	 the	sense	 in	which	atē	 is	employed	here.	While	 it	 can	be	 translated	as	‘seduction’	or	‘misfortune’,	this	really	does	not	cover	the	meaning	of	the	word.	It	is	not	to	be	mistaken	for	the	feeble	sentiments	of	seduction	or	misfortune.	Atē	is	closer	to	the	rage	and	fury	of	the	old	world,	if	to	some	extent	curbed,	reshaped,	and	 temporalised	by	 the	economy	of	desire.	The	poet	will	 still	 situate	 rage	on	the	side	of	the	disturbing	course	of	events,	which	is	tragedy.	However,	rage	and	fury	are	not	really	put	in	opposition	to	arkhē	in	support	of	the	emergent	order	of	things.	 Nor	 do	 they	 function	 in	 a	 caricature	 that	 exposes	 the	 old	world	 as	 an	
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	Yes,	since	it	was	not	Zeus	that	declared	me	that	decree,	and	since	not	of	that	kind	are	 the	 laws	which	 Justice	who	 dwells	with	 the	 gods	 below	 established	 among	men.	Nor	 did	 I	 think	 that	 your	 decrees	were	 of	 such	 force,	 that	 a	mortal	 could	override	the	unwritten	and	unfailing	statutes	given	us	by	the	gods.	(450-55).		The	decree	issued	by	the	stratēgos,	Antigone	says,	cannot	have	the	force	of	law	since	 it	 violates	 nomos	 [custom].	 The	 chorus	 agrees	 (365-70):	 “When	 he	honours	the	laws	of	the	land	and	the	justice	of	the	gods	to	which	he	is	bound	by	oath,	his	city	prospers.	But	banned	from	his	city	[apolis]	is	he	who,	thanks	to	his	rashness,	 couples	 with	 disgrace.”	 So,	 by	 issuing	 the	 decree,	 Creon	 becomes	
apolis;	 he	 becomes	 without	 a	 polis.	 Creon	 stands	 outside	 of	 the	 polis	 as	 the	betrayer	 of	 the	 law	 whereas	 the	 heroine	 Antigone	 stands	 as	 the	 defender	 of	
nomos.	So,	at	the	threshold	to	the	classical	period	we	find	tragedy	contesting	the	activity	of	ruling	by	command,	as	the	arkhōn	transgresses	the	old	boundaries	of	custom	 [nomos].	 Thus	 far,	 it	would	 seem	 as	 if	 tragedy	makes	 a	 return	 to	 the	archaic	 world	 then,	 forgetting	 the	 disturbing	 forces	 of	 madness	 that	 had	seemingly	 come	 to	 haunt	 the	 hērōs.	 In	 fact,	 one	 cannot	 fail	 to	 see	 a	 striking	analogy	 to	 the	 Iliad.	 In	 a	manner	not	 so	different	 from	 the	 logos	 recounted	of	Agamemnon	 and	 Achilles,	 we	 find	 the	 arkhōn	 intervening	 in	 the	 relations	 of	forces	beyond	his	rightful	sphere	of	influence,	and,	as	his	strategic	opposite,	the	
hērōinē	 who	 brings	 a	 fury	 to	 bear	 on	 the	 sovereign	 activity	 of	 command.	Antigone	is	certainly	the	heroine	in	whom	the	old	friendship	with	war	to	some	extent	still	persists.	She	is	obviously	not	the	disordered	player	of	the	Same	and	the	 Other,	 as	 he	 is	 represented	 in	 Sophocles’	 rather	 unsublime	 hērōs,	 Ajax.	Antigone	 is	 not	 struck	 by	madness,	 and	 her	 actions	 have	 little	 to	 do	with	 the	spirit	of	resentment	or	any	feeling	of	self-pity	or	vanity.	Antigone	is	closer	to	the	figure	of	Achilles	who	does	not	display	 the	kind	of	 character	 faults	we	 find	 in	Ajax.	 Like	 Achilles,	 Antigone	 never	 seems	 to	 fall	 prey	 to	 hubris.	 She	 has	 not	invited	the	agony	–	disgrace	and	wrongdoing	capture	her.	The	sovereign	rule	is	forced	onto	her	 subverting	her	 autonomy	and	dishonouring	her	 family.	 She	 is	forced	to	 live	 in	the	house	of	Creon,	she	 is	subject	 to	his	 law,	and,	at	 the	same	time,	she	has	to	live	with	the	memory	that	Creon	and	his	allies	are	responsible	
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for	the	death	of	her	brothers	and	the	sacrilege	of	refusing	Polynices	his	proper	funeral.	 Like	 the	 Iliad,	 then,	 it	 seems	 tragedy	 dwells	 on	 the	 wound	 and	 the	repeated	 injury	 inflicted	 on	 the	 heroine	 as	 she	 is	 subjected	 to	 the	 repeated	blows	of	atē.	In	a	manner	similar	to	Achilles,	it	is	this	unbearable	wretchedness	and	shame	that	make	Antigone	cross	the	line	to	try	to	go	beyond	the	state	of	atē,	where,	once	subject	to	these	terrible	forces,	only	the	gods	can	save	a	valiant	soul	from	being	consumed	by	the	forces	of	Hades.	Beyond	this	limit,	the	heroine	will	find	no	exaltation	but	in	death.	Antigone	knows	it,	but	like	the	true	hērōinē	she	never	 breaks	 character.34	Yet,	 the	 order	 of	 things	 is	 no	 longer	 quite	 the	 same.	While	 it	 seems	as	 if	 it	 is	simply	 the	attempt	of	ruling	by	command	that	brings	about	the	deinon,	it	would	be	a	mistake	to	reduce	the	logos	the	poet	recounts	to	a	mere	lesson	on	the	sovereign	violation	of	the	sacred	statutes	of	nomos.	What	we	must	pay	attention	to	here	is	the	entry	of	the	deinon.	The	cipher	of	the	tragic	encounter,	the	deinon	emerges	at	the	point	where	the	divine	forces	of	polemos	have	taken	hold	of	man	to	steer	the	course	of	events	to	the	inevitable	endpoint	of	tragedy.	The	entry	of	the	deinon	is	the	sign	of	the	gathering	of	logos	at	its	most	intense,	and	therefore	closest	to	truth	[alētheia],	as	the	unmediated	confrontation	of	opposites.	In	his	reading	of	the	play,	Heidegger	has	accurately	captured	 the	 function	 of	 the	 deinon,	 as	 he	 directs	 our	 attention	 to	 the	 point	where	 the	 poet	makes	 it	 appear.	 As	Heidegger	 is	 careful	 to	 explain,	 the	 point	where	 the	deinon	 is	disclosed	 is	 actually	not	with	 the	disgraceful	 act	of	Creon	leaving	 the	 body	 of	 Polynices	 to	 the	 vultures.	 The	 terrible	 does	 not	 appear	before	 it	 is	revealed	that	someone	has	defied	Creon	by	performing	the	 funeral	ritual	 on	 Polynices.35	The	 deinon	 appears	 with	 Antigone,	 Heidegger	 explains	(2000:	112).	Certainly,	the	figure	of	Creon	expresses	the	traits	of	the	character	who	 inevitably	will	 face	nemesis,	 driven	 as	 he	 is,	 in	 his	 sacrilegious	 hubris,	 to	strike	 at	 his	 enemy	beyond	his	 rightful	 sphere	 of	 influence.	 But	 it	 is	 not	 until	Antigone,	captured	by	atē,	goes	up	against	Creon	that	the	deinon	appears	and	a	certain	 irrevocable	chain	of	events	 is	set	 in	motion.	 It	 is	precisely	at	 this	point																																																									34	Clearly,	Antigone	realises	that	her	doings	will	claim	her	life,	but	like	the	archaic	hērōs	she	never	strays	from	the	path	where,	once	you	have	entered,	no	escape	can	be	procured	from	death.	35	We	do,	however,	see	a	glimpse	of	the	deinon	in	the	dialogue	between	Ismene	and	Antigone,	as	Antigone	rejects	and	banishes	her	with	cruelty	and	scorn	for	her	unwillingness	to	partake	in	burying	their	brother.	
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where	she	crosses	 the	 threshold	 that	 the	chorus	enters	and	begins	 to	bemoan	the	 deinon.	 Although	 Creon	 certainly	 commits	 sacrilege	 and	 is	 punished	accordingly	by	the	gods,	tragedy	is	not	simply	the	outcome	of	Creon’s	violation	of	nomos.	Antigone	is	to	blame	too.	How	is	 this	so?	Here,	 in	 the	earliest	appearance	known	 in	existing	Greek	literature,	the	word	autonomos	turns	up.36	It	is	the	conjunction	of	auto	[self]	and	
nomos,	which	is	to	say	that	Antigone,	although	the	heroine	who	defends	nomos,	is	also	the	dangerous	individual	who	defies	the	arkhōn	and	makes	her	own	law.	In	the	remarks	of	the	chorus,	we	learn	that	this	will	take	her	life	(Antigone	821).	In	fact,	the	chorus	not	only	laments	how	Antigone	makes	her	own	laws,	but	also	that	this	happens	out	of	her	 ‘self-willed	 impulses’.	Caught-up	in	her	self-willed	impulses,	Antigone	is	responsible	for	her	own	destruction.	Here,	it	is	important	to	 note	 the	 curious	 use	 of	 the	 word	 orgē,	 which	 in	 the	 archaic	 vocabulary	typically	denotes	‘natural	impulse’,	as	in	rage	and	spiritedness.	In	the	comment	by	the	chorus,	this	meaning	is	displaced	as	orgē	is	connected	to	the	idea	of	a	self	[auto]	to	form	the	specific	meaning	of	being	autognōtos	[self-willed].	As	we	also	saw	 the	 glimpse	 of	 in	 Polynices,	 certain	 self-willed	 or	 should	we	 perhaps	 say	auto-impulsive	actions	now	open	up	being	to	the	dreadful	passages	of	rage	and	affect.	What	surfaces	here	 is	 in	other	words	the	new	register	of	human	affects	wherein	the	signification	of	orgē	 is	restructured	by	the	economy	of	desire	that	begins	 to	 postulate	 a	 certain	 sense	 of	 the	 self.	 This	 is	 how	 autognōtos	 and	
autonomos	denote	the	certain	kind	of	behaviour,	which	is	not	merely	bound	to	the	tragic	cycle	of	hubris-atē-harmatia-nemesis,	but	also	leads	to	suicide;	in	the	economy	of	desire,	rage	can	find	no	exaltation	but	in	what	reverberates	inwards	until	 it	 implodes	consuming	the	soul	of	man,	consuming	being.	 If	you	as	fail	 to	rule	over	desire	and	make	your	own	law,	the	gods	will	have	your	life.	This	is	the	message	 that	 resonates	 in	 the	 sense	 of	 being	autonomos.	 Being,	 it	 seems,	 has	entered	 into	 alliance	 with	 a	 new	 sense	 of	 order,	 a	 sense	 of	 order	 to	 which	neither	Creon	nor	Antigone	can	belong.	We	can	trace	this	emergence	in	terms	of	the	 deinon	 in	 which	 we	 will	 see	 that	 Creon	 and	 Antigone,	 in	 their	 opposed	confrontations,	have	 in	 fact	 come	 to	 share	a	 certain	 resemblance	 that	appears	on	the	opposite	side	of	order,	as	the	face	of	Other.																																																									36	See	Allen	(2008:	92).	
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To	 analyse	 the	 course	 of	 events,	 at	 the	 end	 of	 which	 the	 opposed	confrontations	 of	 our	 two	 protagonists	 seem	 to	 have	 produced	 a	 certain	 new	resemblance	of	the	Other,	we	must	try	to	trace	the	course	of	descent	in	terms	of	
alētheia	as	the	functioning	of	the	deinon	at	the	site	of	polemos.	As	noted,	we	are	still	in	a	world	where	fixed	identities	have	yet	to	issue	from	the	mind	even	if	the	poet	has	begun	to	speak	of	a	certain	vaguely	defined	will	of	 the	self.	Certainly,	the	poet	tells	us	at	the	beginning	of	the	play	that	Creon	is	the	ruler	of	the	polis	and	Antigone	 the	 sister	 of	 dead	 Polynices.	However,	 it	 is	 not	 before	Antigone	and	 Creon	 enter	 into	 a	 relationship	 of	 opposition	 that	 they	 truly	 step	 into	appearance.	Then	their	opposed	confrontations	give	birth	to	the	hērōinē	and	the	
stratēgos	 in	 the	 overwhelming	 coming-to-presence	 of	 polemos,	 as	 Heidegger	would	perhaps	say.	This	is	precisely	when	the	deinon	appears.	As	in	Homer,	the	
deinon	appears	at	 the	site	of	polemos	as	alētheia	on	which	difference	emerges.	The	 more	 Creon	 and	 Antigone	 step	 apart	 in	 opposition	 –	 the	 more	 the	conjunction	 of	 opposites	 is	 accentuated	 –	 the	 better	 we	 can	 see	 the	 truth	[alētheia].	One	will	notice	 then	 that	 they	are	 indeed	also	 the	Same.	Polemos	 is	father	of	all	giving	birth	to	Antigone	and	Creon	as	they	step	apart	in	opposition	as	 the	 hērōinē	 and	 the	 stratēgos	 to	 become	 the	 Same.	 However,	 contrary	 to	Homeric	 poetry,	 in	 Antigone,	 the	 Logos	 of	 polemos	 is	 no	 longer	 unmediated.	
Polemos	no	longer	simply	answers	to	its	own	inner	law,	but	must	also	answer	to	the	order	that	has	opened	up	at	the	division	between	forms	of	law.	This	is	how	Creon	and	Antigone	appear	on	the	other	side	of	an	order,	which	Homeric	poetry	shows	 no	 traces	 of.	 In	 their	 struggle,	 they	 become	 caught	 in	 the	 resemblance	that	now	animates	order;	they	move	in	parallel	on	the	outer	edges	of	the	ancient	culture	of	nomos,	as	the	figure	of	the	Other.	Although	Antigone	is	certainly	the	heroine	and	the	defender	of	nomos	and	Creon	the	transgressor	of	the	laws	given	by	 Zeus,	 as	 autonomos	 they	 both	 end	 up	 as	 one	 and	 the	 same	 in	 a	 kind	 of	doubling	of	the	figure	who	is	without	a	polis	[apolis].	As	noted	previously,	 this	 idea	of	 the	one	who	 is	apolis	will	 appear	 as	 an	important	 theme	 in	 classical	 political	 discourse,	 but	 by	 then	 the	meaning	 the	tragedians	 were	 so	 much	 at	 pains	 to	 convey	 has	 been	 lost.	 In	 Antigone,	 we	should	note	that	the	logos	of	the	one	who	becomes	apolis	in	making	his	own	law	articulates	a	site	on	which	the	poet	records	the	change	that	seems	to	take	place	
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in	 the	 shift	 towards	 the	new	order.	This	 is	 in	 fact	 the	 logos	 in	which	Antigone	culminates:	with	the	arrival	of	the	new	order	born	from	the	exigencies	of	war,	the	 hērōs	 comes	 to	 resemble	 the	 arkhōn.	 But	 how	 is	 this	 possible?	 How	 is	 it	possible	 that	 the	 hērōinē	 and	 the	 stratēgos	 come	 to	 resemble	 one	 another	without	destroying	the	fundamental	ordering	codes	of	society?	The	answer	we	find	 is	 far	 from	 reassuring	 and	 the	 real	 surprise	 of	 the	play.	 It	 appears	 in	 the	passage	where	the	chorus	sings	of	the	one	who	is	apolis.	While	one	cannot	fail	to	hear	 in	 the	 remarks	 of	 the	 chorus	 the	 reference	 to	 Creon,	 the	 chorus	 actually	never	 mentions	 his	 name.	 Certainly,	 Creon	 is	 the	 one	 who	 in	 his	 foolishness	‘couples	with	 disgrace’,	 as	 he	 fails	 to	 honour	 the	 customs	 of	 the	 land	 and	 the	justice	of	the	gods,	and	so	becomes	apolis.	But	a	few	lines	earlier	in	the	play	we	learn	that	the	character	the	chorus	sings	of	is	not	Creon,	but	anthrōpos,	which	is	to	 say	man	 in	 general	 as	 a	 certain	 animal	 species.	History,	 it	 seems,	 is	 on	 the	verge	of	breeding	a	new	character	of	man:		 Wonders	are	many,	and	none	is	more	wonderful	than	man.	This	power	spans	the	sea,	even	when	 it	surges	white	before	the	gales	of	 the	south-wind,	and	makes	a	path	under	swells	that	threaten	to	engulf	him.	Earth,	too,	the	eldest	of	the	gods,	the	 immortal,	 the	 unwearied,	 he	wears	 away	 to	 his	 own	 ends,	 turning	 the	 soil	with	 the	offspring	of	horses	as	 the	plows	weave	 to	and	 fro	year	after	year.	The	light-hearted	tribe	of	birds	and	the	clans	of	wild	beasts	and	the	sea-brood	of	the	deep	he	snares	in	the	meshes	of	his	twisted	nets,	and	he	leads	them	captive,	very-skilled	man.	He	masters	by	his	arts	the	beast	who	dwells	in	the	wilds	and	roams	the	hills.	He	tames	the	shaggy-maned	horse,	putting	the	yoke	upon	its	neck,	and	tames	the	tireless	mountain	bull.	(335-50).		 In	 a	world	where	 truth	 is	 still	 seen	as	alētheia	 and	where	 the	 conflict	 of	opposites	continuously	provoke	new	and	more	powerful	offspring,	what	seems	to	 read	 as	 a	 celebration	 of	 the	 deeds	 and	 acts	 of	 anthrōpos	 simultaneously	announces	 the	 birth	 of	 an	 order	 of	 things	 wherein	 man	 has	 overstepped	 a	threshold	in	assuming	a	kind	of	mastery	that	could	only	belong	to	the	gods.	The	subject	that	now	begins	to	speak	in	history	is	one	whose	relationship	to	nomos	and	phusis	seems	to	border	on	hubris,	as	if	this	subject	had	come	into	being	with	the	violation	of	an	unspoken	taboo,	the	kind	of	ancient	taboo	that	surrounds	the	eldest	of	 the	gods,	Earth,	 and	with	 it	 the	entire	 cosmic	 chain	of	 resemblances.	
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We	should	note	here	that	while	nomos	certainly	demarcates	a	certain	distance	between	man	 and	 animal,37	at	 this	 point	 in	 time,	nomos	 appears	 at	 level	with	
phusis;	nomos	is	of	the	same	order	of	reality	as	nature,	as	that	which	is	[phusis].	In	 the	birth	of	 an	order	 that	would	gradually	wrestle	 itself	 free	of	 the	 archaic	ordering	codes	of	nomos	as	custom,	anthrōpos	emerges	in	close	proximity	to	the	
deinon	and	within	a	certain	field	of	knowledge	that	transgresses	the	immediacy	of	phusis	and	nomos.	Here,	we	can	return	to	Heidegger.	According	to	Heidegger,	what	appears	in	the	 transgression	 of	phusis	 is	what	 the	 Greeks	 referred	 to	 as	 technē,	which	 is	neither	 to	 be	 understood	 as	 art	 nor	 skill,	 and	 it	 has	 no	 resemblance	 with	technology	in	the	modern	sense:	“We	translate	technē	as	 ‘knowing’…	Knowing,	in	 the	 genuine	 sense	 of	 technē,	 means	 initially	 and	 constantly	 looking	 out	beyond	what,	 in	 each	 case,	 is	 present	 at	 hand…	 Knowing	 is	 the	 ability	 to	 set	being	 into	 work	 as	 something	 that	 in	 each	 case	 is	 in	 such	 and	 such	 a	 way.”	(Heidegger	2000:	122).	Now,	Heidegger	 says,	what	 characterises	 technē	 is	 the	
deinon	by	which	he	means	not	simply	the	terrible	event,	but	also	a	certain	state	of	 being	 in	which	 the	 one	who	 is	 subject	 to	 it	 always	 stands	 in	 a	 position	 of	daring	 to	 cross	 the	 limit.	 In	doing	 so,	 in	 crossing	 the	 limit,	 says	Heidegger,	 he	creates	through	‘violence-doing’.	Not	in	the	pastoral	sense,	but	in	the	sense	that	transgression	appears	in	the	event	of	man	breaking	into	nature	to	form	culture,	Heidegger	 argues,	 as	 he	 explains	 how	 the	 Greeks	 associated	 technē	 with	 the	creation	of	authentic	artwork.	This	is	true,	but	technē	is	also	the	knowledge	that	concerns	the	cultivation	of	a	domain,	the	domestication	of	animals,	the	mastery	of	 land	 and	 sea,	 and	 all	 that	 belongs	 to	 the	 subsistence	 of	 life	 of	 the	 classical	
oikonomia	[household]	and	the	sedentary	space	of	the	polis.	The	semantic	field	of	technē	therefore	concerns	more	than	the	privileged	form	of	sublime	artwork.	Moreover,	 I	 think	 we	 should	 replace	 the	 word	 ‘violence’	 here	 with	 mastery,	though	keeping	in	mind	the	meaning	of	transgression.	Indeed,	 it	 seems	 to	 me	 that	 what	 we	 see	 reflected	 in	 Antigone	 is	 that	tragedy	seems	to	go	hand	in	hand	with	technē	as	a	particular	kind	of	knowledge	belonging	to	an	order	in	which	man	comes	to	posit	himself	as	master	and	ruler																																																									37	As	Hesiod	says	in	his	Works	and	Days,	nomos	is	Zeus’	gift	to	man	rather	than	to	the	‘fishes	and	beasts	and	winged	fowls’	(276-277).	
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over	land	and	sea	and	the	wild	beast	that	belong	to	‘the	eldest	of	the	gods’,	Earth.	In	Antigone	we	witness	how	the	technē	of	setting	phusis	 into	work,	 intrinsic	to	the	 practices	 of	 ruling	 and	 steering	 issuing	 from	 the	 principle	 of	 arkhē,	 is	accompanied	by	a	course	of	descent	written	in	the	codes	of	the	deinon.	It	is	with	
technē	 that	 anthrōpos	 discovers	 the	 knowledge	 of	 ruling	 over	 phusis,	 the	steering	of	phusis	towards	a	certain	end.	This	end	is	yet	to	be	recognised	as	the	good.	In	fact,	it	remains	tied	up	with	the	deinon,	so	much	so	that	the	intervention	into	the	relationship	of	 forces	by	the	command	of	ruling	and	steering	reads	as	signs	that	a	certain	course	of	events	is	set	into	motion,	which	is	tragedy.	We	can	see	how	this	logos	is	to	some	extent	already	present	in	Homer;	the	transgression	 by	 Agamemnon	 sets	 in	 motion	 the	 chain	 of	 events,	 which	endpoint	is	the	underworld	of	Hades.	This	logos	persists	in	the	tragedians	of	the	early	classical	period,	however,	 in	 the	 later	poets	we	can	see	 that	 the	order	of	things	 is	 no	 longer	 quite	 the	 same.	 The	 archaic	world,	where	 the	 poet’s	 song	made	 the	 divinity	 of	 rage	 be	 known	 to	man	 as	 the	 deinon	 poured	 the	 fire	 of	
kosmos	 into	 the	 life	of	mortals	with	 the	kind	amazement	worthy	of	Arēs,	now	occurs	at	a	certain	distance.	A	new	economy	of	the	human	affects	has	emerged	at	 the	 site	where	 the	 great	 speculation	 about	 the	 self	 has	 awakened	 amid	 the	carnage	of	madness	 and	 illusion.	 Still,	 as	we	 see	 in	Antigone	 the	hērōinē,	 rage	and	affect,	though	certainly	tamed	and	reshaped	by	the	economy	of	desire,	have	not	lost	every	positive	relation	to	action.	The	contours	of	the	archaic	friendship	with	war	are	yet	visible.	In	a	world	where	technē	and	arkhē	have	begun	to	exert	a	certain	influence,	it	still	has	a	positive	valorisation	even	if	what	used	to	read	as	the	glorious	deeds	and	acts	of	a	hērōinē,	bound	to	the	friendship	with	war	and	the	steering	of	the	kosmos	by	polemos,	 is	now	seen	from	the	vantage	point	of	a	slightly	skewed	perspective,	as	the	self-willed	impulses	of	the	one	who	falls	prey	to	 the	 passions.	 In	 fact,	 not	 before	 the	 advent	 of	 philosophical	 discourse	will	rage	 and	 spiritedness	 be	 aligned	 in	 a	 position	 to	 knowledge	 in	which	 the	 old	resemblances	disappear.	Beginning	with	Plato,	rage	will	be	transformed	under	the	theme	of	 inspired	madness	 into	the	sober	mania	of	viewing	 ideas.	By	then	the	 madness	 of	 the	 old	 world	 has	 been	 exorcised,	 as	 order	 is	 sought	 out	 in	accordance	 with	 the	 idea	 of	 the	 good.	 Yet,	 the	 order	 of	 things	 always	 seems	liable	 to	 lapse	 into	 excess	 and	 intoxication,	 as	 the	 spirit	 of	man	 slips	 into	 the	
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channels	of	 love	and	war.	Here,	on	the	other	side	of	order,	the	chimeras	of	the	old	world	will	linger	on,	as	the	face	of	the	Other.	Now,	the	transition	from	the	Logos	of	polemos	to	the	order	of	arkhē	seems	to	gather	pace	roughly	around	the	time	of	the	Persian	invasion	at	the	beginning	of	the	fifth	century,	culminating	in	the	period	following	the	Peloponnesian	War.	During	 these	 centuries,	 sobriety	 and	 seriousness	 will	 gradually	 begin	 to	 take	over	the	representation	of	war.	Knowledge	detaches	itself	from	war	in	order	to	return	 to	 war	 a	 form	 of	 knowledge	 that	 puts	 itself	 in	 opposition	 to	 war,	 to	combat	and	conquer	war,	 to	ruler	over	war;	 to	 fit	 it	 into	a	sequence	of	events	wherein	 it	 is	made	 intelligible	 in	 terms	 of	 time	 and	 space,	 preconditions	 and	effects.	 The	 temporalisation	 of	 the	 affects	 would	 be	 accompanied	 by	 the	temporalisation	 of	 war.	 This	 form	 of	 knowledge	 is	 very	 different	 from	 the	oracular	 truth	versed	by	poet.	 It	 is	wedded	to	evidence,	detail	and	 fact,	and	to	establishing	 connections	 between	 events	 to	 form	 a	 series	 of	 events	 within	 a	temporally	defined	 space.	 Its	 authors	are	meticulous,	patient,	 and	detached	 in	their	pursuit	of	this	knowledge.	Its	ambition	is	to	seek	out	war	where	no	Greek	
poiitis	or	logographos	had	hitherto	sought	to	discover	war:	to	apply	the	ordered	space	 to	 the	 undifferentiated	 space,	 to	 apply	 time	 to	 the	 futile	 and	 the	ephemeral,	to	decipher	truth	by	means	of	the	 logos	of	mind	[nous]	rather	than	to	represent	signs	by	means	of	verse	and	lyric	attuned	to	the	melody	of	kosmos;	to	investigate	war,	not	from	the	poet’s	vantage	point	within	the	Orphic	kinship	of	 the	 signs	 that	 speak	of	polemos,	 but	 from	 the	 exteriority	 of	 the	 illuminated	space	of	logical	exercise.	Against	the	constantly	mobile	whole	of	polemos,	it	will	divide	 the	 past	 against	 the	 present;	 to	 explain	 the	 present	 in	 terms	 of	 what	happened	 in	 the	 past,	 to	 trace	 the	 course	 of	 descent	 of	 this	 present	 in	 the	attempt	to	recover	the	remains	of	the	old	order	that	died	before	the	fall	of	the	Athenian	empire.	
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§ 3 Historia – The Calligraphy of War and Time					
3.1.	 With	 the	 opening	 phrase	 “Thucydides	 the	 Athenian	 wrote	 up	 the	Peloponnesian	War”,	Thucydides,	presenting	his	work	in	the	peculiar	detached	form	of	third	person,	sets	the	tone	for	this	distinctly	novel	representation	of	war,	which	 is,	Thucydides	says,	historia.38	This	 form	of	knowledge	 is	not	historia	 in	the	sense	Herodotus	adheres	to	 in	the	title	of	his	work	of	 the	same	name.	The	work	 of	 Herodotus	 cannot	 be	 considered	 historia	 since	 it	 is	 the	 work	 of	 a	
logographos	 [storyteller],	whereas,	according	to	Thucydides	(I:	21-22),	historia	marks	a	quite	different	undertaking.	Scholars	have	pointed	to	the	particular	use	by	 Thucydides	 of	 the	 verb	 xungraphein	 (xungrapse	 ton	polemon,	 meaning	 “he	wrote	up	the	war”).39	In	Greek	 literature,	xungraphein	occurs	 in	 texts	 that	rely	on	accuracy	and	attention	to	detail	such	as	texts	on	medicine,	architecture,	and	cooking,	 but	 here	 Thucydides	 uses	 the	 verb	 in	 the	 most	 unusual	 context	 of	
historia	opening	up	a	space	for	the	acquisition	of	the	knowledge	of	war,	which	seeks	 to	 break	 free	 of	 traditionary	historia.40	Indeed,	 this	 form	of	 inquiry	 into	
polemos	seems	to	have	been	new	to	the	Greeks.	However,	it	is	important	to	note	that	 it	 maintains	 a	 certain	 structural	 familiarity	 in	 syntax	 to	 the	 oratory	tradition.	 Like	 the	 poet,	 Thucydides	 proceeds	 by	 way	 of	 antilogies,	 the	juxtaposition	 of	 opposites.41	Moreover,	 his	 arguments	 rely	 on	 the	 pairing	 of	opposing	 speeches.42	To	 this	 extent,	 Thucydides	 remains	 within	 the	 linguistic																																																									38	See	Lebow	on	how	the	History	of	the	Peloponnesian	War	represents	a	break	with	the	oratory	tradition	expressing	a	new	and	dinstinctly	different	representation	of	war	(2003:	73).	Because	of	his	inauguration	of	the	method	of	historia,	Thucydides	is	often	referred	to	as	the	father	of	scientific	history.	39	See	Connor	(1984:	248);	Lebow	(2003:	72-73).	40	Traditionary	historia	is	what	we	find,	for	example,	in	Herodotus’	account	of	the	battle	at	Marathon.	41	Lebow	provides	an	instructive	example	of	how	Thucydides’s	account	is	a	dialogue	of	opposite	pairs:	“rationanal	descision	[gnōme]	and	chance	[tuchē],	speech	[logos]	and	deed	[ergon],	law	[nomos]	and	nature	[phusis]…”	(2003:	112;	72-74).	42	In	example,	when	representatives	of	Corcyra	and	Corinth	appear	before	the	Athenian	assembly,	immediately	before	the	outbreak	of	the	Peloponnesian	War,	their	speeches	are	juxtaposed	one	against	the	other,	and	when	the	Athenian	and	the	Corinthian	representatives	
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order	 of	 polemos	 throughout	 his	 historia.	 But	 contrary	 to	 the	 poet	 and	 the	storyteller,	 Thucydides	 (1.22)	 seeks	 to	 acquire	 knowledge	principally	 through	what	he	 says	 are	 eyewitness	 accounts	 [autopsia],	which	 is	 not	 to	be	 confused	with	hearsay,	 that	 is,	 second-hand	knowledge	passed	on	 from	 the	observer	 to	the	histōr	who,	in	accumulating	this	form	of	knowledge,	recounts	historia	in	the	traditional	 sense.	While	 Thucydides	 also	 relies	 on	 second-hand	 knowledge	 as	well	 as	 the	 knowledge	 of	 signs,	 he	 clearly	 attaches	 greater	 importance	 to	 this	form	 of	 knowledge	 not	 merely	 because	 he	 personally,	 as	 stratēgos	 [general]	during	part	of	war,	had	seen	and	witnessed	several	events,	but	because	autopsia,	according	 to	 this	 taxonomy,	 is	 of	 a	 higher	 order	 in	 terms	 of	 accuracy	 and	reliability	 than	second-hand	knowledge	and	 the	knowledge	of	 signs:	 “Since	he	was	a	poet”,	Thucydides	says,	“it	is	questionable	whether	we	can	have	complete	confidence	 in	Homer’s	 figures…”	However	 “there	 is	 no	 reason	why	we	 should	not	 believe	 that	 the	 Trojan	 expedition	 was	 the	 greatest	 that	 had	 ever	 taken	place.”	(1.10:	23-25;	20-22).	Symptomatically	 for	 Thucydides,	 things	 are	 weighed	 in	 numbers	 and	figures	 and	 deciphered	 in	 terms	 of	 their	 logical	 conditions	 of	 possibility.	Magnitude	and	scale,	but	also	the	intrinsic	qualities	of	things	and	their	minutiae	workings	 matter	 to	 this	 art	 of	 calculating	 force	 relations;	 of	 deducting	 and	inferring	 measures	 for	 the	 capacities	 of	 forces,	 of	 determining	 strength	 and	ability.	 Having	 discussed	 in	 detail	 the	 role	 of	wealth	 in	 the	 sustenance	 of	 the	Athenian	army,	Thucydides	records	their	numbers	and	kind:	“…	they	had	13.000	hoplites	 in	 addition	 to	 the	 16.000	 others	 who	 were	 in	 various	 garrisons	 and	those	engaged	in	the	actual	defence	of	the	city…	There	were	also	1.200	cavalry,	included	mounted	bowmen;	1.600	unmounted	bowmen,	and	300	triremes	ready	for	active	service.”	 (2.13:	46-49;	60-62).	Thucydides	 then	proceeds	 to	observe	the	strong	points	of	the	sedentary	space	of	Athens’	walls,	recounting	the	forces	occupying	this	space	and	distinguishing	between	divisions	within	this	space	in	terms	of	the	allocation	of	forces:	“The	wall	of	Phalerum	ran	for	four	miles	from	the	sea	to	the	city	circuit;	and	nearly	five	miles	of	the	wall	surrounding	the	city	was	guarded,	though	part	of	it	was	left	without	guard.	Then	there	were	the	four																																																																																																																																																														appear	before	the	Spartan	assembly,	Thucydides	once	again	relies	on	the	pairing	of	opposing	speeches.	
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and	 a	 half	 miles	 of	 the	 Long	 Walls	 to	 Piraeus,	 the	 outer	 one	 of	 which	 was	garrisoned.	 Then,	 too,	 there	 were	 seven	 and	 a	 half	 miles	 of	 fortifications	surrounding	Piraeus	and	Munychia,	half	of	which	was	guarded.”	(2.13:	52-60).		Approximately	 250	 years	 separate	 Homer43	from	 Thucydides	 and	 yet	these	 representations	 of	 polemos	 are	 quite	 different.	 In	 Homer,	 heroes	 and	warriors	appear	and	disappear	on	a	stage	to	perform	their	deeds	and	acts.	The	planes	 of	 Troy	 are	 a	 theatre	 in	 which	 euphoric	 expressions	 and	 emphatic	gesticulations	are	exchanged,	as	man	engage	in	ephemeral	struggles	unleashing	his	rage	and	affect.	 In	a	kind	of	 theatrical	play	of	power,	man	 is	bound	to	war	and	 action	 to	 a	 series	 of	 exaltations	 that	 unbinds	 force;	 blazing	 up	 and	disappearing	 in	 an	 instant,	 a	 pure	 catatonic	 rupture,	 the	 forces	 of	 polemos	cannot	 be	 controlled	 or	mastered	 since	 they	 are	 inspired	 by	 gods	 and	 not	 by	kings	 or	 any	 mortal	 being.	 War	 steers	 men	 and	 heroes	 who	 fight	 in	 fluid	formations	intermingling	kind	and	species;	light-armed	infantry	appears	among	horsemen,	 chariots	 in	 the	 midst	 of	 archers.44	We	 are	 far	 from	 the	 strategic	warfare	of	Athena,	the	half-sister	of	Arēs	and	Plato’s	war	god	of	choice	(Timaeus	21e,	 Laws	 626d,	 796c;	 Cratylus	 406d).	 We	 are	 at	 the	 level	 of	 the	 singular	
polemistēs	and	at	the	point	of	emergence	of	the	forces	that	govern	his	soul	and	body	in	accordance	with	polemos.	By	contrast,	in	Thucydides	we	learn	not	so	much	of	the	individual	hērōs	or	
polemistēs,	 but	 rather	 of	 the	 relations	 of	 forces	 among	 poleis.	 In	 Thucydides,	
polemos	emerge	 from	within	 a	 complex	 set	 of	 relations	of	 forces	 stretching	 in	time	and	space:	military	strength	(the	types	of	infantry,	the	kind	of	organisation	of	 troops,	 fortifications,	 supply	 lines	 etc.),	 alliances,	 wealth,	 and	 riches	 all	constitute	 elements	 of	 an	 entire	 economy	 of	 forces,	 which	 manipulates	 the	relations	of	forces	in	such	a	way	that	they	acquire	temporality,	permanence,	and	are	multiplied	in	their	effects.	Polemos	is	certainly	seen	at	the	level	of	man,	but	more	often	it	is	thought	of	at	the	level	of	political	life	[bios	politikos]	and	at	the	hands	 of	 the	Athenian	 stratēgos	 [general]	 or	 the	 Spartan	hēgemon	 [king]	who	leads	 his	 forces	 into	 battle.	 Whereas	 in	 Homer	 and	 Heraclitus,	 and	 to	 some																																																									43	According	to	van	Wees	(2004:	252),	comparative	studies	of	Homer’s	descriptions	of	weaponry	and	archaeological	evidence	situate	‘Homeric	warfare’	at	around	700-640	BC.	44	See	van	Wees	on	the	mode	of	combat	of	the	archaic	phalanx	(2004:	166-168).	
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extent	 also	 in	 Sophocles,	polemos	 steers	both	man	and	kosmos,	 by	 the	 time	of	Thucydides	 it	 seems	war	 and	man	 have	 changed	 places.	 Polemos	 has	 become	subject	to	a	particular	technē,	a	technē	in	the	most	fundamental	sense	because	it	has	little	to	do	with	the	uncalculated	or	the	random,	the	spontaneous	eruption	of	force	or	its	abrupt	disappearance.	Although	it	will	eventually	claim	a	relation	to	the	forces	that	steer	the	kosmos	in	the	great	chain	of	simile	and	resemblance,	the	sense	of	polemos	alluded	to	by	Thucydides	has	more	to	do	with	an	order	in	which	 difference	 rather	 than	 simple	 polarity	 and	 analogy	 distributes	 the	resemblances	 between	 the	 Same	 and	 the	 Other;	 an	 order	 in	 which	 war	 is	reshaped	 by	 the	 technē	 of	 steering	 polemos	 and	 the	 chain	 of	 resemblances	revealed	in	the	arkhē	of	kosmos.	This	is	not	to	say	that	Thucydides	appears	as	a	protagonist	of	the	order	of	things	 he	 carefully	 describes.	 In	 fact,	 historia,	 in	 the	 sense	 alluded	 to	 by	Thucydides,	 is	neither	an	account	of	 the	question	of	 capabilities,	 strategies,	or	alliances	 per	 se,	 nor	 an	 inquiry	 into	 how	 this	 economy	 of	 forces	 ought	 to	 be	shaped	 by	 considerations	 of	 power	 issuing	 from	 the	 quintessential	 strategic	mind.	 On	 the	 contrary,	 and	 in	 almost	 perfect	 consistency	with	 the	 tragedians	that	preceded	him,	it	is	an	account	of	a	certain	course	of	events.	It	is	an	inquiry	into	the	political	economy	of	war	that	has	come	into	being	in	the	classical	world,	an	inquiry	that	seeks	to	interrogate	the	course	of	events	that	took	place,	as	the	opposed	 confrontations	 of	 forces	 brought	 about	 the	 Peloponnesian	 War.	 But	why,	 then,	 when	 the	 poetic	 tradition	 was	 readily	 available	 to	 him,	 did	Thucydides	go	to	such	painstaking	efforts	of	inaugurating	a	decisively	new	kind	of	knowledge?	I	have	previously	noted	how	the	works	of	the	classical	tragedians	seem	to	reflect	the	dislocation	of	the	archaic	relationship	of	polemos,	and	along	with	it	the	poetic	account	[logos]	of	polemos.	In	this	transition	from	the	Logos	of	
polemos	 to	 the	 order	 of	 arkhē,	 the	 old	 poetic	 form	 of	 knowledge	 has	 lost	continuity	with	war,	 which	 is	 how	 it	 can	 no	 longer	 be	 relied	 upon	 to	 convey	
alētheia.	As	we	saw	in	his	comment	on	Homer,	Thucydides	realises	this.	Logos	and	 polemos	 are	 no	 longer	 one	 and	 the	 same,	 but	 have	 been	 separated	 as	
polemos	 has	 become	 inscribed	 in	 the	 technē	 of	 steering,	 and,	accordingly,	 the	gathering	 of	 opposites	 by	 logos	 has	 come	 to	 resemble	 certain	 strategic	calculations	of	 the	mind.	The	narrative	position	of	 the	poet	must	 therefore	be	
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abandoned.	In	fact,	the	knowledge	of	war	can	only	gain	continuity	with	alētheia	by	bringing	the	logos	to	bear	on	polemos	from	the	outside.	Through	the	activity	of	logos,	one	sees	and	acts	upon	things	in	the	domain	of	the	real	by	recourse	to	what	 is	 provided	 by	 technē.	 Hence	 the	 peculiar	 introduction	 by	 Thucydides	where	 he	 recounts	 the	 logos	 in	 the	 third	 person.	 This	 is	 to	 say,	 in	 order	 for	knowledge	 to	 acquire	 continuity	 with	 war,	 it	 must	 now	 produce	 evidence	 to	demonstrate	 that	 this	 knowledge	 is	 in	 fact	 of	 the	 same	order	 of	 reality	 as	 the	
technē	of	war.	Obviously,	the	histōr	cannot	produce	this	kind	of	evidence	if	the	
logos	 remains	 within	 the	 poetic	 realm	 of	 parable	 and	 paradox	 with	 their	mutable	potentialities.	The	chain	of	events	must	be	disclosed	 in	the	domain	of	the	real	rather	than	in	allegorical	 form,	which	is	also	how	we	find	the	unusual	concern	 for	 accuracy,	 detail,	 and	 fact.	 With	 historia,	 the	 chain	 of	 events	 is	referred	 to	 the	 domain	 of	 actuality	 and	 applied	 to	 time	 so	 as	 to	 draw	 a	distinction	between	 the	Same	and	 the	Other,	dispelling	 the	 chimeras	of	poetic	truth	from	the	body	of	knowledge.	This	is	how	historia	will	be	at	level	with	the	new	reality	of	war.	In	the	classical	world,	polemos	has	become	subject	to	a	certain	technē	then.	By	 this	 I	 mean	 a	 certain	 knowledge	 and	 a	 set	 of	 practices	 that	 involve	 the	assemblage	 of	 forces	 into	 a	 kind	 of	 living	 machinery	 or	 mechanic	 organism,	which	 to	 a	 certain	 extent	 can	 be	 steered	 [kubernaō]	 by	 the	 stratēgos	 or	 the	
hēgemon.	As	we	learn	in	Plato,	this	is	done	by	the	application	of	a	particular	set	of	rules	of	behaviour	for	regulating	the	relation	between	stratēgos	and	stratiōtēs	[a	 citizen	bound	 to	military	 service].	 In	 the	Laws	 (942a-c),	 then,	we	 find	Plato	carefully	examining	the	rules	governing	this	relationship	between	stratiōtēs	and	
arkhōn,45	which	 appears	 at	 the	 site	 of	war	where	 the	 disciplined	 space	 of	 the	
stratiōtēs	 overlays	 the	erratic	 space	occupied	by	 the	one	who	 is	philopolemos;	the	ordered	space	which	belongs	to	the	strategic	assemblage	of	 forces	called	a	
stratia	 [army]	 or	 militia	 [military].	 Within	 this	 space,	 one	 must	 avoid	 the	imprecise	distribution	of	force	and	action,	which	happens,	says	Plato,	if	‘anyone	follows	 his	 own	 work’.	 One	 must	 eliminate	 the	 untimely	 or	 uncontrolled	disappearance	 of	 individuals	 tending	 to	 their	 own	 matters	 of	 subsistence.	 In																																																									45	Rather	than	the	term	stratēgos,	Plato	uses	the	word	arkhōn	in	the	more	general	sense	of	‘leader’	or	‘ruler’.	
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military	affairs,	Plato	explains,	 “The	vital	point	 is	 that	no	one,	man	or	woman,	must	ever	be	left	without	someone	in	charge	of	him;	nobody	must	get	into	the	habit	 of	 acting	 alone	 and	 independently,	 in	 all	 kinds	of	war,	 and	 in	peace	 and	war	 alike	 we	 must	 give	 our	 constant	 attention	 and	 obedience	 to	 our	 leader,	submitting	to	his	steering	[kubernōmenon]	even	in	tiny	details.	When	the	order	is	 given	we	 should	 stand,	march,	 exercise,	wash,	 feed,	 stay	 awake	 at	 night	 on	duty	as	guards	or	messengers,	and	even	in	the	midst	of	dangers	not	pursue	the	enemy	or	yield	without	a	sign	from	our	commander	[arkhōn].”	This	 set	 of	 rules,	 enabling	 the	 functioning	 of	 the	 stratia	 and	 by	which	 it	becomes	 possible	 for	 the	 arkhōn	 [leader]	 to	 be	 kubernōmenon,	 furthermore	relies	 on	 a	 specific	 tactic	 for	 keeping	 these	 forces	 in	 place,	 for	 consolidating	them	and	 for	holding	 their	 ground	 in	 the	 theatre	of	war.	While	 in	Homer	 it	 is	considered	 most	 shameful	 not	 to	 hold	 one’s	 ground	 and	 abandon	 a	 fellow	
philopolemos,	 the	 hērōs	 or	 polemistēs	 is	 not	 subject	 to	 the	 steering	 of	 the	
stratēgos	or	 the	hēgemon,	 since	he	answers	neither	 to	 the	stratēgos	nor	 to	 the	
hēgemon,	but	to	polemos	by	virtue	of	being	philopolemos	in	which	he	is	bound	to	the	forces	of	kosmos	and	the	will	of	gods.	Reasserting	his	honour	before	Glaucus	who	had	 just	put	his	 courage	 into	question,	Hector	 says:	 “Believe	me,	 fighting	and	the	noise	of	chariots	do	not	frighten	me.	But	the	will	of	Zeus	who	drives	the	storm-cloud	always	prevails.	He	can	easily	make	a	brave	man	run	away	and	lose	a	 battle,	 but	 another	 time	 that	 very	 same	 god	 will	 urge	 him	 to	 fight.”	 (Iliad	XVII.174-178).	By	contrast,	as	we	learn	in	Plato,46	the	apprehension	of	the	lines	of	escape	and	pursuit	is	precisely	the	tactic	by	which	the	steering	of	the	stratia	operates	–	it	is	the	principle	from	which	it	acquires	its	strength	and	consolidates																																																									46	While	it	was	not	considered	cowardice	to	flee	from	an	obviously	superior	enemy,	the	Greeks	had	an	expression	to	denote	the	act	of	retreating	from	battle	[anaklèsis]	in	which	the	hoplite	would	leave	his	weapons	and	shield	behind	for	a	quicker	escape.	The	verb	rhipsaspia	literally	means	‘discarding	the	shield’,	which,	although	clearly	associated	with	certain	stigmatising	connotations,	was	nevertheless	common	practice.	Writing	in	the	Laws,	Plato	proposes	to	prosecute	against	the	man	guilty	of	such	felonies	and	make	him	subject	to	punishment	and	penalty:	“If	a	man	finds	the	enemy	at	his	heels	and	instead	of	turning	round	and	defending	himself	with	the	weapons	he	has,	deliberately	lets	them	drop	or	throws	them	away,	preferring	a	coward’s	life	of	shame	to	the	glorious	and	blessed	death	of	a	hero,	then	there	should	certainly	be	a	penalty	for	losing	his	weapons	by	abandonment…		If	a	man	is	convicted	on	a	charge	of	shamefully	dropping	his	weapons	in	war,	a)	no	general	or	any	other	army	officer	must	employ	him	as	a	soldier	again,	or	appoint	him	to	any	position	whatever;	b)	and	in	addition	to	being	thus	permitted,	like	the	woman	he	is	by	nature,	to	avoid	the	risks	that	only	men	can	run,	the	guilty	man	must	also	pay	a	sum	of	money:	1.000	drachmas	if	he	belongs	to	the	highest	property-class,	500	if	to	the	second,	300	if	to	the	third	and	100	if	to	the	lowest.”	(Laws	944c-945b).	
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its	force.	Although	this	principle	or	tactic	clearly	seems	more	fully	developed	by	the	time	of	Plato,	it	is	actually	attested	to	by	the	time	of	the	Persian	Wars	in	the	oath	sworn	by	the	Greeks	before	the	battle	of	Plataea	in	479	BC.	At	this	point	in	time,	 the	bond	between	men	and	gods	 is	 still	 affirmed	 in	 sacrifices	and	 in	 the	significance	 given	 to	 omens,	 as	 Xenophon	 recounts	 in	 his	 Hellenica	 (1.4.12).	However,	immediately	before	the	battle	we	find	the	Greeks	engaged	in	the	act	of	affirming,	 not	 so	much	 the	 bond	 between	men	 and	 gods,	 but	 rather	 the	 bond	between	stratēgos	and	stratiōtēs:	 “I	shall	not	dessert	my	taxiarchos	 [officer]	or	my	 enōmotarkhēs	 [group-leader]	 whether	 he	 is	 alive	 or	 dead,	 and	 I	 shall	 not	leave	unless	the	hēgemones	lead	us	away,	and	I	shall	do	whatever	the	stratēgoi	may	command…”	(Tod	II.	204:	25-31).47	The	emergence	of	 the	technē	of	steering	by	the	stratēgos	of	 the	stratiōtēs	marks	 the	 threshold	 of	 a	 dramatic	 change	 in	 the	 perception	 of	 the	 form	 and	rationality	of	polemos,	and	during	the	classical	era	an	obvious	transformation	of	the	knowledge	of	war	takes	place.	The	deeds	and	acts	of	the	singular	polemistēs	‘fighting	 in	a	rage’,	as	he	ventures	 into	fluid	combat	by	stepping	outside	of	the	formation	of	the	hoplite	phalanx,	are	no	longer	praised	by	the	Spartans	as	arētē	[excellence]	 or	 seen	 as	 the	 sign	 of	arēios	 (the	 adjective	 form	 of	 Arēs).	 By	 the	time	 of	 the	 battle	 of	 Plataea,	 Herodotus	 tells	 us	 of	 the	 endeavours	 of	Aristodemus,	 it	has	come	to	be	seen	as	a	conspicuous	will	 to	die	worthy	of	no	honour,	 even	 if	 Herodotus	 himself	 still	 praises	 Aristodemus	 as	 ‘by	 far	 the	bravest	man’	(Histories	9.71.2-4).	In	Herodotus,	the	new	disparity	between	war	and	 the	 knowledge	 that	 recounts	 it	 becomes	 clear.	 The	 kind	 of	 historia	Herodotus	 recounts	 remains	 caught-up	 in	 the	 old	 poetic	 logos,	 as	 he	 praises	Aristodemus	for	an	archaic	sense	of	arētē	now	denounced	by	the	Spartans.48	In	Herodotus,	the	new	sense	of	polemos,	in	which	the	idea	of	combat	has	gradually	left	 less	 scope	 for	displays	of	 archaic	arētē,	 is	 yet	 to	be	discovered.	 In	 combat	[makhē],	it	has	become	a	cardinal	virtue	to	show	obedience	[aidōs],	moderation																																																									47	The	oath	sworn	by	the	Greeks	is	mentioned	in	several	sources	and	recorded	in	an	Athenian	inscription	dating	from	the	fourth	century	(Tod	II.	204:	25-31).	While	the	inscription	certainly	uses	a	mixture	of	Athenian	and	Spartan	epithets	for	war	leaders,	as	pointed	out	by	van	Wees	(2004:	243-244),	the	general	sense	of	the	oath	seems	clearly	delineated.	48	Herodotus	interprets	the	Spartan	condemnation	of	Aristodemus	as	the	expression	of	envy.	While	this	could	also	be	taken	to	mean	that	hoplites	could	still	charge	forward	with	some	honour	(and	drop	back	without	complete	shame),	the	Spartan	discourse	on	arētē	seems	to	contradict	this	view.	
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and	 self-restraint	 [sōphrosynē],	 which	 is	 basically	 the	 intention	 that	 guides	Plato	when,	in	his	elucidations	on	the	matters	of	military	service,	he	stresses	the	importance	that	no	man	should	‘follow	his	own	work’.	For	the	stratiōtēs,	but	this	is	equally	true	of	the	stratēgos,	it	has	become	vital	not	to	succumb	to	the	forces	of	menis	or	thumos,	because	they	have	come	to	pose	a	permanent	threat	to	the	activity	 of	 warfare.	 As	 an	 assemblage	 of	 forces,	 the	 functioning	 of	 the	 stratia	depends	 on	man	 to	 show	moderation	 and	 self-restraint	 and	 to	 submit	 to	 the	steering	of	the	stratēgos,	the	arkhōn,	or	the	hēgemon.	Menis	and	thumos	are	now	quickly	fading	from	the	world	of	positive	affects.	They	have	come	to	belong	to	a	different	register	in	the	restructuration	of	the	ordering	codes	of	combat.		When	we	encounter	the	virtue	of	arētē	in	classical	discourse	it	has	in	fact	come	 to	 resemble	 the	 sense	of	mastery	 expressed	 in	 the	 virtue	of	 sōphrosynē.	More	 precisely,	 arētē	 has	 attained	 the	 meaning	 of	 courage	 and	 manliness	[andriea]	 around	 which	 the	 paideia	 of	 classical	 man	 is	 arranged,	 with	 its	practices	 of	 endurance	 trials	 and	 gymnastics,	 contest	 and	 competition,	 the	practice	 of	 hunting,	 the	 learning	 of	 pipe	 tunes	 and	 manly	 rhythms.	 Although	Homer	is	fed	as	the	mother’s	milk	to	the	young	male	Greek,	and	although	arētē	is	certainly	yet	recognised	as	a	sign	which	is	written	on	the	body	of	the	hērōs,	at	the	moment	 the	 poet’s	 song	 has	 been	 filtered	 through	 the	 sanitising	 gates	 of	classical	 thought,	 arētē	 is	 no	 longer	 so	much	 seen	 as	 something	 given	 by	 the	gods	and	 the	 forces	of	kosmos.	Rather,	 it	 is	 recognised	as	something	one	must	learn	and	practice	for,	that	is,	a	technē	.49	The	meaning	of	arētē	has	in	other	words	now	crossed	the	limit	from	where	it	will	no	longer	signify	the	intensities	of	rage	and	pure	catatonic	force,	but	their	moderation,	 domination,	 and	 subjection;	 the	 manipulation	 of	 the	 relations	 of	forces,	the	curbing	and	alternation	of	the	affects,	the	command	and	steering	of	these	 forces	 that	 now	 arise	 in	 their	 cultivated	 form	 as	 desire.	 Now,	 as	 the	intensities	of	polemos	are	bent	and	shaped	by	the	technē	of	steering	the	stratia,	and	 as	 combat	more	 and	more	often	 is	 discovered	 in	 the	privileged	 form	of	 a	relationship	among	poleis,	 a	 remarkable	displacement	occurs.	War	moves	 into																																																									49	As	Lebow	notes,	this	is	particularly	true	about	the	teachings	of	the	Sophists	who	came	to	dominate	Athenian	philosophy	in	the	second	half	of	the	fifth	century:	“They	were	subversive	of	the	old	aristocratic	order	in	the	deepest	sense	for	they	maintained	that	arētē…	could	be	acquired	through	study,	not	only	through	breeding…”	(2003:	109).	
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the	soul	of	man.	A	new	battlefront	appears	 in	the	division	of	polemos	 into	two	analogous	but	contingent	realms.	The	cries	of	the	battlefield	will	echo	in	the	soul	as	polemos	emerges	as	spiritual	combat	 in	the	waging	of	a	war	by	the	mind	to	straighten	out	the	soul;	to	struggle	against	desire	and	spiritedness,	to	rule	over	them,	 to	 conquer	 them.	 It	 is	 the	 formation	 of	 an	 askēsis.	 In	 the	 Greek	 word	
askēsis,	one	should	hear	the	all	the	connotations	of	an	ascetics	in	the	sense	of	a	set	 of	 practices	 shaped,	 not	 merely	 from	 physical	 exercise,	 rigorous	 practice,	and	 training,	but	also	 from	practices	of	 the	soul	 taking	aim	at	 the	heart	of	 the	affects;	the	domination	of	the	passions,	the	struggle	against	desire.	Here	we	can	return	to	the	passage	in	Plato	from	which	the	present	study	set	out	and	add	to	it	a	certain	gravity	of	war:	“each	man	fights	a	private	war	against	himself…	This,	sir,	 is	 where	 a	 man	 wins	 the	 first	 and	 best	 of	 victories	 –	 over	 himself”,	 says	Cleinias	the	Cretan	to	the	Athenian	Stranger	in	a	passage	of	the	Laws	(626d-e)	and	adds:	“Conversely,	 to	 fall	victim	to	oneself	 is	 the	worst	and	most	shocking	thing	 that	 can	 be	 imagined”.	 In	 fact,	 if	 one	 falls	 victim	 to	 oneself	 on	 the	battlefield,	if	one	falls	into	the	old	habits	of	the	singular	polemistēs	fighting	in	a	rage,	 the	 enemy	 will	 have	 one’s	 life,	 as	 we	 saw	 in	 the	 Spartans’	 view	 of	Aristodemus.	With	 Plato,	 polemos	 permeates	 the	 soul.	 Man	 struggles	 against	 himself,	because	 the	 ruling	 principle	 of	 arkhē	 pervades	 the	 mind,	 dividing	 the	 soul	against	itself	and	opposing	it	to	itself	in	order	for	man	to	rise	above	polemos	on	multiple	battlefields	of	pleasure	and	pain.	Out	of	what	was	once	the	Same,	 the	mind	emerges	as	 the	 site	where	 the	Same	can	now	be	discriminated	 from	 the	Other,	 but	 only	 through	 the	 persistent	 and	 recurrent	 attempts	 of	 steering	 the	strife	 of	 opposites.	 So	 the	 soul,	 says	 Plato	 in	 a	 passage	 of	 Phaedrus,	 can	 be	likened	 to	 ‘the	 composite	nature	of	 a	pair	of	winged	horses	 and	a	 charioteer’;	“one	of	the	horses	is	noble	and	of	noble	breed,	but	the	other	quite	the	opposite	in	breed	and	character.”	(Phaedrus	246b).	Like	the	chariot	fighter	struggling	to	steer	his	chariot	driven	by	these	contrary	forces,	so	the	soul	of	man	is	in	a	state	of	perpetual	war	struggling	by	means	of	nous	 [mind]	 to	rule	over	 the	 invasive	forces	of	thumos	[spiritedness]	and	epithumia	[appetite].50	It	is	instructive	here																																																									50	In	the	Republic,	Plato	was	to	further	elaborate	his	allegory	for	man’s	ruling	of	himself	dividing	the	soul	into	nous,	thumos,	and	epithumia.	
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to	briefly	make	a	digression	and	trace	the	genealogy	of	this	metaphor	in	which	the	chariot	 fighter	comes	to	resemble	 the	mind	struggling	with	 the	soul.	What	we	see	is	the	abduction	by	an	early	political	psychology	of	a	practice,	which	in	the	 classical	 world	 still	 has	 an	 iconographical	 standing;	 the	 ancient	 ritual	 of	chariot	 fighting,	 an	activity	 that	was	at	 least	a	 thousand	years	old	by	 the	 time	Plato	conceives	of	 the	 tripartite	soul.	At	 that	point	 in	 time,	however,	and	until	the	 Archaic	 period	 draws	 to	 a	 close,	 chariot	 fighting	 had	 a	 predominantly	ceremonial	character,	even	if	some	observers	point	to	the	first	recorded	battle	in	history	as	having	been	 fought	by	 chariots,	namely,	 the	battle	of	Megiddo	 in	1469	BC	northern	Palestine	between	the	Egyptian	pharaoh	Tuthmosis	III	and	an	alliance	 under	 Hyksos	 leadership	 (Keegan	 2004:	 175).	 It	 appears	 the	 first	recorded	battle	in	history	was	concluded	almost	without	bloodshed	(Ibid.),	and	while	the	 imagery	that	depicts	the	battle	would	seem	to	delineate	the	site	of	a	battlefield,	as	a	certain	strategic	space	in	which	the	pharaoh	could	rule	over	his	forces	(the	pharaoh	commanding	his	charioteers	from	his	royal	chariot	from	the	centre	 of	 the	 Egyptian	 line,	with	 one	wing	 of	 chariots	 on	 each	 side),	 this	was	rather	 the	site	of	a	ceremonial	spectacle,	 the	ritual	display	of	 force.	The	Greek	practice	of	chariot	fighting	emerged	from	this	heritage	and	became	the	epitome	of	 the	 representation	 of	polemos,	 as	 in	 the	 figure	 of	Arēs	 riding	 in	 his	 chariot	driven	by	the	four	immortal	stallions.	Now,	 when,	 in	 Plato,	 this	 ancient	 iconography	 of	 war	 enters	 into	 the	though	form	of	the	soul,	a	remarkable	transformation	seems	to	take	place.	In	the	ritual	of	chariot	fighting,	no	particular	attention	seems	to	have	been	given	to	the	activity	 of	 steering,	 since	 the	 sign	 of	 resemblance	 to	 be	 displayed	was	 that	 of	
arētē	affirming	the	kinship	of	being	philopolemos	to	Arēs.	As	arēios,	the	issue	of	steering	 never	 arises	 in	 the	 hero.	 Like	 Arēs,	 the	 hero	 simply	 arrives,	 and	 his	arrival	is	celebrated	as	a	sign	of	the	dreadful	War-god.	Polemos	steers,	which	is	to	 say	 that	 there	 is	 no	moderation	 or	mollification	 of	 forces,	 no	 duality	 to	 be	harnessed.	There	is	but	the	unitary,	catatonic	pull	of	the	blazing	fire	of	kosmos	exhausting	 itself	 in	man	 and	 animal.	 By	 contrast,	 in	 Plato,	arētē	must	 now	be	shown	 to	 be	 of	 the	 same	 nature	 as	 the	 self-restraining	 hold	 expressed	 in	 the	virtue	 of	 sōphrosynē.	Polemos	must	 answer	 to	 the	 steering	 of	arkhē,	 but	 since	
polemos	is	the	perpetual	strife	of	opposites,	it	can	never	correspond	to	mean	or	
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moderation.	 Spiritual	 chariot	 fighting	per	 Plato	 therefore	becomes	a	matter	of	recurrent	domination,	 because	as	 long	as	man	has	 thumos	 and	epithumia	 –	 as	long	as	man	is	alive	and	vigilant	–	these	contrary	forces	pull	him	as	he	struggles	to	steer	them	by	command.	So,	unlike	the	archaic	idea	of	combat	[makhē]	as	a	temporally	limited	form	of	dreadful	excess,	happiness	and	bliss	[makaria],	there	really	can	be	no	end	to	this	struggle.	This	 is	 how	 idea	 of	 conquest	 now	 turns	 up	 in	 the	 discourse	 on	 arētē.	Specifically,	arētē	will	 be	 linked	 to	 the	 idea	of	 conquering	 [nikēeis]	oneself	by	which	man	realises	his	potentialities	for	virtue.	Remember	that	in	the	context	of	struggle	 and	 combat,	 archaic	 thought	 understands	 arētē	 as	 the	 excellence	 of	man	reaching	his	highest	potential	as	philopolemos;	it	is	the	fleeting	moment	of	
makhē	 and	makaria	 in	which	hērōs	 resembles	 god.	 In	Plato,	arētē	 is	 still	what	occurs	 in	 connection	with	makhē;	 in	 fact	man	 is	precisely	 called	upon	 to	 seek	out	battle	showing	no	cowardice,	but	not	in	the	sense	of	the	fleeting	moment	of	heroic	rage.	Arētē	 is	now	what	manifest	 itself	over	time.	In	fact,	arētē	does	not	appear	before	the	battle	is	over	and	the	opponent	defeated,	that	is,	in	the	state	of	 conquest	 [nikaō]	 that	 follows.	 This	 is	 how,	 in	 the	 Laws,	 in	 the	 dialogue	between	the	Athenian	and	Cleinias,	arētē	will	come	to	resemble	what	had	until	then	 seemed	 a	 most	 unfamiliar	 offspring	 of	 Arēs,	 namely,	 the	 virtue	 of	
sōphrosynē:		A	man	has	 to	 fight	and	conquer	his	 feelings	of	cowardice	before	he	can	achieve	perfect	 courage;	 if	 he	 has	 no	 experience	 and	 training	 in	 that	 kind	 of	 struggle	[polemos],	he	will	never	more	than	half	realise	his	potentialities	for	virtue	[arētē].	Isn’t	 the	 same	 true	 of	 self-control	 [sōphrosynē]?	Will	 he	 ever	 achieve	 a	 perfect	mastery	 here	 without	 having	 fought	 and	 conquered	 [diamemakhēmenos	 kai	nenikēkōs],	with	 all	 the	 skills	 of	 speech	 and	 action	 both	 in	word	 and	 play	 [kai	ergou	kai	tekhnēs],	the	crowd	of	pleasures	and	desires	[hēdonais	kai	epithumias]	that	stimulate	him	to	act	shamelessly	and	unjustly?	(Laws	647:	c-e).		 Certainly,	 the	sense	of	arētē	expressed	by	Plato	here	has	 little	relation	to	the	archaic	 celebration	of	 the	deeds	and	acts	of	 the	 singular	polemistēs.	When	Plato	speaks	of	arētē	or,	more	exactly,	the	coming	into	being	of	arētē	[gignomai	pros	arētē],	he	has	in	mind	a	sense	of	virtue	most	different	from	the	ephemeral	display	of	rage	and	spiritedness	once	discovered	by	the	poet.	Arētē	has	become	
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inscribed	in	the	unmistakable	resemblance	of	the	mind	to	the	strategic	schema	of	the	stratia.	Just	as	the	practice	of	sōphrosynē	must	govern	the	conduct	of	the	
stratēgos	 and	 the	 stratiōtēs	 to	 achieve	 conquest	 in	 battle,	 so	 the	 soul	 must	observe	 this	 principle	 to	 arrive	 at	 the	 state	 of	 a	 certain	 soundness	 of	 mind	[sōphrōn],	 having	 fought	 and	 conquered	 [diamemakhēmenos	 kai	 nenikēkōs]	desire	 [epithumia]	 and	 spiritedness	 [thumos].	 In	 both	 cases,	 arētē	 now	expresses	 the	 kind	 of	 conduct	 that	 requires	 sōphrōn	and	 is	 achieved	 through	struggle	and	conquest.	It	is	this	state	of	soundness	of	mind	Plato	alludes	to	when	–	 in	 a	 complete	 reversal	 of	 the	 archaic	 sense	 of	 arētē	 –	 he	 speaks	 of	 the	resemblance	of	arētē	and	sōphrosynē.	This	is	the	site	where	the	disciplines	of	the	
stratia	and	the	militia	will	work	their	way	into	the	mind	and	body	of	man	in	the	perpetual	struggle	for	domination	over	the	unruly	soul.		
3.2.	 It	 is	 not	 difficult	 to	 see	 how	 the	 philosopher	must	 have	 had	 a	 hard	time	convincing	the	polemistēs,	as	opposed	to	the	stratiōtēs,	of	this	new	order	of	reality	where	arētē	 is	 sōphrosynē,	where	excellence	 is	moderation.	This	 seems	attested	 to	 by	 the	 fact	 that	 Plato	 dedicated	 almost	 his	 entire	 treatise	 of	 the	
Republic	 to	 persuading	Polemarchus	 [war	 leader]	 and	his	 band	of	warriors	 of	the	truth	of	this	unusual	unification	in	which	reality	must	be	brought	to	adhere	to	form	[eidos],	which	must	then	be	imitated	in	the	domain	of	the	real.	Indeed,	it	seems	to	bare	witness	to	the	difficulties	early	political	 thought	encountered	 in	the	period	in	time	where	polemos	steered	both	men	and	kosmos.	For	knowledge	to	 escape	 the	 order	 of	 polemos	 and	 make	 new	 alliances	 with	 the	 world,	 for	
polemos	 to	 acquire	 an	 affinity	 and	 resemblance	 with	 moderation,	 the	 site	 of	
polemos	 had	 to	be	effaced	 in	 the	world	of	 sensible	 things,	 and	moved	 into	 the	ethereal	plane	of	the	soul.	In	the	realm	of	imagination	and	speculative	discourse,	a	nascent	political	psychology	will	then	be	able	to	discover	the	site	of	polemos	as	the	strife	of	the	soul,	against	which	the	practice	of	conquest	must	perpetually	be	mobilised	constituting	an	 irreducible	circularity;	 the	sound	mind	 is	at	one	and	the	same	time	what	must	occur	at	the	end	of	the	struggle,	and	that	which	cannot	persist	but	from	the	continuous	interventions	of	conquest.	Therefore,	the	mind	can	never	quite	seem	to	agree	with	itself.	The	spiritual	combat	of	man	remains	in	a	permanent	state	of	entropy	where	the	soul	never	seems	to	be	able	to	finally	
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surrender	to	the	sense	of	self	prescribed	by	the	early	psychoanalyst	to	the	war	leader.	 Perhaps	 it	 is	 not	 so	 strange	 how	 Polemarchus	 seems	 portrayed	 as	ignorant	of	such	well-meaning	concerns	for	the	soul.	However,	 the	 first	 great	 displacement	 in	 which	 arētē	 loses	 its	 Orphic	kinship	 and	 prophetic	 guise,	 did	 not	 come	 from	 Plato	 and	 the	 realm	 of	speculative	 discourse.	 Rather,	 it	 seems	 to	 have	 emerged	 out	 of	 the	 technē	 of	
polemos,	 which	 appears	 at	 the	 intersection	 where	 the	 Spartan	 militia	 and	
paideia	are	 joined	in	the	practice	of	an	askēsis.	This	technē	 then	later	seems	to	have	 been	 adopted	 by	 the	 Athenians	 after	 the	 Peloponnesian	 War,	 where	 it	appears	to	have	found	its	way	into	the	kind	of	spiritual	battle,	where	man	begins	to	imitate	the	form	[eidos]	of	a	certain	sense	of	self.	Did	the	mind	awaken	on	the	battlefield,	where	 ‘the	 iron	hand	 shakes	 the	dice	box	of	 chance’,	 to	borrow	an	expression	 from	 Nietzsche?	 Perhaps,	 but	 maybe	 we	 should	 rather	 make	 the	more	modest	claim	that	the	mind	is	an	invention	that	belongs	to	the	birth	of	an	order	of	things	in	which	arētē	no	longer	reads	as	a	sign	of	the	friendship	of	war,	but	 rather	 of	 the	 workings	 of	 paideia;	 as	 that	 which	 is	 given	 from	 askein	[exercise],	gumnasion	[bodily	exercise],	and	periodos	[marching	round]	bringing	the	body	and	soul	into	apogumnazō	[hard	exercise].	One	 thing	 in	 any	 case	 is	 certain.	 The	 mind	 belongs	 to	 a	 world	 where	archaic	 arētē	 has	 come	 to	 be	 seen	 as	 a	 deviance	 from	 the	 paideia.	 When	 it	appears	 among	 the	 young	 Greeks,	 it	 resembles	 infantile	 behaviour	 or	 lack	 of	discipline	 [ataxia].	When	 it	 occurs	 in	 grown	men,	 as	 in	Herodotus’	 account	 of	Aristodemus,	 it	 is	 seen	as	vanity,	 stupidity,	or	error,	 the	danger	 to	which	man	exposes	himself	and	his	 fellow	warrior	when	he	has	not	observed	and	learned	the	proper	paideia.	Paideia	 and	askēsis,	 as	opposed	 to	rage	and	disorder,	have	come	 to	 form	 the	 coordinates	 for	 a	 technē	 of	polemos.	 This	 vast	 displacement	and	 restructuration	 is	 complete	 when	 the	 love	 and	 friendship	 found	 in	 the	experience	 of	 being	 philopolemos	 have	 become	 inscribed	 in	 a	 most	 different	chain	of	 resemblances.	When,	 in	Classical	Greece,	Homer	 is	 sung	 to	 the	young	Greeks	throughout	their	paideia,	the	friendship	with	war	and	the	deeds	and	acts	of	the	hērōs	will	have	attained	a	sense	of	artifice	and	machination,	which	is	how	the	 scattered	 resemblances	 of	 love	 and	 friendship,	 having	become	dissociated	
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from	 the	 archaic	 experience	 of	 menis	 and	 arētē,	 turn	 up	 in	 the	 peculiar	conjunction	of	love	and	exercise	[philogumnasteō].	But	at	first,	this	is	only	true	of	the	Spartiate	male	who	devoted	almost	his	entire	 life	 to	 military	 practice	 and	 service.	 In	 the	 Spartan	 hoplite	 we	 see	 the	most	 clearly	 delineated	 expression	 of	 the	 peculiar	 resemblance	 of	askēsis	 and	the	 order	 that	 has	 come	 to	 govern	 the	 knowledge	 of	 polemos	 in	 the	 classical	world.	 At	 around	 age	 seven,	 Spartan	 boys	 left	 their	 home	 (which	 essentially	meant	 their	mother	 and	 younger	 siblings)	 to	 go	 live	 among	 other	 boys	 in	 so-called	 herds	 [boua],	 which	 comprised	 the	 entry	 form	 of	 socialisation	 to	 an	isolated	community	of	men	reminiscent	of	a	kind	of	barracks	or	military	school.	Once	 in,	 the	 Spartan	man	never	 left	 the	 barracks	 to	 go	 live	with	 his	wife	 and	children,	and	he	remained	on	military	call	until	the	age	of	sixty.	It	is	important	to	note	that,	at	this	point	in	time,	the	Spartan	form	of	paideia	clearly	differed	in	several	ways	 from	 that	 of	most	 other	 city-states,	 as	 Xenophon	 explains	 in	 his	account	 in	 the	Spartan	Constitution	 (2.2).	 The	 young	 Spartan	boy	was	not	 put	under	the	care	of	a	paidagōgos,	a	tutor	usually	chosen	among	the	slaves,	as	was	common	practice.	Instead,	the	boua	[herd]	of	boys	was	put	under	the	command	of	 the	 paidonomos	 [literally	 a	 shepherd	 or	 lawgiver	 of	 education]	 who	 was	selected	 as	 a	member	 of	 the	 class	 from	which	 the	 highest	 offices	 of	 the	 polis	were	filled.	In	the	boua,	several	boys	from	different	households	come	under	the	permanent	 control	 and	 supervision	 of	 the	 paidonomos.	 Their	 multiplicity	 is	dissolved	 as	 the	 individuals	 are	 reduced	 to	 bodies	 that	 can	 be	 kept	 under	control	 by	 the	paidonomos	who	had	 the	 authority	 to	 gather	 them	 together,	 to	take	charge	of	them,	to	lead	and	guide	them	in	all	matters	of	life	and,	if	need	be,	to	punish	them.	In	the	event	that	the	paidonomos	had	to	be	absent,	he	divided	his	herd	of	boys	 into	divisions,	 selected	 the	keenest	of	his	young	prefects	and	gave	to	each	the	command	of	one	division.	And	so,	Xenophon	tells	us,	‘at	Sparta	the	 boys	 were	 never	 without	 a	 ruler’	 (2.11).	 Of	 the	 actual	 paideia,	 as	 it	 was	carried	out	by	the	paidonomos,	Xenophon	explains:		Instead	of	softening	the	boys'	feet	with	sandals	he	required	them	to	harden	their	feet	by	going	without	shoes.	He	believed	that	if	this	habit	were	cultivated	it	would	enable	 them	 to	 climb	 hills	 more	 easily	 and	 descend	 steep	 inclines	 with	 less	danger,	and	that	a	youth	who	had	accustomed	himself	to	go	barefoot	would	leap	
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and	jump	and	run	more	nimbly	than	a	boy	in	sandals.	And	instead	of	letting	them	be	pampered	in	the	matter	of	clothing,	he	introduced	the	custom	of	wearing	one	garment	throughout	the	year,	believing	that	they	would	thus	be	better	prepared	to	face	changes	of	heat	and	cold.	As	to	the	food,	he	required	the	prefect	to	bring	with	 him	 such	 a	moderate	 amount	 of	 it	 that	 the	 boys	would	 never	 suffer	 from	repletion,	and	would	know	what	it	was	to	go	with	their	hunger	unsatisfied;	for	he	believed	that	those	who	underwent	this	training	would	be	better	able	to	continue	working	on	an	empty	stomach,	if	necessary,	and	would	be	capable	of	carrying	on	longer	 without	 extra	 food,	 if	 the	 word	 of	 command	 were	 given	 to	 do	 so:	 they	would	want	 fewer	delicacies	and	would	accommodate	 themselves	more	 readily	to	 anything	 put	 before	 them…	 He	 also	 thought	 that	 a	 diet	 which	 made	 their	bodies	 slim	would	 do	more	 to	 increase	 their	 height	 than	 one	 that	 consisted	 of	flesh-forming	food.	(2.3-6).		 The	 result,	 says	 Xenophon,	 is	 that	 modesty	 and	 obedience	 [aidōs]	 are	inseparable	companions	at	Sparta.	Now,	it	is	important	to	note	that	the	Spartan	organisation	constituted	the	exception	to	the	rule	well	 into	the	fourth	century.	Moreover,	 before	 the	 late	 fourth	 century	 there	 is	 actually	 little	mentioning	 of	hoplite	 training	 or	 any	 form	 of	 military	 exercise.	 In	 fact,	 even	 in	 Sparta,	becoming	a	hoplite	was	not	singled	out	as	a	certain	discipline	or	practice	of	its	own.	On	the	contrary,	it	was	simply	an	integral	part	of	the	paideia.	The	primary	weapons	 of	 the	 hoplite,	 the	 long	 spear	 and	 the	 sword,	 were	 also	 used	 for	hunting	wild	boars	and	other	game,	and	so	hunting	was	considered	an	excellent	means	of	training	young	men	into	becoming	warriors.	War	resembled	hunting,	and	so	good	hunting	skills	were	seen	as	a	sign	of	similitude	to	martial	excellence	[arētē].	 Hoplite	 training	 in	 other	 words	 occurred	 principally	 in	 the	 form	 of	general	exercises	aimed	at	strengthening	the	body	and	the	limbs	rather	than	the	learning	of	particular	combat	skills	such	as	formation-	and	weapons-drills.	The	absence	 of	 a	 set	 of	 practices,	which	would	 separate	 out	warfare	 as	 a	 singular	activity,	 is	 furthermore	attested	 to	by	 fact	 that,	 at	 this	point	 in	 time,	weapons	training	was	not	organised	in	any	regular	or	central	form	in	the	polis.	In	the	late	fifth	 century,	 the	 closest	 the	 Greeks	 would	 come	 to	 any	 form	 of	 formalised	training	with	arms	would	be	 the	private	hiring	of	a	so-called	hoplomachoi,	 the	martial	equivalent	of	the	Sophist	tutor	who	would	charge	people	for	his	services.	The	hoplomachoi	 gave	exhibitions	on	 the	handling	of	 spear,	 sword,	 and	 shield	
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using	 non-lethal	 weapons	 of	 their	 own	 design.51	Again,	 the	 employment	 of	
hoplomachoi	seems	to	have	constituted	the	exception	to	the	rule.	In	fact,	like	the	Sophist	tutor,	the	hoplomachoi	would	often	be	ridiculed	for	his	self-proclaimed	wisdom	and	mocked	for	charging	people	to	learn	things	that	were	as	plain	as	a	pikestaff.	But	one	 should	not	mistake	 this	 suspiciousness	of	 the	hoplomachoi	 for	 a	strictly	 pecuniary	matter.	 In	 this	 suspiciousness	 or	 even	hostility	 towards	 the	drill	sergeant	of	the	ancient	world	we	actually	find	the	expression	of	the	archaic	kinship	of	man	and	war	in	which	combat	[makhē]	has	little	to	do	with	a	technē	or	 any	 practice	 one	 must	 attain	 through	 learning.	 As	 late	 as	 in	 Xenophon’s	
Education	of	Cyrus,	we	can	still	catch	a	glimpse	of	the	old	relationship	with	war,	in	 particular,	 in	 his	 account	 of	 the	 common	men.	 Here,	 we	 learn	 that	men	 of	common	 stature	 are	 seemingly	 unable	 to	 learn	 the	 military	 practices	 of	 the	
stratia	such	as	the	execution	of	formation-drill.	However,	it	appears	that	this	is	not	 because	 of	 a	 general	 lack	 of	 fighting	 ability	 or	 uselessness	 in	 war.	When	encouraged	to	fight	in	the	usual	form	of	fluid	combat,	the	common	man	seems	to	prove	as	able	as	any	man.	In	Pheraulas,	one	of	the	Persian	commoners,	we	learn	how	 this	 is	 so.	 It	 is	 a	 method	 of	 fighting,	 Pheraulas	 says,	 that	 “…	 all	 men	naturally	 understand,	 just	 as	 in	 the	 case	 of	 other	 creatures	 each	 understands	some	method	of	 fighting	which	 it	has	not	 learned	 from	any	other	 source	 than	from	instinct:	for	instance,	the	bull	knows	how	to	fight	with	his	horns,	the	horse	with	his	hoofs,	the	dog	with	his	teeth,	the	boar	with	his	tusks.	And	all	know	how	to	protect	themselves,	too,	against	that	from	which	they	most	need	protection,	and	 that,	 too,	 though	 they	 have	 never	 gone	 to	 school	 or	 to	 any	 teacher.”	Pheraulas	continues:	“I	have	understood	from	my	very	childhood	how	to	protect	the	spot	where	I	thought	I	was	likely	to	receive	a	blow;	and	if	I	had	nothing	else	I	put	out	my	hands	to	hinder	as	well	as	I	could	the	one	who	was	trying	to	hit	me…	Furthermore,	even	when	I	was	a	little	fellow	I	used	to	seize	a	sword	wherever	I	saw	one,	although,	I	declare,	I	had	never	learned,	except	from	instinct,	even	how	to	take	hold	of	a	sword…	And,	by	Zeus,	I	used	to	hack	with	a	sword	everything	that	 I	 could	without	 being	 caught	 at	 it.	 For	 this	was	 not	 only	 instinctive,	 like	
																																																								51	For	a	description	of	the	practices	of	the	hoplomachoi,	see	Wheeler	(1983:	227-228).	
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walking	and	running,	but	I	 thought	 it	was	fun	in	addition	to	 its	being	natural.”	(2.3.9-10).	As	the	passage	suggests,	 the	old	friendship	with	war	still	exerts	a	certain	influence	 if,	 in	 the	 classical	world,	 it	would	mostly	occur	 in	 the	 common	man.	This	is	not	to	say	that	the	kind	of	military	exercises	of	which	Xenophon	speaks	were	widely	practiced	among	 the	aristocracy.	 In	 fact,	by	 the	 time	Plato	writes	the	Laws,	regular	and	centrally	organised	practices	for	war	are	almost	unknown.	Having	 suggested	 that	 “…	 each	 and	 every	 citizen	 must	 undertake	 military	training	in	peace-time,	and	not	leave	it	till	war	breaks	out”,	Plato	hastens	to	add	that:	“…	no	such	group	training	and	competition	is	currently	to	be	found	in	any	
polis	at	all,	except	on	a	very	modest	scale	indeed.”	(Laws	(829b;	831b).	With	the	exception	 of	 the	 Spartan	 army	 and	 few	 elite	 units,	 it	 seems	military	 drill	 and	exercise	 had	 no	 central	 structure,	 but	 took	 on	 a	 rather	 limited	 and	 scattered	form.	Again,	this	is	also	attested	to	in	a	passage	of	the	Laws,	where	Plato	appears	to	 anticipate	 that	 his	 suggestion	 for	 the	 need	 of	 military	 exercise	 and	preparation	 for	 battle	 in	 times	 of	 peace	would	 seem	 especially	 strange	 to	 his	audience.	 Such	practices	 ‘may	 look	 silly	 to	 some	people’,	 the	Athenian	 says	 to	Cleinias	(830d)	echoing	what	appears	to	have	been	a	general	sentiment	in	early	classical	Athens.	Certainly,	the	first	men	outside	of	Sparta	to	take	up	the	unusual	and	 no	 doubt	 rudimentary	 practice	 of	 sham	 battles	 might	 have	 been	 easy	victims	of	satire.	This	is	also	attested	to	in	Xenophon’s	anecdotes	on	Socrates.	In	a	 passage	 of	 Memorabilia,	 Xenophon	 has	 Socrates	 reflecting	 on	 the	 stark	contrast	between	 the	Spartans	 and	 the	apparently	 careless	 and	even	 scorning	Athenians	in	matters	of	training	and	military	exercise:	“…	you	see,	 in	the	army	[stratiōtikos],	where	good	conduct	[sōphroneō,	to	be	of	sound	mind],	discipline	[eutakteō,	to	show	orderly	behaviour],	and	submission	are	most	necessary,	our	people	 pay	 no	 attention	 to	 these	 things…	 they	 not	 only	 neglect	 to	 make	themselves	fit,	but	mock	at	those	who	take	the	trouble	to	do	so.”	(3.5.21,15).	To	 the	 early	 fourth	 century	 Athenians,	 the	 practice	 of	 eutakteō	 [orderly	behaviour],	extolled	as	a	cardinal	virtue	in	the	Spartan	army,	may	have	born	a	stronger	resemblance	to	comedy	than	the	activity	of	a	sound	mind.	In	a	passage,	Thucydides	 tells	 us	 that	 even	 Pericles	 seems	 to	 have	 shared	 the	 common	conviction	not	to	practice	for	war.	In	fact,	says	Thucydides,	he	even	went	so	far	
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as	to	praise	the	Athenians	for	taking	it	easy	in	their	preparation	for	war,	putting	trust	in	‘our	own	native	courage’,	Pericles	said,	rather	than	devoting	themselves	to	hard	exercise	 like	 the	Spartans	 (2.39.1,4).	Writing	 in	 the	Laws,	 Plato	 seems	well	aware	of	this	predicament	and	the	difficulties	that	arise	when	the	hopeless	Athenians	are	 to	be	educated	 in	military	matters,	and	so,	mindful	 that	 the	one	who	intends	at	a	grand	ideas	had	better	start	modestly,	he	suggested	that	“...	a	judicious	polis	must	carry	out	a	march,	every	month,	for	not	less	than	one	whole	day,	or	more	(according	as	the	rulers	decree),	paying	no	heed	to	cold	weather	or	hot.”	(829b).	However,	in	realising	that	such	an	idea	might	not	easily	be	carried	out,	he	devoted	several	passages	of	the	Laws	to	discussing	how	the	obstacles	to	correct	military	training	could	be	overcome.52	So,	in	essence,	the	practice	for	war	and	the	division	of	war	by	means	of	an	
askēsis	is	really	mostly	a	Spartan	matter	well	into	the	fourth	century.	However,	by	 the	 time	classical	 thought	reaches	 its	zenith	with	Aristotle’s	 treatise	on	 the	political,	this	no	longer	appears	to	be	the	case.	The	obstacles	Plato	spoke	of	do	not	 seem	 to	 be	 of	 any	major	 concern.	 The	 Hellenic	world	 has	 discovered	 the	pathways	 to	 excellence	 and	 honour	 that	 run	 through	 technē	 and	paideia.	 In	 a	commentary	on	the	Peloponnesian	war,	Aristotle	says:		It	 is	 notorious	 that	 the	 Lacedaemonians	 themselves,	 while	 they	 alone	 were	assiduous	in	their	 laborious	drill,	were	superior	to	others,	but	now	they	are	 left	behind	by	the	rest	both	 in	athletic	and	military	contests…	Now	they	have	rivals	who	compete	with	their	education…	(Politics	1338b	25-39).		
3.3.	So	we	learn	in	Aristotle	how	the	exigencies	of	the	Peloponnesian	War	seems	to	have	carried	the	technē	of	paideia	onto	a	new	terrain	on	which	the	War,																																																									52	In	these	passages,	we	learn	that	the	first	obstacle	is	the	love	of	wealth	[erōtos	ploutou],	which	makes	men	unwilling	to	devote	time	to	anything	but	their	personal	property:	“This	is	what	every	citizen	concentrates	on	with	all	his	heart	and	soul;	his	ruling	passion	is	his	daily	profit	and	he’s	quite	incapable	of	worrying	about	anything	else.”	In	fact,	the	‘insatiable	desire	for	gold	and	silver’	occupies	his	soul	to	the	extent	that	he	“is	willing	to	toil	at	every	art	and	device,	noble	or	ignoble,	if	he	is	likely	to	get	rich	by	it,	–	willing,	too,	to	perform	actions	both	holy	and	unholy	–	no,	utterly	shameful	–	without	a	scruple,	provided	only	that	he	is	able	to	sate	himself	to	repletion,	like	a	beast,	with	all	manner	of	foods	and	drinks	and	wenchings.”	(831c-e).	The	second,	however	closely	related,	and,	pace	Plato,	perhaps	even	more	important	cause	can	be	referred	to	the	problem	of	‘non-constitutions’	or	‘non-polities’	–	democracy,	oligarchy,	and	tyranny:	“For	none	of	these	is	a	polity,	but	the	truest	name	for	them	all	would	be	‘state	of	faction’	[stasiōteia];	for	none	of	them	is	a	form	of	voluntary	rule	over	willing	subjects,	but	a	voluntary	rule	over	unwilling	subjects...”	(832c).	
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having	made	paideia	worthy	of	belief,	will	affirm	its	solidity	and	provide	proof	of	the	proper	order	of	war.	But	to	return	to	the	discourse	of	Thucydides	and	the	question	of	 truth	and	order,	 the	War	has	yet	 to	produce	 the	 tableau	on	which	the	proper	order	of	war	will	be	posited.	As	I	said,	in	Thucydides,	the	question	of	truth	[alētheia]	is	rather	trying	to	get	back	to	war,	to	acquire	continuity	with	the	new	kinship	of	war	and	 the	world.	 In	Thucydides,	 then,	we	 learn	not	so	much	about	the	proper	or	the	good	or	of	how	the	soul,	along	with	the	order	of	things,	ought	to	be	shaped	from	struggle	and	war.	Alētheia	is	not,	as	in	Plato,	a	certain	measure	according	to	which	reality	must	be	brought	to	adhere	to	form	[eidos].	As	 Thucydides	 explains,	 historia	 concerns	 alētheia	 in	 the	 sense	 of	 something	that	occurs	over	time.	Within	this	temporally	delineated	space,	historia	is	what	discloses	 this	 truth	 as	 formations	 that	 have	 their	 conditions	 of	 possibility.	Specifically,	the	discourse	we	find	in	Thucydides	is	trying	to	decipher	alētheia	in	terms	 of	 the	 events	 that	 took	 place	 and	 became	 known	 as	 the	 Peloponnesian	War;	to	disclose	the	war	in	its	‘truest	preconditions’	[alēthestatē	prophasis],	as	Thucydides	says.	In	tracing	the	course	of	these	events,	Thucydides	can	certainly	speak	of	the	Athenian	or	the	Spartan	quest	 for	hēgemonia	and	arkhē	 in	terms	of	prophaseis	that	made	the	war,	but	this	is	not	the	expression	of	the	kind	of	causation	which	is	derived	from	eidos.	The	relationship	between	alētheia	and	prophasis,	or	rather	
prophaseis	since	Thucydides	lists	several	which	I	will	not	go	into,53	refers	to	the	formation	over	time	of	a	series	of	events	bound	to	a	thoroughly	heterogeneous	set	 of	 circumstances	 that	 have	 no	 privileged	 form.	 If	 we	 look	 at	 the	mode	 of	thinking	 employed	 by	 Thucydides,	 we	 can	 see	 how	 this	 is	 so.	 It	 appears	Thucydides	 borrowed	 the	 term	 prophasis	 from	 the	 medical	 treatises	 of	 the	Hippocratic	 tradition,	where	 it	occurs	 in	 the	description	of	 stages	of	 a	disease	(Lebow	2003:	106-108).	Prophaseis	 in	other	words	attain	the	meaning	of	signs	that	appear	over	time,	as	in	the	outbreak	of	a	disease,	which	is	to	say	that	it	is	close	 to	 the	meaning	of	diagnosis.	Moreover,	Thucydides	uses	 the	 term	 in	 two	senses,	 where	 prophasis	 also	 occurs	 in	 the	 articulation	 of	 a	 kind	 of	 self-
																																																								53	This	work	has	been	done	elsewhere,	see	Lebow	(2003).	
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justification,	which	is	not	necessarily	of	true	intention.54	In	other	words,	we	can	see	 that	 alētheia	 refers	 to	 the	 state	 of	 war	 itself,	 to	 polemos,	 and	 the	relationships	 of	 forces	 historia	 encounters	 in	 it	 over	 time.	 When	 Thucydides	speaks	 of	 alēthestatē	 prophasis,	 then,	 what	 is	 at	 stake	 is	 certainly	 not	 the	essentialist	notion	of	‘the	real	cause’	or	‘the	one	true	cause’,	as	if	things	could	be	referred	back	to	the	site	of	the	origin,	where	the	truth	of	things	corresponds	to	a	truthful	discourse.	Rather,	there	are	symptoms	to	be	deciphered,	symptoms	that	resemble	stages	of	a	disease,	there	are	deceiving	words	and	ignoble	deeds,	there	is	 accident,	 error,	 and	 succession.	 It	 seems	 to	me	 that	what	we	 see	 here	 is	 in	other	 words	 the	 expression	 of	 the	 discerning	 gaze	 of	 the	 early	 historicist	 to	whom	alētheia	cannot	but	refer	to	formations	of	truth	that	occur	over	time,	and	only	so	in	a	provisional	way.	By	this	I	mean	that	alētheia	belongs	to	polemos,	and	
historia	is	the	knowledge	that	recounts	this	relationship	over	time.55	So,	 in	 the	 discourse	 of	 historia	 that	 has	 assumed	 the	 task	 of	 telling	 the	truth	about	the	new	kinship	of	war	and	the	world,	we	find	the	articulation	of	the	resemblance	 of	 the	 outbreak	 of	 disease	 and	 the	 outbreak	 of	war.	 But	 in	what	does	 this	 resemblance	 consist	 then?	Certainly,	 it	 does	not	 consist	 in	 the	mere	enumeration	that	heaps	together	by	its	own	power	of	enchantment	the	13.000	hoplites,	 the	 16.000	 others	 in	 various	 garrisons,	 the	 1.200	 cavalry,	 included	mounted	bowmen,	 and	 the	1.600	unmounted	bowmen	with	 the	300	 triremes.	But	 then	 what	 provides	 proof	 of	 the	 possibility	 of	 this	 juxtaposition	 so	 as	 to	make	the	taxonomy	of	the	stratia	and	the	militia	resemble	signs	of	disease?	That	is,	where	do	the	gaze	of	the	Hippocratic	doctor,	the	long	spear	of	the	hoplite,	the	assemblage	of	man	and	animal	of	 the	 cavalryman,	 the	arrows	of	 the	bowman,	and	the	ramming	force	of	the	trireme	find	their	common	locus?	Well,	the	locus	that	 makes	 this	 resemblance	 possible	 seems	 to	 concern	 polemos	 and	 time;	 it	concerns	the	birth	of	a	certain	knowledge	of	war	pertaining	to	a	particular	set	of	practices	for	intervening	in	the	relationship	of	forces,	a	set	of	practices	that	ties																																																									54	Lebow	explains:	“A	prophasis	(rationalization)	is	essential	to	mask	unacceptable	motives.	Herodotus	reports	that	Miltiades	sailed	against	Paros	with	a	fleet	of	seventy	ships	because	of	a	grievance	he	had	against	the	Parians.	Miltiades	is	careful	to	offer	a	prophasis:	the	Parians	provided	one	ship	to	reinforce	the	Persians	at	Marathon.	This	ridiculous	justification	is	necessary	because	Greeks	did	not	level	cities	to	settle	personal	scores.”	(2003:	106).	55	Following	Foucault	(2004:	173),	we	could	also	say	that	there	is	an	indissociable	circularity	between	the	knowledge	of	history	and	the	war	it	recounts	and	which	at	the	same	time	goes	on	within	it.	
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them	together	in	assemblages	of	forces	to	form	an	economy	of	forces,	one	that	once	delivered	the	Greeks	the	glorious	victory	over	the	Persians,	but	also	bound	the	 Hellenes	 to	 a	 circuit	 of	 ‘machination’,	 to	 machanoen.	 What	 was	 once	discovered	on	the	battlefields	of	glory	becomes	the	assault	of	technē,	not	in	the	sense	of	art	or	skill,	but	in	the	sense	of	a	knowledge	that,	at	the	site	where	man	and	war	come	to	change	places,	brings	a	certain	practice	of	ruling	and	steering	to	bear	on	the	relationships	of	forces	entailing	a	complete	reversal	of	the	order	of	 things.	Historia	 is	 the	 account	 of	 these	 invasive	 forces,	 their	 accumulation,	aggravation,	 overflow,	 and	 manifestation;	 like	 a	 plague,	 the	 outbreak	 of	 war	unleashes	 the	 terrible	 forces	 that	 have	 accumulated	 and	 aggravated	 in	 the	
technē	of	steering	polemos.	So,	 in	essence,	what	emerges	then	when	polemos	is	brought	out	of	the	haze	of	oracular	truth	and	exposed	as	an	object	of	inquiry	to	be	deciphered	like	a	disease	in	its	truest	preconditions;	what	appears	as	war	is	discovered	by	historia?	 It	 seems	 to	me	 that	what	we	 see	 emergent	 in	 this	 the	first	 historia	 of	 the	 West	 is	 the	 entry	 of	 polemos	 into	 the	 realm	 of	 strategic	calculations	giving	birth	to	what	we	could	call	the	military	model	of	war.	This	is	the	site	on	which	historia	will	 recount	alētheia	 as	 the	resemblance	of	war	and	disease.	Once	given	birth	to	by	the	technē	of	steering,	war	–	perhaps	for	the	first	time	in	human	history	–	is	discovered	in	its	most	disquieting	effects:		The	 Peloponnesian	 War…	 not	 only	 lasted	 for	 a	 long	 time,	 but	 throughout	 its	course	brought	with	 it	unprecedented	 suffering	 for	Hellas.	Never	before	had	 so	many	cities	been	captured	and	then	devastated,	whether	by	foreign	armies	or	by	the	 Hellenic	 powers	 themselves	 (some	 of	 these	 cities,	 after	 capture,	 were	resettled	with	new	inhabitants);	never	had	there	been	so	many	exiles;	never	such	loss	of	 life	–	both	 in	the	actual	warfare	and	 in	 internal	revolutions.	(Thucydides	I.23:	3-10).		 It	is	the	scattering	of	the	profound	kinship	of	polemos	by	which	man	for	a	long	 time	 felt	 his	 existence	 carried	 along	 and	whose	 force	 he	 felt	 in	 the	 very	being	of	things.	But	it	is	also	the	return	of	what	was	once	revealed	to	man	in	the	poet’s	song,	as	the	hērōs	set	forth	into	the	unsaid,	broke	into	the	unthought,	and	compelled	what	had	never	happened.	It	is	the	return	of	the	terrible,	the	deinon,	as	emergent	from	the	exigencies	of	rage	and	spiritedness,	set	off	by	the	capture	
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and	usurpation	of	the	friendship	of	war	by	the	bond	of	the	military	model	of	war.	It	 is	 these	 terrible	 forces	 that	now	 turn	up	 in	 this	broken	 image	of	 the	world.	This	 is	 no	 doubt	 a	 moment	 of	 truth	 in	 Western	 political	 thought,	 because	 it	marks	the	threshold	beyond	which	the	relationship	between	the	ruling	principle	and	 alētheia	 the	 tragedians	 were	 so	 much	 at	 pains	 to	 convey	 will	 gradually	begin	 to	 fade.	 In	 Thucydides	 and	 the	 tragedians	 before	 him,	 we	 learn	 how	terrible	things	seem	to	happen	to	man	under	the	influence	of	arkhē,	in	particular,	as	 it	 is	 inscribed	in	the	relations	of	 forces	through	technē.	To	these	thinkers,	 it	seems	the	pursuit	of	hēgemonia	and	mastery	expresses	the	kind	of	hubris	that	destroyed	 the	old	world.	 In	Plato	and	Aristotle,	however,	we	will	 see	 that	bad	things	happen	to	man	precisely	when	the	ruling	principle	[arkhē]	is	absent.	This	is	when	phusis	will	be	imbued	with	a	certain	purpose	and	a	certain	end.	Reality	will	no	longer	simply	be	what	appears	before	man,	since	things	no	longer	simply	reveal	 themselves.	 As	 man	 becomes	 subject	 to	 the	 command	 of	 the	 ruling	principle,	 reality	 is	 rather	 what	 must	 continually	 be	 reshaped,	 guided,	 and	perfected	in	the	image	of	form	[eidos].	Phusis	and	all	the	beings	that	dwell	in	the	bosom	 of	 the	 eldest	 of	 gods	will	 acquire	 a	 certain	 telos;	 it	 will	 be	 found	 that	there	 is	mind	 in	nature.	Among	 those	beings,	man,	 the	most	gregarious	of	 the	animal	 species,	will	 rise	above	 the	monarchy	of	phusis	 to	discover	how	 things	and	 beings	 must	 find	 their	 proper	 ends	 within	 political	 community,	 as	 the	realisation	 of	 life	 according	 to	 the	 good.	 It	 is	 classical	 politico-philosophical	discourse	 emerging	 out	 of	 the	 exigencies	 of	war	 to	 take	 charge	 of	polemos	 in	pursuit	of	the	good.	It	can	only	do	so,	however,	by	declaring	perpetual	war	from	the	outset.	As	the	old	horizon	of	war	closes,	a	new	emerges	 in	the	birth	of	 the	classical	political	model.	
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§ 4 Politikon Zōon – Threshold of Classical Politics					
4.1.	 It	 has	 been	 argued	 that	 classical	 politics	 emerged	 out	 of	 a	 fundamental	distinction	between	forms	of	life.	In	Homo	Sacer	–	Sovereign	Power	and	Bare	Life,	Agamben	 argues	 that	 the	Greeks	distinguished	between	 two	 terms	 to	 express	what	we	mean	by	the	word	‘life’;	“zoē,	which	expressed	the	simple	fact	of	living	common	 to	all	 living	beings	 (animals,	men	or	gods),	 and	bios,	which	 indicated	the	 form	or	way	of	 living	proper	 to	 an	 individual	 or	 a	 group.”	 (1998:	 1).	 This	distinction	between	zoē	and	bios,	Agamben	says,	is	attested	to	in	the	celebrated	passage	of	the	Politics,	in	which	Aristotle	expresses	the	idea	of	life	according	to	the	good.	According	to	Agamben,	 then,	 life	 in	 the	classical	world	 is	distributed	along	 two	 axes;	 ‘politically	 qualified	 life’	 [bios]	 and	 	 ‘simple	 natural	 life’	 [zoē]	where	 the	 later	 is	 excluded	 from	 the	polis,	 and	 remains	 confined	 “–	as	merely	reproductive	 life	 –	 to	 the	 sphere	 of	 the	 oikos,	 home.”	 (Ibid.	 2).	 The	 hidden	paradigm	of	Western	politics,	Agamben	tells	us,	the	division	of	life	into	bios	and	
zoē	that	has	since	lost	its	meaning	and	now	occurs	to	us	as	especially	strange,	is	the	originary	form	the	exceptio	of	sovereign	power	out	of	which	life	according	to	the	good	once	emerged:		 	The	 peculiar	 phrase	 [in	 Aristotle]	 “born	 with	 regard	 to	 life,	 but	 existing	essentially	with	regard	to	the	good	life”	can	be	read	not	only	as	an	implication	of	being	born	(ginomenē)	in	being	(ousa),	but	also	as	an	inclusive	exclusion	(an	
exceptio)	of	zoē	in	the	polis,	almost	as	if	politics	were	the	place	in	which	life	had	to	transform	itself	 into	good	life	and	in	which	what	had	to	be	politicized	were	always	already	bare	life.	In	Western	politics,	bare	life	has	the	peculiar	privilege	of	being	that	whose	exclusion	founds	the	city	of	men	(Ibid.	7).		 According	 to	 Agamben,	 then,	 the	 city	 of	 men	 in	 the	 classical	 world	 was	founded	on	the	exceptio	of	‘bare	life’,	which	is	to	say,	“…	the	inclusion	of	bare	life	in	 the	 political	 realm	 constitutes	 the	 original	 –	 if	 concealed	 –	 nucleus	 of	sovereign	 power.”	 (Ibid.	 6).	 From	 the	 earliest	 treatises	 of	 political	 theory,	
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Agamben	argues,	notably	 in	Aristotle’s	opposition	 in	 the	Politics	of	 ‘the	simple	fact	 of	 living’	 [to	 zēn]	 to	 ‘politically	 qualified	 life’	 [to	 eu	 zēn],	 we	 find	 the	delineation	of	the	principle	according	to	which	sovereign	power	to	some	extent	has	always	sought	to	govern	life	and	the	species	existence	through	the	reduction	of	 life	 to	 ‘bare	 life’,	 situating	 life	 at	 the	 zone	of	 indistinction	between	 law	and	violence.	In	fact,	Agamben	contends,	not	only	is	‘bare	life’	that	which	founds	the	city	of	men	 in	 the	polis,	 the	 ‘structure	of	 the	exception’	 is	 ‘consubstantial	with	Western	 politics’.	 A	 power	 over	 life	 has	 existed	 from	 the	 very	 inception	 of	classical	politics	and	persisted	throughout	Western	political	thought,	Agamben	claims,	as	he	calls	for	the	Foucaultdian	thesis	of	biopolitics	to	be	corrected	or	at	least	 completed:	 “…	 what	 characterizes	 modern	 politics	 is	 not	 so	 much	 the	inclusion	of	zoē	in	the	polis	–	which	is,	in	itself,	absolutely	ancient	–	nor	simply	the	 fact	 that	 life	 as	 such	 becomes	 a	 principal	 object	 of	 the	 projections	 and	calculations	of	State	power.	 Instead	 the	decisive	 fact	 is	 that,	 together	with	 the	process	by	which	the	exception	everywhere	becomes	the	rule,	the	realm	of	bare	life	–	which	is	originally	situated	at	the	margins	of	the	political	order	–	gradually	begins	to	coincide	with	the	political	realm,	and	exclusion	and	inclusion,	outside	and	inside,	bios	and	zoē,	right	and	fact,	enter	into	a	zone	of	indistinction.”	(Ibid.	9).	 Leaving	 aside	 for	 now	 the	 question	 of	 biopolitical	 modernity,	 as	formulated	 by	 Foucault,	 it	 is	 useful	 to	 further	 examine	 the	 argument	 posited	here	 by	 Agamben,	 since	 it	 will	 help	 establish	 some	 reference	 points	 for	 the	present	 analysis.	 We	 are	 basically	 faced	 with	 the	 following	 hypothesis:	 the	classical	world	 unfolds	 on	 the	 terrain	 of	 the	 principle	 of	 sovereignty,	 initially	expressed	as	an	implicit	power	over	life	that	functions	by	means	of	an	inclusive	exclusion,	 an	exceptio	 of	zoē	 in	 the	polis,	 so	 as	 to	 transform	 life	 into	good	 life.	With	Lacan,	I	have	previously	argued	that,	in	Antigone,	a	certain	displacement	in	the	relationship	of	the	ruler	to	nomos	can	indeed	be	identified.	At	the	threshold	to	the	classical	world,	we	find	the	arkhōn	passing	over	into	a	sphere	beyond	the	
nomos	 that	 existed	 in	 the	 archaic	 world,	 as	 he	 seeks	 to	 rule	 by	 command.	Although	seemingly	the	expression	of	the	sovereign	exception	and	the	pursuit	of	the	good	(the	promotion	of	the	good	of	all	as	the	law	without	limits),	but	as	we	traced	 this	 displacement	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 logos	 recounted	 by	 the	 poet	we	 saw	
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how	no	such	principle	actually	existed	at	this	point	in	time.	In	fact,	we	are	rather	at	 the	 site	 of	 war	where	 certain	 exigencies	 seem	 to	 carry	 off	 the	 arkhōn	 and	displace	 the	 art	 of	 ruling	 within	 the	 governmental	 sphere	 of	 the	 stratēgos,	opening	 up	 the	 terrain	 on	which	 the	 old	 boundaries	 of	 authority	would	 fade.	Now,	 as	we	have	 effectively	 crossed	 the	 threshold	 to	 the	 classical	 period,	will	the	principle	of	the	sovereign	law,	the	exceptio,	finally	be	unveiled	in	the	birth	of	the	juridico-institutional	model	of	power?	Let	us	look	at	the	evidence	provided	by	Agamben,	in	particular,	at	the	reference	to	Aristotle	from	whom	he	seems	to	derive	the	gist	of	his	thesis.	The	evidence	provided	by	Agamben	 first	and	 foremost	seems	 to	concern	the	particular	passage	 in	 the	Politics	where	Aristotle	 supposedly	 identifies	 the	end	 of	 political	 community	 by	 opposing	 the	 ‘simple	 fact	 of	 living’	 [zoē]	 to	‘politically	 qualified	 life’	 [bios].	 It	 is	 true	 that	 Agamben	 also	 mentions	 the	famous	passage	of	the	same	work,	in	which	Aristotle	articulates	the	idea	of	man	as	 a	politikon	zōon,	 and	 he	 later	 draws	 on	 Pindar	 and	Hesiod	 to	 speak	 of	 the	sovereign	law.	I	will	return	to	Agamben’s	reading	of	Pindar	and	Hesiod,	but	first	I	will	comment	on	the	analysis	of	Aristotle.	Concerning	Aristotle’s	predication	of	man	 as	 a	 politikon	 zōon, 56 	Agamben	 almost	 unitarily	 seems	 to	 direct	 his	attention	to	 the	 literal	meaning	that	appears	 in	 the	conjunction	politikon	zōon,	which	 is	 commonly	 rendered	 in	 terms	 of	 man	 being	 ‘an	 animal	 with	 the	additional	capacity	for	political	existence’.	According	to	Agamben,	then,	what	is	at	issue	is	this	‘additional	capacity’	of	man	tied	to	language,	which	compels	man,	as	opposed	to	the	mere	animal,	to	seek	out	“…	the	relation	between	phonē	and	
logos.”	(Ibid.	7).	This	 is	how	the	politikon	zōon	expresses	the	implicit	exclusion	of	the	‘bare	life’	[zoē]	of	the	animal,	as	it	appears	at	the	threshold	of	political	life	delimited	by	the	transition	from	voice	to	language.	The	politikon	zōon	is	in	other	words	basically	seen	as	a	linguistic	problem	that	appears	to	have	little	or	no	historical	reality.	Strangely	enough,	Agamben	in	fact	never	dwells	on	 the	actual	 text	of	 the	passage	 in	which	Aristotle	provides	his	account	of	man.	Political	man	seems	to	be	understood	as	a	mere	ontological	fact	derived	from	linguistics.	I	have	previously	noted	how,	in	the	classical	world,	resemblance	 is	 still	 the	primary	 form	of	 knowledge,	which	 is	 how	one	 should																																																									56	In	Aristotle,	arguments	take	the	form	of	predication	rather	than	definition	(Lewis	1991).	
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suspect	that	Aristotle	might	have	something	to	say	about	the	sense	of	‘politically	qualified	 life’	 in	 this	 passage,	 other	 than	 the	 simple	 finding	 of	 the	 form	 of	politicity	being	tied	to	language.57	In	fact,	having	explained	how	life	according	to	the	good	is	the	end	of	political	community,	only	a	few	lines	later	of	the	Politics	–	in	 a	 passage	 that	 was	 to	 become	 canonical	 to	 Western	 political	 thought	 –	Aristotle	 expresses	 most	 clearly	 the	 sense	 of	 being	 a	 political	 animal,	 not	 by	recourse	to	the	distinction	between	bios	and	zoē,	man	and	animal,	but	to	a	quite	different	 idea.	 Specifically,	 in	 this	 passage	 Aristotle	 alludes	 to	 the	 idea	 of	
sōphrosynē,	which	neither	concerns	the	question	of	life	nor	a	specific	difference	that	 determines	 the	 genus	 zōon.	 Rather,	 as	 we	 have	 touched	 upon	 in	 the	preceding	pages,	it	concerns	the	problem	of	the	government	of	self.		This	 passage	 of	 the	Politics,	 which	 often	 posits	 in	 political	 theory	 as	 the	originary	 ground	 of	 the	 political,	 rarely	 seems	 to	 have	 been	 discussed	 in	 its	entirety.	 In	 fact,	 certain	 formulations	 even	 appear	 to	 have	 been	 overlooked,	dismissed	as	unimportant,	and	perhaps	even	set	aside	as	 too	obscure	to	merit	serious	 attention,	 not	 only	 by	 Agamben,	 but	 seemingly	 also	 in	 much	 of	 the	literature	as	attested	to	in	the	modern	rendering	of	the	text.	Here	is	the	passage	from	the	Politics	in	the	translation	of	Richard	McKeon:		 Hence	it	is	evident	that	the	state	is	a	creation	of	nature,	and	that	man	is	by	nature	a	political	animal.	And	he	who	by	nature	and	not	by	mere	accident	 is	without	a	state,	is	either	a	bad	man	or	above	humanity;	he	is	like	the		“Tribeless,	lawless,	hearthless	one,”		whom	Homer	denounces	–	the	natural	outcast	is	forthwith	a	lover	of	war;	he	may	be	compared	to	an	isolated	piece	at	draughts.	(1253a:	1-6).		Certainly,	 Aristotle’s	 account	 of	man	 seems	 strangely	 peculiar	 as	 rendered	 by	means	 of	 our	 modern	 language,	 withdrawn	 as	 it	 necessarily	 is	 from	 the	vicissitudes	 of	 history.	 Clearly,	 it	 seems	 difficult	 to	 imagine	 how	 ‘the	 natural	outcast’	who	is	forthwith	‘a	lover	of	war’	could	have	any	importance	to	the	sense																																																									57	The	absence	of	such	an	inquiry	in	Agamben	is	all	the	more	remarkable	since	he	actually	notices	the	resemblance	between	the	political	community	and	its	inhabitant,	the	politikon	zōon,	as	expressed	in	the	politicity	tied	to	language	(Agamben	1998:	3).	
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of	being	a	politikon	zōon,	let	alone	that	of	political	community.	But	while	it	might	appear	 as	 a	 negligible	 idiosyncrasy	 in	 Aristotle’s	 text,	 it	 seems	 beyond	 doubt	that	the	politikon	zōon	–	and	thus	by	resemblance	what	Aristotle	saw	as	the	telos	of	 political	 community	 –	 is	 distinguished	 from	 this	 figure	who	 seems	 to	 come	across	as	particularly	troublesome	in	being	 ‘a	 lover	of	war’.	 It	would	therefore	not	be	true	to	the	discourse	of	Aristotle	to	simply	dismiss	or	ignore	the	passage.	Advocates	of	 the	thesis	of	 the	exception	might	see	themselves	vindicated	here,	since	it	appears	as	if	a	form	of	exclusion	is	indeed	at	stake	in	Aristotle.	But	while	 it	 seems	reasonable	 to	claim	that	some	 form	of	exclusivity	 is	at	 stake	 in	the	 sense	 that	 certain	 forces	 cannot	 exist	 within	 political	 community,	 the	
politikon	 zōon	 is	 clearly	 not	 opposed	 to	 the	 empty	 category	 of	 ‘bare	 life’.	Conversely,	 the	 sense	 of	 being	 a	 political	 animal	 is	 obviously	 not	 a	 simple	linguistic	matter.	 In	 short,	 it	would	 not	 be	 true	 to	 the	 historical	 reality	 of	 the	classical	period	to	see	in	this	articulation	the	division	between	forms	of	life,	as	expressed	 in	 the	 sovereign	 exception.	 Therefore,	 if	 we	 are	 to	 understand	 the	discourse	that	once	articulated	a	certain	caesura	with	the	‘founding	of	the	city	of	men’,	we	must	show	a	more	acute	sensitivity	to	the	subtleties	of	Aristotle’s	text.	Here	is	the	original	Greek	text	of	the	passage	in	the	Politics	(1253a:	1-6):		Ek	 toutōn	 oun	 phaneron	 hoti	 tōn	 phusei	 hē	 polis	 esti,	 kai	 hoti	 ho	 anthrōpos	phusei	 politikon	 zōon,	 kai	 ho	 apolis	 dia	 phusin	 kai	 ou	 dia	 tukhēn	 ētoi	 phaulos	estin,	ē	kreittōn	ē	anthrōpos:	hōsper	kai	ho	huph'	Homērou	loidorētheis			“aphrētōr	athemistos	anestios”:		hama	gar	phusei	toioutos	kai	polemou	epithumētēs,	hate	per	azux	ōn	hōsper	en	pettois.		I	am	not	going	to	suggest	reading	the	passage	in	Greek,	since,	like	Foucault,	I	am	neither	 a	 Hellenist	 nor	 a	 Latinist.	 In	 stead,	 I	 would	 like	 to	 draw	 attention	 to	some	key	 terms	by	means	of	which	we	can	attempt	at	 establishing	 the	 logical	space	in	which	Aristotle’s	text	is	rendered	intelligible.	We	can	see	that	Aristotle	expresses	 the	 idea	 of	 the	 politikon	 zōon	 by	 drawing	 a	 distinction	 between	political	man	and	a	specific	politico-historical	identity	that	cannot	be	explained	by	the	crude	division	of	life	into	zoē	and	bios,	man	and	animal.	Clearly,	Aristotle	
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does	not	classify	this	figure	as	a	mere	animal	in	the	sense	of	having	no	language	and	no	ability	 to	 seek	out	 the	 relation	between	phonē	 and	 logos,	 as	we	would	expect	 from	 Agamben’s	 thesis.	 On	 the	 contrary,	 Aristotle	 distinguishes	 his	
politikon	zōon	from	the	strange	figure	who,	according	to	nature	[kata	phusin],	is	without	a	polis	[apolis].	While	 the	 identity	 of	 this	 figure	may	 seem	obscure	 or	 even	 enigmatic,	 a	careful	 rendering	 of	 the	 passage	 reveals	 a	 clue	 that	might	 allow	us	 to	 inquire	into	the	actual	meaning	of	this	distinction.	We	have	previously	encountered	the	theme	 of	 the	 one	who	 is	apolis	 in	Antigone,	 in	 particular,	where	 it	 appears	 in	close	proximity	with	the	term	autonomos	 to	describe	the	one	who,	in	her	 ‘self-willed	impulses’,	makes	her	own	law.	Aristotle	certainly	speaks	of	his	figure	as	lawless	 [athemistos],	 so	 it	 seems	 a	 viable	 first	 approximation	 to	 suspect	 a	certain	resemblance.	Yet	the	context	in	which	Aristotle	employs	the	term	seems	to	suggest	that	a	different	meaning	and	a	different	set	of	circumstances	might	be	at	 stake.	 What	 we	 must	 pay	 attention	 to	 is	 Aristotle’s	 conjunction	 polemou	
epithumētēs,	which	 forms	 a	 very	 specific	meaning	 far	 removed	 from	what	 the	modern	rendering	of	the	text	suggests	(he	is	forthwith	a	lover	of	war).	Polemou	
epithumētēs	certainly	concerns	a	matter	of	affect	and	war	involving	a	particular	mode	of	 conduct,	but	 the	actual	 sense	of	 this	 conjunction	must	be	 resolved	 in	terms	of	the	semantics	of	the	actual	classical	Greek	categories.	In	 the	 previous	 chapter,	 I	 explained	 how,	 in	 Plato,	 we	 often	 find	 the	metaphor	 for	man’s	 ruling	 of	 his	 soul	 expressed	 in	 the	 composite	 nature	 of	 a	pair	of	winged	horses	and	a	charioteer,	where	one	horse	is	of	noble	breed,	the	other	 ignoble.	 In	this	resemblance	of	 the	tripartite	soul	and	the	chariot	driver,	we	find	the	soul	in	a	state	of	perpetual	war	struggling	by	means	of	nous	[mind]	to	 steer	 the	 forces	 of	 thumos	 [spiritedness]	 and	 epithumia	 [desire].	 Now,	 it	seems	 to	 me	 that	 this	 resemblance	 in	 fact	 has	 a	 certain	 affinity	 with	 the	Aristotelian	distinction	between	the	politikon	zōon	and	the	man	who	is	polemou	
epithumētēs.	The	word	epithumētos	is	the	adjective	form	of	the	Greek	notion	of	
epithumia	[desire,	yearning],	whereas	polemou	is	the	adverbial	form	of	polemos.	A	more	accurate	rendering	of	polemou	epithumētēs	would	then	seem	to	be	“he	is	yearning	for	war”	or	“he	has	a	desire	for	war”,	and	yet,	 if	we	take	into	account	the	 Platonic	 model	 of	 the	 soul	 wherein	 the	 nous	 is	 given	 the	 double	 role	 of	
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consolation	 and	 imperative,	 as	 that	 which	 can	 and	must	 rule	 over	 epithumia,	then	the	more	correct	rendition,	though	it	is	difficult	to	convey	this	expression	accurately,	would	seem	to	be	“his	desire	is	ruled	by	war”.	This	seems	to	suggest	that	Aristotle	distinguishes	the	politikon	zōon	in	terms	of	man	being	able	to	rule	over	 his	 soul,	 which	 is	 to	 say	 that	 the	 sense	 of	 being	 a	 political	 animal	 in	Aristotle	 might	 resemble	 Plato’s	 concern	 for	 the	 proper	 ruling	 of	 the	 soul.	However,	 to	affirm	such	a	hypothesis,	 it	 is	clearly	necessary	to	 further	 inquire	into	the	relationship	in	Aristotle	between	‘political	man’	and	his	‘double’;	who	is	this	peculiar	being	whose	 ‘desire	 is	 ruled	by	war’	and	who	seems	 to	be	either	above	 man	 belonging	 to	 the	 divine	 sphere	 of	 gods	 or	 below	 man	 and	 the	mundane	sphere	of	the	city	of	men?	While	the	description	of	this	curious	figure	that	dwells	either	among	gods	or	 outside	 the	 city	 walls	 might	 bring	 to	 mind	 the	 image	 of	 the	 erudite	philosopher’s	 ironic	 disputation	 over	 the	 primitive	 man,	 Aristotle’s	 words	contain	 neither	 ambiguity	 nor	 irony,	 at	 least	 in	 this	 sense.	 Aristotle’s	representation	 of	 this	 apparently	 eccentric	 creature	 that	 has	 no	 polis	 and	 no	sound	virtue,	but	on	the	contrary	appears	to	have	an	affect	for	war,	is	not	to	be	confused	with	the	figure	of	the	primitive	or	savage	man	per	se.	In	the	discourse	of	Aristotle,	even	the	savage	man,	according	to	nature,	belongs	to	a	collective	in	the	form	of	a	tribe.	Aristotle,	however,	says	that	this	man	is	specifically	without	a	tribe	or	clan	[aphrētōr]	as	well	as	lawless	[athemistos].	However,	this	should	not	 be	misunderstood	 in	 the	 sense	 that	 this	man	 is	de	 facto	 banned	 from	 the	
polis.	Aristotle’s	treatise	on	the	political	is	not	a	juridical	stipulation	of	nomos.	It	is	not	written	 in	 the	 codes	of	 law.	 It	 is	precisely	what	 it	 says	 it	 is	 –	 a	political	discourse	–	in	the	most	fundamental	sense	of	the	term.	In	 other	 words,	 what	 is	 at	 stake	 in	 Aristotle	 is	 precisely	 the	 practice	 of	politics	in	the	sense	of	a	certain	strategic	manoeuvre	targeted	against	a	specific	individual	relationship.	Specifically,	what	Aristotle	has	in	mind	is	a	particular	of	form	conduct	–	a	specific	mode	of	being	–	which	can	be	explicated	by	examining	the	 reference	 to	 Homer.	 Aristotle	 refers	 to	 a	 passage	 of	 the	 Iliad	 in	 which	Diomedes,	 the	 Achaean	 hērōs	 descending	 directly	 from	 Heracles,	 opposes	 his	fellow	 Achaean	 king,	 Agamemnon,	 who	 at	 this	 stage	 of	 the	 siege	 of	 Troy	proposes	a	retreat.	Bristling	with	rage	and	spiritedness,	Diomedes	encourages	
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the	Achaeans	to	stay	and	fight,	as	he	appeals	to	the	warriors’	sense	of	arētē.	The	crowd	of	warriors	 applauds	Diomedes	while	 the	 tension	 starts	 to	 rise.	At	 this	point,	Nestor,	 the	wise	old	Achaean	king	who	 is	often	portrayed	 in	 the	 role	of	giving	 advice	 to	 young	 warriors	 as	 well	 as	 council	 to	 the	 kings,	 intervenes.	Nestor	 speaks	 out	 to	 the	 crowd	 and	 declares:	 “A	 clanless,	 lawless,	 hearthless	man	is	the	person	that	loves	war	[polemou	eratai]	among	his	own	folk.”	(Iliad:	9.64).	This	is	the	passage	Aristotle	refers	to	in	the	passage	of	the	Politics.	As	we	know,	 in	the	Iliad,	Nestor’s	diplomatic	skills	are	deployed	throughout	the	epos	to	 bring	 reconciliation	 among	 the	 Achaeans,	 most	 importantly	 in	 the	relationship	 between	 the	 hērōs	 and	 demigod	 Achilles	 and	 Agamemnon.	 But	Nestor,	the	wise	old	man,	always	seems,	if	only	slightly,	to	give	the	power	to	one	side	 in	 the	 struggle,	 namely,	 to	 the	 arkhōn	 who	 favours	 moderation	 over	excellence,	 sōphrosynē	 over	 archaic	arētē.	Nestor,	 in	 other	words,	 functions	 in	the	role	of	the	mediator	who,	by	neutralising	the	forces	of	polemos	in	favour	of	moderation,	reunites	the	bond	among	the	Achaeans.	That	is,	the	bond	which,	as	classical	 political	 discourse	 overlays	 the	 archaic	 Greek	 oratory	 tradition,	 is	transformed	 into	 the	principle	of	 steering	 the	stratia	 and	 the	militia,	 the	bond	which	 enables	 the	 arkhōn	 to	 be	 kubernōmenon	 [the	 one	 who	 steers],	 as	 we	learned	 in	Plato.	 It	 is	 important	 to	note,	however,	 that	 this	bond,	 issuing	 from	the	government	of	 self,	 is	not	 yet	 in	 existence	 in	Homer.	This	 is	 in	 fact	where	Nestor	comes	in.	Homer	cannot	do	without	the	figure	of	Nestor	if	the	Achaeans	are	to	retain	some	form	of	unity,	because	at	this	point	in	time	there	is	no	mind	to	 take	 charge	 of	 the	 unruly	 soul	 and	 make	 it	 submit	 to	 the	 steering	 of	 the	
arkhōn,	hēgemon,	 or	 stratēgos.	 Nor	 is	 there	 a	mind	 present	 to	 apprehend	 the	lines	 of	 escape	 and	 pursuit.	 As	 we	 know,	 the	 Homeric	 hērōs	 moves	 within	 a	world	 without	 boundaries,	 a	 world	 written	 in	 the	 codes	 of	 polemos	 where	 it	seems	the	hērōs	does	not	have	a	sense	of	self	one	can	appeal	to.	So,	 as	 Nestor	 tries	 to	 induce	 a	 sense	 of	moderation	 in	 the	 crowd	 of	 the	young	warriors,	 he	 expresses	 the	 strategic	 incitement,	 which	 is	 absent	 in	 the	warrior	who	has	yet	to	learn	the	value	of	the	military	model	of	war,	both	on	the	actual	battlefield	and	 in	the	soul.	 In	 fact,	archaic	thought	does	not	really	know	the	 classical	 virtue	 of	 sōphrosynē,	 nor	 does	 it	 seem	 to	 value	 the	 kind	 of	
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government	of	self	that	classical	thought	installs	in	the	virtue	of	arētē.	The	hērōs	knows	 no	moderation	 or	 sense	 of	 reflective	 inwardness,	 but	 on	 the	 contrary	demonstrates	 an	 astounding	 inability	 to	 steer	 the	 affects	 through	 strategic	calculations,	 and	 therein,	 in	 the	 blazing	 fire	 of	 the	 pure,	 catatonic	 rupture,	divinity	 springs	 forth.	 The	 deeds	 and	 acts	 of	 the	hērōs	 are	 born,	 not	 from	 the	calculated	 activities	 of	 nous,	 but	 from	 rage	 and	 spiritedness	 that	 find	 their	attunement	 [harmonia]	 in	 the	 steering	 by	 polemos	 of	 kosmos.	 These	 are	 the	‘Apollonian’	virtues	and	values	celebrated	by	Homer,	as	the	poet	sings	of	the	one	who	 is	philopolemos,	 even	 if	 the	 figure	of	Nestor	 is	 invented	 to	 instil	 some	old	wisdom	in	the	young	souls.	Now,	by	the	time	the	order	of	polemos	 is	displaced	by	classical	discourse	around	the	time	of	the	Peloponnesian	War,	we	saw	how	tragedy	rediscovers	the	profound	sense	of	being	philopolemos,	so	far	removed	from	the	mere	life	of	the	city	of	men,	as	madness	and	illusion.	The	archaic	hero	is	seen	as	the	disordered	player	of	the	Same	and	the	Other,	the	dangerous	individual	who,	in	violating	the	ruling	 principle,	 makes	 his	 own	 law	 [autonomos]	 and	 so	 becomes	 without	 a	
polis	[apolis].	It	is	basically	the	same	theme	we	see	in	Aristotle	when	he	speaks	of	the	one	whose	desire	is	ruled	by	war	[polemou	epithumētēs].	The	one	who	is	
polemou	 epithumētēs	 is	 apolis,	 Aristotle	 says,	 which	 is	 precisely	 how,	 in	 the	discourse	of	Aristotle,	Diomedes	is	‘banned’	as	the	betrayer	of	the	bond	and	the	pact,	the	bond	which	makes	political	man	and	political	community	possible.	But	 how	 is	 this	 displacement	 achieved	 in	 the	 discourse	 of	 Aristotle?	Remember	 that,	 in	 Homer,	 Diomedes	 is	 honoured	 with	 the	 highest	 praise	throughout	the	epos	being	only	second	among	the	Achaean	warriors	in	fighting	skill	and	virtue	to	Achilles.	Let	us	try	to	analyse	the	steps	apparent	in	Aristotle’s	rhetorical	 strategy.	 First	 Aristotle	 cites	 Nestor	 to	 speak	 the	 discourse	 of	 the	mediator	and	seemingly	neutral	 subject.	From	this	vantage	point,	he	animates	the	 telos	 of	mind,	which	 remains	 absent	 in	Diomedes	 and	 the	warriors,	 as	 he	assumes	the	intrinsically	strategic	role	of	being	kubernōmenon.	This	is	the	first	strike	of	the	politico-strategic	mind	against	the	dreadful	opponent	conjured	up	from	the	old	world	to	be	defeated	in	the	present.	As	we	reread	the	passage,	we	discover	 the	 second	 affront	 doled	 out	 by	 the	 philosopher.	 Comparing	 the	 two	texts,	we	can	see	that	Aristotle	seems	to	slightly	alter	the	original	Homeric	text.	
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In	Homer,	the	passage	reads	 ‘polemou	eratai’,	 in	which	love	and	war	appear	in	the	 intimate	 relationship	 of	 being	 philopolemos.	 In	 Aristotle,	 however,	 the	passage	 is	 slightly	 altered	 in	 a	 play	 of	 words	 to	 read	 ‘polemou	 epithumētēs’	attaining	 the	 distinctly	 ridiculous	 sense	 of	 Diomedes	 being	 a	 slave	 of	 his	passions	and	ruled	by	war.	 It	 is	 the	 theatrical	play	of	power	and	the	return	of	masks.	 One	 should	 not	 forget	 how	 the	 old	 order	 was	 laughed	 away	 by	 the	tragedians,	 as	 the	virtues	of	 the	archaic	hērōs	 are	 reversed,	put	on	a	pedestal,	and	displayed	in	their	delusional	intensities	at	the	Athenian	theatre	of	Dionysus.	The	 reference	 to	 Homer	 is	 in	 other	 words	 hardly	 idiosyncratic.	 Nor	 is	Aristotle’s	 slight	 alteration	 the	 expression	 of	 a	 simple	 forgetfulness.	 When	Aristotle	draws	on	this	allusion	to	the	Homeric	poems	in	his	articulation	of	the	
politikon	 zōon,	 and	 this	 is	 the	 third	 affront,	 he	 invokes	 the	 entire	 order	governing	Greek	mythology	 in	order	 to	 turn	 it	on	 its	head,	as	he	re-forges	 the	discourse	 of	 Nestor	 into	 a	 weapon.	 By	 slightly	 altering	 the	 Homeric	 text,	Aristotle	proclaims	 the	 sense	of	 being	 a	politikon	zōon,	 not	 only	by	drawing	 a	linguistic	distinction	between	man	and	animal,	but	by	finishing	off	the	chimera	of	the	polemistēs	of	ancient	mythologeme,	in	a	manner	not	so	different	from	the	Socratic	dialectician	or	the	battlefield	stratēgos.	The	veritable	antithesis	to	being	political	 in	 the	Aristotelian	sense,	 the	one	who	 is	philopolemos	 in	 the	one	who	brings	a	 fury	to	bear	on	the	relations	of	 forces	even	among	his	own	folk;	he	 is	the	 dangerous	 individual	who	 adheres	 to	 no	 political	 order,	 since	 his	 fleeting	order	 of	 self	 answers	 to	 no	 command	 by	 any	 basileus,	 hēgemon,	 arkhōn,	 or	
stratēgos,	which	 is	why	he	should	be	considered,	Aristotle	says,	 ‘as	an	 isolated	piece	at	draughts’	[hate	per	azux	ōn	hōsper	en	pettois].	This	is	how,	as	we	examine	the	Homeric	reference	further,	we	can	see	that	Aristotle	is	indeed	most	concerned	with	the	disruptive	forces	of	the	polemistēs.	Not	 only	 does	 the	 absence	 of	 the	 virtues	 of	 the	 sound	 mind,	 such	 as	 good	conduct	 [sōphroneō],	 discipline	 [eutakteō],	 modesty,	 and	 obedience	 [aidōs],	make	it	impossible	to	command	this	figure	like	a	piece	at	draughts,	in	fact	such	form	 of	 conduct	 seems	 to	 upset	 the	 ruling	 principle	 [arkhē]	 itself.	 Not	 in	 the	sense	 that	 Aristotle	 appears	 to	 be	 particularly	 preoccupied	with	 blocking	 the	warpath	of	Diomedes	targeting	the	Trojans.	The	conviction	of	Diomedes	to	fight	the	 Trojans	 is	 not	 the	 cause	 of	 the	 intervention.	 The	 point	 in	 the	 Iliad	 where	
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Nestor	 intervenes,	which	 is	 the	passage	Aristotle	 cites,	 is	 the	 specific	moment	when	the	speech	of	Diomedes	is	threatening	to	plunge	the	Achaeans	into	what	seems	to	materialise	as	a	form	of	 internal	struggle,	a	war	among	the	Achaeans	themselves.	 What	 occupies	 Aristotle,	 then,	 is	 not	 to	 contain	 the	 force	 of	 the	warrior	 targeting	 the	Trojans,	 but	 rather	 to	 contain	 the	war	 that	 threatens	 to	appear	 on	 the	 inside	 with	 its	 alarming	 consequences;	 the	 blurring	 of	 the	distinction	between	 friend	and	enemy	and	 the	collapsing	of	 the	assemblage	of	Achaean	 forces	 into	 the	 disorganised	 mass	 of	 individual	 polemistēs,	 the	heterogeneous	dispersion	of	the	relations	of	forces	where	no	form	of	steering	or	command	is	possible.	So,	whereas	to	the	modern	mind	Diomedes	might	appear	to	 be	 ‘longing	 for	 war’	 in	 his	 conviction	 to	 fight	 the	 Trojans,	 it	 would	 not	 be	accurate	to	read	in	Aristotle	a	particular	preoccupation	with	what	is	essentially	of	 little	 importance	 to	 the	 significance	 of	 being	 a	 political	 animal.	 The	disquieting	effects	of	the	warrior	lie	not	in	his	force	targeting	the	opponent,	for	this	 is	 also	 the	 aim	 of	 the	 assemblage	 of	 forces	 of	 the	 stratia	 in	 which	 the	
stratiōtēs	is	subjected	to	the	ruling	of	the	stratēgos.	The	disquieting	effects	of	the	figure	 of	 the	 archaic	polemistēs	 –	 as	 distinct	 from	 the	 classical	 stratiōtēs	 –	 lie	precisely	 in	 the	 disruptive	 effects	 of	 arētē,	menis,	 and	 thumos	 stirring	 up	 the	forces	 of	 polemos	 in	 the	 soul,	 and	 this	 is	 precisely	 what	 Aristotle	 seeks	 to	eliminate	in	his	representation	of	political	man.58	Clearly,	 then,	 we	 cannot	 posit	 the	 Aristotelian	 sense	 of	 being	 an	 animal	with	the	capacity	for	political	existence	in	the	historico-politically	empty	space	of	an	opposition	to	zoē.	But	is	the	politikon	zōon	not	precisely	the	expression	of	a	certain	 form	of	 ‘politically	 qualified	 life’?	 Surely	 the	division	 into	 forms	of	 life	must	 have	 had	 some	 degree	 of	 actuality	 in	 the	 domain	 of	 appearance	 in	 the	classical	world.	 Quite	 the	 contrary,	 it	 seems,	 for	 such	 a	 distinction	would	 not	have	been	particularly	meaningful	to	the	Greeks	all	 the	while	that	zoē	was	not	perceived	in	terms	of	an	exception,	but	as	‘normality’	in	the	sense	of	expressing	
																																																								58	In	fact,	the	problem	of	polemos	among	the	citizens	of	the	polis,	or	what	we	could	call	the	public	sphere,	appears	as	a	central	theme	in	classical	discourse,	which	I	will	discuss	in	the	next	chapter.	
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nothing	but	 the	simple	 fact	of	 living	common	to	all	 living	beings.59	Contrary	to	the	convictions	of	Agamben,	zoē	is	not	what	distinguishes	the	ruling	of	the	oikos	by	 the	 oikonomos	 [the	 head	 of	 an	 estate]	 and	 the	 despotēs	 [the	 head	 of	 the	family]	from	the	practice	of	political	life	[bios	politikos].	As	we	learn	in	book	II	of	the	Politics	(1261a),	where	Aristotle	interrogates	Socrates’	suggestion	in	the	
Republic	for	men	to	have	common	property	of	the	households	of	the	polis	and	all	that	belong	to	them,	women,	children,	and	slaves,	the	oikos	and	the	ruling	by	the	
oikonomos	do	not	demarcate	a	sphere	of	‘simple	natural	life’,	zoē.	The	boundary	that	appears	at	the	site	of	the	oikos	is	simply	that	of	private	property.	Accordingly,	when	Aristotle	distinguishes	the	practice	of	politics	from	that	of	ruling	by	the	oikonomos	and	the	despotēs	at	the	beginning	of	the	Politics,	what	he	has	in	mind	is	clearly	not	to	separate	out	zoē	from	politics.	Rather,	it	is	simply	to	differentiate	among	 the	practices	 that	dispose	differently	over	 things	 in	 the	public	and	the	private	domains.	In	each	case,	zoē	is	never	absent	simply	because	it	is	what	animates	life.	Zoē	does	not	just	dwell	in	the	oikos	or	at	the	margins	of	political	order,	but	in	fact	everywhere	in	the	polis.	Zoē,	therefore,	never	appears	at	the	site	of	exclusion.	It	is	simply	not	true	to	the	discourse	of	Aristotle	to	try	to	make	 the	notion	of	 the	politikon	zōon	 fit	 the	distinction	of	what	was	never	an	inclusive	 exclusion	of	 the	 animal	 in	man,	 since	both	 the	bodily	 endowment	of	the	former,	zoē,	and	the	spiritual	endowment	of	the	later,	dwell	in	both	beings.	Most	importantly,	in	the	world	of	classical	Greece,	zoē	is	not	recognised	in	terms	of	 identity	and	difference,	but	 rather	 in	 terms	of	 resemblance.	At	 this	point	 in	time,	the	life	of	man,	animal,	and	nature	are	not	really	seen	as	distinct	forms	of	life.	Rather,	 there	are	degrees	of	difference,	which,	however,	 are	bound	 to	 the	chain	 of	 resemblances.	 As	 Aristotle	 says	 in	 the	 Politics,	 “…	 man	 is	 more	 of	 a	political	animal	than	bees	or	any	other	gregarious	animals…”	(1253a	8).	This	is	to	 say	 that	 life,	 first	 and	 foremost,	 appears	 to	 man	 as	 signs	 that	 bare	 the	markings	of	resemblance:	“…	there	is	Mind	[nous]	in	nature,	just	as	in	animals,	and…	 this	 is	 the	 cause	 of	 all	 order	 and	 arrangement,”	 Aristotle	 says	 in	 the	
																																																								59	As	pointed	out	by	Ernesto	Laclau:	“[In	Classical	GreeceClassical	GreeceClassical	Greece]	living	beings	are	not	distributed	between	two	categories	–	those	who	have	exclusively	bios	and	those	who	have	exclusively	zoē	–	for	those	who	have	bios	obviously	have	zoē	as	well.”	(2007:	17).	
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Metaphysics	 (984b	 15-19)	 affirming	 the	 fact	 that	 life	 in	 the	 classical	 world	 is	recognised	much	more	in	the	form	of	resemblance	than	difference.	It	seems	to	me,	then,	that	we	should	abandon	the	distinction	between	bios	and	 zoē	 and	 instead	 try	 to	 think	 of	 the	 politikon	 zōon	 as	 a	 figure	 who	 bares	witness,	not	to	the	idea	that	a	certain	new	species	has	been	born,	but	rather	to	the	fact	that	a	particular	mode	of	self-relationship	has	now	emerged	at	the	site	of	 the	 bios	 politikos.	 This	 sense	 of	 self-relationship	 does	 not	 emerge	 out	 of	 a	fundamental	distinction	between	man	and	animal,	as	if	man,	having	uttered	his	last	 animal	 cries,	 suddenly	 appears	 out	 of	 the	 jungle	 to	 seek	 out	 the	 relation	between	 phonē	 and	 logos.	 Rather,	 what	 could	 perhaps	 be	 described	 as	 the	reflective	inwardness	of	a	self	refers	to	degrees	of	difference	that	separates	the	kind	 of	 animal	 who	 is	 capable	 of	 ruling	 over	 his	 soul	 from	 the	 one	 who	 is	seemingly	 incapable	of	mastering	himself	and	thus	anyone	else.	This	 is	also	to	say	 that	 the	 idea	 of	 self-control	 [sōphrosynē],	 Aristotle	 seems	 to	 allude	 in	 his	predication	of	man,	concerns	a	matter	of	degrees	of	resemblance;	the	soundness	of	mind	[sōphroneō]	does	not	concern	an	exceptio	of	life	or	a	specific	difference	that	determines	the	genus	zōon.	On	the	contrary,	it	concerns	the	resemblance	of	man	 and	 nature	 found	 in	 the	 nous	 [mind],	 as	 ‘the	 cause	 of	 all	 order	 and	arrangement’.	If	we	dismiss	the	terms	bios	and	zoē	as	meaningful	descriptors	of	man,	the	question	 that	 remains	 though	 is	 whether	 the	 specific	 distinction	 in	 Aristotle	between	 the	 politikon	 zōon	 and	 the	 one	 whose	 desire	 is	 ruled	 by	 war,	nonetheless,	can	meaningfully	be	understood	as	an	exceptio	in	the	polis.	After	all,	Aristotle	speaks	of	the	later	in	terms	of	being	apolis	and	without	a	tribe	or	clan	as	 well	 as	 lawless.	 This	 would	 require	 that	 Aristotle’s	 distinction	 in	 fact	expresses	 the	 bond	 between	 sovereign	 power	 and	 life	 through	 which	 the	original	political	relation	takes	the	form	of	the	ban	(the	state	of	exception	as	the	zone	 of	 indistinction	 between	 inside	 and	 outside,	 exclusion	 and	 inclusion).60	While	 clearly	 the	 expression	 of	 a	 certain	 sense	 of	 governmental	 reason,	 the	denouncement	by	Aristotle	of	the	man	who	is	polemou	epithumētēs	in	favour	of	the	 politikon	 zōon	 is	 not	 the	 expression	 of	 the	 sovereign	 ban.	 Remember,	 for																																																									60	Still,	we	would	merely	be	saying	something	at	the	level	of	discourse	rather	than	at	the	level	of	actual	practices.	
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instance,	 that	 the	 Cynics	 referred	 to	 themselves	 as	 apolis	 and	 yet	 they	 lived	among	 the	 citizens	 of	 the	 polis.	 While	 Aristotle	 does	 not	 seem	 to	 have	 been	targeting	 the	 Cynics	 in	 this	 passage	 of	 the	Politics,	 for	 the	 simple	 reason	 that	they	perfected	the	ascetic	ideal	of	self-mastery,	this	is	just	to	say	that	we	really	find	no	traces	of	the	juridico-institutional	model	in	Aristotle’s	account	of	man.	One	should	also	keep	 in	mind	that	 in	this	period,	and	up	until	 the	end	of	the	 Renaissance,	 sovereignty	 is	 not	 understood	 in	 terms	 of	 an	 institution	belonging	to	the	state.	The	nomos	basileus	has	nothing	to	do	with	the	 juridico-institutional	model	of	power.	By	contrast,	sovereignty	is	recognised	in	terms	of	the	mark	of	 superiority	or	as	 the	 sign	of	divine	origin	ascribed	 to	 individuals;	marks	and	signs	that	are	known	and	disseminated	by	resemblance	and	analogy	(Bartelson	1995:	138).	So,	while	Aristotle’s	account	of	 the	one	whose	desire	 is	ruled	by	war	certainly	seems	to	refer	to	a	‘naked’	individual,	dispossessed	of	any	kind	of	collective	identity	and	seemingly	reduced	to	‘bare	life’,	this	should	not	be	confused	with	 a	de	 facto	 dispossession,	 the	 outcast	 of	 the	polemistēs	 from	 the	
polis.	What	is	at	stake	here	is	not	the	sovereign	ban,	but	closer	to	what	we	could	call	the	political	play	of	power	in	the	most	fundamental	sense	of	the	mutual	ban;	the	opposition	of	two	claims	to	law	and	authority,	which,	as	Ernesto	Laclau	says	(2007:	15),	is	precisely	the	constitutive	nature	of	any	radical	antagonism	or,	as	the	Greeks	would	say,	polemos.	This	is	not	to	say	that	the	non-reciprocal	ban	has	no	existence	in	classical	Greece.	Often	it	would	occur	in	the	form	of	the	common	practice	of	exiling,	as	in	the	 famous	 examples	 of	Thucydides	 and	Kleisthenes,	 both	of	whom,	however,	were	simply	exiled	rather	 than	killed.	Moreover,	 the	practice	of	exiling	cannot	be	 understood	 as	 indicative	 of	 the	 non-reciprocal	 ban,	 seen	 as	 a	 generalised	technique	employed	by	power	in	its	reference	to	life,	simply	because	the	form	in	which	 power	 manifests	 itself	 in	 the	 classical	 world	 has	 little	 to	 do	 with	 the	juridical	model	of	power,	and	more	to	do	with	the	disciplines	of	an	askēsis	and	the	government	of	self.	In	fact,	we	could	even	say	that	the	idea	of	power,	in	the	sense	of	an	abstract	group	of	institutions	or	techniques	of	government	by	which	a	state	assures	the	subservience	of	its	citizens,	has	yet	to	emerge.	It	is	therefore	no	coincidence	that	Agamben	seems	to	have	a	hard	time	speaking	of	the	actual	sense	of	the	particular	kind	of	conduct,	which	supposedly	is	subject	to	sovereign	
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power.61	Agamben	certainly	refers	to	actual	figures	as	bearers	of	so-called	‘bare	life’,	such	as	the	Roman	figure	of	the	sacred	man	[homo	sacer],	the	bandit,	and	the	 werewolf	 (as	 threshold	 of	 indeterminacy	 between	 man	 and	 animal),	 but	these	are	all	more	 recent	 figures	 that	have	no	existence	 in	classical	Greece.	 In	the	world	of	 classical	Greece,	 it	appears,	 there	are	no	referent	object(s)	of	 the	ban	to	be	found	anywhere	but	in	the	empty,	ahistorical	category	of	‘bare	life’.62	So,	at	this	point	in	time,	the	juridical	model	of	power	has	yet	to	be	invested	in	the	relations	of	forces	as	a	political	idea	of	order.	In	fact,	this	will	not	happen	before	the	invention	of	Roman	law.	We	are	at	the	threshold	where	the	relations	of	forces	have	come	to	find	an	expression	in	the	military	model	of	war	and	yet	still	refer	back	to	polemos.	It	is	in	this	sense	we	must	understand	the	discourse	of	 Aristotle.	 The	 discourse	 on	 the	 one	 who	 is	 apolis	 does	 not	 concern	 the	question	 of	 the	 sovereign	 ban.	 It	 concerns	 a	 certain	 bond	 that	 constitutes	 the	condition	of	possibility	of	ruling	and	hence	the	order	of	political	community.	As	we	 have	 seen,	 what	 is	 at	 stake	 here	 is	 the	 bond	 of	 the	 stratia	 in	 which	 the	government	of	self	makes	possible	the	government	of	others.	It	is	the	bond	that	issues	from	the	practices	of	an	askēsis	and	its	correlatives,	discipline	[eutakteō],	moderation	and	self-control	[sōphrosynē]	–	all	the	signs	that	bare	the	markings	of	 the	set	of	 resemblances	articulated	 in	 the	sound	mind	 [sōphroneō].	But	are	these	 practices	 not	 precisely	 the	 expression	 of	 the	 division	 of	 life	 or	 in	 what	exactly	does	this	bond	consist?	It	consists,	not	in	the	division	of	life	by	sovereign	power,	but	in	the	resemblance	according	to	which	there	is	mind	[nous]	in	nature,	animals,	 and	men.	 Hence	 the	 formulation	 ‘man	 is	 by	 nature	 a	 politikon	 zōon’.	There	 is	mind	 in	nature	and	all	 that	belongs	 to	 it,	because	 the	ruling	principle																																																									61	In	fact,	it	is	not	until	the	second	last	page	of	the	book	that	the	meaning	of	zoē	is	even	vaguely	qualified	other	than	the	sense	of	‘reproductive	life’	we	learn	of	in	the	first	few	pages	of	the	book.	At	the	end	of	the	study,	Agamben	says	that	zoē	concerns	the	private	life	of	‘man	as	a	simple	living	being	at	home	in	the	house’,	as	opposed	to	the	political	existence	of	man	in	the	polis	(Agamben	1998:	187).	62	Hence	the	problem	which	however	by	now	should	seem	of	strictly	academical	value:	Must	we	understand	the	nature	of	the	exclusion	of	‘bare	life’	as	a	ban	on	public	reproduction,	perhaps	as	a	peculiar	variant	of	the	Lévi-Straussian	‘ban	on	incest’,	or	should	we	see	it	as	a	confinement	of	the	relations	of	forces	that	appear	in	the	mere	absence	of	what	is	deemed	to	be	political	life,	so	as	to	give	life	in	the	oikos	a	privileged	form?	In	case	of	the	former,	it	seems	to	remain	unclear	what	relation,	if	any,	actually	exists	between	the	Classical	Greek	sense	of	zoē	and	the	Roman	notion	of	the	vitae	of	homo	sacer.	In	case	of	the	later,	the	exclusion	of	zoē	would	correspond	to	the	veritable	site	of	social	indeterminacy	leaving	power	with	no	pivotal	point	within	the	relations	of	forces	to	separate	life	from	politics.	
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found	in	the	arkhē	of	kosmos	permeates	everything.	As	Aristotle	explains	in	the	
Politics,	the	arkhē	is	the	principle	of	ruling	and	subject	element,	which	‘comes	to	light	in	all	things’:	“Such	a	duality	exists	in	living	creatures,	but	not	in	them	only;	it	originates	in	the	constitution	of	the	kosmos;	even	in	things	which	have	no	life	there	is	a	ruling	principle,	as	in	a	musical	mode.”	(Politics	1254a:	31-34).	This	is	how,	in	nature	and	in	animals	such	as	man,	the	ruling	element	of	nous	governs	the	soul	and	body	in	which	it	dwells.	This	is	what	Aristotle	has	in	mind,	not	only	when	he	speaks	of	zoē,	but	also	of	life	in	the	sense	of	the	proper	way	of	living	to	an	 individual	 or	 a	 group	 [bios].	 In	 fact,	 this	 is	 precisely	 how	 the	 one	 whose	desire	is	ruled	by	war	turns	up	at	the	site	of	the	wholly	unnatural.	The	chimera	of	Diomedes	appears	on	the	other	side	of	order,	not	because	he	is	banned,	but	because	he	has	no	mind	in	the	Aristotelian	sense	and	therefore	is	without	tribe,	clan,	and	polis.	The	arkhē	permeates	both	the	sphere	of	the	oikos	and	the	site	of	the	bios	politikos.	 The	arkhē	 knows	 no	 separation	 between	bios	 and	 zoē,	man	and	 animal,	 nomos	 and	 phusis;	 in	 the	 life	 of	 the	 despotēs,	 the	 oikonomos,	 the	
politēs,	and	the	stratēgos,	bios	and	zoē	are	collapsed	in	the	resemblance	of	nous	to	the	arkhē.		
4.2.	However,	it	is	no	doubt	an	intricate	path	that	has	now	led	classical	thought	to	the	discovery	of	the	bond	of	resemblance	between	the	mind	and	the	steering	 of	 kosmos.	 Indeed,	 it	 is	 necessary	 to	 return	 to	 the	 archaic	 period	 in	order	to	trace	this	genealogy.	This	will	allow	us	to	determine	the	line	of	flight	in	which	the	idea	of	steering,	at	the	point	of	intersection	where	the	mind	comes	to	mirror	 the	 one	 God,	 will	 be	 connected	 to	 the	 ruling	 principle.	 In	 turn,	 it	 will	enable	us	to	understand	how	the	relationships	of	 forces	 in	 the	classical	world,	rather	 than	 issuing	 from	the	 juridical	model	of	power,	 for	a	 long	 time	actually	found	their	expression	in	a	war	and	conquest,	as	the	disciplinary	practices	of	the	nascent	mind	articulate	the	pathways	to	political	community	in	the	elaboration	of	a	self.	Finally,	 this	will	allow	us	 to	move	beyond	the	 thesis	of	Agamben	and	perhaps	 enable	 us	 to	 say	 something	 new	 about	 the	 Foucaultdian	 thesis	 of	biopolitics.	 In	 any	 case,	 this	 trajectory	 of	 thought	 takes	 us	 back	 to	 one	 of	 the	most	profound	moments	of	the	history	of	the	Western	epistēmē	where	the	first	great	speculation	about	order	and	the	steering	of	kosmos	begins.	Thought	finds	itself	faced	with	the	stark	fact	that	there	exists,	below	the	level	of	spontaneous	
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orders,	 things	 that	 are	 in	 themselves	 capable	 of	 being	 ordered,	 things	 that	belong	to	a	certain	unspoken	order;	the	fact	that,	in	short,	order	exists.	But	it	is	also	a	moment	of	true	irony.	Once	again,	we	are	confronted	with	the	comforting	yet	 disconcerting	possibility	 that	perhaps	 the	mind	was	born	 in	 an	 altogether	reflective	manner	–	 from	war	 [polemos].	As	man	occurs	at	 the	middle	ground	between	being	and	 thinking,	polemos	 and	 logos,	 the	order	of	war	reflects	back	on	 the	 reflection	 upon	 order	 itself	 as	 the	 activity	 of	 thought	 itself.	 Order	will	illuminate	 in	 the	gathering	 [logos]	of	kosmos	 in	man.	As	 father	and	king	of	all,	
polemos	will	give	birth,	not	only	to	god	and	man,	the	slave	and	the	free,	but	also	to	the	wise	man	and	the	ignorant.	However,	as	the	illuminated	outline	of	kosmos	is	 apprehended	 enlightening	 the	 soul,	 that	 is,	 as	 polemos	 becomes	 capable	 of	being	 thought	 [logikoi],	 thought	must	 answer	 to	 the	 apprehension	 of	 its	 own	gathering	[logos].	“Although	 this	Logos	 exists	 for	 ever”,	Heraclitus	 says	 in	 fragment	 one,	“men	prove	as	unable	to	understand	it	when	once	they	have	heard	it	as	before	they	heard	it.	For,	though	all	things	come	to	pass	in	accordance	with	this	Logos,	men	 seem	 as	 if	 ignorant	 when	 they	 experience	 such	 words	 and	 things…”	 All	things	come	into	being	by	way	of	strife	and	man	is	forever	engaged	in	strife	and	struggle,	 but	 men	 do	 not	 grasp	 this	 Logos.	 In	 fact,	 the	 Logos	 of	 polemos	 is	something	so	difficult	to	apprehend	that	it	can	neither	be	acquired	by	learning	[polymathie]	nor	is	it	something	that	can	easily	be	disseminated.63	It	is	not	even	possible	 to	 know	 polemos	 from	 the	 teachings	 of	 philosophia,	 we	 learn	 in	Heraclitus.	It	cannot	be	taught.	Moreover,	polemos	cannot	be	made	the	object	of	scientific	knowledge	[epistēmē].	But	this	is	not	because	polemos	stands	outside	of	 epistēmē.	 It	 is	 for	 the	 reason	 that	 underneath	 the	 amassed	 knowledge	 of	words	and	things,	 it	speaks	another	 language,	without	words	or	discourse,	the	language	in	which	the	kosmos	sings	to	man	in	the	vibrating	tension	of	signs	that	bare	the	markings	of	polemos.	So	 life	[bios]	 is	 the	name	of	 the	bow	being	bent	around	itself	by	the	force	of	the	string,64	and	so	bios,	this	immanent	tug-of-war	
																																																								63	“Much	learning	(polymathie)	does	not	teach	sense.	Otherwise	it	would	have	taught	Hesiod	and	Pythagoras,	or	again	Xenophanes	and	Hecataeus.”	(Heraclitus	fr.	40).	64	The	Homeric	name	for	bow	is	bios.	
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whose	name	is	life	but	whose	work	is	death,65	will	pass	on	the	Logos	to	the	one	who	 will	 grasp	 its	 incisive	 arrows:	 “I	 have	 many	 swift	 arrows	 in	 the	 quiver	under	my	arm,	arrows	that	speak	to	the	initiated”,	says	Pindar	in	the	Olympian	
Odes	(Olympian	Odes	II:	84-85).66	The	Logos	is	in	other	words	what	strikes	one,	as	it	appears	in	man	who	does	not	 consider	himself	 as	 the	 source	of	his	own	 thought.	 In	 the	 attempt	of	approaching	 the	 sense	 of	 this	mode	 of	 thinking,	 we	 could	 perhaps	 liken	 it	 to	when	 we	 today	 try	 to	 recapture	 a	 certain	 course	 of	 event	 or	 a	 trajectory	 of	thought	in	which	case	we	might	lose	sight	of	our	own	share,	and	ask	ourselves:	how	did	this	happen	or	how	did	this	thought	come	to	me?	If	we	take	the	sense	of	this	wonderment	and	apply	 the	kind	of	 slithering	surface	 to	words	and	 things	that	 remain	 in	 the	unceasing	 state	 of	 being	 carried	 off	 by	war	we	 come	 fairly	close	 to	 the	mode	of	 thinking	 of	 the	Pre-socratics.	Words	 and	 things	 literality	arrive	in	the	soul;	they	are	part	of	the	single	great	text	of	kosmos	that	travels	as	much	with	 the	 timbre	of	 sound	as	 through	 the	unspoken	pathways	of	order	–	the	Logos	comes	to	man:	“Listen	not	to	me	but	to	the	Logos”,	Heraclitus	says	in	fragment	50.	But	must	one	simply	listen	and	hope	for	the	Logos	to	arrive	or	how	can	one	hope	to	be	initiated	in	this	Logos	that	cannot	be	learned	from	teaching,	in	fact,	not	even	from	the	master	himself?	The	 profound	 kinship	 of	 man	 and	 kosmos	 will	 be	 revealed	 if	 man,	listening	 to	 the	Logos,	 goes	 ‘looking	 for	himself’,67	probing	within	himself.	The	
Logos,	according	to	which	all	things	come	to	pass,	can	be	grasped,	but	only	when	man	 follows	 no	 one.	 One	must	 abandon	 all	 the	 false	 appraisals,	 the	 stubborn	heredities,	and	the	manifold	atavisms	in	which	one	is	 inscribed	and	instead	go	looking	for	oneself,	retreating	into	this	self.	Only	then	will	man	know	the	Logos	of	polemos	or,	rather,	will	polemos	reveal	to	man	the	truth	[alētheia]	of	the	order	that	 governs	 all	 things.68	Polemos	makes	 the	 inner	 law	 of	 things	 be	 known	 to																																																									65	“The	bow's	name	is	life,	though	its	work	is	death.”	(Heraclitus	fr.	48).	66	Having	explained	how	this	form	of	knowledge	will	only	speak	to	the	initiated,	Pindar	continues:	“The	man	who	knows	a	great	deal	by	nature	is	truly	skillful,	while	those	who	have	only	learned	chatter	with	raucous	and	indiscriminate	tongues	in	vain	like	crows	against	the	divine	bird	of	Zeus.”	(Olympian	Odes	II:	85-86).	67	“I	searched	myself”,	Heraclitus	says	in	fr.	101.	The	expression	edizēsamēn	emeōuton	literally	means	‘I	went	looking	for	myself’.	68	“Nature	loves	to	conceal	itself.”	(Heraclitus	fr.	123).	
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man,	the	inner	law	that	permeates	everything	[panta].	To	know	polemos	“…	is	to	know	the	thought	by	which	all	things	are	steered	through	all	things	[ekubernese	panta	 dia	 panton].”	 (fr.	 41).	 This	 is	 also	 to	 say	 that,	 despite	 most	 men	 being	ignorant	of	it,	the	Logos	is	in	fact	‘common’.69	Since	the	Logos	is	common	to	man	and	beast,	god	and	mortal,	–	since	the	Logos	steers	everything	through	all	things	–	 to	 follow	the	Logos	 is	also	what	allows	man	to	know	himself.	“Know	thyself”	was	 one	 of	 three	 aphorisms	 carved	 into	 the	 temple	 of	 the	 Delphic	 Oracle	 by	which	the	Seven	Sages	did	not	mean	the	idea	of	the	substantial	primacy	of	the	mind	 [nous]	 that	 in	 time	 would	 be	 discovered	 as	 the	 essential	 nature	 of	 the	
psukhē.	To	know	oneself	is	to	know	the	Logos,	which	is	to	know	the	kosmos.	To	know	the	kosmos	 is	 to	know	the	chain	of	 resemblances	 in	which	everything	 is	steered	 through	everything.	 It	 is	 to	know	that	all	 things	are	one,	 in	short,	 that	“wisdom	is	one	thing”	(Heraclitus	fr.	50,	41).	With	thought	having	discovered	that	all	things	are	one	and	the	Same,	in	time,	and	as	the	gathering	[logos],	which	is	thought	itself,	penetrates	deeper	into	the	soul,	in	fact	the	more	the	logos	goes	looking	for	the	self,	the	more	it	retreats	into	the	self	to	discover	that	the	kosmos	and	the	soul	are	one	and	the	Same,	the	more	vividly	will	it	eventually,	in	the	intimacy	of	self-presence,	hear	the	voice	of	the	 Other	 and	 that	 of	 commandment	 [arkhein].	Writing	 in	On	Grammatology,	Derrida	 accurately	 captures	 this	 predicament	 of	 self-search	 in	 what	 he	 calls	‘Arche-speech’;	 one	 believes	 (in	 this	 case	 Rousseau)	 to	 have	 discovered	 the	origin	of	natural	law	through	self-search	when	in	fact	what	one	hears	is	always	the	voice	of	the	other	and	that	of	commandment.	Arche-speech	is	in	other	words	the	 spoken	 form	 of	 law,	 because	 ‘the	 native	 unity	 of	 the	 voice	 and	writing	 is	
prescriptive’	 (Derrida	 1997:	 17).70	That	 is,	 as	 thought	 takes	 hold	 of	 the	 Same,	and	believes	 it	 to	be	polemos,	 the	Other	enters	 into	openness.	But	around	500	BC,	the	voice	of	the	Other	has	yet	to	call	upon	man	to	observe	the	divine	law	of	the	ruling	principle	[arkhē].	Again,	this	is	because	man	has	yet	to	regard	himself	or	 anyone	 else	 as	 the	 source	 of	 his	 actions.	 There	 is	 no	mind	 to	 posit	 as	 the	
																																																								69	“One	must	follow	what	is	common;	but	although	the	Logos	is	common,	most	men	live	as	if	they	had	a	private	understanding	of	their	own.”	(Heraclitus	fr.	2).	70	The	conjunction	of	phonē	and	logos	is	esssentially	prescriptive	then;	the	voice	cannot	but	order	by	command	simply	because	language	can	never	be	fully	reconciled	with	the	world.	
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supreme	and	unchanging	origin	that	articulates	the	relation	between	voice	and	the	steering	of	the	world,	phonē	and	logos.	The	 voice	 one	 hears	 when	 one	 retreats	 into	 oneself	 is	 the	 Logos	 of	
polemos	in	which	logos	is	both	human	thought	and	the	movement	of	kosmos.	It	is	the	 conjuncture	of	 force	 relations	 that	 steers	 all	 things	 through	 all	 things;	 the	law	by	which	the	motion	of	the	kosmos	 is	seen,	heard,	and	felt	as	the	vibrating	tension	of	force	relations.	The	steering	of	kosmos	is	the	attunement	[harmonia]	of	these	infinite	relationships	of	tension.	The	Logos	animates	the	soul	as	well	as	the	kosmos	in	the	constant	gathering	of	opposites.	This	is	how	the	soul,	in	being	at	 variance	 with	 itself,	 agrees	 with	 itself,	 and	 it	 is	 by	 way	 of	 this	 permanent	variance,	which	 instils	movement	 in	 the	soul,	one	becomes	capable	of	 thought	[logikē].	Accordingly,	 and	analogous	 to	 the	 curvature	of	bow	and	soul,	 it	 is	by	way	of	this	conjuncture	of	force	relations,	immanent	the	folding	of	kosmos	upon	itself,	that	the	movement	of	each	planētēs	[wanderer]	comes	to	agree	with	itself	in	 the	 curvature	 of	 its	 celestial	wandering.	 It	 is	 how,	 in	Democritus,	 the	 same	curvature	 is	 read	 in	 the	 movement	 of	 the	 atom.	 As	 Aristotle	 explains	 of	Democritus:	“soul	and	mind	are,	he	says,	one	and	the	same	thing,	and	this	thing	must	be	one	of	the	primary	and	indivisible	bodies,	and	its	power	of	originating	movement	must	be	due	 to	 its	 fineness	of	 grain	and	 the	 shape	of	 its	 atoms;	he	says	that	of	all	the	shapes	the	spherical	is	the	most	mobile,	and	that	this	is	the	shape	of	the	particles	of	both	fire	and	mind.”	(On	the	Soul	405a	8-13).	In	the	cosmic	chain	of	resemblances,	the	movement	of	the	atom	will	be	similar	to	the	movement	of	thought,	as	the	activity	of	the	soul	as	Logos.	The	self-movement	of	the	psukhē	will	be	similar	to	the	self-movement	of	the	kosmos.	In	the	outset,	here	at	 the	 threshold	of	 the	Western	epistēmē,	 thought	 is	 therefore	not	a	certain	activity	of	mind,	which	seeks	to	 imitate	 in	the	domain	of	the	real	what	corresponds	to	the	fixture	of	eidos,	as	it	would	become	in	the	development	that	begins	with	Plato71	and	which	culminates	with	the	Cartesian	Cogito	where	consciousness	of	being	would	be	subordinated	to	the	experience	of	thought.	The	mode	 of	 thinking	 is	 one	 of	 becoming	 as	 opposed	 to	 the	 static,	 polemos	 as	opposed	to	stasis.	Thought	has	yet	to	discover	the	self-restraining	hold	of	statos																																																									71	Perhaps	not	surprisingly,	legend	has	it	“that	Plato	wished	to	burn	all	the	writings	of	Democritus	that	he	could	collect"	(Diogenes	Laertus	7.40).	
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[being	 placed],	 which	 ‘set	 things	 before	 thought’	 as	 the	 mind	 strives	 to	 rise	above	polemos.	 Thinking	 is	 inseparable	 from	 flow,	 flux,	 and	 consistency,	 since	thought	 is	of	 the	same	order	of	 reality	as	being,	not	merely	by	virtue	of	being	self-moving	and	thus	alive	and	divine	like	the	kosmos,72	but	by	virtue	of	having	a	tangible	material	 reality.73	Anaximenes	 thus	explains	how	 the	arkhē	 of	kosmos	and	the	arkhē	of	soul	are	both	constituted	in	the	living	substance	of	aer	[air].	Aer	travels	through	the	channels	of	aisthēsis	[sense-perception]	by	which	the	psukhē	makes	the	world	of	things	intelligible.74	Man	breathes	in	the	Logos,	and	through	the	 senses	 [aisthētērion,	 the	 organ	 of	 sense]	 the	 psukhē	 is	 linked	 with	 the	
kosmos.	So	much	so	that	the	only	thing	that	prevents	 it	 from	growing	together	with	what	 lies	 outside	 is	 sleep.	While	 asleep,	 the	 channels	 of	 aisthētērion	 are	closed	 except	 for	 the	 linkage	 of	 soul	 and	 body	 with	 the	 kosmos	 through	 the	inhalation	and	exhalation	of	aer,	which,	as	Sextus	Empiricus	would	later	say,	can	be	likened	to	a	root	[rādīx].	In	 time,	 the	Logos	will	 gradually	 lose	 its	 continuity	with	material	 reality	and	 instead	acquire	continuity	with	 the	knowledge	of	philosophia.	 In	 time,	 the	
Logos	 will	 be	 divorced	 from	 the	 signs	 that	 speak	 it	 and	 instead	 be	 conferred	onto	 them	 from	 the	 outside.	 Logos	 will	 be	 seen	 both	 as	 a	 certain	 calculative	faculty	of	mind	as	well	as	 the	 linguistic	 turn	by	which	one	gives	an	account	of	the	nature	of	things,	their	articulated	outline,	their	inner	reason,	the	principle	of	their	 coming	 into	 being	 as	 actuality	 from	 the	 potentiality	 of	 the	 prōtēs	 aitias	[first	 cause]	and	 the	sum	of	causes	 [aitias	einai].	But	 for	some	 time,	 the	Logos	would	 play	 among	 the	 crude	 resemblances	 of	polemos	 intermingling	with	 the	elements	to	influence	the	soul	with	moist	and	dryness,	cold	and	heat.	The	soul	would	be	likened	to	water	[hudōr]	because	the	seed	of	all	animals	is	fluid,75	and																																																									72	As	Aristotle	explains	commenting	on	the	ancients’	idea	of	the	soul:	“Alcmaeon	also	seems	to	have	held	a	similar	view	about	the	soul;	he	says	that	is	immortal	because	it	resembles	‘the	immortals’,	and	that	this	immortality	belongs	to	it	in	virtue	of	its	ceaseless	movement;	for	all	the	‘things	divine’,	moon,	sun,	the	planets,	and	the	whole	heavens,	are	in	perpetual	movement.”	(On	the	Soul	405a29-32).	73	Both	in	Pythagorean	thought	and	in	the	two	great	schools	of	thought	that	appeared	in	sixth	century	BC,	the	Ionian	and	the	Italian,	we	find	the	idea	of	the	activity	of	nous	having	a	material	reality.	74	“As	the	primordial	principle	from	which	all	other	things	are	derived,	it	[the	soul]	is	cognitive;	as	finest	in	grain,	it	has	the	power	to	originate	movement.”	(On	the	Soul	405a	23-24).	75	“Of	more	superficial	writers,	some	e.g.	Hippo,	have	pronounced	it	to	be	water;	they	seem	to	have	argued	from	the	fact	that	the	seed	of	all	animals	is	fluid,	for	Hippo	tries	to	refute	those	who	
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it	would	be	held	to	be	aer	since	aer	is	the	finest	grain	of	things76	and,	finally,	to	fire	 [pur]	 because,	 though	 certainly	 a	 conduit	 through	which	 the	 Logos	 flows	into	the	soul	and	prior	to	hudōr,77	aer	is	not	the	purest	form	of	Logos	among	the	four	elements.	The	purest	form	in	which	the	substance	of	Logos	appears	is	fire:	“This	world,	which	 is	 the	same	for	all,	no	one	of	gods	or	men	has	made.	But	 it	always	was,	is,	and	will	be:	an	ever-living	fire,	with	measures	of	it	kindling,	and	measures	going	out.”	(Heraclitus	fr.	30).	The	Logos	is	an	ever-living	fire,	but	this	is	not	 the	 fire	of	 flame.78	It	 is	 the	 fire	of	dry	 exhalation	 in	which	 the	 soul	 also	consists,	 the	 exhalation	 which	 “…	 is	 most	 incorporeal	 and	 in	 ceaseless	 flux”,	Aristotle	would	later	explain	in	his	treatise	on	the	soul;	“…	for	fire	is	the	subtlest	of	 the	 elements	 and	 nearest	 to	 incorporeality;	 further,	 in	 the	 most	 primary	sense,	 fire	 is	 both	moved	 and	originates	movement	 in	 all	 the	 others.”	 (On	 the	Soul	 405a	 6-8,	 27).	 Fire	 is	 both	 what	 moves	 and	 originates	 movement	 in	 all	things,	which	is	how	it	is	the	purest	of	the	elements	and	therefore	holds	primacy	over	them.	By	resemblance,	Heraclitus	explains	in	fragment	118,	“The	dry	soul	is	 wisest	 and	 best”,	 whereas	 the	 mixture	 of	 soul	 with	 moist	 will,	 if	 only	temporarily,	extinguish	the	fire	of	soul	and	thus	become	the	source	of	all	kinds	of	 humiliations:	 “A	man	when	he	 is	 drunk	 stumbles	 and	 is	 led	 by	 a	 beardless	boy,	not	knowing	whither	he	goes,	for	his	soul	is	wet.”	(fr.	117).	But	the	primacy	of	fire,	moving	in	itself	and	instilling	movement	in	all	else,	is	also	the	principle	that	explains	how	the	Logos	steers	everything	[panta];	fire	is	both	 what	moves	 in	 itself	 throughout	 the	 quintessential	 relatedness	 of	 panta	and	 that	 which	 originates	 movement	 in	 panta.	 “The	 thunderbolt	 steers	 all	things”,	 Heraclitus	 says	 in	 fragment	 64.	 Commonly	 associated	 in	 the	 oratory	tradition	 with	 the	 fiery	 weapon	 wielded	 by	 Zeus,	 the	 thunderbolt	 steers	 all	things,	not	by	virtue	of	being	wielded	by	the	Sky-God,	but	because	it	resembles	fire	originating	movement	 in	panta	 and	moving	 throughout	panta.	 The	purest																																																																																																																																																														say	that	the	soul	is	blood,	on	the	ground	that	the	seed,	which	is	the	primordial	soul,	is	not	blood.”	(On	the	Soul	405b	1-4).	76	“Diogenes	(and	others)	held	the	soul	to	be	air	because	he	believed	air	to	be	the	finest	grain	and	a	first	principle;	therein	lay	the	grounds	of	the	soul’s	power	of	knowing	and	originating	movement.”	(On	the	Soul	405a	22-23).	77	In	both	Anaximenes	and	Diogenes,	air	is	prior	to	water	among	the	four	elements.	78	As	Philoponus	explains	commenting	on	Aristotle	who	cites	Heraclitus	in	On	the	Soul	(405a25):	“By	fire	he	does	not	mean	flame:	fire	is	the	name	given	to	the	dry	exhalation,	of	which	the	soul	also	consists.”	(Guthrie	2003:	432-33).	
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form	of	panta	is	Logos,	and	the	purest	matter	of	Logos	is	fire,	the	purest	matter	of	 fire	 is	 the	 energeia	 of	 keraunos	 [thunderbolt],	 keraunos	 that	 in	 its	resemblance	to	the	movement	by	fire	of	the	soul	animates	the	sense	of	aliveness,	by	 nature	 common	 to	 all	 living	 beings,	 but	 to	 man	 the	 sign	 of	 the	 divine	resemblance	 of	 polemos	 in	 which	 makhē	 [combat]	 is	 makaria	 [happiness].	Thunderbolt	steers	everything	as	the	dreadful	Warlike	Arēs	stirs	up	the	fire	of	soul,	which	erupts	in	a	divine	exaltation	that	satiates	the	body	with	vigour;	rage	and	affect	are	the	energeia	of	keraunos.	Keraunos	reveals	how	the	world	is	both	steered	 by	 fire	 and	 made	 of	 fire,	 with	 measures	 of	 it	 kindling	 and	 measures	going	out;	the	pure	catatonic	rupture	and	abrupt	disappearance	of	force	of	the	warrior	strikes	like	lightning	and	falls	back	into	the	silent	movement	of	kosmos.	The	 Sovereignty	 of	 the	 Same,	 keraunos	 is	 both	what	 illuminates	 the	 soul	 and	what	lights	up	the	site	of	polemos	to	disclose	some	beings	as	men	and	others	as	gods,	some	as	slaves	and	others	as	free.	So	the	bond	of	resemblance	between	the	soul	and	the	steering	of	kosmos	would	be	seen	for	some	time.	But	as	soon	as	the	mind	awakens	 in	the	soul,	as	soon	 as	 the	 site	 of	 polemos	 is	 displaced	 and	 projected	 onto	 the	 spiritual	battleground	of	 the	 soul	with	 the	 discovery	 of	 the	military	model,	 intrinsic	 to	political	man	and	political	 community,	 it	will	be	 found	 that	 something	beyond	the	relativity	of	force	itself	is	responsible	for	the	steering	of	kosmos	and	all	that	dwell	 beneath	 the	 eternal	 celestial	 wonder.	 The	 Logos	 of	 polemos	 will	 recede	from	 the	 world	 of	 things	 and	 never	 fully	 awaken	 from	 its	 dormant	 place	 of	residence.	Not	before	the	dawn	of	modern	natural	science	would	 fragments	of	this	ancient	knowledge	emerge	in	the	grid	created	by	a	glance,	an	examination,	and	 from	 its	 slumber	 be	 reborn	 within	 the	 confines	 of	 the	 disciplined	knowledges	as	the	Theory	of	Relativity.79	But	 for	 a	while,	polemos	would	 be	 king	 and	 father	 of	 all.	Polemos	would	reveal	 some	 as	 gods,	 others	 as	men,	 some	 the	Logos	 would	make	 slaves,	 and	others	 free.	 But	 then,	 the	 Logos	 of	 polemos	 was	 never	 more	 than	 a	 play	 of	primitive	 resemblances	where	 the	 acquisition	 of	 knowledge	would	 always	 be	
																																																								79	More	than	twenty-five	hundred	years	before	Einstein,	Heraclitus,	albeit	phrased	in	oracular	and	poetic	lingua,	said	that	energy	(fire)	is	the	essence	of	matter,	and	that	everything	always	was,	is,	and	will	be	energy	in	flux,	in	relativity.	
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referred	back	 to	 the	 infinite	 task	of	knowing	what	polemos	 is.	Epistēmē	would	shine	in	its	raw	being,	but	remain	caught	up	in	the	crude,	enigmatic,	and	tedious	resemblances	 in	 which	 knowledge	 would	 always	 be	 reabsorbed	 into	 the	Sovereignty	 of	 the	 Same.	 The	 Logos	 knows	 only	 being	 and	 has	 no	 account	 of	time	other	than	what	is	held	in	the	infinite	suspension	of	kosmos;	time	and	space	are	collapsed	 into	 the	single	continuum	of	being	and	kosmos.	The	beginning	 is	always	 the	 end	 since	 “the	 road	up	 and	 the	 road	down	 are	 one	 and	 the	 same”	(Heraclitus	fr.	60).	The	road	itself	can	never	be	known,	just	as	one	cannot	step	into	 the	same	river	 twice;	 “On	those	who	enter	 the	same	rivers,	ever	different	waters	 flow.”	(fr.	12).	Things	are	ever	 in	a	state	of	 flux	and	flow	wherefore	no	knowledge	is	possible	of	their	essential	nature;80	no	cause	can	be	deciphered	of	how	existing	 things	 come	 to	 acquire	 form	 from	 the	potentiality	 of	matter	 and	then	be	arranged	well	and	beautifully.	So,	after	these	thinkers,	Aristotle	explains	in	the	Metaphysics	(984b	6-10),	“…	men	were	again	compelled	(as	we	have	said)	by	truth	itself	[autēs	tēs	alētheias]	to	investigate	the	ruling	principle	[ezētēsan	arkhēn].”	The	Logos	will	be	inadequate	to	account	for	the	origin	of	things,	their	nature,	and	their	end:			All	those	who	regard	the	universe	as	a	unity,	and	assume	as	its	matter	some	one	nature,	and	that	corporeal	and	extended,	are	clearly	mistaken	in	many	respects.	They	 only	 assume	 elements	 of	 corporeal	 things,	 and	 not	 of	 incorporeal	 ones,	which	also	exist.	They	attempt	to	state	the	causes	of	generation	and	destruction,	and	investigate	the	nature	of	everything;	and	at	the	same	time	do	away	with	the	cause	of	motion.	Then	there	is	their	failure	to	regard	the	essence	or	formula	as	a	cause	of	anything…	For	presumably	it	is	unnatural	that	either	fire	or	earth	or	any	other	 such	 element	 should	 cause	 existing	 things	 to	 be	 or	 become	 well	 and	beautifully	disposed.	(Ibid.	988b	22-30,	984b	11).		 It	 is	not	be	possible,	Aristotle	 explains,	 for	 the	world	 to	 come	 into	being	from	 the	movement	of	 fire	or	originate	 from	earth,	 since	 the	elements	merely	refer	 to	 the	 corporeal	 reality	 of	 the	 arkhē,	 and	 if	 the	 arkhē	 were	 purely	‘corporeal’	[eidomai,	visible]	the	beautiful	[kalos]	and	the	good	[agathos]	would	not	be	possible;	 there	would	be	no	cause	of	 the	movement	by	which	 the	good																																																									80	As	Aristotle	explains	of	Heraclitean	doctrine:	“…	all	sensible	things	are	ever	in	a	state	of	flux	and	there	is	no	knowledge	about	them”	(Metaphysics	987a	31-32).	
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and	the	beautiful	come	into	being.	Hence,	there	must	be	in	the	world,	Aristotle	explains,	an	additional	cause	other	than	the	material	in	order	for	things	to	move	and	be	brought	together.	This	psukhē	will	take	that	place	and	become	that	site	of	order	on	which	 the	corporeal	reality	of	man	and	kosmos	will	be	rearranged	 in	accordance	with	a	different	order	of	reality	that	will	be	determined	as	the	aitias	[cause]	 of	 how	movement	 is	 originated	 in	 things;	 how	 things	 are	 arranged	 as	potentiality	 and	move	 toward	an	end	guided	by	 the	 actuality	of	 the	 good.	But	how	is	it	we	come	to	find	this	idea	of	the	good	in	the	arkhē	of	kosmos,	and	what	trajectory	 of	 thought	 has	 brought	 about	 the	 conviction	 in	 Aristotle	 that	 the	
arkhē	must	also	be	sought	out	at	the	level	of	the	incorporeal?	In	 the	 Pre-Socratics,	 the	 question	 of	 the	 movement	 of	 kosmos	 seems	 to	concern	the	unity	in	which	kosmos,	being,	and	thought	belong	to	the	same	order	of	reality,	the	self-moving	material	reality	of	the	Same.	Although	not	necessarily	visible	[eidomai],	the	arkhē	of	kosmos	and	the	arkhē	of	soul	appear	on	the	plane	of	consistency	of	the	corporal	by	virtue	of	being	made	up	of	the	living	substance	of	 air,	 water	 or,	 eventually	 with	 Heraclitus,	 fire.	 To	 this	 mode	 of	 thinking,	movement	 refers	 to	 a	 perpetual	 state	 of	 flux	 of	 energy	 with	 neither	 end	 nor	beginning.	In	Aristotle,	however,	we	can	see	that	movement	refers	to	the	kind	of	motion	in	which	things	are	steered	toward	a	certain	end.	This	is	how	Aristotle	cannot	 do	without	 the	 incorporeal	 element	 of	 the	arkhē.	 If	movement	 has	 no	cause	but	 the	material,	as	 the	pure	relativity	of	 force,	 then	 there	cannot	be	an	end	of	things.	Nor	can	there	be	a	beginning.	In	effect,	it	would	make	no	sense	to	speak	of	the	good,	the	beauty	of	which	now	seems	immediately	apparent	to	the	eye	of	classical	man.	Now,	 this	 obviously	 raises	 the	 more	 fundamental	 question	 of	 how	 the	order	of	things	in	the	first	place	has	come	to	be	recognised	in	terms	of	the	good.	In	 Heraclitus,	 we	 saw	 how	 order	 appeared	 at	 the	 site	 of	 the	 clearing	 as	 the	thunderbolt	illuminated	the	cosmic	battlefield,	and	in	that	flash	gave	birth	to	the	gathering	 [logos]	 of	 kosmos	 in	 the	 soul,	 the	 reflective	 activity	 also	 known	 as	thought.	The	site	of	polemos	flashes	up	and	enlightens	the	soul,	which,	as	it	takes	hold	of	one	side	of	polemos	or	the	other,	affirms	the	fact	that	order	exists.	What	happens	 in	 Aristotle	 is	 that	 the	 site	 of	 polemos	 encountered	 by	 thought	 is	projected	back	onto	the	world	with	the	illumination	of	the	mind	taking	hold	of	
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what	 now	 appears	 to	 be	 either	 good	 or	 bad,	 night	 or	 day,	 famine	 or	 plenty.	
Anthrōpos	and	polemos	have	changed	places,	which	is	how	man,	rather	than	war,	will	 reveal	 things	 in	 their	 articulated	 outlines.	 The	mind	 will	 be	 what	 makes	things	 visible	 [eidomai]	wherefore	 it	will	 be	 seen	 as	 the	 resemblance	 of	what	now	appears	to	man	as	the	form	of	the	good;	the	clearing	will	take	up	residence	in	the	fixture	of	the	mind	as	the	eidos	of	the	good.	This	is	how,	in	one	of	the	few	passages	of	the	Republic	where	Plato	speaks	of	the	relationship	between	the	kosmos	and	man,	we	learn	of	a	new	resemblance	of	 mind	 and	 kosmos.	 Now,	 it	 seems	 the	 kosmos	 springs	 from	 the	 form	 of	 the	good.	The	sun	is	the	offspring	of	the	form	of	the	good,	Socrates	explains,	since,	like	 the	 good,	 the	 sun	 makes	 the	 form	 of	 things	 visible	 and	 thus	 intelligible.	Having	explained	how	vision	receives	‘the	power	which	it	possesses	as	an	influx	dispensed	from	the	sun’,	Socrates	says:		This,	then,	you	must	understand	that	I	meant	by	the	offspring	of	the	good	which	the	good	begot	to	stand	in	a	proportion	with	itself:	as	the	good	is	both	the	mind	and	what	converts	into	pure	Intelligence	[te	noun	kai	ta	nooumena],	so	is	this	in	the	visible	world	to	vision	and	the	objects	of	vision…	when	the	eyes	are	no	longer	turned	upon	objects	upon	whose	colours	the	light	of	day	falls	but	that	of	the	dim	luminaries	of	night,	their	edge	is	blunted	and	they	appear	almost	blind,	as	if	pure	vision	did	not	dwell	in	them...	But	when,	I	take	it,	they	are	directed	upon	objects	illumined	by	the	sun,	they	see	clearly,	and	vision	appears	to	reside	in	these	same	eyes…	Apply	this	comparison	to	the	soul	also	in	this	way.	When	it	is	firmly	fixed	on	 the	 domain	 where	 truth	 and	 reality	 shine	 resplendent	 it	 apprehends	 and	knows	 them	 and	 appears	 to	 possess	mind;	 but	 when	 it	 inclines	 to	 that	 region	which	 is	 mingled	 with	 darkness,	 the	 world	 of	 becoming	 and	 passing	 away,	 it	opines	only	and	 its	edge	 is	blunted,	and	 it	 shifts	 its	opinions	hither	and	 thither,	and	again	seems	as	if	the	mind	could	not	bring	fact	to	bear.	(508c-e).		The	mind	apprehends	the	world	as	the	form	of	the	good	shines	on	the	surfaces	of	 things,	 the	 glittering	 edges	 of	matter	 reflecting	 back	 on	 the	mind	 to	 affirm	that	reality	where	things,	having	relinquished	their	heterogeneous	and	mutable	potentialities,	disclose	a	certain	form	of	inner	nature.	As	the	order	of	things	has	now	 come	 to	 be	 recognised	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 good,	 as	 the	 simultaneous	withdrawal	and	projection	onto	the	world	of	the	site	of	polemos,	 the	mind	will	be	able	to	decipher	the	possibility	of	the	propinquity	of	things	and	impose	limits	
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on	 them,	 since	 the	 projection	 of	 though	 onto	 the	 world	 now	 enables	 their	separation.	But	 it	 is	 clear	 then	 that,	 for	 the	 activity	 of	 thought	 to	 take	hold	of	what	glitters	in	the	illuminated	glow	of	the	good,	Plato	must	necessarily	relegate	‘the	world	of	becoming	and	passing	away’	to	that	region	where,	as	Socrates	says,	‘the	soul	mingles	with	darkness’.	The	mode	of	thinking	will	therefore	no	longer	be	one	of	becoming,	but	one	of	stasis	as	the	perpetual	movement	of	polemos	 is	arrested	in	the	restraining	hold	of	eidos	by	which	things	are	placed	or	arranged	from	the	vantage	point	of	the	mind,	as	the	illumination	of	the	good.	Now,	 in	 what	 exactly	 did	 the	 form	 of	 the	 good	 consist,	 the	 good	 which	would	 be	 sought	 out	 the	 level	 of	 political	 life?	 In	 the	 same	 passage	 of	 the	
Republic,	this	is	actually	the	question	Glaucon	invites	Socrates	to	explain	having	set	 forth	 ‘the	nature	of	 justice,	 sobriety,	 and	 the	other	virtues’.	Before	 turning	his	 attention	 to	 the	 question	 of	 the	 sun	 as	 the	 offspring	 of	 the	 good,	 Socrates	responds:	“It	will	right	well	content	me	[to	explain	the	nature	of	the	good],	my	dear	fellow,	but	I	fear	that	my	powers	may	fail	and	that	in	my	eagerness	I	may	cut	a	sorry	figure	and	become	a	laughing-stock.	Nay,	my	beloved,	let	us	dismiss	for	 the	 time	being	 the	nature	of	 the	good	 in	 itself;	 for	 to	 attain	 to	my	present	surmise	 of	 that	 seems	 a	 pitch	 above	 the	 impulse	 that	wings	my	 flight	 today.”	(506d-e).	Indeed,	the	nature	of	the	good	seems	to	have	posed	a	difficult	question	to	 the	Greeks,	 as	attested	 to	also	 in	 the	satirical	poetic	gesture	by	Amphis.	An	Athenian	 comic	playwright,	Amphis	has	one	of	his	 characters	 say:	 “And	as	 for	the	 good	 that	 you	 are	 likely	 to	 get	 on	 her	 account,	 I	 know	 no	more	 about	 it,	master,	 than	 I	 do	 of	 the	 good	 of	 Plato.”	 (Diogenes	 Laertus	 3.27).	 Moreover,	legend	has	it	that	when	Plato	gave	a	lecture	entitled	On	the	Good,	it	confused	the	audience	to	such	a	degree	that	most	walked	out.	In	 any	 case,	 if	 we	 look	 beneath	 the	 chatter	 and	 the	 mockery	 of	 the	comedians	 the	problem	 that	 appears,	 as	 the	 site	of	polemos	 is	 fixed	under	 the	illuminated	gaze	of	eidos,	 in	fact	the	true	paradox	that	now	becomes	evident	is	that	the	world	comes	to	a	permanent	rest.	Writing	in	the	Metaphysics,	Aristotle	is	quite	aware	of	this	problem	as	he	reproaches	Plato	for	being	unable	to	explain	the	source	of	the	movement	of	kosmos,	which	is	everywhere	apparent.	In	effect,	the	failure	in	Plato	to	recognise	a	source	of	movement,	says	Aristotle,	makes	him	unable	 to	 ascribe	 a	 cause	 to	 the	 form	 of	 the	 good	 (988a	 14-15).	 But	 in	 the	
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wonderment	of	this	idea	of	the	good,	in	the	profound	estrangement	that	must	to	have	 caught	 the	 philosopher	 in	 the	 quiet	 moments	 where	 he	 pondered	 the	origin	of	 the	mind	and	the	steering	of	 the	world,	a	new	chain	of	resemblances	has	 appeared.	 In	 Aristotle,	 the	 mystery	 of	 the	 good	 is	 resolved	 with	 the	introduction	 into	 the	 principle	 of	 the	 arkhē	 of	 the	 particular	 order	 of	 reality,	which	is	the	‘incorporeal’.	Since	the	good	is	the	end	of	things,	and	yet	also	what	exists	 in	actuality	for	things	to	become	well	and	beautifully	disposed,	Aristotle	argues,	 the	good	cannot	merely	be	of	a	single	order	of	reality.	Moreover,	since	the	 good	 is	what	moves	 the	kosmos,	 but	 also	what	 does	 not	move,	 it	must	 be	corporeal,	but	also	incorporeal.	Consequently,	the	divine	arkhē	of	kosmos	must	be	 both	 the	 origin	 of	 things,	 in	 terms	 of	material	 reality,	 and	 the	 incorporeal	command	 that	 steers	 and	 guides	 things	 to	 become	 well	 disposed.	 The	 arkhē,	which	 is	 both	 corporeal	 and	 incorporeal	 then,	 must	 also	 be	 the	 site	 of	 their	intersection	thus	making	the	origination	of	movement	possible.	But	 how	 is	 the	 corporeal	 joined	 with	 the	 incorporeal	 so	 as	 to	 originate	movement?	 In	 Aristotle,	 this	 is	 now	 resolved	 in	 the	 relationship	 between	 the	
arkhē	of	kosmos	and	the	soul.	Remember	how	Aristotle	seems	most	concerned	to	explain	how	the	earlier	thinkers	arrived	at	the	account	of	fire	as	the	essence	of	the	soul	on	the	basis	of	the	conviction	that	fire	is	 ‘nearest	to	incorporeality’,	and	 when	 Aristotle	 refers	 to	 Democritus	 to	 speak	 of	 the	 homology	 of	 the	curvature	 of	 mind,	 cosmos,	 and	 atom,	 what	 occupies	 the	 philosopher	 is	precisely	this	question	of	the	possibility	of	movement	at	the	intersection	of	the	corporal	 and	 the	 incorporeal.	 So	 when	 one	man	 in	 his	 sobriety	 said	 that	 the	incorporeality	[asōmatos]	of	mind	existing	in	all	animals	and	throughout	nature	is	the	cause	of	all	order	and	arrangement,81	in	assuming	“…	a	principle	in	things	which	 is	 the	 cause	 of	 beauty,	 and	 the	 sort	 of	 cause	 by	 which	 motion	 is	communicated	 to	 things”,	 Aristotle	 says,	 he	 far	 exceeded	 the	 wisdom	 of	 his	predecessors	 with	 their	 ‘disorganised	 knowledges’	 (Ibid.	 984b	 15-22).82	Now,	while	 the	 knowledge	 of	 this	 arkhē	 did	 not	 become	 clearly	 delineated	 before	Anaxagoras,	 Aristotle	 explains,	 Hesiod	may	 have	 been	 the	 first	 to	 provide	 an																																																									81	Aristotle	refers	to	Anaxagoras.	82	“Hence	when	someone	said	that	there	is	Mind	[nous]	in	nature,	just	as	in	animals,	and	that	this	is	the	cause	of	all	order	and	arrangement,	he	seemed	like	a	sober	man	in	contrast	with	the	haphazard	statements	of	his	predecessors.”	(Metaphysics	984b	15-19).	
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answer	to	the	question	of	the	aitias	of	the	beautiful	and	the	good	by	making	love	[erōs]	and	desire	[epithumia]	the	arkhē	of	existing	things:		“For	he	says,	where	he	is	describing	the	creation	of	the	universe,	‘Love	she	created	first	of	all	the	gods	.	.	.	‘83	And	Hesiod	says,	‘First	of	all	things	was	Chaos	made,	and	then	Broad-bosomed	Earth	.	.	.	And	Love,	the	foremost	of	immortal	beings,’	thus	 implying	 that	 there	must	 be	 in	 the	world	 some	 cause	 to	move	 things	 and	bring	them	together.”	(Ibid.	984b	25-31).			 Since	 Earth	 is	 the	 offspring	 of	 Chaos	 and	 all	 immortal	 beings	 are	 the	offspring	of	Erōs,	day	the	offspring	of	night,	there	is	a	principle	in	things,	which	is	 the	 cause	 of	 how	motion	 is	 originated	 in	 them;	 a	 principle	 that	 determines	how	Earth	comes	into	being	from	Chaos,	how	night	turns	into	day.	But	day	and	night,	 male	 and	 female,	 famine	 and	 plenty	 cannot	 be	 the	 offspring	 of	 one	another.84	Nature	 is	 one;	 it	 is	 the	 simultaneity	 of	 opposites	 and	 nothing	more	since	no	one	of	gods	or	men	has	made	the	world.85	But	this	cannot	explain	how	or	why	things	have	come	to	be	and	then	be	disposed	in	such	a	way	as	to	become	drawn	 to	 the	 good	 and	 the	 beautiful.	 It	 cannot	 explain	 how	 vegetation	 and	animal	life	grow	and	develop	toward	a	zenith,	how	they	flourish	and	then	decay	losing	the	vivacity	of	youth	as	they	pass	into	old	age	and	die.	It	cannot	explain	the	animate,	Aristotle	 says	 in	On	the	Soul.	 It	 is	 the	 telos	of	 the	seed	 to	become	plant,	 just	 as	 it	 is	 for	 the	 ship	 to	 sail	 the	 seas.	 The	 form	 of	 the	 seed	 will	determine	the	form	of	the	plant,	just	as	the	form	of	wood,	great	or	small,	will	be	a	cause	of	 the	 form	of	 the	ship.	But	whereas	 the	ship	 is	 the	product	of	human	
technē,	 there	 is	mind	 in	nature,	Aristotle	explains,	which	 is	what	Hesiod	might	have	been	the	first	to	describe	by	making	erōs	the	arkhē,	thus	making	intelligible	to	 man	 the	 occurrence	 of	 motion	 and	 the	 cause	 of	 why	 things	 are	 brought	together.																																																									83	Parmenides	fr.	13.	84	“Teacher	of	most	men	is	Hesiod.	They	are	sure	he	knew	most	things,	a	man	who	could	not	recognise	day	and	night;	for	they	are	one.”	(Heraclitus	fr.	57).	85	Heraclitus	fr.	30.	
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Epithumia	makes	possible	 the	origination	of	motion	 in	 the	body	 in	being	drawn	 to	 the	 good	 of	 erōs	 that	 influences	 movement	 in	 it.	 Being	 most	incorporeal,	 the	good	originates	the	movement	of	the	corporeal,	 the	body.	The	incorporeality	of	 the	good,	 then,	 is	 the	cause	for	things	to	move	 in	order	to	be	brought	together.	It	follows,	therefore,	that	since	nature	not	only	provides	what	is	 good,	 but	 also	 the	 opposite	 of	 order	 and	 the	 beautiful,	 Aristotle	 says,	Empedocles	was	right	in	dividing	the	cause	of	movement	into	love	and	strife:	“…	since	 it	 is	apparent	 that	nature	also	contains	 the	opposite	of	what	 is	good,	 i.e.	not	only	order	and	beauty,	but	disorder	and	ugliness,	a	thinker	introduced	Love	and	Strife86	as	the	respective	causes	of	these	things…”	If	one	is	to	follow	out	the	true	meaning	 of	 this	 principle	 in	 Empedocles,	 Aristotle	 continues,	 “we	 should	find	 that	 Love	 is	 the	 cause	 of	 good	 [agathon],	 and	 Strife	 of	 bad	 [kakon].”	(Metaphysics	984b	32-985a,	985a	7-9).	What	we	see	in	Aristotle	is	in	other	words	the	complete	displacement	and	reorganisation	of	 the	site	of	polemos.	 Instead	of	 the	horizontal	proliferation	of	polarities,	we	will	have	 the	vertical	distribution	of	 ruling	and	subject	element.	Instead	of	the	order	of	concurrent	opposites,	that	is,	instead	of	polemos,	we	will	see	their	division	into	strife	and	peace	[eirene],	mind	and	desire,	good	and	bad.	Suffice	 it	 to	 say,	 this	 upsets	 the	 entire	 sense	 of	 order	 found	 in	 the	 Logos	 of	
polemos.	For	the	arkhē	of	bad	and	good	[kakon	kai	to	agathon	arkhas]	to	become	the	 arbiter	 of	 movement,	 philia	 and	 neikos	 are	 necessarily	 divorced	 thus	fundamentally	 altering	 the	 archaic	 sense	 of	 harmonia.	 As	 Aristotle	 says,	 no	doubt	in	allusion	to	the	fragments	of	Heraclitus,	 it	 is	the	nature	of	things	to	be	united	(in	being	drawn	together	by	love)	as	a	harmony	of	opposites:	“For	there	would	be	no	attunement	[harmonia]	without	high	and	low	notes	or	any	animals	without	 male	 and	 female,	 both	 of	 which	 are	 opposites”.	 (Eudemian	 Ethics	1235a:	 25).	 However,	 what	 Aristotle	 has	 in	 mind	 is	 not	 the	 simultaneity	 of	opposites,	 but	 the	 fact	 that	 opposites	 exist	 as	 a	 condition	 of	 possibility	 of	
harmonia	as	engendered	by	the	arkhē.	The	 Logos	 of	 polemos	 is	 divided	 on	 the	 axis	 of	 the	 ruling	 principle,	 as	
harmonia	 is	 recognised	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 movement	 by	 the	 arkhē	 that	 brings	things	 together	 according	 to	 love	 and	 friendship	 and,	 on	 the	 other	 hand,																																																									86	Aristotle	is	referring	to	Empedocles	(fr.	17,	26).	
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separates	 them	 through	 strife.	 The	 Logos	 of	 concurrent	 of	 opposites	 will	therefore	 be	 seen	 as	 an	 enigma,	 the	 unification	 of	 two	 essentially	 antithetical	principles.	As	Aristotle	says	 in	 the	Metaphysics:	 "It	 is	 impossible	 that	 the	same	thing	belong	and	not	belong	to	the	same	thing	at	the	same	time	and	in	the	same	respect…	No	one	can	believe	that	the	same	thing	can	(at	the	same	time)	be	and	not	be."	(1005b	19-24).	Also	referred	to	as	the	law	of	contradiction,	which	is	in	fact	 already	 delineated	 in	 Plato,87	Aristotle	 abandons	 the	 Logos	 of	 concurrent	opposites	 in	 order	 to	 invest	 in	 the	 order	 of	 things	 the	 true	 enigma	 of	 an	incorporeal	level	of	reality	held	to	be	the	good,	which	functions	as	the	positive	ground	of	knowledge	and	being	and	the	indispensable	principle	of	the	arkhē	of	
kosmos.	 We	 could	 also	 follow	 Aristotle	 in	 the	 Politics	 and	 say	 that	 in	 the	incorporeality	 of	 the	 good,	 of	 which	 the	 mind	 is	 also	 made,	 the	 principle	 of	subject	and	ruling	element	of	the	arkhē	 ‘always	comes	to	light’	(1254a:	31-33).	In	fact,	with	Aristotle,	 the	good	reappears	 in	the	eternal	eclipse	of	the	mind	as	the	 site	 of	 polemos	 becomes	 indistinguishable	 from	 the	 fixture	 of	 mind.	 The	fixture	of	mind	mirrors	 the	restraining	hold	of	arkhē	 that	 rules	 the	kosmos,	 as	thought	articulates	the	particular	space	which	Heidegger	would	later	call	onto-theology	or	metaphysics.	But	 to	 speak	 in	 terms	 of	 what	 is	 actually	 said	 in	 Aristotelian	 discourse,	what	is	discovered	at	the	site	of	these	resemblances,	where	the	mind	is	seen	as	a	simile	of	the	arkhē	of	kosmos,	is	that	the	soul	is	steered	by	the	same	principles.	For	the	soul	to	follow	the	good,	directing	itself	towards	or	against	the	forces	that	tempt	to	move	it,	that	is,	in	order	for	the	soul	not	to	be	absorbed	in	the	ceaseless	flux	of	panta	where	good	and	bad	cannot	be	determined,	part	of	the	it	will	need	to	 withdraw	 from	 the	 world	 of	 things	 and	 come	 to	 rest	 in	 the	 mind	 as	 the	necessary	correlative	of	the	soul	to	the	good.	But,	at	the	same	time,	the	soul	will	have	to	remain	open	to	the	potentiality	of	movement.	Therefore,	it	will	be	found	that	the	psukhē	is	divided	too.	The	psukhē	is	divided	into	the	incorporeal,	which	remains	 at	 rest,	 and	 the	 corporeal,	 in	 which	 movement	 is	 originated,	 as	movement	is	realised	in	the	conjunction	of	epithumia	and	the	calculative	faculty	
																																																								87	As	Plato	states	in	the	Republic	(436b):	“It	is	obvious	that	the	same	thing	will	never	do	or	suffer	opposites	in	the	same	respect	in	relation	to	the	same	thing	and	at	the	same	time.	So	that	if	ever	we	find	these	contradictions	in	the	functions	of	the	mind.”	
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[logos].	 The	 psukhē	 will	 be	 understood	 as	 a	 form	 of	 ‘double	 articulation’;	 the	incorporeal	activity	of	mind,	in	which	the	logos	also	consists,	and	the	corporeal	activity	of	desire.	The	fixture	of	the	mind	will	be	seen	as	the	‘unmoved’	point	of	the	 origin,	 which	 is	 pure	 incorporeality	 (and	 hence	 remains	 unmoved),	 from	which	 the	 soul	 steers	 and	 guides	 itself.	 This	 is	what	Aristotle	means	when	he	says	that	 ‘the	mind	is	always	right’,	whereas	 ‘appetite	and	imagination	may	be	either	right	or	wrong’	(On	the	Soul	432a	26).	The	mind	is	the	incorporeal	reality	of	 thought,	which	 remains	 unmoved	 [akinētos]	 being	 situated	 in	 a	 relation	 of	exteriority	to	the	potentiality	of	movement.	This	is	why	it	cannot	be	wrong,	but	also	 how	 the	 activity	 of	 mind,	 as	 the	 apprehension	 of	 the	 world	 by	 thought,	resembles	 ‘a	 coming	 to	 rest	 or	 arrest’	 rather	 than	movement	 (Ibid.	 407a	 32).	Appetite	and	desire,	on	the	other	hand,	is	the	‘instrument	of	movement’	of	what	lies	outside	the	body,	as	motion	is	originated	in	it	through	the	joining	of	desire	with	sense-perception	[aisthēsis]	and	calculation	[logos];	like	‘a	ball	and	socket	joint’,	Aristotle	explains,	movement	appears	 in	 the	 joining	of	desire	with	 logos	because	 there	 the	 convex	 and	 the	 concave	 sides	 are	 respectively	 an	 end	 and	beginning	(Ibid.	433b	21-23).	So,	at	the	interstice	of	calculation	and	desire,	logos	and	epithumia,	we	find	the	mechanism	 for	movement	 that	 functions	 in	 the	 following	manner:	 “…	 the	object	of	appetite	starts	a	movement	and	as	a	result	of	that	thought	gives	rise	to	movement,	the	object	of	appetite	being	to	it	a	source	of	stimulation.”	(Ibid.	433a	19-20).	 The	 object	 of	 appetite	 originates	movement	 by	way	 of	 the	 epithumia,	which,	as	 it	 is	brought	 to	a	halt	 in	 the	apprehension	of	 thought,	originates	 the	movement.	 Being	 unmoved	 and	 situated	 in	 a	 relation	 of	 exteriority	 to	 the	
epithumia	 the	 mind	 remains	 pure	 actuality	 whereas,	 in	 the	 mechanics	 of	 the	
psukhē,	 the	 logos	 will	 be	 situated	 at	 the	 intermediary	 position	 between	potentiality	and	actuality	thus	making	action	possible.	In	 fact,	 even	 when	 it	 happens	 that	 the	 psukhē	 acts	 as	 an	 effect	 of	responding	 to	 the	epithumia,	 as	 in	 the	case	of	moral	weakness,	the	part	of	 the	mind	which	 is	 not	 the	 logos	 remains	 unmoved:	 “…	mind	 as	 speculative	 never	thinks	what	is	practicable,	it	never	says	anything	about	an	object	to	be	avoided	or	pursued…	Further,	even	when	the	mind	does	command	and	thought	bids	us	pursue	 or	 avoid	 something,	 sometimes	 no	 movement	 is	 produced;	 we	 act	 in	
	 161	
accordance	with	desire,	as	in	the	case	of	moral	weakness.”	(Ibid.	433a	1-2).	But	moral	weakness	is	not	the	effect	of	the	complete	absence	of	mind.	The	logos	still	has	 some	 part	 in	 the	 production	 of	 action,	 since	 the	 epithumia	 is	 too	incompetent	 to	account	 fully	 for	movement;	 “for	 those	who	successfully	 resist	temptation	 have	 appetite	 and	 desire	 and	 yet	 follow	mind	 and	 refuse	 to	 enact	that	 for	which	 they	have	 appetite.”	 (Ibid.	 433a	6-8).	 So	 to	 the	 extent	 that	 one	may	consider	the	 imagination	of	 logos	as	a	kind	of	 thinking,	Aristotle	explains,	the	sources	of	movement	in	the	psukhē	are	logos	and	epithumia.	We	 could	 also	 say	 that,	 as	 the	 soul	 is	 constituted	 in	 the	 caesura	 that	articulates	in	it	mind	and	desire,	the	soul	which	can	now	be	held	accountable	for	the	production	of	 order	 and	 the	beautiful	 on	 the	one	hand,	 and,	 on	 the	other,	disorder	and	the	ugly,	in	the	interplay	of	variance	and	correspondence	between	desire	and	mind,	between	the	articulation	of	movement	and	the	confinement	of	rest.	As	the	‘sorting	table’	of	good	[agathon]	and	bad	[kakon],	the	soul	will	be	the	site	 of	 friendship	 [philia]	 when	 the	 appetites	 agree	 with	 the	 mind,	 and,	accordingly,	the	site	of	strife	when	the	appetites	run	counter	to	nous	and	logos.	Though	only	possible	in	beings	that	have	a	sense	of	time,	Aristotle	says,	the	later	happens	 “…	when	 a	 principle	 of	 reason	 and	 a	 desire	 are	 contrary…	 for	while	mind	bids	us	hold	back	because	of	what	is	future,	desire	is	influenced	by	what	is	just	 at	 hand:	 a	 pleasant	 object	 which	 is	 just	 at	 hand	 presents	 itself	 as	 both	pleasant	and	good,	without	condition	in	either	case,	because	of	want	of	foresight	into	what	is	farther	away	in	time”	(Ibid.	433b	5-10).	Temporalisation	 of	 action,	 then,	 is	what	makes	 this	model	 of	 the	psukhē	work.	It	is	what	enables	the	psukhē	to	act	in	accordance	with	the	good	and	the	beautiful,	 since	 the	 exercise	 of	 mind	 temporalises	 the	 potential	 form	 of	behaviour	 which	 relates	 itself	 to	 time	 by	 taking	 it	 into	 its	 reckoning	 in	 the	production	 of	 the	 right	 action.	Epithumia,	 on	 the	 contrary,	 has	 no	 account	 of	time,	 which	 is	 why	 the	 immediate	 pursuit	 of	 the	 object	 of	 appetite	 will	sometimes	result	in	the	wrong	action	being	carried	out.	By	way	of	temporalising	action	or,	as	Aristotle	says	in	the	Politics,	to	‘foresee	with	the	mind’,	the	soul	will	be	able	to	draw	the	distinction	between	“the	apparent	good	that	is	the	object	of	appetite,	 and	 the	 real	 good	 [kalon,	 beautiful]	 that	 is	 the	 object	 of	 the	 rational	
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wish.”	 (Metaphysics	 1072a	 28).88	To	 act	 in	 accordance	 with	 the	 real	 good	requires	 time,	 not	 least	 because	 it	 relies	 on	 the	 good	 of	 nous	 to	 enter	 into	alignment	with	the	calculative	powers	of	logos,	which	may	then	take	hold	of	and	steer	 the	erratic	 forces	of	epithumia	 toward	 the	object	of	desire.	But	since	 the	real	good,	as	opposed	to	the	apparent	good,	will	not	reveal	itself	to	action	before	the	object	of	desire	has	aligned	with	the	mind	and	come	to	a	rest,	certainty	of	the	real	good	inevitably	becomes	contingent	in	the	most	absolute	sense.	In	fact,	the	real	good	cannot	be	determined	but	in	the	infinite	suspension	of	action,	the	contemplative	mind	per	se.	Though	ever-present	 in	 the	mind,	 the	good	always	seems	 to	 occur	 at	 a	 certain	 distance	 to	 reality,	 which	 can	 never	 really	 be	mitigated	 by	 action.	 Accordingly,	 action	 is	 never	 really	 present	 in	 being	 or	should	 we	 perhaps	 rather	 say	 that	 this	 is	 what	 now	 will	 be	 posited	 as	 the	essence	of	action,	the	mind	bringing	the	logos	to	bear	on	the	relations	of	forces?	Safe	 to	say	 though,	 in	 this	model	of	 the	psukhē	 the	pursuit	of	 the	good	will	be	marked	 by	 the	 proportional	 increase	 of	 disorder	 and	 the	 ugly.	 Man	 cannot	escape	the	bad	and	the	ugly	precisely	because	it	is	in	the	idea	of	the	good	that	he	now	speaks,	thinks,	and	exists.	Do	we	hear	the	faint	echo	of	tragedy	here	where	certain	impulses	of	desire	will	find	no	katharsis,	but	rather	continue	to	invest	in	the	 relations	 of	 forces	 the	 ever-greater	 urgency	 for	 man	 to	 rule	 over	 the	
epithumia	to	prevent	the	strife	of	mind	and	desire	from	causing	the	bad	and	the	ugly?	Indeed,	this	model	of	the	psukhē	seems	to	mark	the	return	of	the	terrible	where	thought	has	lost	every	account	of	how	terrible	things	seem	to	happen	to	man	 under	 the	 influence	 of	arkhē.	 The	 terrible	 and	 the	 dreadful	 becomes	 the	model,	as	the	soul	 is	made	responsible	for	good	and	bad,	friendship	and	strife.	The	positive	ground	of	being	is	what	occurs	as	the	mind	takes	hold	of	one	side	of	
polemos	 and	 therein	believes	 it	has	 the	 truth	or,	more	precisely,	 that	one	 side	which	is	life	according	to	the	good	[to	eu	zēn].	The	life	of	the	soul	will	therefore	no	 longer	 resembles	 the	 life	 [bios]	 of	 the	 bow	 [bios]	 or	 the	 string	 of	 the	 lyre,	since	the	soul	can	no	longer	agree	with	itself	in	being	at	variance	with	itself	as	a	
																																																								88	It	is	precisely	this	intention	that	guides	Aristotle	in	the	passage	of	the	Politics	where	he	explains	how	that	which	can	foresee	with	the	mind	is	the	naturally	ruling	element,	while	that	which	can	do	these	things	with	the	body	is	the	naturally	ruled	and	slave.	(Politics	1252a:	31-35).	
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mere	relationship	of	 force.	Mere	 force	relations	resemble	strife	and	hence	will	be	referred	to	the	causes	of	the	bad.	In	fact,	in	order	for	the	soul	to	agree	with	itself	in	its	composite	nature	of	nous,	logos,	and	epithumia,	it	must	permanently	straighten	out	itself	by	means	of	temporalising	action.	To	this	sense	and	mode	of	being	(life	according	to	the	good),	the	order	of	reality	of	the	mind	will	constitute	the	 highest	 ground	 of	 being;	 to	 escape	 the	 workings	 of	 the	 inner	 laws	 of	corporeal	being	will	represent	the	highest	value,	since	it	 is	on	the	basis	of	this	escape	that	mankind	will	be	able	to	pursue	the	real	good.	Paradoxically,	 then,	 the	 good	 life	will	 necessarily	 come	at	 the	 loss	 of	 the	intimate	sense	of	being	alive,	as	the	happiness	[makaria]	found	in	the	sense	of	aliveness	man	 discovered	 in	makhē	 [combat]	 is	 replaced	 by	 the	 happiness	 of	living	 well	 [eu	 zēn].	 It	 is	 the	 same	 shift	 we	 find	 in	 the	 transformation	 of	 the	meaning	of	eudaimon,	which	is	the	conjunction	of	eu	[well]	and	daimon	[divine	spirit].	In	the	archaic	sense,	to	be	eudaimon	means	to	be	living	in	a	way,	which	is	well-favoured	by	the	gods,	whereas,	as	we	find	the	term	in	Aristotle,	this	mode	of	 being	 appears	 to	have	withdrawn	 from	 the	 field	 of	 positive	 experiences.	 In	Aristotle,	 eudaimonia	 means	 the	 happiness	 of	 living	 well	 in	 the	 sense	 of	 the	permanent	intervention	in	the	soul	by	the	mind,	the	logos	straightening	out	the	soul	in	accordance	with	the	good.	In	fact,	this	idea	of	happiness,	which	separates	the	 classical	 world	 from	 the	 archaic,	 is	 precisely	what	 guides	 Aristotle	 in	 the	famous	 passage	 of	 the	Politics	 (1252b	 30)	where	 he	 speaks	 of	 the	 end	 of	 the	perfect	community	in	terms	of	the	opposition	between	the	fact	of	living	[to	zēn]	and	life	according	to	the	good	[to	eu	zēn].	Rather	than	expressing	the	sovereign	
exceptio	 of	 ‘bare	 life’,	 pace	Agamben,	 the	phrase	 “born	with	 regard	 to	 life,	 but	existing	 essentially	 with	 regard	 to	 the	 good	 life”	 expresses	 the	 implicit	articulation	 of	 the	 form	 of	 the	 soul	 in	which	 happiness	 is	what	 occurs	 as	 the	incorporeality	 of	 mind	 enters	 into	 alignment	 with	 the	 good,	 the	 infinite	suspension	of	corporeal	being.	In	fact,	this	is	also	how	the	mode	of	being	we	find	in	 the	 one	 who	 is	 philopolemos	 is	 seen	 as	 something	 unnatural.	 Archaic	happiness	and	bliss	will	not	be	excluded	from	the	realm	of	possible	experiences,	but	will	rather	be	considered	as	deviant	or	foolish	acts,	as	the	archaic	harmony	of	opposites	is	marked	off	as	the	primitive	beliefs	of	the	ancients.	More	precisely,	the	vigilant	sense	of	eudaimonia	will	lose	continuity	with	the	archaic	divinities,	
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be	 applied	 to	 time,	 and	 transformed	 by	 the	 disciplines	 into	 the	 pleasure	[hēdonē]	of	the	kind	of	good	life	one	derives	from	the	calm	activity	of	the	mind	also	 known	 as	 theōria.	 As	 Aristotle	 says	 in	 the	 Metaphysics:	 “…	 active	contemplation	 [theōria]	 is	 that	 which	 is	 most	 pleasant	 [hēdiston]	 and	 best	[ariston].”	(1072b	17-19).	This	development	in	which	eudaimonia	comes	to	resemble	the	happiness	of	 living	well	 [eu	zēn]	 is	 reflected	 in	 the	process	where	corporeality	gradually	loses	 continuity	 with	 the	 divine.	 We	 could	 also	 say	 that,	 as	 the	 good	 life	 is	discovered	from	the	vantage	point	of	the	contemplative	mind,	the	unity	of	being	will	 lose	continuity	with	 the	plurality	of	gods.	 In	Homer,	 the	one	God	remains	absent,	because	it	is	not	really	man	who	is	seen	as	the	origin	or	cause	of	either	
makaria	or	eudaimon.	It	is	not	man	who	is	the	master	of	the	passions	or	has	the	privilege	of	commanding	them	in	pursuit	of	happiness.	It	is	rather	the	passions	that	have	man	being	animated	by	the	multitude	of	gods,	such	as	when	Arēs	stirs	up	 rage,	 when	 Zeus	 inspires	 in	man	 fight	 or	 flight,	 or	 when	 Odysseus	 brings	about	cunning.	But	once	the	mind	is	postulated	as	the	world’s	principle,	the	one	God	will	come	into	being	as	the	necessary	correlative	to	the	good	discovered	in	the	incorporeality	of	the	mind.	Anaxagoras	 seems	 to	 have	 been	 the	 first	 thinker	 in	 which	 we	 find	 a	delineation	 of	 this	 resemblance,	 as	 he	 likens	 the	mind	 to	 the	moving	 force	 of	
arkhē	 steering	 the	 kosmos	 (Physics	 203b6).	 With	 the	 teachings	 of	 the	Pythagoreans,	 a	 variant	 of	 which	 Aristotle	 seems	 to	 have	 adopted,	 the	resemblance	 of	 the	 mind	 to	 the	 moving	 force	 of	 kosmos	 is	 articulated	 in	 the	doctrine	of	the	kinship	of	all	animate	nature.	Now,	when	we	find	the	doctrine	on	the	nous	in	Aristotle,	the	kinship	of	mind	does	not	simply	concern	the	matter	of	movement,	the	pure	relativity	of	force.	As	we	have	seen,	it	concerns	the	matter	of	movement	in	relation	to	the	good.	Having	resolved	the	problem	in	Plato	of	the	world	coming	to	a	rest	in	the	eidos	of	the	good,	what	now	faces	the	philosopher	is	 how	 to	 account	 for	 the	 intersection	 of	 movement	 and	 the	 good	 in	 the	relationship	between	the	mind	and	the	arkhē	of	kosmos.	This	will	be	resolved	in	the	following	manner:	as	the	principle	that	steers	all	animate	nature,	the	mind	is	pure	incorporeality	and	therefore	always	right,	Aristotle	explains.	This	is	how	it	resembles	 the	 one	 God.	 It	 cannot	 be	 wrong	 because	 the	 one	 God	 cannot	 be	
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wrong.	 Neither	 the	 mind	 nor	 God	 can	 be	 wrong	 because	 they	 constitute	 the	linkage,	 which	 ties	 together	 the	 good	 with	 the	 ruling	 principle	 of	 mind	 that	governs	 all	 animate	 nature.	 In	 the	 soul,	 this	 translates	 into	 the	 idea	 that	 the	mind	remains	uncorrupted	by	the	variance	induced	by	the	influences	of	desire.	In	 fact,	 this	 is	 how	 the	 incorruptibility	 of	 the	 mind	 resembles	 God	 in	 being	
akinētos	[unmoved].	We	could	also	say	that	since	the	mind	is	to	function	as	the	source	and	origin	of	order	and	as	the	command	that	upholds	order,	bidding	man	to	hold	back	desire,	it	cannot	be	brought	into	movement	by	desire.	At	the	level	of	God,	however,	the	doctrine	of	the	kinship	of	mind	translates	into	a	somewhat	different	arrangement.	Whereas	the	soul	is	divided	into	the	incorporeal	reality	of	 mind	 and	 the	 corporeal	 reality	 of	 desire,	 God	 is	 of	 a	 different	 nature.	 The	caesura	once	articulated	in	the	soul	will	now	be	reconciled	in	God,	as	God	will	become	 responsible	 for	 the	 existence	 of	 beings	 as	 anything.	 The	 question	 of	whether	man	is	simply	a	certain	species	animal,	god,	slave,	or	free	will	no	longer	be	 a	 question	 of	 potentiality	 to	 be	 resolved	 at	 the	 site	 of	polemos,	 but	will	 be	determined	in	the	domain	of	actuality	as	the	thing	begins	to	assume	an	identity	held	to	be	its	nature.	What	happens	is	that	the	clearing	once	encountered	by	thought	is	effaced	by	the	resemblance	in	which	the	ruling	principle	of	mind	is	resolved	in	God,	the	‘unmoved	mover’,	who	 is	 seen	 as	 both	 the	 origin	 of	 things	 and	 the	 command	that	 steers	 them.	Thus,	Aristotle	explains	 in	 the	Metaphysics,	 in	 the	kosmos	 “…	there	is	something	which	moves	without	being	moved	[ou	kinoumenon	kinei]…”	(1072a	21-25).	The	kosmos	 is	moved	in	an	unceasing	motion	[aei	kinoumenon	kinēsin	 apauston]	 by	God	who	 remains	 unmoved.	 That	which	 ‘moves	without	being	 moved’	 is	 analogous	 to	 the	 mind	 in	 being	 unmoved,	 but	 since	 things	acquire	 form	 not	 only	 from	movement,	 but	 also	 from	 substance	 [ousia],	 God	must	 be	 “…	 something	 eternal	which	 is	 both	 substance	 and	 actuality.”	 God	 is	both	 substance	 and	 actuality,	 incorporeal	 and	 corporeal.	 But	 since	 God	 is	 ou	
kinoumenon	kinei	and	therefore	cannot	be	moved	(in	contrast	to	substance),	in	God	 substance	and	actuality	must	be	united	 in	 a	particular	kind	of	movement	where,	contrary	to	the	workings	of	the	soul,	the	object	of	desire	and	the	object	of	thought	remain	identical.	Now	this	can	only	happen	if	both	the	cause	and	the	
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end	of	 the	good	apply	 to	 the	unmoved.	Consequently,	 the	divine	moves	 in	 the	following	manner:		The	object	 of	 desire	 and	 the	object	 of	 thought	move	without	being	moved.	The	primary	objects	of	desire	and	thought	are	 the	same.	For	 it	 is	 the	apparent	good	that	is	the	object	of	appetite,	and	the	real	good	[kalon,	beautiful]	that	is	the	object	of	 the	 rational	 will.	 Desire	 is	 the	 result	 of	 opinion	 rather	 than	 opinion	 that	 of	desire;	 it	 is	 the	 act	 of	 thinking	 that	 is	 the	arkhē.	 Now	 thought	 is	moved	 by	 the	intelligible,	 and	 one	 of	 the	 series	 of	 contraries	 is	 essentially	 intelligible.	 In	 this	series	 substance	 stands	 first,	 and	 of	 substance	 that	 which	 is	 simple	 and	 exists	actually.	But	the	Good,	and	that	which	is	 in	 itself	desirable,	are	also	 in	the	same	series;	and	 that	which	 is	 first	 in	a	class	 is	always	best	or	analogous	 to	 the	best.	That	the	final	cause	may	apply	to	immovable	things	is	shown	by	the	distinction	of	its	meanings.	For	the	final	cause	is	not	only	‘the	good	for	something’,	but	also	‘the	good	which	is	the	end	of	some	action’.	(Ibid.	1072a-1072b	3).		 Although	probably	one	of	the	most	difficult	passages	in	Aristotle,	it	seems	inferable	 that	 the	caesura	articulated	 in	 the	soul	 is	resolved	 in	God	by	making	the	final	cause	apply	to	immovable	things.	Now	what	does	this	mean?	It	means	that	 since	 ‘the	 cause	of	 all	 goods	 is	 the	good	 itself’,	 as	Aristotle	explains	 (Ibid.	985a	9),	the	nature	of	God	is	both	the	cause	of	the	good,	the	good	itself,	and	the	end	of	 all	 goods.	 Substance	and	actuality,	 the	 cause	of	 the	good,	 and	 the	good	itself	are	collapsed	in	the	supreme	being	of	God.	The	birth	of	the	one	God	now	opens	 up	 the	 field	 of	 knowledge	 to	 what	 must	 be	 considered	 as	 one	 of	 the	strangest,	 but	 no	 doubt	 most	 pertinacious	 of	 the	 resemblances	 found	 in	 the	Western	 epistēmē,	 namely,	 the	 kinship	 of	 God	 and	mind	where	 one	 is	 always	liable	to	pass	over	into	the	other.	It	is	strange	because	the	kind	of	happiness	the	mind	 discovers	 cannot	 be	 found	 but	 in	 the	 solitude	 of	 the	 one	 God,	 as	 the	caesura	resolved	in	God	returns	as	the	burden	of	man	to	whom	life	[zoē]	cannot	gain	continuity	with	the	divine	but	in	the	actuality	of	thought.	Once	discovered	on	 the	 great	 battlefield	 of	kosmos,	 the	mind	 is	 believed	 to	 speak	 the	 order	 of	things	as	the	origin	and	commandment	found	in	God	is	projected	back	onto	the	world:	 “For	 the	 actuality	 of	 thought	 is	 life	 [zoē],	 and	 God	 [Theos]	 is	 that	actuality;	and	the	essential	actuality	of	God	is	life	most	good	and	eternal.”	(Ibid.	1072b	26).	
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It	 should	come	as	no	surprise	 then	 that	 theōria	will	be	 the	expression	of	the	form	of	knowledge	in	which	the	mind	communicates	the	resemblances	that	issue	 from	 the	 one	 Theos	 [God].	 Theōria	 is	 what	 makes	 Theos	 speak	 to	 man.	
Theōria	is	the	divine	knowledge,	the	pure	actuality	of	life,	which	reveals	to	man	how	 things	 become	well	 and	 beautifully	 disposed.	 But	 this	 is	 because	 theōria	itself	 is	 the	 good,	 which	 is	 Theos.	 Theōria	 is	 the	 activity	 of	 the	 mind	 most	pleasant	 and	 best,	 which	 is	 how	 the	 pleasure	 of	man	 active	 in	 contemplation	resembles	the	happiness	of	God.	Having	praised	the	contemplation	of	the	mind	as	 most	 pleasant	 and	 best,	 Aristotle	 says:	 “If,	 then,	 the	 happiness	 which	 God	always	 enjoys	 is	 as	 great	 as	 that	which	we	 enjoy	 sometimes,	 it	 is	marvellous;	and	if	it	is	greater,	this	is	still	more	marvellous.”	(Ibid.	1072b	24-25).	In	the	love	and	friendship	with	knowledge	[philosophia],	 the	happiness	of	God	 intermixes	with	the	pleasures	of	 the	mind.	Once	the	expression	of	 the	happiness	 found	in	being	philopolemos,	 the	 resemblance	 of	eudaimonia	 and	arētē	will	 persist,	 but	become	 fundamentally	 rearranged	 in	 the	 dimension	 of	philosophia	 expressing	the	virtuousness	of	good	conduct	and	the	discipline	of	the	sound	mind,	affirmed	by	the	divine	activity	of	theōria.	In	this	development	where	the	love	and	friendship	of	knowledge	displaces	the	love	and	friendship	of	war,	it	seems	as	if	corporeal	reality	loses	all	continuity	with	 thought.	 However,	 knowledge	 will	 rather	 attain	 a	 new	 continuity	 with	corporeal	reality,	one	in	which	thought	will	no	longer	be	steered	by	the	Logos	of	
polemos.	 Having	 discovered	 the	 logos	 from	 the	 vantage	 point	 of	 theōria,	knowledge	detaches	itself	from	being	caught	up	in	the	simple	being	of	polemos	where	it	would	always	be	reabsorbed	into	the	Sovereignty	of	the	Same.	By	then,	perhaps	for	the	first	time	in	the	history	of	Western	systems	of	thought,	the	mind	will	 be	 able	 to	 set	 new	 arrangements	 for	 the	 intelligibility	 of	 existing	 things.	Knowledge	goes	beyond	the	mere	 fact	of	phusis	 to	seek	out	 the	boundaries	 ‘to	set	before	thought’	[epistēsantos];	to	seek	out	predication	in	the	realm	of	what	lies	 beyond	 the	 physical	 world	 of	 sensible	 things,	 that	 is,	 in	 the	 field	 of	knowledge	 Aristotle	 also	 refers	 to	 as	metaphysics.	 According	 to	 Aristotle,	 the	Milesians	(Thales,	Anaximander	and	Anaximenes)	were	the	first	to	seek	out	this	field	of	knowledge,	as	they	posited	the	idea	of	the	arkhē	under	which	all	existing	things	could	be	explained.	However,	Aristotle	continues,	the	possibility	of	fixing	
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upon	things	that	do	not	admit	of	change	will	not	appear	before,	with	Socrates,	thought	 abandons	 phusis:	 “Socrates,	 disregarding	 the	 physical	 universe	 and	confining	his	 study	 to	moral	questions,	 sought	 in	 this	 sphere	 for	 the	universal	and	was	the	first	to	concentrate	upon	definition.”	(Metaphysics	987b	1-4).	When,	 in	 Plato,	 we	 find	 the	 term	 definition	 or	 to	 be	 more	 accurate,	predication,	 we	 learn	 that	 it	 does	 not	 apply	 to	 sensible	 things.	 In	 fact,	 Plato	argues	no	doubt	 in	allusion	to	Heraclitean	doctrine,	sensible	things	are	always	changing	and	never	in	a	permanent	state.	To	set	things	before	thought	therefore	has	 to	 do	with	 entities	 of	 another	 kind,	 entities	which	 exist	 independently	 of	sensible	things.	As	Plato	explains	in	the	Symposium	where	he	discusses	the	form	of	beauty,	these	entities	are	in	fact	abstractions	that	exist	only	in	themselves:	"It	is	not	anywhere	in	another	thing,	as	in	an	animal,	or	in	earth,	or	in	heaven,	or	in	anything	else,	but	itself	by	itself	with	itself…"	(211b).	Sensible	things	are	named	after	 these	 entities	 that	 reside	 in	 the	 arbitrary	 relation	 of	 language	 and	 the	world,	 and	which,	 of	 course,	 are	what	Plato	 called	 eidos.	Eidos	 is	 abstract	 and	general	 in	 nature	 constituting	 a	 fixed	 entity,	 but	 does	 not	 remain	 constant	 in	name.	Eidos	is	rather	a	kind	of	functional	linguistic	form	deployed	in	the	practice	of	 language.	In	its	application	to	sensible	things,	eidos	 therefore	exist	by	virtue	of	‘participation’,	Plato	says,	and	it	changes	accordingly	as	an	effect	of	dialogue,	which	is	to	say	in	the	practice	of	discourse.	In	effect,	the	predication	of	epistēmē,	in	the	sense	of	arresting	 in	thought	sensible	things	and	disclosing	their	nature	by	ascribing	to	them	a	form,	is	not	really	possible.	Phusis	remains	autonomous	to	the	realm	of	eidos,	because	the	physical	world	remains	in	a	permanent	state	of	change.	Now,	 with	 Aristotle,	 this	 distinction	 that	 Plato	 was	 so	 much	 a	 pains	 to	convey	will	 be	 conflated.	 Remember	 how	 Aristotle,	 in	 his	 elucidations	 on	 the	
arkhē,	 rebukes	Plato	 for	ascribing	the	causes	of	good	and	bad	to	the	elements,	that	 is,	 to	phusis,	which	 in	Aristotle	 reads	as	Plato	being	unable	 to	explain	 the	source	of	movement	 in	 the	arkhē	 and,	ultimately,	 the	cause	of	 the	eidos	of	 the	good.89	The	 problem	 we	 now	 find	 in	 Aristotle	 is	 basically	 the	 other	 side	 the	
																																																								89	In	Plato,	eidos	is	simply	the	form	of	a	dyad	of	the	great	and	the	small,	the	form	of	which	in	itself	has	no	cause,	Aristotle	explains	and	adds:	“Further,	he	[Plato]	assigned	to	these	two	elements	respectively	the	causation	of	good	and	of	evil;	a	problem	which,	as	we	have	said,	had	
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same	question	of	the	good	and	the	possibility	of	the	movement	of	kosmos,	which,	as	we	saw,	 is	 resolved	with	 the	 introduction	 into	 the	arkhē	 of	 the	 incorporeal	order	of	reality.	It	is	the	caesura	articulated	with	the	introduction	of	this	level	of	reality	(theōria)	that	now	returns	to	be	resolved.	This	is	how,	in	one	of	the	most	remarkable	passages	in	the	Metaphysics,	phusis	is	joined	with	eidos	to	constitute	what	Aristotle	calls	the	essence	of	a	thing	[to	ti	en	einai]	(988a	7-14).	The	ousia	[essence]	of	a	thing	is	caused	by	eidos,	and,	as	we	saw,	God	is	the	cause	of	eidos.	As	 the	order	of	 things	 is	derived	 from	Theos,	 it	 now	becomes	possible	 for	 the	mind	–	from	an	absolute	point,	which	is	permanently	at	rest	and	where	the	truth	of	 things	 corresponds	 to	 a	 truthful	 discourse	 –	 to	 fix	 upon	 temporality	 and	causality	 in	 order	 to	 capture	 in	 language	 and	 confine	 in	 the	 thing	 an	 essence	[ousia],	a	nature.	In	Aristotle,	the	realm	of	eidos	and	the	world	of	sensible	things	are	 collapsed	 in	 the	 supreme	 being	 of	 God	 as	 both	 substance	 [ousia]	 and	actuality,	 opening	 up	 the	 peculiar	 space	within	 language	 in	which	 it	 becomes	possible	 to	give	a	reasoned	account	of	 the	cause	and	end	of	existing	 things	by	recourse	to	God.	We	could	also	say	that	this	development,	in	which	it	becomes	possible	for	thought	to	fix	upon	the	essence	of	things,	is	born	out	of	the	process	where	the	Logos	is	replaced	by	the	logos	of	mind	articulated	in	the	resemblance	of	theōria	and	the	one	God.	It	is	no	coincidence	then	that	logos,	besides	denoting	the	calculating	part	of	the	soul	[to	logistikon],	is	also	the	term	Aristotle	applies	for	the	predication	that	gives	an	account	of	the	nature	of	things.	
4.3.	Why	is	this	important,	and	where	is	this	genealogy	on	the	metaphysics	of	 the	mind	 taking	 us?	 It	 is	 important	 because,	 in	 a	world	where	 the	 concept	remains	absent,	 the	safe	passage	between	language	and	the	world	that	we	call	order	relies	on	the	conjuncture	to	provide	an	account	of	things.	In	other	words,	if	political	community	is	to	function	as	a	site	where	things	can	be	‘put’	or	‘placed’	according	to	their	nature,	that	is,	if	the	activity	of	government	is	to	be	possible,	not	least	in	the	sense	of	steering	men	towards	living	well,	it	cannot	rely	on	the	mind	 alone.	 The	mind	must	 be	 articulated	 in	 the	 chain	 of	 resemblances	 by	 a	conjuncture	 that	 assures	 the	 possibility	 of	 fixing	 upon	 the	 identities	 of	 things	and	their	end,	the	origin	of	things	and	the	commandment	that	steers	them.	This																																																																																																																																																														also	been	considered	by	some	of	the	earlier	philosophers,	e.g.	Empedocles	and	Anaxagoras.”	(Metaphysics	988a	14-15).	
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is	 the	 great	 invention	 of	 the	 philosopher,	 which	 however	 would	 remain	 the	mere	brainchild	of	the	speculative	mind	so	long	as	theōria	is	distinguished	from	
technē	and	practical	wisdom	[phronēsis].90	That	is,	even	if	the	one	God	has	now	shown	 himself,	 man	 has	 yet	 to	 derive	 his	 sense	 of	 being	 from	 Theos	 as	 the	incorporeal	 codification	of	 action.	 In	 fact,	 as	 I	will	 explain	 in	 the	next	 chapter,	the	form	in	which	power	expresses	itself	occurs	almost	entirely	in	the	domain	of	corporeal	 reality,	 as	 technē.	 However,	 with	 the	 emergence	 of	 early	 Christian	thought,	 theōria	will	be	 redeemed	as	 the	 lost	arkhē	 scripture.	This	 is	when,	 in	
The	Book	of	Revelation,	we	 find	 the	peculiar	 conjunction	of	Theos	and	 logos	 in	the	figure	of	John	the	theologos,	the	one	who	speaks	the	Word	of	God.	By	then,	the	 erudition	 will	 have	 begun	 to	 read	 the	 logos	 as	 the	 account	 of	 the	 divine	Word	of	God,	which	articulates	 in	God	 the	origin	and	 the	commandments	 that	sanction	the	government	of	souls.	But	 in	 the	world	of	 classical	Greece,	 there	 really	 is	no	arkhē	 scripture	 in	the	sense	of	a	universal	law	to	govern	all	individuals	from	the	privileged	centre	of	the	one	text.	The	arkhē	we	find	in	Aristotle	does	not	take	the	form	of	law,	but	is	rather	expressed	in	the	practices	of	discipline	as	emergent	in	the	government	of	self.	The	Aristotelian	Theos	certainly	commands,	but	the	government	of	men	is	essentially	a	matter	of	the	government	of	self,	because	the	resemblance	of	the	good,	 the	mind,	and	God	does	not	 find	 its	endpoint	 in	 the	prescriptive	 form	of	the	one	law.	Contrasting	Christian	thought	with	that	of	the	Classical	Greeks,	we	could	 also	 say	 that	 the	 reflection	 of	 the	 Greeks	 upon	 good	 conduct	 is	 not	directed	toward	a	codification	of	acts,	such	as	in	The	Ten	Commandments	of	the	
Decalogue,	 but	 toward	 a	 stylisation	of	 attitudes;	man	 is	 indeed	 called	upon	 to	govern	himself,	but	the	expurgation	of	conduct	presents	itself	as	a	kind	of	open-ended	requirement	rather	than	in	the	form	of	law.	In	case	of	misconduct,	there																																																									90	Phronēsis	is	derived	from	experience	of	being.	Whereas	the	mind	apprehends	definitions,	which	cannot	be	proved	by	reasoning	[logos],	phronēsis	deals	with	the	ultimate	particular	thing	that	cannot	be	apprehended	by	mind	as	epistēmē	in	the	sense	of	scientific	knowledge,	but	only	by	sense-perception	and	logos	bringing	the	sense	of	being	before	the	mind.	This	is	also	how	
philosophia	cannot	really	be	practiced	in	youth	since	it	requires	not	only	mind,	but	also	the	experience	garnered	by	phronēsis.	As	Aristotle	explains	in	the	Nicomachean	Ethics:	“…	although	the	young	may	be	experts	in	geometry	and	mathematics	and	similar	branches	of	knowledge,	we	do	not	consider	that	a	young	man	can	have	Prudence	[phronēsis].	The	reason	is	that	Prudence	includes	a	knowledge	of	particular	facts,	and	this	is	derived	from	experience,	which	a	young	man	does	not	posses;	for	experience	is	the	fruit	of	years…	the	first	principles	of	Metaphysics	and	Natural	Philosophy	are	derived	from	experience:	the	young	can	only	repeat	them.”	(1142a	5-10).	
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is	 certainly	 a	 form	 of	 punishment	 to	 be	 had,	 but	 rather	 than	 stipulating	 how	exactly	 one	 ought	 to	 behave	 expurgation	 concerns	 a	 matter	 of	 overcoming	moral	 weakness,	 which	 reads	 as	 a	 sign	 of	 the	 absence	 of	 arkhē,	 the	 lack	 of	moderation	 and	 self-control.	 This	 also	 explains	 the	 absence	 of	 the	 sovereign	
exceptio.	 Although	 Aristotle’s	 denouncement	 of	 the	 disruptive	 affects	 of	 the	singular	polemistēs	 certainly	 bares	witness	 to	 a	 certain	 concern	 about	 private	war,	it	is	for	the	same	reason	that	the	war	of	every	man	against	every	man	has	yet	to	be	codified	juridically	as	the	principle	of	the	state	of	nature.	As	Foucault	explains	in	The	Use	of	Pleasure,	commenting	on	the	Greeks:		We	 are	 a	 long	 way	 from	 a	 form	 of	 austerity	 that	 would	 tend	 to	 govern	 all	individuals	 in	 the	 same	 way,	 from	 the	 proudest	 to	 the	 most	 humble,	 under	 a	universal	law	whose	application	alone	would	be	subject	to	modulation	by	means	of	 casuistry…	 The	 few	 great	 common	 laws	 –	 of	 the	 city,	 religion,	 nature	 –	remained	present,	but	it	was	as	if	they	traced	a	very	wide	circle	in	the	distance,	inside	of	which	practical	thought	had	to	define	what	could	rightfully	be	done.	And	for	 this	 there	 was	 no	 need	 of	 anything	 resembling	 a	 text	 that	 would	 have	 the	force	 of	 law,	 but	 rather,	 of	 a	 technē	 or	 ‘practice’,	 a	 savoir-faire	 that	 by	 taking	general	 principles	 into	 account	would	 guide	 action	 in	 its	 time,	 according	 to	 its	context,	and	in	view	of	its	ends.	(Foucault	1992:	62).		This	has	some	important	implications,	not	least	for	the	thesis	of	Agamben	we	examined	at	the	beginning	of	this	chapter.	 It	appears	Agamben	ignores	the	fact	that	the	Christian	idea	of	the	one	text	to	govern	the	affairs	of	men,	the	arkhē	scripture,	remains	unknown	in	classical	Greece.	In	fact,	instead	of	inquiring	into	the	 historical	 reality	 of	 the	 Greeks,	 and	 the	 role	 and	 place	 of	 Aristotelian	discourse,	Agamben	rather	paradoxically	seems	to	read	Aristotle	precisely	 like	the	 theologians	 in	 time	 would	 do,	 that	 is,	 like	 an	 arkhē	 scripture.91	In	 fact,	 it	seems	to	me	that	this	might	be	how	Agamben	mistakenly	posits	the	idea	of	life	according	 to	 the	 good,	 as	 articulated	 in	 the	 arkhē,	 in	 terms	 the	 principle	 of	sovereignty	and	logic	of	the	exceptio.	Moreover,	it	might	explain	how	Agamben	sees	 in	 Aristotle	 a	 distinction	 between	 forms	 of	 life,	 upon	 which	 political	community	is	supposedly	founded,	when	in	fact	the	idea	of	good	life	is	actually																																																									91	Perhaps	coincidentally,	Agamben	in	fact	refers	to	Aquinas	and	Marsilius	of	Padua’s	readings	of	the	Latin	translation	of	Aristotle	by	William	of	Moerbeke	(Agamben	1998:	2).	
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the	 expression	 of	 the	 resemblance	 of	 the	 arkhē	 and	 the	 mind,	 that	 is,	 the	expression	of	the	open-ended	requirement	of	being	a	politikon	zōon	rather	than	the	austerity	of	the	law	without	limits.	One	might	even	suspect	that	this	is	how	the	thesis	of	Agamben	seems	as	if	it	was	moulded,	not	from	the	fabric	of	history,	but	 from	 ideal	 significations	 and	 indefinite	 teleologies	 borrowed	 from	 a	philosophy	 in	 pursuit	 of	 the	 origin.	 As	 if	 words	 and	 things	 had	 somehow	attained	an	originary	meaning	 in	Aristotle,	we	are	 told	 to	believe	 that	what	 is	found	at	the	historical	beginning	of	politics	is	the	inviolable	identity	of	man	and	animal.	As	if	the	politikon	zōon	had	always	existed	in	some	kind	of	monotonous	finality,	we	are	told	that	political	man	is	a	figure	who	has	never	seen	invasions,	struggles,	plundering,	disguises,	and	ploys	–	all	of	that	which	make	up	the	fabric	of	 history.	 In	 short,	 we	 are	 led	 to	 believe	 in	 a	 Greek	 world	 without	 polemos	where	the	one	whose	desire	is	dominated	by	war	cannot	be	awakened	from	his	dormant	place	of	residence	to	speak	of	the	love	and	friendship	of	war,	because	sentiments,	love,	conscience,	and	instincts	are	seen	from	the	vantage	point	of	a	timeless	condition	without	history.	Indeed,	reading	Aristotle	like	an	arkhē	scripture,	one	is	led	to	believe	that	words	 and	 things	 have	 always	 kept	 their	 meanings,	 that	 desire	 had	 always	pointed	in	unanimous,	but	opposite	directions	of	man	and	animal;	that	man	and	animal,	 law	and	desire,	could	in	fact	be	traced	to	a	unitary,	 if	concealed,	origin	where	power	has	never	 ceased	 to	 shine	 in	 the	pertinacious	 resemblance	with	politico-juridical	sovereignty.	From	the	point	of	the	origin,	the	site	of	a	fleeting	articulation	of	law	and	life	that	discourse	has	since	obscured	and	finally	lost,	one	can	then,	on	the	one	hand,	praise	Aristotle	for	having	expressed	‘the	aporia	that	lies	at	the	foundation	of	Western	politics’	and,	on	the	other,	proclaim	the	same	philosopher	to	be	the	secret	protagonist	of	biopolitics,	the	calamitous	spinner	of	cobwebs	uniting	the	hidden	tie	of	power	and	bare	life,	the	politikon	zōon	being	–	by	 virtue	 of	 the	 opposition	 to	 ‘bare	 life’	 –	 the	 manifest	 example	 of	 the	production	 by	 sovereign	 power	 of	 a	 biopolitical	 body;	 that	 Aristotle,	 in	 fact,	merely	affirms	a	 tenacious	bond	between	sovereign	power	and	 life,	which	can	be	traced	to	‘the	most	immemorial	of	the	arcana	imperii’	(Agamben	1998:	6-11).	Is	 this	 not	 precisely	 the	 traits	 of	 an	 arkhē	 scripture;	 the	 search	 for	 the	privileged	beginning	of	things,	the	obfuscation	of	historical	contingency,	and	the	
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collapsing	of	truth	and	being	at	the	site	of	the	origin?	Or,	to	state	it	differently,	it	is	not	 the	expression	of	 the	kind	of	 inquiry,	which	 is	directed	 to	 that	which	 is	already	 there	 in	 the	 first	 place,	 a	 primordial	 truth	 fully	 adequate	 to	 its	 own	nature?	 Is	 it	 not	 the	 kind	 of	 tautological	 exercise	 Foucault	 warns	 about	 in	
Nietzsche,	Genealogy,	History,	as	he	exposes	the	fallacy	of	the	idea	of	 ‘immobile	forms	that	precede	the	external	world	of	accident	and	succession’?	If	this	is	so,	we	should	recall	 from	our	quotation	of	Foucault	at	 the	beginning	of	 this	study	that	 the	 lofty	 origin	 to	which	 such	 quests	 are	 inextricably	 bound	 is	 ‘no	more	than	 a	metaphysical	 extension’:	 “the	 origin	 always	precedes	 the	Fall.	 It	 comes	before	the	body,	before	the	world	and	time;	 it	 is	associated	with	the	gods,	and	its	story	is	always	sung	as	a	theogony.”	(Foucault	1971:	79).	No	irony,	then,	in	fact	with	Hesiod’s	Theogonia	man	once	became	attuned	to	this	chime	as	he	discovered	the	moving	force	of	desire	in	the	arkhē	of	kosmos.	Indeed,	by	making	the	good	and	the	beautiful	the	causes	of	all	 things,	the	poet	anticipated	 the	 formation	 of	 the	 chain	 of	 resemblances	 that	 was	 to	 be	 given	birth	 to	 at	 the	point	where	 the	 friendship	with	war	was	 eclipsed	by	 a	 certain	love	of	the	one	Theos;	the	point	where,	as	theōria	dispels	the	chimeras	of	the	old	world,	 the	 ruling	 of	 mind	 and	 kosmos	 will	 mirror	 the	 ruling	 by	 Theos	 as	 the	essential	 actuality	 of	 life	 devoid	 of	 foundation	 in	 phusis.	 This	 is	 why	 the	genealogist	will	never	have	faith	in	theōria.	Genealogy	opposes	itself	to	theōria	and	the	love	of	the	one	Theos,	the	purpose	of	which	is	to	establish	the	true	order	of	things	on	the	basis	of	the	kind	of	method	that	proceeds	from	the	recitation	of	divine	birth.	Genealogy	runs	with	the	grain	of	a	different	language	than	that	of	the	metaphysician,	the	kind	of	language	that	will	never	sacrifice	the	vicissitudes	of	 history	 or	 give	 up	 the	 friendship	 with	 war	 for	 transcendental	 aspirations.	Examining	 the	history	of	politics,	 the	genealogist	 learns	 that	 it	was	born	 in	an	altogether	 ‘political’	 fashion	 –	 from	 polemos;	 from	 struggles	 over	 truth,	 from	contestations	 of	 the	 sense	 of	 virtue,	 and	 from	 claims	 to	 normality	 won	 by	conquest.	 Political	man	 arrives	 on	 the	 stage	 of	 history,	 not	 in	 the	 shadowless	night	of	a	first	morning	of	the	arcana	imperii,	but	in	the	murmuring	cacophony	of	an	endless	quarrel	of	polemical	beings.	We	do	not	find	the	‘original’	basis	of	politics	 in	 the	exclusion	of	 the	other	or	 in	 the	cast	out	of	 the	polemistēs	or	 the	animal	from	the	city	of	men.	As	we	have	seen,	political	man	is	not	so	much	the	
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product	 of	 an	 inclusive	 exclusion	 as	 he	 is	 the	 effect	 of	 the	 quintessential	introspective	 practice	 born	 from	 struggle,	 accident,	 and	 tragedy;	 a	 circular	movement	between	war,	the	government	of	self,	and	the	steering	of	kosmos.	That	being	said,	what	about	the	thesis	of	biopolitics	Agamben	sets	out	to	correct?	 Is	 there	a	possible	relationship	 to	be	 found	between	 the	ancient	telos	and	biopolitics?	Let	us	begin	by	getting	rid	of	some	false	paternities	that	seem	to	influence	the	work	of	Agamben.	In	the	work	of	Foucault,	biopolitics	has	little	to	do	with	juridical	sovereignty	as	such.	Writing	in	The	Will	to	Knowledge,	Foucault	distinguishes	 biopolitics	 from	 juridical	 sovereignty,	 as	 he	 analyses	 the	 shift	towards	 an	 early	 industrial	 capitalism;	 biopolitics	 is	 “a	 power	 bent	 on	generating	 forces,	 making	 them	 grow,	 and	 ordering	 them,	 rather	 than	 one	dedicated	 to	 impeding	 them,	 making	 them	 submit,	 or	 destroying	 them.”	(Foucault	1998:	136).	Moreover,	as	explained	in	chapter	one,	biopolitics	occurs	at	the	intersection	where	disciplinary	techniques	of	subjective	individualisation	are	 integrated	with	regulatory	procedures	of	objective	totalisation	 in	the	birth	of	a	new	political	subject,	the	population.	This	expresses	a	way	of	organising	the	relationships	of	forces,	which	is	vastly	different	from	the	old	juridical	model	of	power	and	 the	 theory	of	 sovereignty.	As	Foucault	 explains,	 this	 is	particularly	evident	in	the	practice	of	warfare.	The	existence	in	question	will	then	no	longer	be	 the	 juridical	 body	 of	 the	 sovereign	 whose	 sovereignty	 was	 limited	 by	 his	survival	or	death;	at	stake	is	the	biological	existence	of	a	population.	Biopolitical	power,	 Foucault	 is	 careful	 to	 explain,	 does	not	mark	 the	 return	of	 the	 ancient	sovereign	right	to	kill,	since	the	subject	at	stake	is	no	longer	the	sovereign,	but	the	 category	 of	 life	 and	 the	 subject	 of	 population.	 Moreover,	 in	 the	 classical	theoreticians	the	right	to	kill	of	sovereign	power	was	never	seen	as	an	absolute	privilege,	 but	 conditioned	by	and	 limited	 to	 the	defence	of	 the	 sovereign.92	By	contrast,	 with	 the	 birth	 of	 biopolitics,	 the	 right	 to	 kill	 is	 seen	 as	 a	 universal	privilege,	as	war	becomes	as	a	matter	of	 the	 life	of	 the	population,	 the	species	existence,	and	the	survival	of	the	race.																																																									92	The	sovereign	right	to	decide	over	life	and	death	appeared	in	two	relatively	clearly	delimited	spheres	centered	around	the	juridical	body	of	the	sovereign;	the	sovereign	could	indirectly	expose	the	subject	to	death	in	war	and	directly	in	the	event	the	subject	had	transgressed	his	laws	in	which	case	he	could	punish	the	subject	by	having	him	put	to	death.	For	most	of	the	period	of	the	Renaissance,	Foucault	explains,	war	accordingly	functioned	as	a	means	of	solving	disputes	among	sovereigns,	in	defence	of	whose	sovereignty	the	individual	could	be	mobilised.	
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In	fact,	it	really	makes	no	sense	to	speak	of	life-administering	forces	before	power	 discovers	 the	 population	 as	 an	 object	 of	 government,	 a	 global	 mass	imbued	with	the	 ‘mechanics	of	 life’	and	‘certain	productive	forces’.	Suffice	it	to	say,	no	such	totality	is	present	in	the	Greek	bios	politikos	[political	life].	Looking	at	the	government	of	the	subsistence	of	life	in	the	Classical	Greek	oikonomia,	it	is	clear	that	the	ruling	of	the	household	is	not	a	matter	of	public	concern.	It	does	not	 concern	 a	 population	 as	 it	 eventually	 would	 with	 the	 emergence	 of	‘economy’	and	the	liberal	arts	of	government	(Foucault	2007;	2008a).	Moreover,	the	 Aristotelian	 idea	 of	 the	 end	 of	 political	 community,	 expressed	 in	 the	resemblance	 of	 life	 according	 to	 the	 good,	 the	 virtue	 of	 moderation,	 and	 the	attitude	of	being	a	politikon	zōon,	never	surfaces	at	the	level	of	great	totalising	strategies	 that	 targets	 the	 life	 of	 the	 individuated	 body	 and	 deploys	 it	 within	homogeneous	mass	population.	In	 fact,	even	in	the	most	ardent	of	politico-philosophical	discourses,	such	as	 Plato’s	 treatise	 on	 the	 Republic,	 the	 idea	 of	 individuals	 as	 constitutive	 of	 a	global	mass	of	 life	remains	absent.	As	Foucault	explains	 in	The	Use	of	Pleasure,	the	Greek	principle	of	moderation	is	not	a	prescript	of	how	all	individuals	must	be	governed	 in	the	same	way:	“It	 is	 true	that	Plato	would	give	the	entire	state	the	virtue	of	moderation;	but	he	does	not	mean	by	this	that	all	would	be	equally	self-controlled:	 sōphrosynē	 would	 characterize	 the	 city	 in	 which	 those	 who	ought	to	be	ruled	would	obey,	and	those	who	were	destined	to	rule	would	in	fact	rule:	hence	there	would	be	a	multitude	of	‘appetites	and	pleasures	and	pains’	in	children,	women,	and	slaves,	as	well	as	in	the	inferior	majority.”	(1992:	61).	In	essence,	the	great	totality	of	population	would	be	impossible	in	classical	Greece	all	the	while	that,	as	we	have	noted,	the	modern	idea	of	power,	in	the	sense	of	an	abstract	 group	 of	 institutions	 and	 techniques	 of	 government,	 remains	 absent.	The	relationships	of	forces	find	their	expression	in	the	form	of	dominance	and	submission,	 ruling	 and	 subject	 element,	 that	 is,	 in	 the	war	 that	 goes	 on	 at	 all	times	both	within	man,	struggling	to	dominate	his	passions,	as	well	as	between	men,	wives	and	children,	the	slaves	and	the	free.		 However,	 while	 Foucault	 located	 the	 emergence	 of	 biopolitics	 in	 the	seventeenth	 century,	 a	 careful	 reading	 of	 his	 work	 suggests	 that	 he	 did	 not	delimit	 the	 entire	 genealogy	 to	 this	 period.	 In	 his	 lecture	 series	 at	 Collège	 de	
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France,	The	Birth	of	Biopolitics,	and,	in	particular,	Security,	Territory,	Population,	we	 find	 trajectories	 of	 thought	 that	 place	 the	 early	 forms	 of	 the	 practices	emergent	 in	 the	 corpus	 of	 biopolitics	 beyond	modernity.	 Tracing	 an	 itinerary	from	 the	 ‘state	 of	 population’	 and	 the	 ‘territorial	 state’	 to	 the	 idea	 of	 the	‘government	of	men’,	Foucault	arrives	at	the	idea	of	the	‘government	of	souls’	of	Christian	 pastoral	 power	 (Foucault	 2007:	 123-130).	 In	 the	 shepherd-flock	relationship	 found	 in	 the	 pastoral	 model	 of	 power,	 Foucault	 discovers	 the	paradoxical	logic	according	to	which,	almost	two	millennia	later,	biopolitics	will	allow	for	the	‘flock’	of	population	to	be	sacrificed	in	the	name	of	protecting	the	life	of	it.	In	this	passage,	Foucault	is	careful	to	explain	that	this	idea	of	governing	men	 by	 means	 of	 a	 shepherd-flock	 relationship,	 which	 was	 to	 achieve	 such	devastating	 effects,	 “…	 is	 certainly	 not	 a	Greek	 idea,	 and	nor	do	 I	 think	 it	 is	 a	Roman	idea”,	Foucault	says,	as	he	describes	how	in	Greek	literature	the	notions	of	‘the	rudder’	and	‘the	helmsman’	occur	almost	exclusively	in	the	context,	not	of	governing	the	souls	of	men,	but	in	terms	of	‘navigating’	the	city-state,	which	as	a	ship	has	to	be	steered	clear	of	reefs,	storms,	enemies	and	pirates,	and	reach	safe	harbour	(Ibid.	122-123).	While	 obviously,	 we	 do	 not	 find	 in	 the	 Greeks	 anything	 resembling	 the	monastic	 practices	 of	 spiritual	 direction	 that	 constitute	 the	 relationship	 of	command	 and	 obedience	 between	 the	 tyrannical	 spiritual	 director	 and	 the	subject	 being	 directed	 by	 command,	 as	 he	would	 be	 by	 the	Word	 of	 God,	 the	question	 is	 whether	 the	 idea	 of	 steering	 men	 by	 means	 of	 a	 shepherd-flock	relationship	was	in	fact	completely	alien	to	the	Greeks.	As	we	saw	in	Xenophon’s	account	of	the	militia	 in	the	Spartan	Constitution,	 the	theme	of	the	herd	[boua]	and	the	shepherd	of	education	[paidonomos]	in	fact	figures	prominently	in	his	discussion	of	the	education	of	Spartan	boys.	The	institution	of	the	boua	and	the	practices	 of	 the	 paidonomos	 constituted	 the	 foundation	 upon	 which	 Spartan	society	rested	–	a	society	whose	constitution	was	written	almost	unitarily	in	the	codes	of	 the	military	model	of	war.	Most	 importantly,	however,	 in	 the	Spartan	
boua,	 the	 relationship	 between	 the	 subject	 and	 his	 paidonomos	 is	 not	 a	relationship	that	ties	the	subject	not	to	an	external	truth,	as	 in	Christianity.	So	while	 it	may	 seem	 that	 the	 pastoral	model	 of	 the	 shepherd-flock	 relationship	and	 the	model	of	 the	militia	 and	 the	stratia	might	have	 some	 form	of	kinship,	
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which,	 eventually,	 would	 be	 invested	 in	 the	 biopolitical	 model	 of	 power,	 this	could	never	unfold	on	the	terrain	of	classical	Greece.	What	 separates	 the	 Greek	 from	 the	 Roman-Christian	 world	 is	 the	discovery	 of	 an	 arkhē	 scripture	 to	 guide	 action	 and	 define	 the	 knowledge	 of	ruling,	an	arkhē	scripture	which,	however,	would	never	fully	coincide	with	the	art	 of	 governing	 men	 in	 the	 mundane	 sphere	 of	 the	 city	 of	 men	 before	 the	emergence	 of	 the	 modern	 state.	 Nevertheless,	 we	 must	 not	 lose	 sight	 of	 the	military	 model	 of	 the	 Greeks	 as	 articulated	 precisely	 in	 the	 arkhē.	 While	 we	should	 avoid	 subscribing	 to	 the	 erroneous	 belief	 of	 a	 philosophy,	 which	 in	pursuit	of	the	origin	makes	Aristotle	the	protagonist	of	a	biopolitics	that	would	not	come	into	being	before	the	passing	of	two	millennia,	it	is	equally	important	to	recognise	the	elements,	which,	out	of	accident,	error,	and	succession,	would	be	carried	onto	a	new	terrain	in	the	transcription	of	the	discourse	on	Theos	and	the	 reworking	 of	 the	 ruling	principle.	We	will	 then	 see	 a	 kind	of	 convergence	where,	 on	 the	 one	 hand,	 the	 military	 model,	 having	 broken	 loose	 from	 its	original	 setting	 and	 escaped	 as	 the	 form	 of	 the	 good	 in	 the	 passage	 between	mind	 and	 Theos,	 comes	 to	 resemble	 pastoral	 power,	 as	 Christian	 thought	discovers	the	logos	as	the	arkhē	scripture	embodied	in	the	Son	of	God,	the	kēryx,	
angelos,	the	messenger,	the	emissary	who	transmits	commandments	and	orders,	and,	on	the	other,	a	development	in	which	the	shepherd-flock	relationship	turns	up	 in	 the	knowledge	of	ruling,	as	 the	Roman	emperor	appears	 in	 the	 image	of	the	philosopher	king.	We	would	thereby	not	have	said	that	biopolitics	is	a	Greek	invention,	 nor	 that	 of	 the	 Romans	 or	 the	 Christians.	 Rather,	 we	 would	 have	pointed	to	the	complex	course	of	descent	in	which	a	series	of	events	bound	to	a	thoroughly	heterogeneous	set	of	circumstances	once	made	it	possible	for	some	important	elements	of	biopolitics	to	have	their	‘lowly’	beginnings.	One	 of	 these	 beginnings	 occurs	 in	 the	 practice	 of	 sōphrosynē.	 While	 we	should	clearly	see	the	expression	of	a	certain	ethics	in	the	practice	of	sōphrosynē,	a	technē	tou	biou	[technē	of	living],	we	must	not	suppress	the	other	side	of	how	the	 Greeks	 discovered	 the	 mind	 and	 how	 it	 came	 to	 function	 as	 a	 strategic	incitement	 for	 rendering	 being	 governable.	 Classical	 man	 is	 called	 upon	 to	master	 himself,	 not	 simply	 as	 a	 care	 of	 the	 self,	 but	 also	 so	 as	 to	 transform	himself,	to	correct	and	sanitise	himself,	that	is,	in	the	first	instance	to	produce	a	
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self;	a	self	which	is	governable,	not	only	in	the	relation	of	oneself	to	oneself,	but	precisely	 by	 virtue	 of	 becomes	 governable	 for	 others.	 The	 government	 of	 the	self	 goes	 hand-in-hand	 with	 the	 mind	 that	 binds	 man	 to	 the	 steering	 of	 the	
militia	and	the	stratia.	A	disciplinary	model	for	the	steering	men	as	a	herd,	the	military	 model	 occurs	 as	 an	 assemblage	 of	 forces	 where	 the	 self-disciplinary	spaces	 occupied	 by	 the	 stratiōtēs	 and	 the	 stratēgos	 are	 tied	 together	 in	 the	principle	of	command	[arkhein].	Although	the	 idea	of	 the	government	of	souls	by	 divine	 providence	 is	 essentially	 Christian,	 there	 is	 certainly	 a	 resemblance	between	the	shepherd-flock	relationship	of	pastoral	power	and	the	relationship	between	stratiōtēs	and	stratēgos	in	the	military	model.	Both	models	conceive	of	the	 government	 of	men	 as	 a	matter	 of	 following	 command,	 even	 if	 the	 stratia	often	did	not	behave	as	one,	but	became	scattered	as	the	hoplite	discarded	his	shield	 and	 fled	 from	 battle.	 Moreover,	 we	 should	 note	 that	 both	models	 held	together	by	the	practice	of	an	askēsis.	Like	the	military	model	of	power,	pastoral	power	 cannot	 function	without	 the	 kind	 of	 government	 of	 self	 in	which	man,	through	the	practice	of	an	askēsis,	brings	his	body	in	the	state	of	submission	in	the	hierarchical	division	of	the	soul	into	subject	and	ruling	element.	There	 is	no	arkhē	 scripture,	we	 should	 contend	with	Foucault,	 no	divine	Word	of	God,	to	govern	men	in	the	world	of	classical	Greece.	We	are	at	the	level	of	a	set	of	practices	that	seemingly	have	no	need	for	a	single	great	text	that	has	the	force	of	 law.	Yet,	as	I	will	discuss	in	the	next	chapter,	this	 is	not	the	whole	truth.	What	 is	at	stake	 in	the	Greek	self-relationship	 is	not	simply	a	technē	tou	
biou,	which	 has	 no	 need	 to	 seek	 out	 order	 beyond	 concrete	 practices.	 In	 fact,	even	 if	 it	 appears	 as	 a	 marginal	 theme,	 it	 is	 in	 the	 classical	 Greeks	 we	 first	encounter	 the	 idea	of	man	as	part	of	a	 flock	 that	must	be	prescribed	a	proper	sense	of	justice.	It	is	the	theme	of	the	flock,	but	not	so	much	in	the	sense	of	the	domesticated	herd	as	that	of	the	horde	and	the	war	of	every	man	against	every	man	in	the	elaboration	of	the	idea	of	a	public	sphere	traversed	by	perpetual	war.	The	shepherd	of	justice	and	wisdom	will	then	appear	to	put	the	wretched	men	under	his	command.	This	too	belongs	to	the	world	of	the	Greeks.	In	the	birth	of	a	
technē	politikē,	we	will	not	only	see	practical	thought	at	work	to	determine	what	can	rightfully	be	done,	but	also	the	traces	of	an	arkhē	scripture	to	constitute	a	knowledge	 of	 ruling	 in	 the	 reworking	 by	 philosophia	 of	 the	 ancient	 claim	 to	
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authority.	We	 could	 also	 say	 that	 the	 Greek	 idea	 of	 sovereignty	 as	 a	 form	 of	authority	tied	to	phusis	and	the	body	of	the	sovereign,	an	authority	issuing	from	the	 marks	 of	 superiority,	 lineage,	 and	 the	 signs	 that	 speak	 of	 the	 archaic	divinities,	will	now	be	challenged	by	a	knowledge	of	ruling	that	claims	authority	to	 be	 vested	 in	 the	 resemblance	 of	 justice,	 the	 form	 of	 the	 good,	 and	 the	beautiful.	It	is	the	birth	of	the	theme	of	the	philosopher	king	in	the	presence	of	whom	the	shepherd	is	never	far	away.	Under	the	theme	of	the	philosopher	king,	a	technē	politikē	will	emerge	as	an	art	of	ruling	that	seeks	to	guide	the	flock	of	men	by	means	of	wisdom	and	justice,	an	art	of	ruling	that	looks	after	the	welfare	of	the	polis,	taking	counsel	for	the	polis	as	a	whole	with	a	view	to	its	betterment.	This	 technē	politikē	 certainly	 concerns	 the	 steering	 of	 the	 ship	 of	polis,	 rather	than	 the	 souls	 of	 men,	 but	 one	 should	 not	 forget	 that	 the	mechanism	 of	 this	
technē	politikē,	and	the	pivotal	point	that	enables	the	steering	of	men	aboard	the	ship	of	polis,	is	the	mind.	
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§ 5 Eleutheria – Freedom and the Sheepfold					
5.1.	So,	 it	all	does	not	begin	with	the	principle	of	sovereignty,	 the	exclusion	of	‘bare	life’,	and	the	birth	of	a	power	over	life.	The	kind	of	power	classical	thought	installs	rather	takes	its	model	from	the	stratia	and	the	militia,	as	the	disciplines	begin	 to	 function	 as	 correlates	 to	 an	 emergent	 sense	 of	 being	 political.	 This	development,	 at	 the	high	point	of	which	Aristotle	would	 formulate	 the	 idea	of	life	according	to	the	good	as	the	end	of	political	community,	has	no	relation	to	the	 sovereign	exceptio.	 In	 fact,	 the	dream	of	 early	political	power	 is	not	about	incarceration,	 confinement,	 or	 exclusion,	 but	 quite	 the	 opposite.	 It	 is	 about	freedom	[eleutheria].	Specifically,	 the	 idea	of	to	eu	zēn	seems	to	emerge	out	of	the	horizon	wherein	the	Greeks	once	encountered	a	certain	state	of	deliverance.	We	can	trace	it	in	the	discourse	on	eleutheria.	The	Greek	idea	of	eleutheria	can	be	rendered	as	‘liberty’	or	‘freedom’,	if	not	quite	in	the	modern	meaning	of	the	words.	Eleutheria	did	not	refer	to	a	juridical	of	right	conferred	upon	the	subject	and	guaranteed	by	sovereignty	and	law,	and	by	which	the	individual	enters	into	a	pact	or	contract	giving	up	his	natural	right	to	 govern	 himself,	 as	 in	 Hobbes,	 Rousseau,	 and	 Kant.	 The	 social	 contract	 of	modern	 juridical	 power	 has	 no	 existence	 in	 classical	 Greece	 as	 a	 grid	 of	intelligibility	of	freedom,	which	perhaps	could	lead	to	some	confusion	about	the	semantic	field	the	term	covered.	It	has	been	argued,	for	example,	that	eleutheria	was	 understood	 as	 a	 kind	 of	 deliberative,	 autopoietic	 force	 that	 grows	 and	develops	towards	its	zenith	according	to	its	own	internal	law,	as	in	the	vegetal	notion	of	flowering	(Esposito	2006).	While	one	could	follow	Esposito	to	read	in	
eleutheria	 the	 connotation	 of	 flowering,	 this	 seems	 to	 be	 a	 derivation	 from	 a	later	 representation	 of	 the	 word	 in	 which	 the	 sense	 of	 freedom	 acquires	 a	familiarity	 with	 eudaimonia	 [happiness,	 flourishing],	 such	 as	 when	 Aristotle	speaks	of	eleutheros	or	politēs	[the	free	man]	and	the	end	of	political	community	(Politics	 1252b:	 30).	 And	 yet,	 when	 Aristotle	 speaks	 of	 the	 happiness	 and	flourishing	of	man	in	relation	to	freedom,	it	is	not	the	expression	of	any	kind	of	
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to	 say	 that	 life	 according	 to	 the	 good	 requires	 agein	 to	 come	 into	 being	 as	actuality	 and	 persist	 in	 actuality.	 Agein	 will	 then	 be	 what	 separates	 actuality	from	 potentiality	 where	 potentiality	 passes	 over	 into	 actuality	 from	 the	articulation	of	act	and	potentiality.	Here,	it	is	important	to	note	that	for	Aristotle,	as	Agamben	rightfully	shows	while	discussing	 the	question	of	potentiality	and	law,	 potentiality	 is	 not	 simply	 a	matter	 of	 the	 logical	 possibility	 of	 something	passing	over	into	actuality:	“…	if	potentiality	is	to	have	its	own	consistency	and	not	always	disappear	into	actuality,	it	is	necessary	that	potentiality	be	able	not	to	pass	over	into	actuality,	that	potentiality	constitutively	be	the	potentiality	not	
to	(do	or	be).”	(1998:	45).93	Given	that	potentiality	also	implies	im-potentiality,	then	the	passing	over	into	actuality	of	the	potentiality	of	the	good	requires,	not	only	the	possibility	of	action,	but	also	the	possibility	of	no	act	or,	more	precisely,	it	requires	the	figure	of	man	who	is	capable	of	action	as	well	as	suspending	his	actions.	In	other	words,	it	requires	the	existence	of	a	certain	sense	of	self,	a	self	capable	of	a	will	of	not	realising	an	action;	it	requires	the	free	man	[eleutheros].	
Eleutheros,	Aristotle	explains	in	the	Metaphysics	(982b:	25-26),	is	the	man	who	by	nature	exists	for	his	own	sake	and	not	for	that	of	another.	But	one	could	also	say	 that	 the	 free	man	exists	 for	 the	sake	of	 the	good,	 since,	 for	 the	good	 to	be	possible	and	not	always	disappear	into	the	emergent	sway	of	polemos,	the	free	man	must	appear	as	the	vehicle	of	action	at	the	site	where	agein	breaks	free	of	the	agōnia	of	phusis	and	moves	into	the	 logos	 to	become	conditioned	upon	the	unmoved	mind.	Agein	will	then	attain	a	meaning	closer	to	conquest	[nikaō]	and	antagonism	[neikos]	 than	 to	agōnia.	Conquest	and	 freedom	will	be	part	of	 the	same	political	dream,	as	action	is	disclosed	in	the	actuality	of	the	good.	Man	is	said	to	have	conquered	himself	or	to	rule	over	himself,	and	only	then	will	he	be	free.	Eleutheros	 is	he	who	 is	 capable	of	arriving	at	a	 certain	 state	of	 conquest,	and	the	good	is	that	state	of	conquest,	which	is	freedom.	However,	before	eleutheria	would	be	linked	with	eudaimonia	in	the	notion	of	 life	according	to	the	good,	 it	has	been	in	circulation	for	several	centuries.	In	fact,	the	word	is	much	older	than	classical	discourse.	It	seems	the	first	entry	of	the	word	in	the	literature	appears	with	the	name	given	to	a	feast	or	festival	held																																																									93	Agamben	quotes	a	passage	from	the	Metaphysics	(1046a:	32)	in	which	Aristotle	states:	“Every	potentiality	is	im-potentiality	of	the	same	with	respect	to	the	same”.	
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in	 honour	 of	 Zeus	 Eleutherios	 [Zeus	 the	 Deliverer]	 after	 the	 victory	 over	 the	Persians	 at	 the	 battle	 of	 Plataea	 (Smith	 et	 al.	 1890).	 In	 its	 early	 etymological	form,	then,	the	Greek	idea	of	freedom	as	eleutheria	really	has	no	relation	to	the	form	of	 the	 good,	 let	 alone	 any	notion	of	 a	 self-unfolding	deliberative	 form	of	being	 or	 that	 of	 a	 juridical	 right	 conferred	 upon	 the	 citizen,	 in	whom	 certain	rights	of	 freedom	are	 ‘preserved’.	On	the	contrary,	 it	 tells	a	history	of	struggle	and	combat,	of	conquest	and	victory.	When	the	Greeks	speak	of	eleutheria,	one	should	 hear	 the	 distant	 roar	 of	 the	 battlefield;	 a	 discourse	 of	war	 and	 violent	death	runs	through	the	notion	of	freedom,	the	mind	passing	over	the	horizon	of	existence	in	the	memory	of	lifeless	bodies	devoured	by	birds	and	dogs	under	the	open	sky	as	 they	descend	 into	Hades.	But	one	should	also	hear	a	discourse	of	military	success	and	a	celebration	of	the	bond	between	stratēgos	and	stratiōtēs,	
taxiarchos,	 enōmotarkhēs,	 and	 arkhōn	 that,	 by	 the	 will	 of	 Zeus	 Eleutherios,	assured	the	deliverance	of	the	Greeks	with	the	victory	over	the	Persians.	The	discourse	on	eleutheria	in	other	words	bares	the	markings	of	war,	but	not	so	much	in	the	archaic	sense	of	agōnia,	the	metope-like	encounter	of	hērōs	and	hērōs.	 Although	 the	 relationship	 of	war	 is	 certainly	 still	 recognised	 at	 the	level	 of	 man-to-man	 struggle,	 the	 discourse	 on	 eleutheria	 seems	 to	 articulate	this	 struggle	 around	 the	 vast	 division	 of	 a	 fundamental	 antagonism	 dividing	Greeks	 against	 Persians,	 Hellenes	 against	 barbaroi	 [those	 who	 do	 not	 speak	Greek].	 From	 the	Persian	Wars	 to	 around	 the	 time	of	 the	Peloponnesian	War,	the	discourse	on	freedom	in	other	words	seems	to	attain	the	connotation	of	the	conquest	of	one	race	over	the	other,	Hellenes	over	barbaroi,	while,	on	the	inside	of	 the	 polis,	 the	 same	 sense	 of	 freedom	 appears	 at	 the	 site	 of	 the	 division	between	eleutheros	[the	free	man]	and	doulos	[the	natural	slave],	articulating	a	binary	division	that	runs	through	the	whole	of	society.	Now,	while	it	 is	easy	to	claim	 that	 certain	 elements	 of	 racism	 are	 now	 present	 in	 the	 discourse	 on	
eleutheria,	 this	 may	 well	 miss	 the	 essential	 elements	 of	 both	 racism	 and	 the	historical	 reality	of	 classical	Greece.	 It	 is	 important	 to	note	 that	when	we	 find	the	discourse	on	race	at	the	site	of	the	polis	and	the	oikonomia,	it	has	little	to	do	with	 the	 modern	 discourse	 on	 racism.	 Insofar	 as	 the	 distinction	 between	
eleutheros	and	doulos	articulates	a	division	of	races,	it	has	to	do	with	little	more	than	what	is	basically	a	relationship	of	dominance	established	through	conquest.	
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We	 are	 in	 a	 relationship	 of	 dominance	 and	 submission,	mastery	 and	 docility,	albeit	where	the	later	condition	is	fit	for	no	Greek.94	What	we	must	pay	attention	to	in	the	discourse	on	freedom,	and	hence	in	the	 distinction	 between	 eleutheros	 and	 doulos,	 is	 in	 other	 words	 the	 logic	 of	conquest,	in	particular,	as	it	occurs	in	the	shift	in	the	practice	of	warfare	where	the	 military	 model	 overlays	 the	 old	 ways	 of	 the	 singular	 polemistēs.	 As	 the	military	 model	 is	 invested	 in	 the	 relations	 of	 forces,	 conquest	 is	 no	 longer	achieved	by	the	deeds	and	acts	of	one	man	alone,	demi-god	or	not.	The	state	of	deliverance	 cannot	 really	 exist	 in	agōnia	with	 its	 elaborate	wills	 of	 individual	warriors,	 its	 heterogeneous	 forces,	 and	 multiple	 divisions.	 What	 assures	deliverance	is	the	assemblage	of	forces	of	the	militia	and	the	stratia.	Eleutheria	in	other	words	remains	absent	as	long	as	the	subjects	have	not	submitted	their	wills	 to	 the	 command	 of	 the	 arkhōn,	 the	 stratēgos,	 or	 the	 hēgemon	 who	 then	leads	these	otherwise	heterogeneous	forces	to	victory.	We	could	also	say,	since	it	is	basically	the	same	logic	we	saw	in	Aristotle’s	reference	to	Homer,	that	the	
politēs	 remains	absent	so	 long	as	man,	as	 in	 the	conduct	of	Diomedes,	has	not	renounced	the	friendship	with	war	to	discover	war	as	a	problem	among	his	own	folk.	Eleutheria	is	tied	to	neikos	rather	than	agōnia,	then,	which	is	how	it	occurs	at	 the	 site	of	 the	vast	division	of	 two	 races,	one	pitted	against	 the	other,	both	struggling	for	hēgemonia	and	arkhē.	Domination	or	submission,	mastery	or	docility,	freedom	or	servitude,	this	is	the	great	division	that	runs	through	the	discourse	of	eleutheria	and	whose	end	point	 is	 the	 necessity	 of	 conquest.	 The	 telos	 of	 conquest	 is	 the	 promise	 of	freedom,	not	simply	because	it	establishes	the	dissymmetrical	relation	of	victor	over	vanquished,	but	because	it	establishes	order	on	both	sides	of	the	division	as	 the	 relationship	 of	 subject	 and	 ruling	 element	 found	 in	 the	 arkhē.	 The	conquest	therefore	assures	harmonia;	on	the	inside,	men	are	no	longer	engaged	in	the	day-to-day	warfare	with	one	another	because	of	the	relationship	between	master	and	slave,	while,	on	 the	outside,	 the	 relations	of	 forces	are	 invested	 in	the	 great	 war	 and	 united	 in	 the	 common	 good	 of	 freedom.	 In	 fact,	 in	 the	
																																																								94	As	Aristotle	explains	in	a	passage	of	the	Politics	where	he	discusses	the	problem	of	slavery	and	conquest:	“…	the	Hellenes	do	not	like	to	call	Hellenes	slaves,	but	confine	the	term	to	barbarians	[barbaroi].”	(Politics	1255a:	25-29).	
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discourse	on	freedom,	as	we	find	it	in	Isocrates,	the	conquest	will	now	promise	to	bring	an	end	to	the	great	war	that,	despite	the	division	between	master	and	slave,	 has	 appeared	 among	 fellow	 Greeks.	 Writing	 in	 the	 course	 of	 the	Peloponnesian	 War,	 in	 his	 Panegyricus	 Isocrates	 calls	 on	 Sparta	 to	 establish	concord	 [harmonia]	 in	 Greece	 by	 recourse	 to	 the	 practice	 of	 conquest.	 In	 his	plea	for	reconciling	Athens	and	Sparta,	Isocrates	proposes	an	expedition	led	by	the	Athenians	and	 the	Spartans,	 “gathered	 together	 in	 the	 cause	of	 the	 liberty	[eleutheria]	 of	 our	 allies,	 dispatched	 by	 all	 Greece,	 and	 faring	 forth	 to	 wreak	vengeance	on	the	barbarians”	(Panegyricus:	185).	Also,	in	his	letter	To	Philip,	an	appeal	to	the	King	of	Macedonia,	Isocrates	once	again	proposes	for	the	Hellenes	to	follow	the	command	[arkhein]	of	the	Macedonian	king	in	a	conquest	of	Persia	reuniting	 the	 Greeks	 in	 the	 common	 cause	 of	 eleutheria.	 By	 then,	 what	 once	appeared	on	the	desolate	plains	of	Plataea	in	the	blood	and	mud	of	battle	now	seems	 to	 have	 acquired	 its	 own	 form,	 a	 form	 whose	 telos	 compels	 that	 the	conquest	 be	 carried	onto	 ever-greater	 and	more	distant	 battlefields,	 since	 the	state	of	deliverance	cannot	be	found	but	in	the	finality	of	the	last	battle.	It	is	in	this	schema	of	freedom	and	conquest,	we	find	the	great	Alexander	who	got	lost	in	 India,	 and	 the	Caesars	 of	Rome	who	dreamt	 in	 the	 halls	 of	 their	 palaces	 of	becoming	emperor	of	all	the	world.	Now,	 this	 idea	 of	 freedom,	 to	 which	 the	 Greeks	 alluded	 by	 the	 word	
eleutheria,	begins	 to	appear	 in	discourses	 that	are	neither	directly	 linked	with	festival	 and	 the	 honouring	 of	 Zeus	 nor	 with	 the	 unification	 of	 the	 Hellenes	against	 the	 Persians.	 It	 is	 one	 of	 the	 beguiling	 morphologies	 that	 seems	 to	appear	during	 the	classical	period,	one	 that	cannot	be	reduced	 to	 the	event	of	the	Persian	Wars,	and	yet,	nevertheless,	always	seems	to	refer	back	to	the	birth	of	 the	 military	 model,	 which	 is	 doubled	 and	 multiplied	 in	 the	 chain	 of	resemblances.	 In	 fact,	 it	 is	precisely	the	schema	of	 the	military	model	that	will	guides	Aristotle	when	he	now	speaks	of	mankind	acting	in	order	to	obtain	that	which	 they	 think	good.	The	good	appears	at	 the	 site	where	action	 [agein]	 ties	together	the	division	between	master	and	slave	by	recourse	to	the	principle	of	conquest.	It	is	important	to	note	that	this	is	not	the	expression	of	the	division	of	life	by	sovereign	power	though.	We	are	a	long	way	from	a	form	of	austerity	that	would	 tend	 to	 reduce	 the	 slave	 to	 ‘bare	 life’.	 Although	excluded	 from	political	
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life,	 the	slave	never	appears	at	 the	site	of	 incarceration	and	confinement	or	as	life	that	may	be	killed.	In	fact,	the	slave	does	not	appear	because	he	has	violated	the	sovereign	law,	but	because	he	has	found	himself	in	the	unfortunate	event	of	a	 struggle	 in	which	he	has	come	 to	surrender	 to	 the	master.	The	division	 that	appears	 here	 is	 in	 other	words	 the	 one	 that	 occurs	 through	war,	 the	 division	which	 is	 war,	 the	 ineradicable	 basis	 of	 all	 social	 relations	 where	 some	individuals	are	disclosed	as	free	[eleutherous]	and	others	as	doulous	[slaves].	It	is	the	harmony	of	opposites	of	which	everything	is	made	and	held	together.	In	fact,	the	master	and	the	slave	are	not	recognised	as	divorced	entities,	but	as	an	assemblage	forming	a	relationship	(Politics	1252b).	It	 is	 from	 the	 enjoinment	 of	 this	 relationship	 of	master	 and	 slave,	made	possible	 by	 the	 conquest,	 that	 the	 possibility	 of	 the	 good	 now	 comes	 to	 light.	Specifically,	the	good	comes	into	being	as	the	effect	of	the	actions	of	the	master	who	from	his	position	as	a	free	man	guides	or	rules	over	the	actions	of	the	slave.	Just	as	the	rudder	serves	as	the	‘lifeless	instrument’	of	the	pilot	for	his	steering	of	 the	ship,	and	the	 lookout	man	as	a	 ‘living	 instrument’,	Aristotle	says,	so	 the	natural	 slave	 is	 ‘a	kind	of	 instrument’	of	 the	master	 in	his	management	of	 the	
oikonomia	(Ibid.	1253b:	26-33).	In	this	sense,	and	just	as	the	pilot’s	steering	of	the	ship	depends	on	the	actions	that	guide	the	rudder	and	the	lookout	man,	the	possibility	of	life	according	to	the	good,	both	in	the	sense	of	the	excellence	of	the	master’s	management	of	the	oikonomia	and	in	the	more	general	sense,	depends	on	the	slave	and	his	ability	to	carry	out	the	actions	of	the	master.	In	fact,	no	man,	Aristotle	 says,	 can	 live	 well	 [eu	 zēn]	 unless	 he	 be	 provided	 with	 such	necessaries:	“For	if	every	instrument	could	accomplish	its	own	work,	obeying	or	anticipating	 the	 will	 of	 others,	 like	 the	 statues	 of	 Daedalus,	 or	 the	 tripods	 of	Hephaestus,	which,	says	the	poet,	‘of	their	own	accord	entered	the	assembly	of	the	Gods’;	if,	in	like	manner,	the	shuttle	would	weave	and	the	plectrum	touch	the	lyre	without	a	hand	to	guide	them,	chief	workmen	would	not	want	servants,	nor	masters	slaves.”	(Ibid.	1253b:	23-39;	1254).	Since	only	a	few	instruments,	such	as	the	self-moving	tripods	of	Hephaestus	(the	only	Greek	god	who	worked,	and	who	is	honoured	in	the	Homeric	Hymn	to	Hephaestus	for	having	taught	mankind	that	work	is	noble)	serving	the	gods	at	feasts,	can	anticipate	the	will	of	others,	life	according	to	the	good	cannot	come	into	being	outside	of	the	relationship	of	
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master	and	slave.	Conversely,	 since	 the	 rudder	will	not	 steer	 the	 ship	without	the	 command	 of	 the	 pilot,	 the	 good	 always	 seems	 to	 require	 the	 rule	 of	command.	It	requires	that	the	practice	of	ruling	be	carried	out,	which	involves	certain	strategic	measures	of	mind	not	unlike	the	kind	of	which	Aristotle	speaks	in	the	Politics	where	he	likens	the	practice	of	politics	to	a	game	of	draughts:	"For	that	 which	 can	 foresee	 with	 the	 mind	 is	 the	 naturally	 ruling	 and	 naturally	mastering	 element,	while	 that	which	 can	do	 these	 things	with	 the	body	 is	 the	naturally	ruled	and	slave."	(Ibid.	1252a:	31-35).	It	is	clear	that	this	economy	of	the	good,	upon	which	the	subsistence	of	life	is	 articulated,	 happens	without	 an	 arkhē	 scripture	 to	which	 the	 exchanges	 of	men	would	come	to	owe	their	law.	The	unit	that	guides	action	is	not	the	code	of	law,	 but	 rather	 that	 of	 rank,	 authority,	 and	 discipline.	 What	 demarcates	 the	threshold	 of	 life	 according	 to	 the	 good	 is	 not	 the	 suspension	 of	 law	 then,	 but	rather	a	technē	of	ruling	that	takes	as	its	principle	the	disciplines	of	the	military	model.	 Like	 the	 stratia	 and	 the	militia,	 the	 oikonomia	 emerges	 as	 a	 strategic	space	in	which	action	is	guided	and	steered	by	the	arkhōn	or,	more	precisely,	by	the	 despotēs	 [head	 of	 a	 family]	 and	 the	 oikonomos	 [head	 of	 an	 estate].	 The	
oikonomia	appears	as	a	kind	of	 field	of	 intervention	 in	which	the	management	by	 the	 oikonomos	 is	 realised	 through	 the	 conjunction	 of	 certain	 strategic	interventions	and	certain	calculations	of	action	articulated	around	 the	schema	of	master	and	slave,	dominance	and	submission.	Oikonomia,	then,	is	a	strategic	schema	 of	 the	 subsistence	 of	 life,	 a	 principle	 of	 intelligibility	 if	 you	 will,	 that	manifests	a	certain	regulatory	idea	of	the	good.	This	is	far	from	saying	that	the	
oikonomia	 reads	 as	 part	 of	 an	 abstract	 category	 of	 life.	 On	 the	 contrary,	
oikonomia	consists	in	the	assemblage	of	instruments	for	the	realisation	of	living	well.	Oikonomia	is	the	manifestation	of	technē,	and	only	secondly	a	principle	of	intelligibility	of	reality	for	a	political	thought	that	is	seeking	the	rationality	of	an	art	of	government	based	on	the	good.	Insofar	as	the	idea	of	life	according	to	the	good	manifests	itself	as	a	certain	governmental	reason,	then,	it	is	not	articulated	around	a	division	of	spheres	of	life,	but	rather	on	the	resemblance	of	a	series	of	relationships	 of	 opposites.	 Master	 and	 slave,	 public	 and	 private	 constitute	relationships	 that	 in	 fact	rely	on	the	same	taxonomy	of	ruling,	as	expressed	 in	the	 recurrence	 of	 the	 terms	arkhein	 and	kratein,	kubernaō	 and	oiakizō,	which	
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appear	in	both	the	discourse	on	the	oikonomia,	the	stratia,	and	the	bios	politikos.	As	Plato	explains	at	length	in	books	II	through	V	of	the	Republic,	the	soul	of	man	is	like	the	polis	wherefore	the	same	structure	should	prevail	in	him.	This	is	also	how	 the	 practice	 of	 ruling	 the	 oikonomia	 (the	 cultivation	 of	 a	 domain,	 the	maintenance	 and	 development	 of	 an	 estate)	 was	 considered	 as	 an	 important	part	of	the	paideia	of	the	free	man	in	his	preparation	for	the	practice	of	politics	and	 the	 fulfilment	 of	 his	 civic	 obligations.	 The	 oikonomia,	 the	 stratia,	 and	 the	
bios	politikos	are	tied	together	 in	the	ruling	principle,	as	the	articulation	of	the	principle	of	conquest	with	the	activity	of	steering	things	towards	an	end.	In	each	case,	the	unit	of	domination	is	rank	and	the	unit	of	order	that	of	resemblance.		 The	idea	of	life	according	to	the	good	does	not	rest	on	a	certain	form	of	‘politically	qualified’	life	then.	To	eu	zēn	has	in	fact	little	to	do	with	what	we	call	politics.	Whereas	Plato	and	Aristotle	can	certainly	speak	of	the	‘happiness	of	the	
polis’	(Laws	628:	d-e;	Politics	1278b:	29),	this	does	not	imply	that	life	according	to	 the	 good	 appears	 the	 level	 of	 politics.	 It	 is	 rather	 so	 that	 the	 bios	politikos	exists	 for	 the	 sake	of	 good	 life,	 as	Aristotle	 says.	The	maintenance	of	 the	 city-walls,	 the	 facilitation	 of	 the	agorā,	 contests,	 education,	 and	 so	 on,	 it	 is	 in	 this	sense	we	must	understand	Aristotle	when	he	discusses	the	idea	of	living	well	in	relation	to	the	polis,	as	it	appears	in	his	discussion	of	good	constitutions	(Politics	1279a-1280a).	 This	 is	 equally	 true	 in	 Plato.	 In	 the	 perfect	 polis	 governed	 by	moderation,	as	we	find	it	in	the	Republic	and	in	the	Laws,	the	good	life	does	not	really	spring	from	the	level	of	political	life.	To	say	that	the	polis	provides	for	the	happiness	 of	man	would	 not	 really	make	 sense,	 since	 the	 souls	 and	 bodies	 of	men,	with	 their	 elaborate	wills	 and	 desires,	 have	 yet	 to	 submit	 their	 ‘right	 to	govern	themselves’	and	become	usurped	in	Hobbes’	God-sovereign.	As	we	have	seen,	happiness	is	precisely	a	matter	of	governing	oneself	and	others	by	means	of	moderation,	that	is,	by	means	of	day-to-day	conquests.	This	is	not	to	say	that	happiness	 cannot	 come	 into	 being	 before	 all	men	 are	 brought	 to	 observe	 the	principle	of	moderation.	As	Foucault	explains,	quoting	Plato	in	the	Republic:	“In	the	 moderate	 state,	 the	 passions	 of	 the	 unprincipled	 multitude	 would	 be	controlled	by	‘the	desires	and	knowledge	of	the	fewer	and	the	better’.”	(Foucault	1992:	 62).	 As	 we	 have	 seen,	 happiness	 occurs	 precisely	 because	 the	 natural	slave	 speaks	 the	 language	 of	 the	 unruly	 body,	 and	 the	 temperate	 soul	 that	 of	
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order.	 So	 long	 as	 the	 free	 man	 remains	 free,	 so	 long	 as	 the	 master	 remains	master	by	virtue	of	being	capable	of	ruling	over	his	appetites	as	if	they	were	his	slaves,	the	servile	‘instruments’	of	the	mind,	order	and	happiness	persist.	This	is	how,	by	contrast,	order	breaks	down	in	the	event	of	the	immoderate	man	who	is	a	slave	of	his	passions.	This	is	because	the	man	who	lacks	moderation	is	neither	capable	of	ruling	himself	nor	his	slaves	and	his	household,	as	Xenophon	explains	in	Oeconomicus	 (I:	 22-23)	where	 he	 likens	 the	mismanaged	 household	 to	 the	state	 of	 the	 disorganised	 soul.	 That	 is,	 there	 is	 a	 perfect	 correspondence	between	the	states	of	order	in	which	the	free	man	must	keep	his	soul,	his	slaves,	and	 his	 household,	 as	 the	 ruling	 principle	 is	 doubled	 and	 multiplied	 in	 an	infinite	series	of	analogies	and	resemblances	so	as	to	constitute	order.	
5.2.	But	did	this	technē	of	ruling	that	seems	to	materialise	a	certain	idea	of	freedom	 simply	manifest	 itself	 in	 the	 exteriority	 of	 concrete	 actions	 then,	 the	exteriority	 of	 ruling	men	 as	 an	 art	 of	 rank	 articulating	 a	 schema	 of	 discipline	with	 the	 practice	 of	 conquest?	 It	 is	 important	 to	 note	 that	 while	 there	 is	 no	
arkhē	 scripture	 and	no	 one	God-sovereign	 to	 command	 the	 flock	 of	 souls,	 the	logic	of	this	schema	of	domination-submission	and	command-obedience	did	not	solely	apply	 to	 the	exteriority	of	 concrete	actions.	Remember	 that	 for	 the	 free	man	to	live	well,	acting	in	accordance	with	the	good	and	the	noble,	he	must	be	capable	of	suspending	his	own	actions	or,	more	precisely,	he	must	be	capable	of	conquering	 the	 sway	of	phusis	 to	 let	 the	mind	determine	 the	 course	of	 action.	While	it	is	clear	that	one	cannot	speak	of	this	practice	in	terms	of	the	interiority	of	the	government	of	souls,	as	in	the	pastoral	model	of	power,	it	is	clear	that	we	are	not	dealing	with	an	exclusively	extrospective	schema	that	solely	exists	in	the	domain	 of	 real	 and	 actual	 practices	 deployed	 upon	 the	 natural	 slave	 by	 an	equally	 true	master.	 The	 technē	 of	 ruling	must	 be	 understood	 in	 terms	 of	 the	resemblance	articulated	in	the	military	model,	which,	as	we	have	seen,	relies	on	the	quintessential	introspective	practice	of	ruling	over	the	soul;	the	conquering	of	phusis	and	the	primacy	of	the	mind	forcing	their	way	into	the	ordering	codes	of	culture	and	the	reflection	upon	order	itself	at	which	point	it	becomes	clear,	as	Aristotle	says	in	the	Politics,	“…	that	the	rule	of	the	soul	over	the	body,	and	the	rational	 element	 [logos]	 over	 the	 passionate	 [pathētikos],	 is	 natural	 and	expedient.”	(1254b:	5-6).	One	will	notice	then	that	the	position	occupied	by	the	
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Logos	to	guide	action	in	the	archaic	world,	where	agein	is	disclosed	in	being	as	the	emergent	sway	of	the	conjunction	of	opposites,	has	moved	into	the	soul	of	man.	This	is	how	we	must	understand	the	relationship	between	action	and	the	principle	 of	moderation,	 and	 this	 is	what	 Aristotle	 has	 in	mind	when	 he	 says	that	 man	 must	 hold	 to	 the	 ‘right	 mean’	 between	 insensitivity	 and	 excess,	indifference	and	self-indulgence,	choosing	reasonable	principles	of	action:		The	 temperate	man	occupies	a	middle	position	with	 regard	 to	 these	objects	 [of	desire].	For	he	neither	enjoys	the	things	that	the	self-indulgent	man	enjoys	most	–	 but	 rather	 dislikes	 them	 –	 nor	 in	 general	 the	 things	 that	 he	 should	 not,	 nor	anything	 of	 this	 sort	 to	 excess,	 nor	 does	 he	 feel	 pain	 or	 craving	when	 they	 are	absent,	or	does	so	only	 to	a	moderate	degree,	and	no	more	 than	he	should,	nor	when	 he	 should	 not,	 and	 so	 on…	 he	 will	 desire	 moderately	 and	 as	 he	 should.	(Nicomachean	Ethics	1119a:	10-18).		At	the	site	of	the	mean,	Logos	and	agein	now	appear	from	the	vantage	point	of	the	soul	whose	mind	has	become	a	principle	of	order.	It	is	from	this	position	of	mean	 that	 order	 becomes	 visible.	 In	 fact,	 there	 can	 be	 no	 order	 without	 this	sense	of	self,	which	rules	the	soul	by	means	of	conquest	in	order	to	steer	things	from	 the	 proper	 place	 of	 mean,	 at	 which	 point	 of	 intersection	 things	 now	assume	their	similarities	and	make	their	agreements.	Must	we	follow	Heidegger	then	 and	 speak	 of	 this	 soul	 in	 terms	 of	 metaphysics	 or	 an	 onto-theology?	Perhaps,	but	it	seems	to	me	that	we	should	rather	pay	attention	to	the	problem	that	arises	with	this	model	of	the	soul.	In	the	perpetual	spiritual	combat	of	the	
politikon	zōon,	 the	soul	must	now	answer	 to	 the	sway	of	agōnia.	 Instead	of	an	
arkhē	 scripture,	 there	 will	 be	 the	 permanent	 danger	 that	 the	 order	 of	 things	escapes	 the	 grasp	 of	 the	 logos	 and	 lapses	 into	 war.	 Man	 will	 appear	 in	 this	middle	 region,	 where	 he	 has	 taken	 over	 the	 steering	 of	 things,	 but	 at	 the	expense	that	he	too	becomes	responsible	for	polemos.	 It	 is	the	appearance	of	a	kind	of	middle	region	where,	on	the	one	hand,	man	must	abandon	the	premises	of	phusis	 to	seek	out	action	 in	the	abeyance	of	 the	unmoved	mind,	and,	on	the	other,	he	must	confront	phusis	and	by	means	of	logos	situate	the	soul	at	the	‘in-between’,	the	site	of	a	fleeting	articulation	which	will	only	be	reconciled	in	the	commandment	and	origin	of	God.	The	site	of	the	mean	will	read	as	the	promise	
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of	freedom,	but	this	freedom	will	come	at	the	expense	that	all	the	weight	of	the	world	 be	 placed	 on	 it,	 since	 phusis	 must	 always	 exhaust	 itself	 in	 the	 logos	 in	order	to	constitute	the	kind	of	order	in	which	reality	must	be	shown	to	be	of	the	same	nature	as	the	schema	of	the	conquest.	Freedom	will	necessitate	recurrent	conquest,	because	as	long	as	man	appear	at	the	site	of	the	intermediary	position	of	 polemos	 –	 as	 long	 as	 the	 logos	 is	 believed	 to	 appear	 in	 the	 soul	 at	 the	intersection	of	 the	mind	and	 the	 appetites	 –	 these	 contrary	 forces	pull	 him	 in	opposite	 directions	 as	 he	 struggles	 to	 steer	 them	 by	 command.	 It	 is	 indeed	 a	difficult	path	to	follow,	Aristotle	explains,	for	‘if	appetites	are	strong	and	violent	they	 even	 expel	 the	 power	 of	 calculation’,	 which	 is	 why	 ‘they	 should	 be	moderate	 and	 few,	 and	 should	 in	 no	way	 oppose	 the	 rational	 principle’	 (Ibid.	1117b:	22-1119b:	19).		It	 is	clear,	then,	that	the	government	of	self	cannot	simply	be	understood	as	a	matter	of	the	stylised	attitudes	of	a	technē	tou	biou,	a	technē	of	living	where	action	would	only	occur	in	its	concrete	realisation	and	appear	in	its	visible	and	manifest	 form.	 In	 fact,	 what	 guides	 practical	 thought	 to	 determine	 what	 can	rightfully	be	done	relies	on	the	truth	of	the	mind.	Moreover,	it	seems	this	technē	articulates	 an	 essential	 irrationality,	 a	 permanent	 state	 of	 disequilibrium;	freedom	is	at	one	at	the	same	time	what	must	occur	at	the	end	of	this	struggle	and	 that,	 which	 cannot	 persist	 but	 from	 the	 continuous	 interventions	 of	conquest,	 which,	 as	 we	 leave	 the	 battlefield	 of	 the	 mind	 and	 enter	 into	 the	reality	of	concrete	actions,	is	bound	to	invite	new	wars	to	be	waged	around	the	division	 of	 master	 and	 slave.	 The	 incorporeality	 of	 the	 permanent	 spiritual	combat	 of	 the	 soul	 will	 be	 mirrored	 by	 the	 corporeality	 of	 struggling	 bodies	engaged	 in	 perpetual	 conquest.	 Unlike	 the	 archaic	 form	 of	 combat,	 as	 the	temporally	 limited	 form	 of	 the	 sway	 of	 phusis,	 the	 exaltation	 of	 affect,	 there	really	 is	 no	 end	 to	 this	 struggle	 in	which	 the	 soul	must	 answer	 to	 the	 idea	 of	freedom	and	the	form	of	conquest.	It	is	the	outbreak	of	a	certain	kind	of	war	that	begins	to	appear	on	the	inside	of	the	polis	where	the	exchanges	of	free	men	are	to	take	place.	 It	seems	we	find	the	first	account	of	this	war	in	a	passage	of	the	
Laws.	Here,	it	appears	in	close	connection	to	the	resemblance	between	the	mind,	the	strategic	schema	of	 the	militia,	and	the	 laws	of	Spartan	society.	Discussing	Spartan	and	Cretan	laws,	Cleinias	says	to	the	Athenian:	“…	the	Cretan	legislator	
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established	 every	 one	 of	 our	 institutions,	 both	 in	 the	 public	 sphere	 and	 the	private,	with	an	eye	on	war,	and	that	this	was	the	spirit	in	which	he	gave	us	his	laws	for	us	to	keep	up.	He	was	convinced	that	if	we	don’t	come	out	on	top	in	war,	nothing	 that	 we	 possess	 or	 do	 in	 peace-time	 is	 of	 the	 slightest	 use…”	 (Laws	626a-c).	 For,	 says	Cleinias	of	 the	Cretan	 legislator	only	 a	 few	 lines	 earlier:	 “In	this	[legislation],	I	think,	he	censured	the	stupidity	of	ordinary	men,	who	do	not	understand	that	they	are	all	engaged	in	a	never-ending	lifelong	war	against	all	other	 city-states.”	 (Ibid.	625e).	The	polis	is	 engaged	 in	a	perpetual	war	among	
poleis.	The	Athenian	does	not	dispute	this.	In	fact,	the	war	among	poleis	is	not	of	any	particular	concern	to	Plato. For	there	is	another	kind	of	war,	the	Athenian	explains	to	Cleinias,	a	war	that	is	much	worse	than	the	one	against	an	external	enemy.	In	fact,	this	kind	of	war	“…	is	the	last	thing	a	man	would	want	to	see”.	It	is	the	war,	which	stems	from	the	“war	against	ourselves	within	each	one	of	us”,	the	war	 in	which	each	one	of	us	 is	either	the	 ‘conqueror	of’	or	 ‘conquered	by’,	the	Athenian	explains.	In	 a	 passage,	which	Hobbes	may	have	had	 in	mind	when	he	defined	 the	principle	 of	 the	 state	 of	 nature,	we	 find	 the	 famous	 idea	on	which	 terrain	 the	principle	of	sovereign	power	in	time	would	occur:	“…	everyone	[is]	an	enemy	of	everyone	 else	 in	 the	 public	 sphere,”	 Plato	 has	 Cleinias	 saying,	 as	 he	 identifies	
polemos,	not	in	terms	of	agōnia,	but	at	the	site	of	perpetual	enmity	[neikos]	and	conquest	 [nikaō]	 (Ibid.	 626d-628a).	 A	 battlefront	 runs	 through	 the	 whole	 of	Classical	 Greek	 society,	 continuously	 and	 permanently,	 as	 the	 struggle	 for	domination	divides	it	against	itself,	pitting	one	man	against	the	other.	But	this	is	clearly	no	 longer	 the	 kind	of	war	 once	discovered	 in	 the	 friendship	with	war.	
Agōnia	no	longer	has	a	positive	relation	to	action	[agein].	On	the	contrary,	action	cannot	 seem	 to	 find	 an	 expression	 outside	 of	 the	 relationship	 of	 neikos,	 the	conquest	of	the	self	and	the	other.	Man	is	called	upon	to	rule	over	his	soul,	but	it	is	for	the	same	reason	that	revolts	and	revolutions	become	still	more	numerous.		So	 we	 find	 Aristotle	 devoting	 the	 entire	 book	 V	 of	 the	 Politics	 to	 the	problem	 of	 revolts	 and	 revolutions,	 in	 particular,	 in	 relation	 to	 forms	 of	government.	While	the	arkhē	rules	both	man	and	kosmos,	since	the	conquest	is	the	condition	of	possibility	of	freedom	the	free	man	cannot	seem	to	find	a	form	of	 government,	which	will	 enable	harmonia	 and	hence	 the	perfect	 community	
	 193	
devoted	 to	 life	 according	 to	 the	 good.	 One	 is	 always	 the	 ‘conqueror	 of’	 or	‘conquered	by’	wherefore	these	tense	force	relations	cannot	seem	to	find	a	form	of	government	that	will	render	them	stable:		Now,	 in	 oligarchies	 the	 masses	 make	 revolution	 under	 the	 idea	 that	 they	 are	unjustly	treated,	because,	as	I	said	before,	they	are	equals,	and	have	not	an	equal	share,	and	 in	democracies	 the	notables	revolt,	because	 they	are	not	equals,	and	yet	have	only	an	equal	share.	Again,	the	situation	of	cities	is	a	cause	of	revolution	when	the	country	is	not	naturally	adapted	to	preserve	the	unity	of	the	state.	For	example,	the	Chytians	at	Clazomenae	did	not	agree	with	the	people	of	the	island;	and	the	people	of	Colophon	quarrelled	with	the	Notians…	For	just	as	 in	war	the	impediment	 of	 a	 ditch,	 though	 ever	 so	 small,	 may	 break	 a	 regiment,	 so	 every	cause	of	difference,	however	slight,	makes	a	breach	in	a	city.	(Politics	1303b:	5-16).		While	initially	drawing	up	the	schism	of	the	oligarchic	and	democratic	models	of	ruling,	Aristotle	finds	that	both	are	prone	to	revolts	and	even	revolutions.	This	is	because	 the	 government	 of	 self	 and	 the	 order	 of	 arkhē	 basically	 constitute	 a	system	 of	 rank,	 which	 is	 at	 rest	 only	 when	 it	 is	 on	 the	 move,	 an	 ‘unmoved	movement’	whose	 constraint	 consist	precisely	 in	being	a	vector	of	movement,	and	 whose	 endpoint	 is	 the	 battle	 and	 the	 clash	 of	 opposite	 forces.	 In	 other	words,	so	long	as	there	is	no	political	structure	to	end	the	war	and	maintain	the	dissymmetry	established	by	 the	 last	conquest,	 this	system	cannot	avoid	revolt	and	revolution.	Aristotle’s	metaphor	about	the	falling	apart	of	 the	ranks	of	 the	regiment,	 as	an	 image	of	 the	 fragility	of	 the	political	order	of	 the	polis,	 should	therefore	be	 taken	quite	 literally.	There	 seems	 to	be	no,	or	 at	 least	 very	 little,	political	structure	to	give	the	power	to	one	side	in	the	struggle	and	establish	a	permanent	relationship	of	force.	The	steering	of	the	ranks	of	the	stratia	and	the	ruling	of	 the	polis	are	 in	other	words	subject	 to	 the	 fundamental	problem	that	occurs,	as	things	must	find	their	resemblance	in	the	arkhē	and	the	division	into	subject	 and	 ruling	 element.	 For	 while	 all	 things	 must	 answer	 to	 their	 true	identity	of	either	subject	or	ruling	element,	it	seems	the	weaker	will	not	submit	to	the	stronger,	just	as	the	ignorant	will	never	give	up	in	the	struggle	against	the	wise	man.	The	weaker	will	declare	himself	the	equal	of	the	stronger,	while	the	stronger	 will	 never	 give	 up	 his	 position	 as	 master.	 This	 is	 the	 safe	 rule,	
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Thucydides	 says	while	 balancing	 the	 scales	 of	 power:	 “…	 to	 stand	up	 to	 one’s	equals,	 to	 behave	 with	 deference	 towards	 one’s	 superiors,	 and	 to	 treat	 one’s	inferiors	with	moderation	[sōphrosynē]”	(V.111).	But	 the	safe	rule	 is	precisely	the	 rule	 of	 war	 because	 both	 man	 and	 polis	 strive	 to	 prevent	 inferiors	 from	becoming	 equals,	 and	 equals	 from	 gaining	 the	 upper	 hand	 and	 becoming	superiors,	as	well	as	making	sure	that	superiors	do	not	become	too	dominant.	The	safe	rule	of	mind	in	other	words	always	seems	to	become	entangled	in	the	play	of	polemos	where	 it	cannot	assert	 itself	and	 finally	conquer	phusis	to	give	the	power	to	political	man.	Man	cannot	seem	to	get	away	from	polemos,	as	the	one	whose	desire	is	ruled	by	war	breaks	the	regiments	of	the	stratia	and	tears	down	 the	 city	walls	 from	 the	 inside.	 The	war	 that	 goes	 on	 at	 all	 times	 in	 the	relationships	 of	 forces	 is	 intensified	 as	 the	 necessity	 of	 conquest,	 articulated	around	 the	difference	between	subject	and	ruling	element,	will	 continue	 to	be	reinvested	in	the	relationships	of	forces	as	the	principle	of	order.	War	will	then	be	waged	on	the	basis	of	slight	differences.95	So,	while	Aristotle	takes	the	greatest	care	to	explain	how	the	relationship	of	master	and	slave	is	given	by	nature,	as	constituted	in	the	arkhē	of	kosmos,	the	strategic	schema	of	ruling	and	subject	element,	of	victor	and	vanquished,	cannot	seem	to	function	as	a	stable	form	of	order	in	the	polis.	Again,	this	is	because	no	equals	can	be	 found	 in	a	system	of	 rank	where	 the	 freedom	and	action	of	one	man	will	only	be	had	from	the	conquest	of	the	other.	Aristotle	realises	this.	The	problem	is	how	to	avoid	the	conquest	among	the	ones	who	are	supposed	to	be	equals	 or,	 better	 yet,	 how	 to	 eliminate	 the	 law	 of	 conquest,	 which,	 in	 the	relations	among	free	men,	seems	threaten	the	possibility	of	living	well	and	the	end	 of	 political	 community.	 Therefore,	 in	 a	 passage	 of	 the	 Politics,	 we	 find	
																																																								95	When	looking	at	the	causes	for	waging	war	against	cities	and	individuals,	we	can	see	how	these	‘slight	differences’,	Aristotle	speaks	of,	come	into	play.	Not	that	the	Greeks	would	lay	waste	to	armies	and	burn	cities	to	the	ground	because	of	minor	insults,	quarrels,	or	light	skirmishes,	nonetheless,	such	events	would	often	be	sufficient	‘causes’	for	waging	war.	When,	for	example,	Sparta	declared	war	on	Elis	in	402	BC,	it	was	to	reassert	itself	on	the	grounds	of	the	allegedly	disrespectful	treatment	Elis	had	given	Sparta	over	the	subsequent	20	years.	That	is,	the	Eleans	had	banned	the	Spartans	from	competing	in	the	Olympic	games	in	420	BC,	and	publicly	whipped	a	prominent	Spartan	who	in	defiance	of	the	ban	had	surreptitiously	entered	a	team	for	the	chariot	race.	This	episode	taken	together	with	a	second,	where	the	Eleans	had	denied	the	Spartan	king	Agis	the	right	to	perform	a	sacrifice	at	the	altar	of	Zeus,	were	sufficient	grounds	for	Sparta	to	declare	war.	According	to	van	Wees,	there	are	numerous	accounts	of	similar	incidents	(2004:	24).	
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Aristotle	 discussing	 the	 conquest	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 problem	 of	 slavery.	 Here,	Aristotle	is	careful	to	explain	that	one	must	distinguish	between	two	meanings	of	slavery.	There	is	the	‘slave	by	nature’	and	then	there	is	the	‘slave	by	law’,	that	is,	the	law	of	conquest;	“the	law	by	which	whatever	is	taken	in	war	is	supposed	to	belong	to	the	victors.”	(Politics	1255a:	5-7).	Having	discerned	the	taxonomy	of	 slaves	 in	 terms	of	 custom	and	nature,	Aristotle	 then	proceeds	 to	 refute	 the	idea	 of	 slavery	 by	 custom	 by	 posing	 the	 problem	 of	 conquest	 in	 terms	 of	 the	virtue	of	 justice	[dikē]:	“Others,	clinging,	as	they	think,	simply	to	a	principle	of	justice	 (for	 law	 and	 custom	 are	 a	 form	 of	 justice),	 assume	 that	 slavery	 in	accordance	with	the	custom	of	war	is	justified	by	law,	but	at	the	same	moment	they	deny	this.	For	what	if	the	cause	of	the	war	be	unjust?”	(Ibid.	1255a:	21-24).	If	the	cause	of	the	war	is	unjust,	Aristotle	explains,	then	the	subordination	of	men	by	means	of	conquest	is	equally	unjust	and	happens	against	nature.	For	what	is	a	most	unjust	and	against	nature	is	the	desire	to	make	the	man	a	slave	‘who	is	unworthy	to	be	a	slave’.	This	is	also	why	“…	Hellenes	do	not	like	to	call	Hellenes	 slaves,	 but	 confine	 the	 term	 to	 barbarians.”	 (Ibid.	 1255a:	 25-29).	 By	nature,	on	the	contrary,	the	superior	in	virtue	rules	over	the	natural	slave	and,	in	doing	so,	he	does	nothing	but	exercise	his	superiority	in	virtue	thus	realising	the	relationship	of	dominance	already	given	by	nature.	The	 free	man	does	not	rule	 over	 the	 one	 who	 is	 unworthy	 to	 be	 a	 slave,	 because	 no	 relationship	 of	slavery	 can	 exist	 among	 men	 of	 equal	 excellence	 and	 virtue.	 This	 is	 why,	 by	nature,	the	superior	in	virtue	conquers	only	himself	and	the	inferior	in	virtue.	In	fact,	 conquest	 or	 no	 conquest,	 it	 is	 all	 the	 same,	 Aristotle	 says,	 because	what	matters	is	what	is	higher	in	virtue,	and	what	is	higher	in	virtue	is	to	follow	the	principle	 of	 justice.	 Justice,	 then,	 provides	 the	 solution	 to	 the	 problem	of	 free	men	conquering	other	free	men.	It	is	the	principle	according	to	which	slavery	by	law	 of	 conquest	 is	 excluded	 from	 the	polis	while,	 at	 the	 same	 time,	 being	 the	principle	 upon	 which,	 through	 a	 simultaneous	 inclusion,	 the	 relationship	 of	master	and	natural	slave	enables	the	oikonomia	as	a	practice	of	living	well.	Thus	Aristotle	neutralises	the	problem	of	conquest	by	affirming	the	originarity	of	the	principle	of	justice.	It	is	basically	the	same	argument	we	find	in	Plato	in	the	passage	where	he	discusses	the	war	of	every	man	against	every	man	in	the	public	sphere.	The	war	
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in	which	everyone	 is	enemy	of	everyone	else	must	be	warded	off	precisely	by	recourse	to	the	principle	of	 justice.	But	how	must	we	understand	this	sense	of	justice	 [dikē];	 what	 is	 the	 genealogy	 of	 the	 term	 and	 how	 can	 it	 provide	 an	effective	solution	to	the	problem	of	war	and	conquest?	In	the	Republic,	we	never	find	 an	 actual	 account	 of	dikē.	 In	 Socrates,	dikē	 seems	 to	 refer	 to	 the	 specific	constitution	 and	 founding	 conditions	 of	 each	 polis.96	Yet,	 dikē	 is	 neither	 an	element	found	within	the	polis	nor	a	property	of	man.	In	Plato	and	Xenophon,	it	seems	dikē	is	rather	understood	as	a	virtue	that	sustains	and	perfects	the	other	three	cardinal	virtues,	wisdom,	moderation,	and	courage.97	In	fact,	dikē	seems	to	be	the	cause	of	the	other	virtues	being	the	result	of	the	‘well-ordered’	soul;	dikē	is	what	occurs	as	the	effect	of	the	soul	bringing	itself	 to	be	in	accordance	with	the	 ruling	 principle.	 This	 is	 how,	 on	 the	 contrary,	 if	 the	 soul	 is	 in	 a	 state	 of	disorder	 and	 in	 discord	with	 the	 ruling	 principle,	man	will	 be	 ‘inferior’	 in	 his	actions	 and	 prone	 to	 the	 causes	 of	 sin	 –	 appetite,	 spiritedness,	 and	 ignorance	[agnoia]	–	that	will	rule	him	making	him	unjust.	This	is	often	the	case	in	‘bad	or	corrupted	natures’,	Aristotle	explains,	where,	 “…	the	body	will	often	appear	 to	rule	 over	 the	 soul,	 because	 they	 are	 in	 a	 wretched	 and	 unnatural	 condition.”	(Politics	1254a:	39;	1254b:	1-2).	Basically,	 it	 is	 the	 same	 logic	 that	 guides	 the	Athenian	 in	 the	 Laws	 (863b-c),	 as	 he	 explains	 how	 one	 must	 distinguish	between	justice	and	injustice	[adikia]:		The	domination	of	passion	and	fear	and	pleasure	and	pain	and	envies	and	desires	in	the	soul,	whether	they	do	any	injury	or	not,	I	term	generally	‘injustice’;	but	the	belief	 in	 the	highest	good	–	 in	whatsoever	way	either	cities	or	 individuals	 think	they	can	attain	to	it,	–	if	this	prevails	in	their	souls	and	regulates	every	man,	even	if	 some	damage	be	done,	we	must	 assert	 that	 everything	 thus	done	 is	 just,	 and	that	in	each	man	the	part	subject	to	this	governance	is	also	just,	and	best	for	the	whole	life	of	mankind…	(863e-864a).																																																										96	In	example,	Plato	draws	on	the	‘earth	born’	myth	according	to	which	men	believe	that	they	are	born	from	the	earth	and	from	birth	have	a	certain	nature	they	are	destined	to	fulfill.	Accordingly,	Socrates	arrives	at	his	definition	of	justice	as	that	of	man	"working	at	that	which	he	is	naturally	best	suited,"	and	"to	do	one's	own	business	and	not	to	be	a	busybody"	(Republic	433a-433b).	97	In	Cyropaedia	(VIII),	Xenophon	also	describes	justice	as	one	among	five	virtues,	the	other	four	being	wisdom,	courage,	piety,	and	moderation,	and	in	book	IV	of	Plato’s	Republic	(430e)	we	find	a	similar	taxonomy	of	justice,	courage,	wisdom,	and	moderation.	
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The	well-ordered	soul,	then,	is	what	provides	men	with	the	sense	of	justice.	But	the	soul,	as	we	saw,	is	precisely	the	site	of	war	and	conquest,	in	which	it	never	seems	to	be	able	to	bring	itself	in	a	permanent	state	of	order.	Dikē	is	subverted	by	that	‘one	element	in	the	soul	that	cannot	be	conquered’,	spiritedness,	“which	is	 an	 inbred	 quality	 of	 a	 contentious	 and	 pugnacious	 kind,	 and	 one	 that	overturns	many	things	by	its	irrational	force.”	(Ibid.	863b).	It	happens	then	that	man	 has	 no	 sense	 of	 justice	 in	 which	 case,	 Aristotle	 says,	 he	 is	 “…	 the	 most	unholy	and	the	most	savage	of	animals,	and	the	most	full	of	lust	[aphrodisia]	and	gluttony.”	(Politics	1253a:	36-37).	
Dikē	seems	to	concern	a	matter	of	virtue	[arētē]	then.	But	is	this	sense	of	virtue	not	precisely	what	enables	the	logic	of	conquest	in	the	first	place;	is	it	not	the	very	principle	that	supports	 it?	 Indeed,	but	how	must	we	then	understand	the	 line	of	reasoning	we	find	 in	Plato	and	Aristotle?	Clearly,	 it	 is	not	 likely	 the	expression	of	 an	 accidental	 tautological	 error	 or	 a	 contradiction	 in	 terms	 that	now	shows	up	in	the	two	master	thinkers	of	the	classical	period,	so	what	 is	at	stake	in	this	paradoxical	conviction	that	harmonia	is	to	be	found	in	arētē	in	the	sense	of	the	very	principle	of	‘the	war	against	ourselves	within	each	one	of	us’?	As	 we	 have	 seen,	 the	 idea	 of	 arētē	 is	 not	 without	 a	 history	 of	 its	 own.	 In	 its	archaic	setting,	arētē	occurs	in	close	proximity	with	arēios,	the	adjective	form	of	Arēs,	expressing	the	highest	praise	that	places	the	strife	of	the	polemistēs	among	the	deeds	and	acts	of	gods.	In	Plato,	however,	we	have	seen	how	the	meaning	of	
arētē	seems	to	undergo	a	remarkable	transformation.	Arētē	 is	transposed	from	the	planes	of	Troy	and	the	ancient	ritual	of	chariot	fighting	to	reappear	beyond	
phusis	 in	 the	 realm	of	 the	 struggling	 soul	at	which	 site	 it	 is	understood	as	 the	virtue	of	conquering	oneself.	Virtue	and	excellence	will	then	resemble	quite	the	opposite	of	archaic	arētē,	namely,	the	virtue	of	sōphrosynē.	We	should	also	recall	how	 this	 displacement	 of	 archaic	 arētē	 occurs	 in	 the	 Republic	 where	 Plato	dedicates	 almost	 the	 entire	 treatise	 to	 persuading	 Polemarchus	 [war	 leader]	and	 his	 band	 of	 warriors	 about	 the	 truth	 of	 this	 unusual	 resemblance,	 the	resemblance	 wherein	 arētē	 is	 brought	 to	 adhere	 to	 the	 eidos	 of	 sōphrosynē,	which	must	then	be	imitated	in	the	domain	of	the	real.	Finally,	we	must	keep	in	mind	how	Aristotle,	in	his	predication	of	man	as	a	
politikon	zōon,	 is	most	concerned	to	show	that	 the	sense	of	arētē	attributed	to	
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the	friendship	of	war	must	in	fact	be	considered	as	something	wholly	unnatural,	the	expression	of	the	domination	of	desire	by	war.	Also,	we	must	keep	in	mind	how	 the	 tragedians	 seem	 to	 agree,	 as	 the	 archaic	 hērōs	 turns	 up	 as	 the	disordered	 player	 of	 the	 Same	 and	 the	 Other,	 exposed	 in	 his	 delusional	intensities.	In	fact,	this	trajectory	provides	a	first	clue	to	what	is	at	stake	in	Plato	and	 Aristotle.	 When	 we	 find	 the	 archaic	 hērōs	 in	 Aristotle,	 he	 clearly	 seems	hopelessly	outmoded	and	reduced	to	his	own	fury.	Yet,	in	his	account	of	man	as	a	politikon	zōon,	the	philosopher	still	bothers	to	conjure	up	this	corrupted	image	of	 the	 archaic	 warrior.	 That	 is	 to	 say,	 Aristotelian	 and	 Platonic	 discourse	 on	virtue	seems	to	appear	on	the	historical	terrain	of	a	certain	struggle,	where	the	sense	of	virtue	associated	with	the	warrior	is	contested,	displaced,	and	reversed.	All	this	is	to	say	that	if	we	are	to	understand	what	is	at	stake	in	the	concern	in	Plato	and	Aristotle	about	the	conquest,	and	their	conviction	to	make	the	virtue	of	dikē	 the	 arbiter	 of	 the	war	 of	 every	man	 against	 every	man,	 then	we	must	seek	to	inquire	further	into	the	historical	reality	in	which	we	find	the	discourse	on	conquest	and	arētē.	It	seems	to	me	that	this	discourse	begins	to	appear	in	the	aftermath	 of	 the	 Peloponnesian	 War,	 which,	 according	 to	 Thucydides,	 was	perhaps	the	single	greatest	event	the	Greek	world	had	seen.	The	defeat	of	Athens	by	Sparta	had	manifested	itself	and	continued	to	do	so	in	many	ways.	The	Spartan	conquest	was	the	stigmata	of	the	foreign	presence	that	 seems	 to	 have	 produced	 a	 long-standing	 division.	 Under	 the	 rule	 of	 The	Thirty	Tyrants,	 the	pro-Spartan	oligarchy	installed	in	Athens	after	 its	defeat	 in	the	war,	the	Athenians	did	not	enjoy	the	same	rights	as	their	conquerors.	This	is	the	context	in	which	we	first	find	the	discourse	on	the	conquest	that	claims	the	resemblance	 of	 arētē	 and	 dikē.	 Now,	 arētē	 was	 the	 very	 mark	 of	 Spartan	authority,	but	not	in	the	sense	of	dikē	it	now	begins	to	attain	on	the	side	of	the	vanquished.	 As	 the	 threshold	 to	 the	 classical	 period	 is	 crossed	 with	 the	Peloponnesian	 War,	 an	 obvious	 disparity	 has	 emerged	 in	 the	 meaning	attributed	 to	arētē.	 In	 fact,	 this	 is	 already	apparent	 in	 the	 classical	 tragedians’	discovery	of	heroic	rage	as	disorder	and	madness.	In	the	classical	poets,	but	also	in	 Herodotus,	 we	 can	 see	 the	 divide	 widening,	 as	 in	 Herodotus’	 account	 of	Aristodemus	where	 he	 praises	 the	warrior	 for	 an	 archaic	 sense	 of	 arētē	 now	denounced	by	the	Spartans.	Some	fifty	years	later	Plato	then	manages	to	make	
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arētē	 resemble	sōphrosynē,	 a	 resemblance	 that	would	have	been	 impossible	 in	the	archaic	world,	and	which	still	seems	controversial	and	worthy	of	dispute,	as	attested	to	in	the	probing	and	interrogative	discourse	of	the	Athenian.	However,	as	we	seen,	this	complete	reversal	of	the	archaic	sense	of	arētē	we	find	in	Plato	is	not	so	much	to	be	attributed	to	the	erudition	of	philosophia	that	has	begun	to	read	 the	world	 and	 the	 fiction	 of	 eidos	 as	 parts	 of	 the	 same	 text.	 Rather,	 the	disparity	that	occurs	in	the	meaning	of	arētē	seems	to	have	been	given	birth	to,	in	particular,	by	the	Spartan	practice	of	askēsis.	While	the	archaic	sense	of	arētē	was	 strongly	 admired	 by	 the	 Spartan	warrior	 aristocracy,	 we	 have	 seen	 how	archaic	 arētē	 was	 in	 fact	 rather	 contradictory	 to	 the	 principle	 of	 steering	 the	
militia	 and	 the	 herding	 of	 boys	 in	 the	 practice	 of	 paideia;	 the	 pure	 catatonic	display	of	 force	brings	a	rupture	to	bear	on	the	relationships	of	 forces	making	no	 steering	 possible.	 This	 ambiguous	 ontological	 status	 now	 found	 in	 arētē,	where	archaic	arētē	is	yet	admired,	but	becoming	increasingly	difficult	to	praise	as	virtue,	now	turns	against	the	victors	of	the	Peloponnesian	War.	The	Athenians	take	aim	at	the	heart	of	this	disparity	in	a	counter-attack	to	destroy	the	remains	of	the	archaic	resemblance	of	arētē,	bia	[force],	and	kratos	[power]	as	a	claim	to	political	authority	[dunamis	te	politikē].	What	is	at	stake	in	Platonic	and	Aristotelian	discourse	on	dikē,	then,	is	not	simply	the	mere	threat	of	 the	war	of	every	man	against	every	man.	Rather,	 it	concerns	 the	actual	and	manifest	 form	of	 the	 Spartan	 conquest	 and	 its	 exigencies.	 In	 fact,	 this	 is	what	guides	Aristotle	in	the	Politics	when	he	says	that	slavery	in	accordance	with	the	custom	of	war	is	the	expression	of	adikia.	It	is	how	the	desire	to	make	the	man	a	slave	‘who	is	unworthy	to	be	a	slave’	is	in	fact	not	only	unjust,	but	also	‘fit	for	no	Greek’.	The	discourse	on	dikē,	as	we	find	it	Plato	and	Aristotle,	does	not	concern	the	simple	matter	of	the	well-ordered	soul	then,	but	the	very	principle	of	power.	It	 is	 the	 contestation	of	 the	ancient	 claim	 to	authority	 [dunamis]	of	 force	 [bia,	kratos]	issuing	from	the	archaic	warrior	aristocracy.	Here,	it	is	essential	to	note	that	 the	word	 ‘bia’	 was	 not,	 as	 asserted	 by	 Agamben,	 understood	 in	 terms	 of	certain	moral	 codes,	 that	 is,	 as	 ‘violence’.	 The	moral	 transcription	 of	 physical	force	is	not	carried	out	before	the	birth	of	pastoral	power	where	weakness	will	become	a	virtue.	
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When	busying	oneself	with	the	Greeks,	one	should	in	other	words	keep	in	mind	that	 ‘what	is	higher	in	rank	is	what	is	stronger’,	as	Heidegger	says	in	the	
Introduction	 to	Metaphysics	 (2000:	 141).	 In	 the	 strict	 sense,	 then,	bia	 denotes	the	kind	of	force	one	associates	with	the	strength	and	vigour	which	is	written	on	the	body	of	warrior	and	displayed	 in	makhē	 [combat].	Homer	sometimes	uses	the	word	 interchangeably	with	kratos	 [dominance]	 in	 the	 sense	 of	 expressing	the	physical	power	to	defeat	or	subdue	an	opponent.	Here,	we	can	see	the	very	tangible	 sense	 attributed	 to	 power	 at	 this	 point	 in	 time.	 To	 the	 Greeks,	 the	physical	 power	 of	 dominance	 [kratos]	 resembles	 the	 ability	 or	 capability	 to	exercise	authority.	When	this	resemblance	of	the	claim	to	authority	occurs,	we	often	 find	 the	mark	of	 superiority	 tied	 to	 signs	of	 divine	origin.	 So	Alexander,	king	of	Macedon,	would	assert	dunamis	[authority]	by	claiming	decadency	from	Heracles,	 having	 led	 the	 Greeks	 to	 victory	 at	 the	 Battle	 of	 Plataea.	 It	 is	 the	articulation	 of	 authority	 as	 lineage	 in	 the	 seizure	 of	 signs	 that	 resemble	 the	martial	divinities;	arētē,	kratos,	and	bia.	Far	from	expressing	a	certain	pastoral	sense	of	injustice,	kratos	and	bia	are	seen	as	the	basis	of	dunamis	rather	than	as	confined	 to	 the	 semantic	 sphere	 of	 violence.	 By	 the	 time	 Plato	 and	 Aristotle	write	 their	 political	 treatises,	 this	 basically	 has	 not	 changed.	 In	 the	 Gorgias	(484b:	1-10),	Plato	is	therefore	not	really	concerned	with	a	deliberation	on	dikē	and	 bia	 in	 the	 sense	 of	 the	 ‘sovereign	 confusion	 of	 justice	 and	 violence’,	 as	Agamben	 tells	 us	 (1998:	 35).	 What	 is	 at	 stake	 in	 both	 Aristotle	 and	 Plato	(though	more	so	in	Plato,	since	this	is	in	fact	a	theme	in	both	the	Gorgias	and	the	
Republic)	 is	rather	the	 intrinsically	politico-strategic	attempt	of	contesting	and	supplanting	the	physiognomic	claim	to	authority	of	bia	and	kratos,	issuing	from	the	 signs	 written	 on	 the	 body	 of	 the	 warrior,	 or,	 in	 the	 scorning	 language	 of	Aristotle,	the	one	whose	desire	is	ruled	by	war.	This	political	strategy	appears	most	obviously	 in	Plato’s	discourse	on	the	tyrant	 (Republic	 577d).	 In	 Plato,	 the	 tyrant	 is	 essentially	 the	 archaic	 warrior	having	 become	 king.	 Like	 the	 warrior,	 the	 tyrant	 is	 seemingly	 unable	 to	 rule	over	 thumos	 and	 epithumia.	 In	 particular	 in	 book	 IX	 of	 the	Republic,	we	 learn	how	 the	 tyrant’s	 lack	 of	 self-mastery	 and	 desire	 for	 self-indulgence	 are	irreconcilable	 with	 the	 ruling	 of	 the	 polis,	 making	 him	 a	 threat	 to	 political	community.	His	rule	results	in	adikia	and	the	suffering	of	the	famous	innocents	
	 201	
who	 died	 at	 break	 of	 day.	 Appearing	 in	 the	 aftermath	 of	 the	 civil	 war	 that	followed	 the	Peloponnesian	War	with	 the	 rule	of	The	Thirty	Tyrants,	 Platonic	discourse	on	bia	is	basically	a	discourse	that	tries	to	cut	off	the	tyrant’s	head.98	But	it	is	also	the	discourse	of	the	vanquished,	a	discourse	spoken	by	pious	men	of	virtue	and	self-mastery	who	now	hold	the	tyrant	accountable	for	the	disparity	found	 in	arētē.	Arētē	 cannot	both	resemble	bia	 and	sōphrosynē,	 force	and	self-restraint,	 but	 must	 be	 located	 on	 the	 right	 side	 of	 the	 division	 that	 has	 now	appeared	 in	 the	 rift	 inflicted	 on	 the	 social	 body	by	 the	war.	 It	 is	 the	 strategic	mobilisation	of	arētē	as	sōphrosynē,	the	practice	of	self-mastery	as	a	weapon	in	a	war	 over	 the	 claim	 to	 authority;	 it	 is	 the	 deployment	 of	 the	 principle	 of	 an	
askēsis	in	the	attempt	to	displace	the	axis	of	authority	in	a	complete	reversal	of	the	ancient	hierarchy	of	strength.	Specifically,	in	the	ruling	of	the	polis,	in	fact	in	all	kinds	of	ruling,	man	must	answer,	not	 to	 the	virtue	of	bia	 and	kratos	 or	divine	origin,	but	 to	 the	kind	of	virtue	 that	 issues	 from	 the	 disciplines	 of	 the	 practice	 of	 askēsis,	 namely,	 the	urgency	of	dikē.	Returning	to	the	dialogue	in	the	Laws,	where	Plato	discusses	the	war	of	every	man	against	every	man,	we	can	see	that	this	is	precisely	what	the	Athenian	 has	 in	 mind	 as	 he	 confronts	 the	 problem	 of	 conquest.	 The	 wise	legislator	must	seek	to	ward	off	the	war	of	every	man	against	every	man,	either	by	‘putting	the	virtuous	in	command’	or	by	reconciling	the	individuals	‘by	laying	down	 regulations	 to	 guide	 them’,	 the	 Athenian	 explains	 as	 he	 draws	 on	 an	analogy	to	the	oikos	and	the	quarrelling	family	(Laws	626d-628a).	This	sense	of	virtuousness,	which	also	defines	the	regulations	to	guide	men,	 is	derived	 from	the	 kind	 of	 authority	 in	which	dunamis	 te	politikē	 is	what	 emerges	 from	dikē,	
sōphrosynē,	and	the	kind	of	wisdom	[phronēsis]	that	belongs	to	the	sound	mind.	We	 are	 not	 talking	 about	 juridical	 categories	 then.	We	 are	 rather	 at	 the	 state	that	precedes	the	birth	of	the	categories	of	a	certain	jurisprudence.	As	we	learn	in	 Plato’s	 elaboration	 on	 justice	 in	 the	 Republic,	 dikē	 is	 tied	 to	 the	 self-relationship	of	 the	 sound	mind	 in	 its	 relation	 to	 the	eidos	 of	 the	highest	good.																																																									98	In	Plato's	Apology,	Socrates	recounts	an	incident	in	which	the	Thirty	once	ordered	him	(and	four	other	men)	to	bring	before	them	Leon	of	Salamis,	a	man	supposedly	known	for	his	justice	and	upright	character,	for	execution.	While	the	other	four	men	obeyed,	Socrates	refused,	not	wanting	to	partake	in	the	guilt	of	the	executioners.	By	disobeying,	Socrates	knew	he	was	placing	his	own	life	in	jeopardy,	and	claimed	it	was	only	the	disbanding	of	the	oligarchy	soon	afterwards	that	saved	his	life	(Apology	32c-d).	
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Although	 Plato	 never	 offers	 an	 exhaustive	 explanation	 of	 the	 relationship	between	the	good,	dikē,	and	the	mind,	we	can	see	that	dikē	seems	derived	from	the	form	of	the	highest	good,	and,	in	this	form,	justice	resembles	the	soundness	of	mind	of	the	well-ordered	soul.	This	is	how,	eventually,	it	will	be	found	in	that	only	such	well-ordered	soul	can	acquire	 the	proper	knowledge	of	ruling,	since	what	allows	man	to	rule	is	neither	bia	nor	kratos,	but	rather	the	conjunction	of	knowledge	and	virtue	enabling	the	wise	ruler	 to	grasp	and	pursue	the	highest	good.	 It	 is	 the	 birth	 of	 a	 new	 resemblance	 of	 dunamis	 te	 politikē,	 a	 new	circularity	 of	 the	 claim	 to	 authority,	 if	 you	 like.	 It	 is	 the	 entry	 into	 the	relationships	of	forces	of	the	idea	of	political	authority	as	a	certain	abstract	form	of	 power	 articulated	 by	 the	 resemblance	 dikē-sōphrōn-sōphrosynē,	 a	 form	 of	power	and	authority	that	is	higher	in	rank	than	the	ancient	resemblance	of	bia-
kratos-arētē.	This	 is	how	we	must	understand	Plato’s	preoccupation	 in	 the	Laws	with	the	war	of	every	man	against	every	man.	The	claim	to	authority	of	dikē-sōphrōn-
sōphrosynē	relies	precisely	on	the	suspension	of	the	war	in	which	bia	and	kratos	constitute	 arētē.	 In	 fact,	 this	 form	 of	 power	 and	 authority	 cannot	 come	 into	being	without	 the	 suspension	 of	 the	 corporeality	 of	 this	war	 that	 governs	 the	exchanges	of	men.	The	suspension	of	the	physical	power	of	dominance	is	both	the	very	principle	that	defines	this	power	and	what	threatens	to	overthrow	the	primacy	of	this	art	of	ruling.	While	not	the	most	ancient	recorded	formulation	of	the	will	to	sanitise	the	essential	relationship	between	man	and	polemos,	it	seems	to	 me	 that	 Plato	 is	 the	 first	 thinker	 to	 introduce	 into	 the	 bios	 politikos	 the	urgency	 of	 the	 seizure	 of	 this	 war	 in	 the	 public	 sphere	 as	 a	 condition	 of	possibility	 of	 the	 good,	 which,	 as	 have	 seen,	 was	 to	 guide	 Aristotle	 in	 the	discovery	of	a	certain	political	calling	in	Western	culture.	Now,	with	the	arrival	of	the	claim	to	authority	of	dikē-sōphrōn-sōphrosynē	we	 have	 effectively	 crossed	 the	 threshold	 to	 the	 classical	 bios	 politikos.	 It	 is	important	to	note,	though,	that	this	model	of	authority	will	not	replace	the	old	one,	nor	are	 they	 incompatible	models.	We	are	still	 in	a	system	of	rank	where	the	 former	 gradually	 seems	 to	 overlay	 the	 later	 in	 the	 formation	 of	 a	 certain	
technē	politikē.	By	recourse	 to	 the	 form	of	 the	highest	good,	as	 the	source	and	absolute	 measure	 of	 dikē,	 this	 technē	 politikē	 will	 work	 out	 the	 fundamental	
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question	 of	 the	 political,	 the	 matter	 of	 ‘ruling	 and	 being	 ruled’,	 that	 is,	 the	question	of	who	should	govern:	First,	there	is	the	claim	of	parents	to	rule	over	offspring.	 Second,	 there	 is	 the	 right	 of	 the	noble	 to	 rule	 over	 the	 ignoble;	 and	then,	following	on	these	as	a	third	claim,	the	right	of	older	people	to	rule	and	of	younger	 to	 be	 ruled.	 The	 fourth	 right	 is	 that	 slaves	 ought	 to	 be	 ruled,	 and	masters	 ought	 to	 rule.	 The	 fifth,	 the	 Athenian	 continues,	 is	 that	 the	 stronger	should	rule	and	the	weaker	be	ruled.	The	later	is	certainly	what	prevails	in	the	animal	 kingdom,	 “being	 in	 accordance	 with	 nature	 as	 Pindar	 of	 Thebes	 once	said”,	but	this	is	not	the	most	important	of	the	rights	to	authority:		The	 most	 important	 right	 is,	 it	 would	 seem,	 the	 sixth,	 which	 ordains	 that	 the	ignorant	man	 should	 follow,	 and	 the	wise	man	 lead	 and	 rule.	Nevertheless,	my	most	 sapient	 Pindar,	 this	 is	 a	 thing	 that	 I,	 for	 one,	 would	 hardly	 assert	 to	 be	against	 nature,	 but	 rather	 according	 thereto	 –	 the	 natural	 rule	 of	 law,	 without	force	[ou	biaion],	over	willing	subjects.	(Ibid.	689e-690c).		 In	the	matter	of	ruling	and	being	ruled	the	ignorant	must	follow	the	wise	man	submitting	to	his	steering	then.	This	is	exactly	what	Plato	has	in	mind	in	the	passage	of	the	Laws	where	the	Athenian	tries	to	convince	Cleinias	of	‘putting	the	virtuous	in	command’	seemingly	as	a	means	of	warding	off	the	problem	of	war	and	conquest	in	the	public	sphere.	To	put	the	virtuous	in	command	corresponds,	as	 we	 learned	 from	 the	 distinction	 between	 justice	 and	 injustice,	 to	 place	 in	command	 the	 structure	 of	 the	well-ordered	 soul	 and	hence	 the	 kind	 of	 ruling	that	follows	from	observing	the	other	cardinal	virtues,	courage,	moderation,	and	wisdom.	 The	 virtuous	man	 seeks	 out	 the	 life	 of	wisdom	 [phronimon],	 and,	 in	joining	wisdom	with	the	knowledge	of	ruling,	brings	justice	to	bear	on	his	soul.	This	is	how	the	licentious	life	of	the	unjust	soul	is	often	the	result	of	ignorance	of	the	ruling	principle.	In	fact,	“…	no	man	can	possibly	be	licentious	voluntarily:	it	is	owing	to	 ignorance	or	 incontinence,	or	both,	 that	 the	great	bulk	of	mankind	live	 lives	 lacking	 in	 moderation.”	 (Ibid.	 734b).	 The	 lack	 of	 moderation	 is	 the	result	 of	 ignorance,	 and	 so,	 in	 the	 absence	 of	moderation,	 ignorance	 is	 joined	with	 spiritedness,	 thus	 overturning	 many	 things	 by	 its	 ‘inconsiderate	 force’	[alogistō	bia].	This	is	why	bia	is	inferior	to	wisdom	as	a	claim	to	authority,	and	why,	consequently,	the	ignorant	must	follow	and	the	wise	man	rule.	
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It	has	been	argued	that	what	Plato	has	in	mind	in	the	passage	cited	above,	where	 he	 disputes	 Pindar	 in	 his	 fragment	 169	 on	 the	 nomos	 basileus,	 is	 to	dismantle	and	neutralise	the	opposition	that	justified	 ‘the	sovereign	confusion’	of	bia	and	dikē:	“…	what	interests	Plato	is…	the	coincidence	of	violence	and	law	constitutive	 of	 sovereignty.	 [In	 Plato]	 the	 power	 of	 law	 is	 defined	 as	 being	 in	accordance	with	nature	 (kata	physin)	and	essentially	non-violent…”	 (Agamben	1998:	34).	The	claim	we	find	 in	Agamben	is	 that	Plato	exposes	 in	Pindar	what	was	 allegedly	 seen	 as	 the	 “…	 scandalous	 unification	 of	 the	 two	 essentially	antithetical	principles	that	the	Greeks	called	Bia	and	Dikē,	violence	and	justice.”	(Ibid.	31).	But	this	is	not	true	until	Plato	arrives	at	the	proposition	of	wisdom	as	the	superior	mark	of	the	right	to	rule	or,	more	exactly,	before	the	argument	of	Plato	 is	 taken	 out	 of	 its	 historical	 setting.	What	 appears	 in	 Pindar	 is	 not	 ‘the	scandalous	unification	of	 justice	and	violence’.	Rather,	 it	 is	 the	resemblance	of	
bia	and	the	ancient	right	to	authority,	which	is	the	rule	of	custom	[nomos]	that	happens	in	accordance	with	nature	[kata	phusin].	Accordingly,	what	occupies	Plato	is	precisely	this	right	to	authority.	In	fact,	the	true	concern	in	Plato,	as	he	opposes	bia	to	dikē,	is	to	dismantle	the	bond	of	resemblance	 binding	bia	 to	nomos,	 the	mark	 of	 superiority	 of	 the	 ruler	 in	 his	divine	lineage	to	ancient	kings,	and	this,	rather	than	neutralising	‘the	sovereign	confusion’	of	violence	and	justice,	is	what	is	at	stake	in	this	passage	of	the	Laws.	The	form	of	law	Plato	speaks	of	as	‘essentially	non-violent’,	pace	Agamben,	does	not	 express	 a	 certain	 deliberative	 discourse	 on	 the	 atrocities	 of	 sovereign	violence,	 but	 rather	 the	 attempt	 to	 subvert	 the	 right	 to	 authority	 of	 force	 by	recourse	to	the	power	of	law	found	in	the	resemblance	dikē-sōphrōn-sōphrosynē.	This	 is	 precisely	 the	 intention	 that	 guides	 the	 Athenian	 in	 his	 refutation	 of	Pindar,	and	what	comes	to	presence	when	he,	in	a	word	play,	slightly	alters	the	fragment	 from	 reading	 ‘justifying	 the	 most	 force’	 to	 ‘doing	 force	 to	 the	 most	just’.	 In	 his	 attempt	 to	 rescue	 the	 concept	 of	 the	 political	 from	 violence,	Agamben	 walks	 straight	 into	 the	 trap	 setup	 by	 the	 tactical	 rhetoric	 of	 the	Athenian.99	This	is	particularly	striking	when	he	argues	how,	in	book	ten	of	the																																																									99	Suffice	it	to	say,	the	Laws	is	a	dialogue;	it	is	a	strategic	mobilisation	of	discourse	that	seeks	to	make	a	certain	claim	valid.	One	should	never	try	to	interpret	the	Greeks	in	terms	of	the	system	of	thought	of	the	Classical	Age	in	which	identity	and	difference	constitute	the	knowledge	of	things	that	situate	them	outside	of	dialectics	and	history.	
	 205	
Laws,	Plato	allegedly	undertakes	to	eliminate	the	sovereign	confusion	born	from	the	opposition	of	phusis	and	nomos	and	the	thesis	of	the	anteriority	of	nature	to	law:	 “Plato	neutralizes	both	by	 affirming	 the	originarity	of	 the	 soul	 and	of	 ‘all	that	 belongs	 to	 what	 is	 a	 soul’	 (intellect,	 technē,	 and	 nomos)	 with	 respect	 to	bodies	 and	 the	 elements	 ‘that	 we	 erroneously	 say	 are	 in	 accordance	 with	nature’.”	(Ibid.).	We	do	not	need	to	repeat	here	in	what	exactly	this	‘originarity	of	the	soul’	consists.	 It	 is	strange,	though,	that	Agamben	does	not	seem	to	concern	himself	with	this	soul	that	makes	possible	the	caesura	between	phusis	and	nomos,	and	which	 is	 actually	 the	 work	 of	 Plato	 rather	 than	 Pindar.	 This	 is	 all	 the	 more	surprising	since	the	discourse	of	Plato	does	actually	not	try	to	hide	the	fact	that	it	is	not	the	neutral	standpoint	of	the	‘natural	law’	without	violence,	but	rather	the	attack	of	 the	 justice	of	 the	mind	on	 the	 right	of	 authority	 found	 in	nature.	While	 the	 passage	 in	 the	 Laws	 might	 give	 rise	 to	 confusions	 on	 the	 actual	intention	that	guides	Plato’s	refutation	of	Pindar,	it	is	not	the	only	text	in	which	the	 Platonic	 polemic	 against	 the	 poet	 appears.	 In	 the	 Gorgias,	 we	 find	 Plato	citing	Pindar’s	 fragment	169,	but	here	 the	 argument	 is	presented	 in	 the	more	sober	manner	where	the	adversary	to	some	extent	is	allowed	to	defend	himself.	So	we	 find	Callicles	 in	dialogue	with	Socrates	stating	 that	 the	kind	of	ruling	of	the	soul,	in	which	the	soul	must	be	brought	to	adhere	to	the	resemblance	of	dikē	and	nomos,	happens	against	nature.	If	this	is	justice	[dikē],	Callicles	says,	phusis	and	nomos	are	opposed	to	each	other,	since	it	forces	man	to	become	‘ashamed’	and	 ‘to	 contradict	himself’,	 and	 “…	by	nature	everything	 is	 fouler	 that	 is	more	evil”.	 (Gorgias	482e-483a).	Such	sense	of	 justice	 is	not	given	by	nature,	but	by	law	[hē	te	phusis	kai	ho	nomos],	that	is,	the	law	one	makes	rather	than	the	one	given	by	nature.	 It	 cannot	be	 given	by	nature	because	 it	 opposes	 all	 the	 tonic	passions	 of	 thumos	 and	 epithumia	 that	 augment	 action	 and	 the	 feeling	 of	aliveness,	by	nature	 common	 to	all	 living	beings	and	 to	man	 the	 source	of	his	divinity.	In	fact,	when	joined	with	law,	this	kind	of	justice	will	not	only	do	harm	to	 the	man	who	unites	 them	and	makes	 them	his	own,	but	 to	all	who	become	subject	to	this	kind	of	ruling,	which	is	against	nature.	In	the	counter-discourse	of	the	polemistēs,	 the	 slave	 rises	 to	 show	himself	 the	master	as	 the	 justice	of	 the	philosopher	is	revealed	as	a	strategy	of	the	weak	for	terrorising	the	stronger:	
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	 …	I	suppose	the	makers	of	the	 laws	are	the	weaker	sort	of	men,	and	the	more	numerous.	So	 it	 is	with	a	view	to	 themselves	and	 their	own	 interest	 that	 they	make	their	laws	and	distribute	their	praises	and	censures;	and	to	terrorize	the	stronger	 sort	 of	 folk	 who	 are	 able	 to	 get	 an	 advantage,	 and	 to	 prevent	 them	from	 getting	 one	 over	 them,	 they	 tell	 them,	 that	 such	 aggrandizement	 is	 foul	and	unjust,	and	that	wrongdoing	is	just	this	endeavour	to	get	the	advantage	of	one's	 neighbours:	 for	 I	 expect	 they	 are	well	 content	 to	 see	 themselves	 on	 an	equality,	when	 they	 are	 so	 inferior…	For	 by	what	manner	 of	 right	 did	 Xerxes	march	against	Greece,	or	his	father	against	Scythia?	Or	take	the	countless	other	cases	of	the	sort	that	one	might	mention.	Why,	surely	these	men	follow	nature	–	the	nature	of	right	–	in	acting	thus;	yes,	on	my	soul,	and	follow	the	law	of	nature	–	 though	 not	 that,	 I	 dare	 say,	 which	 is	 made	 by	 us;	 we	 mould	 the	 best	 and	strongest	 amongst	 us,	 taking	 them	 from	 their	 infancy	 like	 young	 lions,	 and	utterly	 enthral	 them	 by	 our	 spells	 and	witchcraft,	 telling	 them	 the	while	 that	they	must	have	but	their	equal	share,	and	that	this	is	what	is	fair	and	just.	But,	I	fancy,	when	some	man	arises	with	a	nature	of	sufficient	force,	he	shakes	off	all	that	 we	 have	 taught	 him,	 bursts	 his	 bonds,	 and	 breaks	 free;	 he	 tramples	underfoot	our	codes	and	juggleries,	our	charms	and	‘laws’,	which	are	all	against	nature;	our	slave	rises	in	revolt	and	shows	himself	our	master,	and	there	dawns	the	full	light	of	natural	justice.	And	it	seems	to	me	that	Pindar	adds	his	evidence	to	what	I	say,	in	the	ode	where	he	says	–		‘Law	the	sovereign	of	all,	Mortals	and	immortals,’	which,	so	he	continues,	–	‘Carries	all	with	highest	hand,	Doing	violence	to	the	most	just:	in	proof	I	take	The	deeds	of	Hercules,	for	unpurchased’.	(Ibid.	483b-484b)			While	 this	 passage	 in	 the	 Gorgias	 shows	 the	 same	 slight	 alteration	 of	Pindar’s	text,	we	can	see	the	opposing	claim	to	authority	clearly	delineated.	As	we	find	it	in	the	counter-discourse	of	the	polemistēs,	it	is	obvious	that	the	idea	of	the	anteriority	of	phusis	 to	 law	nomos	 does	not	express	 the	 suspension	of	 law	and	 the	 logic	 of	 the	 sovereign	 exception.	 On	 the	 contrary,	 it	 expresses	 the	defence	of	the	unity	of	law	and	nature,	as	it	appears,	not	from	above,	but	from	below,	that	is,	at	the	level	of	the	individual	struggling	against	the	attack	on	the	‘Apollonian’	values	by	a	certain	 justice	of	weakness.	Moreover,	 if	we	approach	this	thinking	of	power	and	authority	from	the	vantage	point	of	the	ruler	and	the	
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nomos	basileus,	we	should	note	this	form	of	power	did	not	express	an	unlimited	or	 absolute	 privilege.	 The	 form	 of	 power,	 which	 is	 articulated	 by	 the	resemblance	bia-kratos-arētē,	essentially	concerns	the	relation	between	master	and	slave.	It	does	not	so	much	concern	the	relation	of	the	ruler	to	a	multitude	of	struggling	forces	that	make	up	the	social	body.	The	nomos	basileus	appeared	in	the	relatively	 limited	sphere	where,	 if	 the	subject	dared	to	rise	up	and	contest	his	 authority	 or	 transgress	 his	 law,	 the	 ruler	 could	 punish	 him,	 ultimately,	 by	taking	 his	 life.	 The	 concern	 about	 the	 multitude	 and	 the	 war	 of	 every	 man	against	every	man	remains	absent,	because	we	have	never	 left	 the	one-to-one	relationship	of	master	and	slave.	We	are	 in	a	 condition	where	 the	 relations	of	forces	find	their	expression	in	war,	as	relationships	of	domination	governed	by	the	 resemblance	bia-kratos-arētē.	 The	 idea	 of	 a	 public	 sphere	 constituted	 in	 a	war	 that	must	be	suspended	therefore	remains	alien	 to	 this	 form	of	authority,	since	authority,	rather	than	being	what	emerges	from	the	global	suspension	of	this	war,	is	precisely	what	is	determined	in	the	actual	practices	of	the	war,	with	its	 trials	 of	 strength,	 its	 disguises,	 its	 strategies	 of	 deception,	 its	 plots	 and	 its	ploys.	It	is	in	other	words	inaccurate	when	Agamben	claims	that	Pindar’s	nomos	
basileus	and	“the	Sophistic	polemic	against	nomos	 in	 favour	of	nature…	can	be	considered	the	necessary	premise	of	the	opposition	between	the	state	of	nature	and	the	 ‘commonwealth’,	which	Hobbes	posits	as	the	ground	of	his	conception	of	sovereignty.”	(Agamben	1998:	35).	In	fact,	we	should	rather	look	to	Plato	and	the	 form	 of	 the	 good	 for	 cues	 to	 the	 origin	 of	 the	 distinction	 between	 the	commonwealth	and	the	state	of	nature.	It	will	be	from	the	tenets	of	the	kind	of	authority,	which	 believes	 authority	 to	 be	 vested	 in	 the	 originarity	 of	 the	 soul,	and	all	that	belongs	to	this	soul	(mind,	technē,	and	nomos),	that	we	will	see	the	law	that	goes	beyond	and	crosses	 the	 limits	 the	natural	 law;	 the	promotion	of	the	good,	the	wise,	and	the	just	as	the	law	without	limits,	the	sovereign	law,	the	sovereign	 law	which	contains	 the	virtuality	of	 the	 law	of	nature	as	 the	war	of	every	 man	 against	 every	 man.	 By	 this	 I	 certainly	 do	 not	 mean	 that	 Platonic	discourse	 is	 identical	 to	 the	modern	discourse	on	sovereignty,	but	rather	 than	the	 essential	 dislocation	 of	 nomos	 from	 phusis,	 on	 which	 the	 principle	 of	sovereignty	 rests,	 is	 delineated	 in	 Plato	 –	 not	 only	 in	 the	 Athenian’s	 polemic	
	 208	
against	phusis	in	favour	of	wisdom,	as	the	superior	mark	of	the	right	to	rule,	but	also	when	Plato	 speaks	of	 the	urgency	of	putting	 the	 virtuous	 in	 command	 to	ward	off	the	perpetual	war	that	traverses	the	public	sphere.	This	suspension	of	
phusis	is	the	logic	that	governs	the	‘natural	law’	according	to	which	the	ignorant	must	follow	the	wise	man.	The	true	meaning	of	the	natural	law	as	being	‘without	force’	 [ou	biaion]	 consists	 in	 the	 telos	 that	 suspends	phusis	 by	 recourse	 to	 the	principle	 of	 the	 soul,100	and	 this,	 rather	 than	 the	 Sophistic	 conviction	 of	 the	anteriority	of	phusis,	 is	 the	 logic	 that	 seems	 to	have	opened	up	 the	 terrain	 for	Hobbes’	invention	of	the	great	Leviathan.	In	 fact,	 the	 worldly	 God-sovereign	 that	 political-philosophy	 was	 to	discover	with	Hobbes	never	seems	far	away	in	Plato.	In	Plato,	the	ruling	by	the	just	 and	 the	virtuous	often	 seems	 to	become	a	matter	of	 the	 command	of	one	man,	the	one	most	superior	in	virtue	and	wisdom	who	brings	his	well-ordered	soul	 to	 bear	 on	 the	 relations	 of	 forces,	 straightening	 out	 the	 souls	 of	men	 by	means	of	law.	It	is	the	introduction	into	the	calculations	of	power	of	the	theme	of	the	philosopher	king,	a	figure	that	seems	not	so	different	from	the	shepherd	who	 in	 time	 would	 emerge	 with	 pastoral	 power.	 Indeed,	 as	 we	 learn	 in	 the	
Republic,	 the	 actions	 of	 men	 must	 be	 guided	 by	 this	 figure	 in	 whom	 the	superiority	of	 ‘philosophic	 intelligence’	 calls	upon	him	 to	exercise	 ‘the	natural	rule	of	law,	without	force,	over	willing	subjects’.	As	Socrates	explains	to	Callicles	in	the	Gorgias,	this	is	the	only	way	man	can	achieve	happiness;	to	submit	to	the	philosopher’s	 sense	 of	 justice	 and	 follow	 his	 ruling.	 In	 fact,	 there	 will	 be	 no	escape	from	trouble	for	the	human	race	[anthrōpinō	genei]	before	man	submits	and	follows	the	philosopher	having	become	king:	
 But	 say	 it	 [eirēsetai]	I	 will,101	even	 if,	 to	 keep	 the	 figure,	 it	 is	 likely	 to	wash	 us	away	 on	 billows	 of	 laughter	 and	 scorn…	 Unless,	 said	 I,	 either	 philosophers	become	kings	in	our	city-states	or	those	whom	we	now	call	our	kings	and	rulers	take	 to	 the	 pursuit	 of	 philosophy	 seriously	 and	 adequately,	 and	 there	 is	 a																																																									100	We	can	see	the	same	logic	at	work	in	another	passage	of	the	Laws.	Having	posited	the	notion	of	the	superiority	of	wisdom	to	all	the	claims	to	authority,	the	Athenian	argues	for	the	legislator	to	put	to	rights	the	order	of	these	claims,	which,	as	‘they	are	essentially	opposed	to	one	another’,	is	‘a	source	of	civil	strife’.	The	failure	to	do	so,	says	the	Athenian,	brought	ruin	to	the	kings	of	Argos	and	Messene	and	to	the	Hellenic	power,	‘splendid	as	it	was	at	that	epoch’	(Laws	690d-e).	101	In	the	orators,	in	particular,	eirēsetai	often	introduces	a	bold	statement.	
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conjunction	 of	 these	 two	 things,	 political	 power	 and	 philosophic	 intelligence,	while	 the	motley	horde	of	 the	natures	who	at	present	pursue	either	apart	 from	the	other	are	compulsorily	excluded,	there	can	be	no	cessation	of	troubles,	dear	Glaucon,	 for	 our	 city-states,	 nor,	 I	 fancy,	 for	 the	 human	 race	 either.	 (Republic	473c-d).		 As	we	can	see	 from	Plato’s	bold	 interrogative	statement,	 the	philosopher	king	is	obviously	closer	to	a	fiction	of	the	speculative	mind	than	the	reality	of	the	practice	of	ruling.	However,	we	should	not	dismiss	this	idea	as	unimportant	or	too	naive	to	merit	serious	attention.	While	it	is	clear	that	this	idea	of	ruling	men	seems	to	have	a	marginal	influence	in	classical	Greece,	we	will	see	the	theme	of	the	 philosopher	 king	 appear	 again	 in	 the	 figure	 of	 the	 Roman	 emperor.	Most	importantly,	what	we	find	in	Plato	is	the	delineation	of	a	certain	model	for	the	government	of	men	as	a	 flock	 that	must	answer	 to	 the	command	of	principles	that	 can	only	be	 resolved	by	 recourse	 to	 the	good.	 It	 is	 the	model	where	man	must	rely	on	the	wisdom	and	virtue	of	 the	shepherd	to	guide	him	towards	his	salvation	 and	 happiness,	 which	 occurs	 at	 the	 intersection	 of	 philosophical	knowledge	and	political	power	[dunamis	te	politikē	kai	philosophia].	It	 is	 clear,	 however,	 that	 the	 function	 of	 the	 philosopher	 king	 is	 not	 so	much	to	guide	and	lead	the	souls	of	men	on	the	path	to	salvation,	as	it	is	to	make	men	derive	the	possibility	of	their	happiness	from	the	rule	of	law.	The	wisdom	and	justice	of	the	philosopher	king	or	good	magistrate	are	in	other	words,	first	and	foremost,	the	sources	of	his	function	as	nomeus,	that	is,	as	the	shepherd	of	law,	as	lawgiver.	Here,	we	are	actually	closer	to	the	old	nomos	basileus	than	the	model	of	pastoral	power,	the	difference	being	that	bia	and	kratos,	as	the	simple	one-to-one	 force	 relations	 between	master	 and	 slave,	 ruler	 and	 subject,	 have	been	suspended	as	sources	of	authority	in	favour	of	dikē,	which	is	to	be	resolved	at	 the	 intersection	 of	 political	 power	 and	 philosophical	 knowledge.	Moreover,	whereas	 the	 nomos	 basileus	 essentially	 concerns	 the	 very	 limited	 relation	 of	master	and	slave,	ruler	and	subject,	the	form	of	nomos	we	find	in	the	idea	of	the	philosopher	king	as	nomeus	 concerns	a	 few	great	 common	 laws	 that	 trace	 the	boundaries	of	a	very	wide	sphere,	 inside	of	which	technē	determines	the	right	course	of	action.	This	is	quite	obvious	in	Plato,	as	the	question	of	transgression	always	seems	to	be	considered	on	the	basis	of	a	few	general	principles,	namely,	
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the	question	of	virtue	and	its	absence.	Agnoia	[ignorance],	for	example,	must	be	punished	being	a	source	of	the	transgression	of	justice.	It	is	the	‘third	cause’	of	injustice	 next	 to	 appetite	 and	 spiritedness,	 and	 should	 receive	 the	 proper	penalty	 according	 to	 the	 nature	 of	 its	 alliance	 with	 bia.102	So,	 while	 political	authority	is	certainly	determined	by	recourse	to	the	soul,	it	seems	the	happiness	and	salvation	of	the	flock	does	not	so	much	concern	the	guiding	of	the	inner	life	of	 souls.	 Happiness	 is	 rather	 derived	 indirectly	 from	 the	 mundane	 law	 that	considers	 acts	 and	 transgressions	 in	 their	 concrete	 realisation,	 the	 law	which	refers	to	the	sword	rather	than	to	heaven	and	hell:		 …	 whenever	 any	 man	 commits	 any	 unjust	 act,	 great	 or	 small,	 the	 law	 shall	instruct	 him	and	 absolutely	 compel	 him	 for	 the	 future	 either	never	willingly	 to	dare	 to	 do	 such	 a	 deed,	 or	 else	 to	 do	 it	 ever	 so	much	 less	 often,	 in	 addition	 to	paying	 for	 the	 injury.	 To	 effect	 this,	whether	 by	 action	 or	 speech,	 by	means	 of	pleasures	and	pains,	honours	and	dishonours,	money-fines	and	money-gifts,	and	in	general	by	whatsoever	means	one	can	employ	to	make	men	hate	injustice	and	love	 (or	 at	 any	 rate	 not	 hate)	 justice,	 –	 this	 is	 precisely	 the	 task	 of	 laws	most	noble.	 But	 for	 all	 those	whom	 he	 perceives	 to	 be	 incurable	 in	 respect	 of	 these	matters,	what	penalty	shall	the	lawgiver	enact,	and	what	law?	The	lawgiver	will	realise	that	in	all	such	cases	not	only	is	it	better	for	the	sinners	themselves	to	live	no	longer,	but	also	that	they	will	prove	of	a	double	benefit	to	others	by	quitting	life	–	since	they	will	both	serve	as	a	warning	to	the	rest	not	to	act	unjustly,	and	also	rid	the	city-state	of	wicked	men,	–	and	thus	he	will	of	necessity	inflict	death	as	the	chastisement	for	their	sins…	(Laws	862d-863a).		
5.3.	As	we	 can	 see,	 then,	 the	nomeus	 looks	 after	 the	welfare	 of	 the	polis	rather	 than	the	souls	of	men.	His	 function	as	 lawgiver	 is	 to	rid	 the	polis	of	 the	wrongdoings	of	wicked	men.	We	are	in	other	words	far	from	a	situation	where	the	shepherd	appears	before	his	flock	to	declare	the	singular	truth	of	an	arkhē	scripture,	 illuminate	 the	 souls	 of	men,	 and	 care	 for	 their	wellbeing.	 Still,	 it	 is	important	to	recognise	the	displacement	that	occurs	in	the	role	of	the	ruler	who	is	now	called	upon	to	suspend	the	condition	of	phusis,	in	which	the	relations	of																																																									102	As	Plato	says	in	the	Laws:	“…	counting	ignorance	in	its	simple	form	to	be	the	cause	of	minor	sins,	and	in	its	double	form	–	where	the	folly	is	due	to	the	man	being	gripped	not	by	ignorance	only,	but	also	by	a	conceit	of	wisdom,	as	though	he	had	full	knowledge	of	things	he	knows	nothing	at	all	about,	–	counting	this	to	be	the	cause	of	great	and	brutal	sins	when	it	is	joined	with	strength	and	might,	but	the	cause	of	childish	and	senile	sins	when	it	is	joined	with	weakness…”	(Laws	863c-d).	
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forces	 find	 their	 expression	 in	 war	 and	 where	 authority	 issues	 from	 the	resemblance	 bia-kratos-arētē.	 It	 is	 important	 to	 notice	 this	 shift	 in	 the	 art	 of	ruling	 that	 appears	 with	 Plato’s	 good	 magistrate	 who	 brings	 the	 recurrent	intervention	of	political	power	to	bear	on	the	relations	of	forces	for	the	good	of	the	polis;	the	good	magistrate	who,	by	virtue	of	his	authority	being	vested	in	the	resemblance	dikē-sōphrōn-sōphrosynē,	must	 see	 to	 it	 that	 the	polis	 arrives	at	a	certain	 form	which	 is	both	 the	 cause	of	 the	good	and	 its	 end.	This	 concerns	a	certain	technē	politikē,	an	art	of	ruling	defined	by	a	specific	knowledge,	which	is	exercised	over	the	flock	of	men.	This	is	actually	where	we	find	the	theme	of	the	shepherd	and	 the	 flock	 in	Greek	 literature	 to	designate	 the	relationship	of	 the	good	magistrate	with	his	subjects	or	fellow	citizens.	As	 Foucault	 explains	 in	 his	 lecture	 series	 at	 Collège	 de	 France,	 Security,	
Territory,	Population,	this	idea	of	politics	as	shepherding	is,	however,	a	marginal	and	limited	theme	in	Greek	literature.	The	theme	of	the	shepherd	first	seems	to	occur	 in	 Homer	 with	 reference	 to	 Agamemnon,	 but	 here	 the	 predication	 of	shepherd	appears	in	the	strictly	ritual	form	of	a	name	given	to	the	ruler	as	the	‘shepherd	of	peoples’,	a	title	conferred	upon	the	sovereign	in	all	Indo-European	literature.	We	also	find	the	theme	of	the	shepherd	in	the	Pythagorean	tradition	in	relation	to	Zeus	who	is	known	by	the	epithet	Nomios.	In	the	etymology	of	the	Pythagoreans,	 nomos	 is	 derived	 from	 nomeus,	 meaning	 the	 shepherd.	 In	 the	Pythagoreans,	 then,	 “[the]	 shepherd	 is	 the	 lawmaker	 insofar	 as	 he	 distributes	food,	 directs	 the	 flock,	 indicates	 the	 right	 direction,	 and	 says	 how	 the	 sheep	must	mate	so	as	to	have	good	offspring.	All	this	is	the	function	of	the	shepherd	who	gives	the	law	to	his	flock.	Hence	the	title	of	Zeus	as	Nomios.	Zeus	is	the	god-shepherd	 who	 provides	 his	 sheep	 with	 the	 food	 they	 need.”	 (Foucault	 2007:	137).	 This	 clearly	 coincides	with	 the	 theme	 of	 the	 pastor	 as	we	 find	 it	 in	 the	Christian	tradition.	However,	the	Pythagorean	tradition	is	rather	marginal,	and	it	seems	the	god-shepherd	is	a	figure	who	appears	at	the	beginning	of	times,	but	then	departs	to	leave	men	to	their	own	affairs.	The	theme	of	the	magistrate	as	the	shepherd,	Foucault	argues,	is	limited	with	one	important	exception,	which	is	Plato.	 In	 the	Republic,	Critias,	 the	Laws,	 and	 the	Statesman,	we	 find	a	 series	of	reflections	on	 the	magistrate	 as	 the	 shepherd.	On	different	 grounds,	 however,	
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Foucault	seems	to	attach	little	importance	to	these	entries	of	the	pastoral	theme	in	the	classical	political	vocabulary	of	Greece.	In	Plato,	Foucault	says,	the	theme	of	the	shepherd	occurs	in	three	contexts.	First,	 it	 occurs	 in	 the	 context	 of	 the	 gods	 who,	 as	 the	 pastors	 of	 humanity,	nurtured	 men,	 guided	 them,	 provided	 them	 with	 food,	 and	 gave	 them	 their	general	 principles	 of	 conduct.	 This	 context	 seems	 to	 correspond	 to	 the	Pythagorean	 theme	 of	 Zeus	 as	Nomios.	 In	 the	 second	 type	 of	 texts	 where	we	learn	of	the	magistrate	as	a	shepherd,	he	appears	as	a	subordinate	magistrate,	Foucault	 argues.	 He	 is	 one	who	 performs	 a	 duty	 and	 is	 something	 between	 a	‘watchdog’	and	a	‘policeman’	who	‘must	keep	the	wild	beast	away	from	his	flock’.	This	 kind	 of	 magistrate,	 Foucault	 explains,	 is	 not	 seen	 at	 the	 pinnacle	 of	 the	ruling	 of	 the	polis,	 but	 is	 rather	 a	 ‘functionary-shepherd’	whose	 function	does	not	 consist	 in	 the	primary	 form	of	 the	political	 art	 of	 government	 (Ibid.	 139).	Foucault	 then	 proceeds	 to	 the	 third	 series	 of	 texts	 from	 Plato	 to	 discuss	 a	dialogue	from	the	Republic	between	Socrates	and	Thrasymachus.	In	this	passage,	we	find	Thrasymachus	opposing	the	idea	of	the	magistrate	as	a	shepherd	stating	that	Socrates	is	naïve	to	see	the	ruler	of	the	polis	as	someone	who	cares	for	the	wellbeing	of	the	flock.	The	rulers	do	not	look	after	the	good	of	men	like	“…	the	shepherds	 and	 the	 neat-herds	 are	 considering	 the	 good	 of	 the	 sheep	 and	 the	cattle	and	fatten	and	tend	them.”	 If	 they	do,	Thrasymachus	says,	 it	 is	 ‘for	their	own	 profit’	 (Republic	 343b-c).	 Socrates	 then	 counters	 Thrasymachus	 arguing	that	he	is	in	fact	not	describing	the	good	shepherd,	which	is	precisely	one	who	devotes	his	ruling	to	the	wellbeing	of	the	flock	and	not	to	his	own	end.	Commenting	on	this	passage,	Foucault	seems	to	dismiss	this	occurrence	as	merely	a	reference	to	the	Pythagorean	theme	rather	than	the	true	conviction	of	Plato.	While	the	conviction	of	Thrasymachus,	who	clearly	derives	his	idea	of	the	magistrate	 from	 the	 claim	 to	 political	 authority	 of	 bia-kratos-arētē,	 seems	 to	bare	 witness	 to	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 idea	 of	 politics	 as	 shepherding	 was	 not	 a	popular	 model	 for	 the	 Greeks,	 the	 appearance	 in	 Plato	 of	 the	 magistrate-shepherd	does	not	simply	express	a	reference	to	the	Pythagorean	theme	of	the	god-shepherds	who	once	appeared	at	the	beginning	of	time.	In	fact,	the	theme	of	the	magistrate-shepherd	 rather	 seems	 to	 coincide	 with	 the	 present	 reality	 in	which	 we	 find	 Plato’s	 formulation	 of	 the	 idea	 of	 political	 power	 as	 an	 art	 of	
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ruling	 exercised	 by	 the	 philosopher	 king	 over	 the	 flock	 of	men.	 It	 is	 precisely	this	 theme	 that	 occurs	 in	 the	 suspension	 of	 the	 old	model	 of	 authority	 of	 the	warrior	 aristocracy.	 As	 we	 have	 seen,	 the	 dialogues	 between	 Thrasymachus,	Polemarchus,	 and	 Socrates	 are	 in	 fact	 the	 expression	 of	 this	 struggle	 for	 the	right	to	political	authority.	We	are	therefore	not	in	a	condition	where	the	god-shepherd	 appears	 to	 provide	men	with	 their	 general	 principles	 of	 conduct	 in	order	 to	 leave	 men	 to	 their	 own	 doings,	 but	 rather	 at	 the	 site	 where	 the	magistrate-shepherd	 appears	 to	 exercise	 political	 authority,	 as	 a	 certain	strategic	intervention	in	the	relations	of	forces.	By	this	I	do	not	mean	to	say	that	the	pastoral	model,	at	least	as	it	would	be	worked	 out	 in	 Christian	 thought	 from	 Pharaonic	 Egyptian,	 Assyrian,	 and	Hebrew	literature,	is	present	in	Classical	Greece,	but	rather	that	there	seems	to	be	certain	resemblances	at	work,	which	places	the	Greeks	closer	to	their	Indo-European	neighbours	than	Foucault	perhaps	is	willing	to	admit.	While	Foucault	is	justified	in	his	analysis	of	the	rarity	of	the	theme	of	the	magistrate-shepherd	in	Greek	 literature,	 it	 seems	 the	 occurrences	 in	 Plato	 of	 this	 theme	 cannot	 be	understood	as	completely	isolated	and	without	reference	to	an	already	existing	set	 of	 practices	 that	 to	 some	 extent	would	 support	 it.	 I	 am	 referring	 here,	 in	particular,	 to	the	schema	of	 the	stratia	and	the	militia,	which	actually	takes	 its	model	 from	 the	 fold.	 It	 seems	 to	me	 that	 Foucault	might	 have	overlooked	 the	resemblances	 or	 perhaps	 brushed	 them	 aside	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 the	 lack	 of	coincidence	 of	 appearance	 and	 the	 knowledges	 and	 practices	 that	 supported	this	 logic	of	governing	men.	This	 is	particularly	striking	when	Foucault,	on	the	basis	 that	 the	 Index	 isokrateon	 shows	 no	 entries	 of	 the	 words	 piomēn	 and	
nomeus,	draws	the	conclusion	that	the	figure	of	the	shepherd	does	not	exist	 in	Isocrates:		[It]	 seems	 that	 the	 expression	 shepherd	 or	 herdsman	 cannot	 be	 found	 in	Isocrates…	it	is	surprising	to	note	that	Isocrates	gives	a	very	precise,	prescriptive,	and	dense	description	of	the	good	magistrate	who,	above	all,	must	watch	over	the	good	education	of	the	youth.	A	whole	series	of	duties	and	tasks	are	incumbent	on	the	 magistrate.	 He	 must	 look	 after	 the	 young	 people	 and	 constantly	 supervise	them,	he	must	watch	over	not	only	their	education	but	also	their	food,	how	they	
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behave,	 how	 they	develop,	 and	 even	how	 they	marry.	We	are	 close	here	 to	 the	metaphor	of	the	shepherd,	but	it	does	not	arise.	(Foucault	2007:	138).		While	Isocrates	might	not	employ	the	words	piomēn	and	nomeus,	it	is	clear	that	what	is	at	stake	here	is	precisely	the	shepherd-flock	relationship	we	have	seen	in	 Xenophon’s	 account	 of	 the	 education	 of	 Spartan	 boys	 in	 the	 Spartan	
Constitution.	There	is	 in	other	words	good	reason	to	suspect	that	Isocrates	did	not	have	to	make	use	of	a	metaphor	to	speak	of	what	is	literally	the	expression	of	 the	 relationship	 of	 the	 shepherd	 of	 education	 [paidonomos]	 and	 the	 herd	[boua].	This	 is	 to	 say	 that	 to	understand	 the	 formation	of	 the	art	of	 ruling	we	find	 in	 Plato,	 and	 how	 it	 related	 to	 the	 world	 of	 classical	 Greece,	 both	 in	 its	limitation	and	 its	possible	articulation	points,	we	must	pay	closer	attention	 to	the	structural	diversity	around	which	the	chain	of	resemblances	 is	articulated.	In	particular,	we	must	pay	attention	to	the	unexpected	morphologies	that	turn	up	 to	 guide	 action	 at	 the	 site	 of	 the	 bios	 politikos	 at	 the	 intersection	 of	 the	techniques	 of	 the	 military	 model	 of	 war	 and	 the	 shepherd-flock	 relationship.	Turning	the	attention	to	this	structural	diversity,	one	finds	that	the	Pythagorean	theme	of	Zeus	as	Nomios	actually	also	occurs	in	Aristotle’s	account	of	the	arkhē.	Foucault	never	mentions	Aristotle,	perhaps	because	the	theme	of	the	shepherd	never	 surfaces	 in	Aristotle	when	he	speaks	of	 the	magistrate	or	 the	politician.	But	 this	 should	 not	 be	 taken	 as	 evidence	 of	 the	 model	 of	 the	 shepherd-flock	being	absent	 in	Aristotle.	We	 should	not	 forget	 that	 the	politikon	zōon	 is	born	from	the	resemblances	of	the	arkhē,	the	ruling	principle	that	governs	all	animate	nature	from	the	vantage	point	of	the	origin	and	commandment	which	is	God.	It	is	not	so	surprising	then	that	the	reference	that	guides	Aristotle	in	his	account	of	the	arkhē	is	in	fact	the	god-shepherd.	More	precisely,	Aristotle	refers	to	Hesiod’s	account	in	Works	and	Days	 in	which	we	find	one	of	the	first	representations	of	the	 theme	of	 Zeus	 as	Nomios,	 the	 Father	 of	Gods	 and	men	who	provides	men	with	a	 sense	of	 justice	 [dikē]	 in	 the	 form	of	 the	gift	of	nomos.	We	should	note	that	 Aristotle’s	 account	 of	 the	 arkhē,	 while	 certainly	 a	 reflection	 on	 the	beginning	of	things,	concerns	the	present	reality	of	the	mind	and	its	counterpart,	God.	 The	 god-shepherd	 survives	 in	 Theos	 and	 the	 justice	 of	 the	 well-ordered	soul,	which,	 as	 Aristotle	 says	 in	 the	Politics,	 is	 an	 element	 of	 the	polis	 for	 the	
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regulation	 of	 the	 political	 community	 (Politics	 1253a:	 37-39).	 So,	 while	 the	theme	 of	 the	 magistrate-shepherd	 does	 not	 seem	 to	 appear	 in	 Aristotle,	 we	should	not	lose	sight	of	the	kinship	between	Aristotle’s	Theos	and	Hesiod’s	Zeus,	as	a	positive	source	of	justice	and	the	good.	In	fact,	as	we	saw	at	the	beginning	of	this	chapter,	not	only	does	the	god-shepherd	survive	in	the	virtue	of	justice,	he	is	 also	 present	 in	 the	Greek	 idea	 of	 freedom	 [eleutheria].	With	Aristotle,	 Zeus	commands	again,	not	simply	from	the	past,	but	 in	the	present,	and	not	only	as	
Nomios,	 but	 also	 as	Eleutherios,	 the	 shepherd	of	deliverance	who	provides	 for	the	 salvation	 of	 the	 flock	 through	 conquest	 and	 victory.	 The	 god-shepherd	 is	ever-present	in	the	mind	of	the	free	man	to	guide	action,	as	conquest,	freedom,	and	justice	become	part	of	the	same	political	dream	in	which	action	must	always	be	 disclosed	 in	 the	 form	 of	 the	 good.	 But	 how	 is	 it	 then	 that	 we	 do	 not	 see	Aristotle’s	political	man	or	Plato’s	philosopher	king	turning	up	to	show	himself	as	the	Son	of	God,	the	emissary	who	transmits	the	commandments	of	the	arkhē	scripture	and	orders	his	flock	of	men?	In	other	words,	how	is	it	that	the	birth	of	political	 man	 from	 the	 metaphysics	 of	 the	 mind,	 the	 emergence	 of	 political	power	with	 the	denouncement	and	suspension	of	bia-kratos-arētē	 in	 favour	of	
dikē-sōphrōn-sōphrosynē,	and	the	introduction	into	the	relations	of	forces	of	the	
telos	of	the	good	as	the	end	of	political	community	never	materialise	as	a	unitary	power	wielded	by	the	one	shepherd	over	his	flock?	In	short,	why	do	we	see	the	birth	of	a	technē	politikē,	which	no	doubt	still	marks	a	bloody	period	in	history,	but	 not	 the	 naked	 politics	 of	 the	 good	 and	 its	 counterpart,	 the	 law	 without	limits?	Here,	 we	 can	 return	 to	 Foucault’s	 commentary	 on	 Plato.	 According	 to	Foucault,	there	is	one	text	in	Plato	that	explains	the	problem	of	thinking	political	power	 in	the	polis	 in	 terms	of	 the	model	of	 the	one	shepherd	commanding	his	flock.	 This	 is	 the	 Statesman.	 Here,	 we	 find	 a	 dialogue	 on	 the	 nature	 of	 the	political	 art	 of	 governing	men	 seen	 from	 the	 vantage	 point	 of	 the	 practice	 of	politics	as	‘the	art	of	tending	a	herd	of	living	beings’	(261e-262a).	In	essence,	the	problem	that	arises	in	the	text	is	how	to	locate	the	magistrate-shepherd	and	his	flock	as	a	unitary	assemblage	at	 the	 site	of	political	order.	First	and	 foremost,	this	involves	the	question	of	what	a	magistrate	is.	A	magistrate	is	known	by	the	knowledge	that	defines	his	art	of	ruling,	we	learn	in	Socrates.	As	we	have	seen,	
	 216	
the	art	of	ruling	consists	in	the	knowledge	of	commanding	and	steering.	But	the	conjunction	 of	 the	 knowledge	 and	 practice	 of	 giving	 command,	 to	 which	 the	Greeks	 applied	 the	 term	 technē,	 cannot	 be	 singled	 out	 in	 terms	 of	 a	 unitary	practice	of	the	care	of	the	flock.	There	is	not	one	technē	that	tends	to	the	flock,	but	rather	a	whole	series	of	arts	of	commanding	and	ruling,	which	pertains	 to	such	 diverse	 practices	 as	 farming,	 horsemanship,	 oxherding,	 huntsmanship,	chariot-driving,	the	piloting	a	ship,	medicine,	calculation,	geometry,	lyre-playing,	flute-playing,	painting,	sculpture,	housebuilding,	shipbuilding,	weaving,	pottery,	smithing,	cookery,	and	so	on.	But	what	if	one	draws	the	distinction,	Plato	asks	in	a	passage	of	 the	 text,	 that	 the	magistrate	 is	not	 to	be	 found	on	 the	side	of	 the	craftsman	who	 imposes	orders	on	 inanimate	things?	The	magistrate	 is	not	 the	shepherd	of	things,	but	of	animals,	that	is,	the	particular	species	man.	However,	within	this	division	of	the	animal	species,	in	which	we	find	the	herd	of	men	to	be	shepherded,	 it	 seems	 a	 series	 of	 subdivisions	 exist.	 The	 herd	 never	 seems	 to	appear	at	the	site	of	any	clear	distinction.	There	is	a	flock	to	be	shepherded,	but	one	with	no	essential	nature	or,	at	least,	one	that	cannot	be	known:		[One]	should	make	the	division	as	most	people	in	this	country	do;	they	separate	the	Hellenic	 race	 from	all	 the	 rest	 as	 one,	 and	 to	 all	 the	 other	 races,	which	 are	countless	 in	number	and	have	no	 relation	 in	blood	or	 language	 to	one	another,	they	 give	 the	 single	 name	 ‘barbarian’;	 then,	 because	 of	 this	 single	 name,	 they	think	 it	 is	 a	 single	 species.	 Or	 it	was	 as	 if	 a	man	 should	 think	 he	was	 dividing	number	into	two	classes	by	cutting	off	a	myriad	from	all	the	other	numbers,	with	the	notion	that	he	was	making	one	separate	class,	and	then	should	give	one	name	to	all	 the	rest,	and	because	of	 that	name	should	 think	 that	 this	also	 formed	one	class	 distinct	 from	 the	 other.	 A	 better	 division,	more	 truly	 classified	 and	more	equal,	would	be	made	by	dividing	number	into	odd	and	even,	and	the	human	race	into	male	and	female;	as	 for	the	Lydians	and	Phrygians	and	various	others	they	could	be	opposed	to	 the	rest	and	split	off	 from	them	when	 it	was	 impossible	 to	find	and	separate	two	parts…	(262d-e).		As	we	can	see,	the	herd	of	men	to	be	shepherded	appears	to	get	lost	in	its	own	divisions	 and	 subdivisions,	 which	 seems	 to	 suggest	 that	 it	 leads	 nowhere	 to	think	 the	essence	of	politics	as	a	matter	of	 the	one	shepherd	and	his	 flock.	As	Foucault	 says,	 ‘the	 magistrate	 is	 a	 shepherd,	 but	 the	 shepherd	 of	 who?’	(Foucault	 2007:	 142).	 In	 this	 sense,	 the	 one	 shepherd	 and	 his	 flock	 remain	
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absent	 in	 Plato,	 because	 the	 knowledge	 of	 the	 flock	 gets	 lost	 in	 the	 order	 of	things,	which	still	appears	as	the	conjunction	of	opposites,	as	polemos.	However,	the	 problem	 that	 faces	 the	 one	 shepherd	 is	 not	 simply	 that	 of	 the	 fleeting	divisions	that	constitute	knowledge.	There	is	also	the	purely	practical	problem	that	 the	one	shepherd	must	 take	care	of	a	whole	series	of	different	 things.	He	must	watch	over	the	young	and	make	sure	that	they	receive	the	right	paideia,	he	must	assure	that	the	walls	of	the	polis	remain	intact,	he	must	provide	his	flock	with	food,	he	must	care	for	them	when	they	are	sick,	and,	most	importantly,	he	must	lead	them	into	battle	to	deliver	their	freedom.	It	 is	clear,	 then,	 that	 the	one	shepherd	and	his	 flock	cannot	 function	as	a	political	model	at	this	point	in	time.	However,	it	seems	to	me	that	we	may	well	miss	 the	 essential	 elements	 the	 Greek	 art	 of	 ruling	 has	 bequeathed	 to	 the	Western	political	ethos	if	we	insist	on	looking	for	the	model	of	the	shepherd	and	the	flock	in	the	clearly	discernable	form	of	a	unitary	assemblage.	What	we	must	pay	attention	to	is	rather	the	development	in	the	field	of	knowledge	concerning	this	art	of	ruling	in	relation	to	the	long	and	broad	development	of	technē.	With	the	appearance	of	classical	politico-philosophical	discourse,	we	have	seen	how	thought	finds	a	renewed	interest	in	the	nature	of	truth	[alētheia]	and	knowledge	[sophia].	With	the	obvious	exception	of	Aristotle,	 this	concern	about	truth	and	knowledge	 is	 not	 expressed	 as	 an	 interest	 in	 the	 primary	 knowledge	 of	immutable	laws	that	govern	the	kosmos.	Politico-philosophical	discourse	in	fact	emerges	out	of	a	dislocation	that	abandons	the	 inquiry	 into	phusis	and	the	old	knowledge	 of	 polemos	 in	 which	 action,	 as	 subject	 to	 the	monotonous	 eternal	laws	of	kosmos,	remains	confined	to	the	monarchy	of	nature.	As	we	have	seen	in	Aristotle’s	 reflection	 on	 the	arkhē	 of	kosmos,	 classical	 thought	 in	 fact	 seeks	 to	break	with	what	 the	 philosopher	 refers	 to	 as	 the	 disorganised	 knowledges	 of	the	ancients.	That	 is,	 in	the	Pre-Socratics,	 things	are	ever	 in	a	state	of	 flux	and	flow	wherefore	no	knowledge	 is	possible	of	 their	essential	nature.	As	we	have	seen,	this	seems	to	have	been	particularly	disturbing	to	Aristotle,	since	no	cause	could	be	deciphered	 from	 this	 kind	of	 knowledge	of	 how	existing	 things	have	come	to	acquire	form	to	be	arranged	well	and	beautifully.	This	is	also	to	say	that	the	classical	concern	about	knowledge	seems	to	have	been	articulated	around	a	particularly	strong	 interest	 in	 form,	 that	 is,	 the	knowledge	 that	has	 to	do	with	
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the	cultivation	of	a	domain	 in	the	sense	of	bringing	forth	beings	and	things	by	recourse	 to	 the	 structure	 of	 eidos.	 To	 this	 end,	 the	 Logos,	 understood	 as	 the	mere	conjunction	of	opposites,	 is	 inadequate	since	here	we	 find	no	account	of	the	origin	of	things,	their	nature,	or	end	[eidos]	to	enable	the	proper	functioning	of	 a	 technē.	 The	 first	 steps	 toward	 a	 knowledge	 that	 would	 enable	 itself	 to	determine	 the	 essence	 of	 the	 thing	 and	 its	 true	 form	 would	 come	 from	 the	tradition	 issuing	 from	Socrates.	As	we	have	seen	 in	Aristotle’s	commentary	on	Socratic	 thought	 in	 the	 Metaphysics	 (987b	 1-4),	 Socrates	 was	 the	 first	 to	‘disregard	the	physical	universe’	to	focus	on	the	predication	of	logos	that	in	time	would	 enable	 the	 disclosure	 of	 the	 nature	 of	 things.	 It	 is	 important	 to	 note,	however,	 that	 the	 old	 knowledge	 of	 polemos	 to	 some	 extent	 still	 persists	 in	Socrates	and	 in	Plato.	We	can	 see	 it	 in	 the	nature	ascribed	 to	 the	 relationship	between	the	predication	of	sensible	things	by	 logos	and	the	eidos	 in	which	the	mind	grasps	 things.	This	 relationship	between	 the	 thing	 itself	 and	 the	 form	 in	which	the	thing	is	seen	is	referred	to	the	arbitrary	relationship	of	language	and	the	 world.	 Phusis	 is	 autonomous	 to	 the	 realm	 of	 eidos,	 because	 the	 physical	world	remains	in	a	permanent	state	of	change,	we	find	Plato	arguing.	Moreover,	
eidos	always	appears	in	the	form	of	a	‘dyad	of	the	great	and	the	small’,	that	is,	as	simple	divisions.	 This	 is	 precisely	 the	 ‘problem’	 that	 Plato’s	 shepherd	 faces	 in	the	 passage	 cited	 above	 from	 the	 Statesman.	 And	 this	 is	 also	 how	 Plato's	suspension	of	 the	war	 of	 every	man	 against	 every	man,	 as	 articulated	 around	the	 division	 of	 wisdom	 and	 virtue	 from	 force	 and	 physical	 power,	 simply	produces	the	horde	with	its	mutable	potentialities	rather	than	the	homogeneous	flock	 of	 peaceful	 sheep.	 There	 is	 no	 point	 of	 origin	 and	 commandment	where	
phusis	 and	 eidos	 can	 be	 reconciled,	 no	 God	 in	 whose	 intimate	 presence	 the	essence	of	things	could	be	given	birth	to	from	the	dazzling	hands	of	their	creator.	What	we	see	 in	Plato’s	multiple	divisions	 that	cannot	be	harnessed	 is	 in	other	words	 simply	 the	 expression	 of	 the	 nascent	 mind	 at	 work,	 as	 the	 simple	withdrawal	 and	 projection	 onto	 the	 world	 of	 the	 clearing	 that	 make	 things	visible	[eidomai]	as	a	series	of	divisions	disclosed	by	polemos.	In	Aristotle,	 this	 is	no	 longer	quite	 the	case	 though.	We	should	recall	 the	passage	in	the	Metaphysics	where	Aristotle	denounces	the	Platonic	idea	of	eidos	on	the	basis	of	Plato	being	unable	to	explain	the	cause	of	the	eidos	of	the	good.	In	
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Aristotle,	phusis	is	joined	with	eidos	to	constitute	the	essence	of	a	thing	[to	ti	en	einai];	 the	ousia	 [essence]	of	a	 thing	 is	 caused	by	eidos,	which	 is	derived	 from	God	who	is	both	the	eidos	of	the	good	and	its	cause	(988a	7-14).	Now,	does	this	mean	that	the	problem	posed	by	the	arrangement	of	truth	and	knowledge	to	the	
technē	 of	 ruling	 of	 the	 one	magistrate-shepherd	 is	 thereby	 solved?	 Obviously	not,	 because	 one	 would	 thereby	 overlook	 that	 technē	 still	 has	 to	 answer	 to	
phusis	even	if	it	has	become	possible	to	speak	of	things	in	theōria	as	having	an	
ousia.	 In	 other	 words,	 so	 long	 as	 ousia	 must	 answer	 to	 phusis	 and	 theōria	 is	distinguished	 from	 technē	and	practical	wisdom	[phronēsis],	which	 is	 the	case	in	the	classical	world,	the	one	magistrate-shepherd	and	his	flock	will	not	appear.	In	fact,	for	a	long	time	technē	actually	has	no	relation	to	the	disclosure	of	things	in	 terms	 of	 ousia.	 The	 meaning	 of	 technē	 seems	 to	 remain	 close	 to	 the	etymological	root	of	the	word	tektōn,	meaning	master	craftsman,	 in	particular,	as	applied	to	woodwork	and	carpentry.	Up	until	a	certain	point,	technē	 simply	expresses	a	relation	of	praxis	that	occurs	between	phusis	and	poiēsis	[creation].	The	 craftsman	 responds	 to	 the	 grain	 of	 the	 wood,	 which	 is	 also	 to	 say	 that	
technē	 remains	 rather	 rudimentary.	 When	 we	 find	 the	 notion	 of	 technē	 in	classical	discourse,	it	seems	to	have	established	a	different	relation	to	phusis	and	its	 semantic	 field	 is	 vastly	 expanded	 encompassing	 several	 practices,	 from	horsemanship	and	oxherding	to	chariot-driving	and	the	piloting	of	a	ship,	and	so	on.	The	relationship	of	phusis	to	technē	is	now	defined	by	eidos	rather	than	mere	
poiēsis.	 As	 Plato	 explains	 in	 the	 Gorgias	 (503d-e),	 all	 craftsmen	 work,	 not	 at	random,	but	 look	 toward	the	end	of	 their	craft	so	 that	what	 they	produce	will	have	the	proper	eidos.	Now,	do	we	see	a	similar	development	in	the	technē	that	cares,	 neither	 for	 inanimate	 things,	 nor	 the	 wild	 beasts	 or	 the	 domesticated	animals,	but	 for	the	particular	animal	species	man?	Well,	 there	 is	certainly	the	development	in	the	practice	of	paideia,	in	which	we	find	the	herd	of	boys	whose	souls	 and	 bodies	must	 to	 be	 shaped	 by	 recourse	 to	 the	 eidos	 of	 the	model	 of	
militia	and	the	stratia.	As	explained	in	these	pages,	one	cannot	overestimate	the	importance	of	these	disciplinary	practices	that	discover	the	mind	and	the	body	as	a	kind	of	living	machinery,	which	belongs	to	the	mechanics	of	an	assemblage	of	 forces,	 an	 assemblage	whose	 form	 is	never	 complete	without	 the	 stratēgos,	the	arkhōn	or	for	that	matter	the	paidonomos.	However,	even	the	Spartans	had	
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to	rely	on	some	form	of	a	slave	economy	to	provide	for	the	subsistence	of	 life,	which	is	also	to	say	that	the	eidos	and	epistēmē	of	this	model	of	ruling	could	not	really	be	applied	to	all	political	matters.	Most	 importantly,	even	 if	 the	military	model	permeates	the	bios	politikos	by	its	presence	in	the	mind,	this	epistēmē	and	
eidos	that	define	both	the	art	of	war	and	the	education	of	boys	never	materialise	as	a	technē	politikē	of	the	magistrate-shepherd	that	encompasses	and	is	defined	by	the	knowledges	and	practices	of	the	oikonomos	who	cares	for	his	household,	the	despotēs	who	cares	for	his	family,	the	farmer	who	cares	for	the	domesticated	animals,	the	physical	trainer	who	looks	after	the	bodies	of	men,	or	the	craftsman	who	maintains	 the	 city	walls.	 As	we	 learn	 at	 the	 beginning	 of	 the	Politics,	 the	
technē	politikē	 is	not	defined	by	 the	knowledges	and	practices	of	 ruling	of	 the	
oikonomos,	the	despotēs,	or	those	of	the	tektōn	(1252a	26-35).	In	 other	 words,	 we	 never	 find	 a	 grand	 theōria	 according	 to	 which	 all	beings	and	things	that	dwell	in	the	polis	must	be	shepherded	by	recourse	to	an	
arkhē	scripture,	to	Theos.	 In	fact,	for	some	time,	classical	thought	will	not	even	distinguish	 between	 technē	 and	 epistēmē.	 In	 Plato,	 there	 is	 no	 systematic	account	of	either	or	of	how	they	relate.	In	some	dialogues,	technē	and	epistēmē	actually	seem	interchangeable.	 In	 the	Charmides	 (165c),	Socrates	explains	 that	medicine,	as	the	craft	of	the	physician	[iatrikē	technē],	is	the	epistēmē	of	health.	In	Euthydemus,	where	Socrates	discusses	the	technē	of	carpentry,	we	learn	that	what	 guides	 the	 right	 use	 of	 materials	 in	 carpentry	 is	 the	 knowledge	 of	carpentry	[techtonikē	epistēmē]	(281a).	And	in	Ion	(532c),	Socrates	rebukes	the	rhapsode	Ion	for	his	account	of	Homer	telling	him	that	he	is	unable	to	talk	about	Homer	with	technē	and	epistēmē.	Finally,	in	Socrates’	many	deliberations	on	the	theme	of	the	care	of	oneself,	we	find	the	delineation	of	an	epistēmē	concerning	the	cultivation	of	the	self;	a	technē	tou	biou.	One	will	notice	then	that	technē	no	longer	simply	concerns	the	exteriority	of	concrete	practices,	the	commanding	of	things	 and	 beings,	 but	 also	 the	 interiority	 of	 the	 soul	 who	 is	 now	 put	 in	command	of	its	desires	and	its	passions.	The	relation	between	phusis	and	technē	can	now	define	the	shepherd-flock	relationship	in	which	men	are	prescribed	the	proper	 form	 of	 justice	 of	 the	 well-ordered	 soul.	 Yet,	 as	 we	 have	 seen,	 what	emerges	out	of	this	sense	of	justice	is	not	really	the	herd,	but	rather	the	horde	wherefore	 the	 form	 of	 the	 good	 always	 seems	 to	 be	 in	 the	 danger	 of	
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disappearing	at	 the	 site	of	 the	vast	dispersion	of	 ‘appetites	 and	pleasures	and	pains’.	 In	 fact,	 the	 unity	 of	 this	 form	 of	 the	 good	 always	 seems	 to	 be	 broken	down	 by	 the	 activities	 of	 this	multitude	 of	 practitioners	 of	 technē	 that	 assure	things	and	beings	find	their	proper	form	or,	in	the	event	that	they	have	suffered	damage	or	become	sick,	help	restore	them	to	their	proper	 form.	This	could	be	the	 physician	 who	 knows	 how	 to	 care	 for	 the	 sick	 and	 prescribe	 the	 proper	regimen,	 but	 also	 the	 carpenter	 who	 seeks	 to	 reconstruct	 a	 broken	 weaver's	shuttle.	The	carpenter	who	seeks	to	reconstruct	the	shuttle	looks	to	the	eidos	of	shuttle,	to	that	which	is	shuttle	[ho	estin	kerkis]	(Cratylus	389a-b).	Accordingly,	the	epistēmē	of	eidos	enables	the	physician	and	the	physical	trainer	to	seek	the	welfare	of	the	body,	just	as	it	makes	possible	for	the	judge	and	the	legislator	to	seek	the	welfare	of	the	soul	(Republic	464c).	So,	when	we	finally	get	to	pinnacle	of	the	polis,	it	seems	little	is	left	to	the	care	of	the	politician	and	the	magistrate	for	the	wellbeing	of	men.	What	are	the	eidos	and	the	epistēmē	that	define	the	art	of	 politics	 then?	 The	 art	 of	 ruling	 men	 in	 the	 polis,	 Socrates	 explains	 in	 the	
Republic,	is	a	kind	of	technē	that	looks	after	the	welfare	of	the	polis.	The	epistēmē	that	 enables	 the	magistrate	 to	 look	 after	 the	wellbeing	of	men	 is	 the	one	 that	allows	for	him	to	dispose	well	over	things	for	the	good	of	the	city;	the	epistēmē	of	ruling	takes	counsel	for	the	polis	as	a	whole	with	a	view	to	the	betterment	of	its	 relations	 with	 itself	 and	 other	 poleis,	 Socrates	 elaborates	 (Republic	 342e;	428b-d).	At	the	hands	of	the	magistrate,	the	wellbeing	of	men	is	in	other	words	seen	as	a	matter	of	providing	for	the	eidos	of	the	good	which	is	the	ship	of	polis.	In	 other	 dialogues,	 it	 appears	 that	 the	 arkhōn	 who	 claims	 the	 just	 right	 to	authority	 has	 the	 proper	 epistēmē	 of	 technē	 allowing	 him	 to	 achieve	 what	 is	good	for	the	polis:	“It	is	the	science	of	guardianship	or	government	and	it	is	to	be	found	in	those	rulers	to	whom	we	just	now	gave	the	name	of	guardians	 in	the	full	sense	of	the	word.”	(428d).	Yet,	to	these	rulers	this	technē	politikē	does	not	really	 seem	 to	 constitute	 a	 clearly	 discernable	 essence	 with	 its	 own	 singular	practices	and	 its	own	particular	end.	The	art	of	government	 is	 in	other	words	articulated	 around	 a	 fairly	 powerless	 essence-knowledge	 relation,	 where	 the	multiple	 resemblances	 of	 technē	 keep	 turning	up	 at	 the	 site	 of	 political	 order.	This	 is	 expressed	 nowhere	 better	 than	 when	 Socrates,	 in	 a	 passage	 of	 the	
Republic,	likens	the	technē	of	ruling	the	polis	to	that	of	the	painter	who	looks	to	a	
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model.	Both	shape	things	according	to	their	proper	eidos,	Socrates	explains,	and	both	 look	to	 the	 form	of	 the	beautiful	 [kalos]	 in	order	to	achieve	what	 is	good	[agathos]	 (484c).	 The	 coupling	 of	 the	 epistēmē	 of	 technē	 with	 the	 deeper	knowledge	 of	 the	 eidos	 of	 the	 beautiful	 and	 the	 good	 form	 the	 art	 of	 politics	exercised	as	the	conjunction	of	philosophical	knowledge	and	political	power.	Turning	 the	 attention	 to	Aristotle,	we	basically	 find	 the	 same	 account	 of	the	 art	 of	 ruling	 with	 the	 exception	 that	 the	 epistēmē	 that	 defines	 the	 art	 of	ruling	the	political	community	is	now	more	clearly	distinguished	from	the	broad	sense	 of	 technē.	 This	 is	 because	 eidos,	 as	 derived	 from	 the	 plane	 of	 God,	 now	determines	 the	 substance	 or	 essence	 [ousia]	 of	 the	 thing.	 In	 Plato,	 eidos	 is	limited	to	the	function	of	establishing	divisions	that	cannot	really	determine	the	propinquity	of	things	or	impose	limits	on	them,	since	eidos	remains	confined	to	the	simple	activity	of	mind	that	projects	the	clearing	onto	the	world.	In	Aristotle,	
eidos,	 and	 hence	 the	 epistēmē	 that	 defines	 the	 technē	 politikē,	 is	 no	 longer	confined	 to	 the	 crude	 divisions	 of	 small	 and	 great,	 night	 and	 day,	 famine	 and	plenty,	male	and	female,	barbarian	and	Greek,	which	show	up	at	the	site	of	the	clearing,	as	eidos,	but	only	to	be	carried	off	in	the	perpetual	motion	of	phusis	and	disappear	 into	 the	 infinite	 resemblances	 of	polemos.	 In	 Aristotle,	 the	mode	 of	thinking	 phusis	 is	 to	 some	 extent	 still	 one	 of	 becoming,	 but	 in	 the	 sense	 that	potentiality	must	pass	over	into	actuality,	as	articulated	from	that	middle	region	where	the	logos	of	mind	corresponds	to	the	essence	[ousia]	of	the	thing	so	as	to	guide	 action	 [agein]	 and	 technē.	 That	 is,	 in	Aristotle,	 the	 relationship	between	
eidos	 and	 technē	 is	 articulated	 around	 a	 stronger	 essence-knowledge	 relation	than	in	Plato.	We	are	closer	to	a	condition	where	the	art	of	government,	rather	than	 simply	being	absorbed	 in	 the	perpetual	movement	of	phusis,	 can	acquire	permanence	or	form	[eidos]	precisely	from	the	restraining	hold	of	eidos	and	the	mind	by	which	 the	 thing	 to	 some	extent	 can	be	 ‘put’,	 ‘placed’,	 or	 ‘arranged’	 in	order	with	its	ousia	and	in	accordance	with	the	good.	Naturally,	this	presents	us	with	 the	 pertinent	 question:	 is	 the	 eidos	 of	 political	 community,	 to	which	 the	
technē	politikē	 strives,	 now	 singled	 out	 as	 an	 essence	 of	 the	 form	of	 the	 good	derived	 from	 theōria,	 the	 pure	 activity	 of	 mind	 devoid	 of	 any	 foundation	 in	
phusis?	 Clearly,	 such	 an	 assertion	 would	 neither	 be	 true	 to	 the	 discourse	 of	Aristotle	nor	to	the	historical	reality	of	classical	Greece.	Technē	politikē	retains	
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foundation	 in	 phusis	 because	 the	 epistēmē	 that	 defines	 the	 end	 of	 the	 art	 of	politics	cannot	come	into	being	without	practical	wisdom	[phronēsis].	Phronēsis	is	derived	from	experience	of	being,	which	is	to	say	that	politics	is	not	the	effect	of	 the	 pure	 actuality	 of	 the	 mind.	 Whereas	 the	 mind	 apprehends	 things	 that	cannot	 be	 proven	 by	 logos,	 phronēsis	 deals	 with	 the	 ultimate	 particular	 thing	that	 cannot	 be	 apprehended	 by	 the	 mind	 as	 epistēmē,	 but	 only	 by	 sense	perception	and	logos	bringing	the	potentiality	of	action	before	the	mind.	This	is	also	why,	 as	 Aristotle	 explains	 in	 the	Nicomachean	Ethics,	 neither	 philosophy	nor	politics	 can	 really	be	practiced	 in	youth	since	 they	 require	not	only	mind,	but	also	the	experience	garnered	by	phronēsis.103	As	we	can	see,	at	the	 level	of	actual	 practices,	 the	 predication	 of	 theōria	 and	 epistēmē,	 in	 the	 sense	 of	arresting	things	and	disclosing	their	essence	from	a	unitary	point	that	ascribes	to	them	their	true	technē	of	ruling,	is	not	really	possible.	In	fact,	in	the	passages	of	the	Politics	where	Aristotle	seems	to	approach	the	essence	of	epistēmē	politikē,	we	actually	encounter	the	same	however	scarcely	less	rudimentary	divisions	we	saw	in	Plato.	Even	for	one	‘who	studies	the	subject	philosophically’,	rather	than	simply	 practically,	 this	 science	 of	 politics	 in	 other	words	 always	 seems	 to	 get	lost	 in	 the	 multiple	 divisions	 and	 subdivisions	 that	 seem	 to	 exist	 within	 the	knowledge	that	is	supposed	to	define	it,	such	as	the	taxonomy	of	constitutions:			But	it	is	necessary	to	say	at	a	little	greater	length	what	each	of	these	constitutions	is;	 for	the	question	involves	certain	difficulties,	and	it	 is	the	special	mark	of	one	who	 studies	 any	 subject	 philosophically,	 and	 not	 solely	 with	 regard	 to	 its	practical	aspect,	that	he	does	not	overlook	or	omit	any	point,	but	brings	to	light	the	 truth	 about	 each.	 Now	 tyranny,	 as	 has	 been	 said,	 is	 monarchy	 exerting	despotic	power	over	the	political	community;	oligarchy	is	when	the	control	of	the	government	is	in	the	hands	of	those	that	own	the	properties;	democracy	is	when	on	the	contrary	it	is	in	the	hands	of	those	that	do	not	possess	much	property,	but	are	poor.	A	 first	difficulty	 is	with	 regard	 to	 the	definition.	 If	 the	majority	of	 the	citizens	were	wealthy	and	were	in	control	of	the	state,	yet	when	the	multitude	is	in	power	it	is	a	democracy,	and	similarly,	to	take	the	other	case,	if	it	were	to	occur																																																									103	As	Aristotle	explains:	“[Although]	the	young	may	be	experts	in	geometry	and	mathematics	and	similar	branches	of	knowledge,	we	do	not	consider	that	a	young	man	can	have	Prudence	[phronēsis].	The	reason	is	that	Prudence	includes	a	knowledge	of	particular	facts,	and	this	is	derived	from	experience,	which	a	young	man	does	not	posses;	for	experience	is	the	fruit	of	years…	the	first	principles	of	Metaphysics	and	Natural	Philosophy	are	derived	from	experience:	the	young	can	only	repeat	them.”	(Nicomachean	Ethics	1142a	5-10).	
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somewhere	that	the	poor	were	fewer	than	the	rich	but	were	stronger	than	they	and	accordingly	were	in	control	of	the	government,	yet	where	a	small	number	is	in	control	 it	 is	said	to	be	an	oligarchy,	 then	 it	would	seem	that	our	definition	of	the	forms	of	constitution	was	not	a	good	one.	And	once	again,	if	one	assumed	the	combination	 of	 small	 numbers	with	wealth	 and	 of	multitude	with	 poverty,	 and	named	the	constitutions	thus	–	one	 in	which	the	rich	being	 few	in	number	hold	the	 offices,	 oligarchy:	 one	 in	 which	 the	 poor	 being	 many	 in	 number	 hold	 the	offices,	democracy,	–	this	involves	another	difficulty.	(Politics	1279b	8-30).		
5.4.	 It	is	clear	then	that	the	essence-knowledge	relation	we	find	in	the	art	of	politics,	while	 certainly	more	 strongly	articulated	 in	Aristotle	 than	 in	Plato,	cannot	 really	 define	 and	 take	 hold	 of	 its	 object.	 So,	 while	 Aristotle’s	 Theos	certainly	commands	in	the	technē	politikē	of	the	city	of	men,	being	ever-present	in	the	mind,	it	is	equally	clear	that	in	the	day-to-day	ruling	of	the	stratēgos,	the	
oikonomos,	and	the	despotēs,	 the	free	man	over	the	slave,	the	philosopher	over	the	ignorant,	the	divine	glow	of	the	god-shepherd	seems	to	appear	in	a	distant	horizon.	The	divine	 ‘unmoved	mover’	takes	his	place	as	the	 ‘master	craftsman’	of	 kosmos	 who	 dwells	 among	 the	 old	 Nomios	 and	 Eleutherios	 whose	 gifts	 of	justice	 and	 freedom,	 along	 with	 those	 of	 the	 stars,	 once	 engendered	 man	 by	flesh	 and	 blood	 as	 a	 certain	 animal	 species	 with	 the	 capacity	 for	 political	existence.	However,	 and	whether	 it	 is	 just	 the	 strange	 course	 of	 history	 or	 that	 of	tragedy	 shall	 remain	unsaid,	but	during	 the	 centuries	 that	 follow	 the	Classical	Greek	 period	we	will	 see	 a	 development	where	 the	arkhē	 scripture	 that	 once	traced	a	wide	circle	 in	the	distance,	 inside	of	which	technē	politikē	determined	the	art	of	ruling,	will	become	the	essence	of	ruling.	It	is	clear	that	the	Christian	model	must	be	considered	in	its	own	right	here,	and	not	be	conflated	with	the	military	model	of	war	that	is	the	invention	of	the	Greeks.	However,	one	cannot	fail	 to	 see	 how,	 during	 the	 first	 centuries	 AD,	 the	 two	 models,	 although	seemingly	distinct	by	means	and	end,	intersect	at	several	places	and	refer	back	to	one	another.	In	fact,	we	find	a	strong	kinship	between	the	two	models	where	one	always	seems	liable	to	pass	over	into	the	other.	With	the	arrival	of	Christian	thought,	 the	 self	 will	 retreat	 further	 into	 the	 depths	 of	 the	 mind	 and,	 in	 the	intimacy	 of	 self-presence,	 discover	 the	 evermore	 urgent	 commandments	 of	
Theos.	The	practice	of	an	askēsis	and	its	correlatives,	discipline,	moderation,	and	
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self-control,	 will	 be	 taken	 into	 the	 cells	 of	 the	 monastery	 where	 theōria	 will	illuminate	the	soul	in	the	darkness	of	its	profound	solitude.	The	struggle	against	desire,	renunciation,	self-accusation,	and	confession	will	constitute	the	strange	rituals	of	a	practice	of	the	soul	whose	counterpart	is	the	ruling	force	of	the	Son	of	 God,	 the	 shepherd	 of	 being	who	 commands	 and	 leads	 his	 army	 of	 souls	 to	salvation	and	eternal	bliss.	But	 it	 is	 the	same	dream	of	salvation	and	 freedom,	now	nourished	from	the	springs	frequented	by	the	first	shepherds,	that	is	lived	in	 the	battlefield	where	 freedom	will	 only	 be	had	 from	perpetual	 conquest	 as	the	stratia	and	the	militia	march	on	in	the	legio.	Now,	these	two	lines	of	flight,	in	which	we	find	the	same	mind	struggling	to	straighten	out	the	strife	of	the	soul,	will	 begin	 to	 intersect	 and	 converge.	 At	 this	 point	 of	 intersection,	 we	 find	 a	figure	such	as	Flavius	Josephus,	a	high-priest	who	commanded	his	flock	of	men	into	battle	in	The	Wars	of	the	Jews.	Conversely,	in	his	Mediations	we	find	Marcus	Aurelius	introducing	into	the	knowledge	of	ruling	the	notion	of	the	emperor	as	a	supreme	being,	a	captain	or	shepherd	that	man,	being	an	‘element’	of	this	logos,	must	follow.	Not	coincidentally,	Aurelius	is	often	referred	to	in	the	literature	by	the	epithet	of	philosopher	king.	Whether	or	not	the	Christian	pastoral	model	found	its	way	into	the	West	by	the	influence	of	the	Egyptians,	the	Assyrians,	or	the	Hebrews,	pace	Foucault,	or	simply	must	be	understood	as	a	kind	of	reworking	of	the	theme	of	the	herd	in	the	Greeks,	is	not	important	then.	What	matters	is	the	fact	that	the	pastoral	and	the	 military	 models	 are	 congenial.	 Perhaps	 we	 could	 even	 say	 that	 they	 are	indeed	the	Same,	a	set	of	antilogies,	a	conjunction	of	opposites	which	was	once	seen	as	truth	[alētheia].	Perhaps	this	is	in	fact	what	accounts	for	the	seemingly	contradictory	logic	that	would	emerge	in	biopolitics	of	which	it	has	been	argued	with	perfect	lucidity	we	see	a	power	that	 ‘kills	to	make	life	live’	(Dillon	&	Reid	2009;	Reid	2009).	But	we	are	getting	ahead	of	ourselves.	Such	abstractions	are	but	mere	 conjectures.	 However,	 these	 abstractions	 should	 now	 become	more	readily	 apparent	 in	 their	 concrete	 arrangements:	 Once	 Plato’s	 horde	 of	struggling	men	utterly	satiated	by	the	desire	for	war	and	Aristotle’s	nemesis	of	the	particularly	troublesome	species	animal	whose	desire	is	dominated	by	war,	once	 these	 warmongering	 men	 with	 their	 pugnacious	 wills	 and	 desires	 have	been	lined	up	next	to	the	gargoyles,	the	chimeras,	the	winged	beasts	of	prey,	and	
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all	the	other	diabolical	offspring,	this	is	when	the	peaceful	flock	of	sheep	turns	up	in	the	fold	as	the	amassa	damnata	[condemned	crowd].	Having	retreated	to	the	point	of	 the	origin,	 the	site	of	 the	 fleeting	articulation	of	God	and	the	pure	activity	of	mind,	at	once	devoid	and	at	the	same	time	bristling	with	desire,	the	Fathers	of	 the	Church	now	read	the	arkhē	 scripture	as	proof	of	man’s	Original	sin.	At	the	site	of	an	absolute	distance	from	phusis,	theōria	once	again	finds	 its	privileged	beginning	with	desire,	but	this	desire,	now	fully	adequate	to	its	own	nature,	cannot	but	find	its	end	in	the	last	judgement	where	the	Word	[logos]	of	God	 absolves	 the	being	of	man	or	 condemns	 it.	 The	 transgression	of	 desire	 is	therefore	no	 longer	 something	 that	must	 be	 considered	 in	 its	 actual,	 concrete	manifestation,	as	 in	 the	event	of	man’s	desire	being	dominated	by	war,	but	an	act	whose	occurrence	simply	reaffirms	the	form	of	the	condemned	crowd.	The	flock	must	now	answer	to	the	Fall	of	man.	This	is	certainly	a	relationship	that	no	Greek	would	see	fit	for	himself,	but	we	should	not	forget	that	the	intrinsic	logic	of	the	shepherd-flock	relationship,	and	the	theōria	that	supported	it,	 is	already	clearly	delineated	in	the	Greeks.	Moreover,	we	should	not	fail	to	notice	that	it	is	basically	 the	same	topological	 figure	 that	guides	Plato	 in	his	 idea	 that	political	community	cannot	come	into	being	without	the	suspension	of	the	war	of	every	man	 against	 every	 man.	 The	 amassa	 damnata	 comes	 into	 being	 from	 the	suspension	of	the	same	war,	which	stems	from	the	‘war	against	ourselves	within	each	one	of	us’,	 the	war	 that	Aristotle	would	relegate	 to	 the	site	of	 the	wholly	unnatural	at	safe	distance	to	his	politikon	zōon.	Naming	this	‘private	war’	desire	[libido]	 and	 placing	 it	 at	 the	 centre	 of	 its	 calculations,	 pastoral	 power	 does	nothing	 other	 than	 rearticulate	 the	 bond	 between	 the	 mind	 and	 the	 stratia,	thereby	reinstating	the	tragedy	once	inflicted	upon	man’s	friendship	with	war.	This	resemblance	is	expressed	most	vividly	in	a	passage	of	Augustine’s	On	Free	
Choice	of	 the	Will.	 Although	 certainly	 an	 unfortunate	matter	 of	 duty,	we	 learn	that	 a	 good	 Christian	 can	 nonetheless	 wage	 war	 so	 long	 as	 he	 observes	 the	codes	of	the	abstinent	mind	and	fights	without	‘inordinate	libido’.104	So,	 we	 can	 see	 that	 the	 points	 of	 intersection	 of	 the	 two	models	 in	 fact	seem	to	constitute	a	common	centre	or	point	of	articulation	from	where	the	care																																																									104	Augustine	explains:	“A	soldier	who	kills	the	enemy	is	acting	as	an	agent	of	the	law,	so	he	can	easily	perform	his	duty	without	inordinate	desire	[libido].”	(I.5).	
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for	 the	 subsistence	 of	 life	 of	 pastoral	 power	 is	 exercised	 on	 life	 simply	 as	 the	reverse	of	 one	and	 the	 same	dream	about	 freedom	and	 salvation	wherein	 the	moderate	 man	 follows	 his	 ruler	 into	 battle.	 At	 the	 topological	 level,	 then,	 it	should	 seem	 evident	 how	 the	 rebirth	 of	 theōria	 and	 the	 shepherd-flock	relationship	 come	 to	 constitute	 a	 power	 that,	 pace	 Foucault,	 will	 have	 the	‘greatest	and	most	durable	fortune’	in	Western	politics.	On	the	one	hand,	we	can	see	how	the	military	model	was	succeeded	in	the	Roman	legio.	This	is	apparent	in	 the	 treatises	 on	 the	 militari,	 such	 as	 Vegetius	 famous	 work	 Concerning	
Military	 Matters,	 a	 work	 that	 functioned	 as	 a	 military	 manual	 long	 into	 the	Renaissance,	 and	which	 Pietrino	 Belli	 and	Machiavelli	 had	 before	 them	when	they	wrote	their	critiques	on	the	art	of	war.105	On	 the	 other	 hand,	 however,	 it	 seems	 necessary	 to	 inquire	 further	 into	how	 the	 pastoral	 model	 comes	 to	 function	 in	 the	 domain	 of	 actual	 practices.	Remember	that	when	we	encounter	the	shepherd-flock	relationship	as	a	model	of	politics	in	Plato,	it	appears	as	a	completely	anaemic	or	sterile	power,	a	power	that	 cannot	 really	 function	both	because	of	 the	 limit	posed	by	knowledge,	but	also	 because	 it	 seems	 defeated	 in	 the	 outset	 by	 the	multiplicity	 of	 things	 and	beings	it	must	care	for.	Moreover,	when	we	looked	to	Aristotle	we	saw	how	the	science	 of	 politics,	 despite	 the	 presence	 of	 the	arkhē	 scripture	 of	 theōria,	was	articulated	 around	 a	 relatively	weak	 essence-knowledge	 relation,	which	 could	not	 really	 constitute	 a	 power	 that	 would	 not	 always	 be	 challenged	 by	 the	necessity	of	technē,	as	well	as	the	resistance	articulated	by	the	old	resemblances	of	 power	 as	 kratos	 and	 bia.	 The	 birth	 of	 pastoral	 power,	 however,	 would	contribute	 to	 solving	 this	problem	 that	we,	 for	 the	 sake	of	 convenience,	 could	call	 the	 problem	 of	 the	 real.	 While	 it	 is	 no	 coincidence	 that	 pastoral	 power	emerges	at	the	level	of	the	incorporeal,	the	care	for	the	soul	and	its	afterlife,	one	should	 not	 thereby	 overlook	 the	 morphological	 potentialities	 of	 this	 form	 of	power	 that	 in	 fact	will	 find	 its	point	of	articulation	 in	 the	Greek	 idea	of	 ruling	[arkhein].	 In	 fact,	 we	 must	 now	 try	 to	 recognise	 these	 potentialities,	 in	particular,	in	view	of	the	Greek	account	of	the	arkhē	and	the	displacement	of	the	
																																																								105	It	should	be	noted,	however,	that	the	Romans	did	rework	the	tactics	of	the	Greek	phalanx	and	further	developed	the	military-disciplinary	practices,	as	explained	by	Gibbon	in	his	extensive	review	of	Roman	sources	(2000:	17-24).	
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Logos.	We	will	 see	 the	mediation	on	 the	Logos,	 once	articulated	by	Heraclitus,	carried	onto	new	battlefields	where	it,	eventually,	will	find	its	common	place	of	residence	with	Aristotle’s	logos,	now	transcribed	as	the	Word	of	God.	In	any	case,	the	problem	one	encounters	in	the	pastoral	model	is	the	difficulty	of	how	to	give	life	to	the	arkhē	scripture	and	make	this	knowledge	function	at	the	intersection	of	 the	 incorporeal	 and	 the	 corporeal	 so	 as	 to	 enable	 a	 power	 capable	 of	constituting	the	divine	economy	of	the	cities	of	men.	This	seems	to	have	been	a	particularly	 difficult	 task	 since,	 as	we	 know,	 the	 emissary	 and	 the	messenger,	who	 is	 supposed	 to	 transmit	 the	 commandments	 and	 orders	 of	 God,	 suffered	and	 died.	 The	 possibility	 of	 God’s	 rule	 in	 the	 mundane	 sphere	 of	 the	 civitas	would	therefore	seem	limited.	In	fact,	not	simply	would	it	appear	to	be	limited	by	 the	mere	physical	 absence	of	 the	 Son,	 but	 also	by	 the	problem	 that	 Father	and	Son	 for	a	 long	 time	actually	were	 seen	as	one	and	 the	 same.	Since	Father	and	 Son	 are	 identical,	 Noetus	 explains,	 the	 Father	 suffered	 and	 died	 in	 the	person	 of	 the	 Son.	 God’s	 active	 creation	 in	 the	 temporal	 world	 is	 therefore	impossible.	This	is	how	we	find	Noetus	arguing	that	the	fourth	Gospel	of	John,	in	which	Jesus	performs	a	miracle,	is	to	be	considered	an	allegory	rather	than	the	sign	of	God,	active	 in	creation.	The	miracle	of	 Jesus	cannot	be	but	an	allegory,	Noetus	says,	because	if	it	were	the	expression	of	the	incarnation	of	God’s	active	creation	 this	 would	 presuppose	 the	 paradoxical	 logic	 of	 the	 simultaneous	division	 and	 reconciliation	 in	God	 of	 the	 corporeal	 and	 the	 incorporeal,	 being	and	action.	In	 the	Refutation	of	all	Heresies,	Hippolytus	deals	with	 this	 heresy	 of	 the	Noetians	 stating	 that	 they	were	 influenced	 by	 the	 tenets	 of	 Heraclitus,	whom	Hippolytus	refers	to	as	the	‘Dark’	or	the	‘Obscure’.	In	fact,	Hippolytus	dedicates	several	 passages	 of	 his	 book	 to	 demonstrating	 how	 the	 Noetian	 system	 of	thought	was	essentially	Heraclitean.	In	fact,	in	order	to	denounce	the	teachings	of	Noetus	who	 at	 the	 time	 had	 a	 large	 following	 in	 Rome,	Hippolytus	 goes	 to	particularly	painstaking	efforts	to	explain	the	erroneous	belief	of	Heraclitus	that	the	 Logos	 and	 God	 are	 identical.	 If	 God	 is	 one,	 Hippolytus	 argues,	 then	 the	Trinity	 could	 only	 be	 achieved	 by	 way	 of	 some	 illusory	 shifting	 of	 forms	between	the	corporeal	and	the	incorporeal,	substance	and	actuality.	What	is	at	stake	in	Hippolytus	is	in	other	words	the	Christian	doctrine	of	the	Trinity,	which	
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seems	to	have	played	a	critical	role	in	making	the	arkhē	scripture	function	as	the	knowledge	that	defines	the	divine	art	of	governing	men.	Specifically,	Hippolytus	draws	on	the	first	chapter	of	the	Gospel	of	John	in	which	Jesus	is	singled	out	as	the	 incarnation	of	 the	divine	 logos.	Here,	 it	 appears	 that	God	and	 the	 logos	do	not	signify	two	forms	of	being	that	are	identical.	The	logos	is	God	–	embodied	in	Jesus	–	active	in	creation	or,	more	exactly,	God’s	self-revelation	and	redemption,	the	logos,	appear	as	Jesus.	So,	even	if	the	Son	of	God	died,	he	lives	on	in	the	Word	[logos]	of	God,	who,	at	the	same	time,	retains	the	potentiality	of	action	by	virtue	of	 being	 non-identical	 to	 his	 messenger.	 But	 how	 then	 would	 the	 Trinity	 of	Father,	Son,	and	the	Holy	Spirit	be	held	together	as	God	when	they	are	not	the	same?	We	find	the	answer	in	Plotinus	who	would	contribute	to	the	elaboration	of	 this	 model	 in	 a	 very	 important	 aspect.	 In	 Plotinus,	 who	 cites	 Heraclitus’	fragments,	 we	 find	 the	 idea	 that	 the	 logos	 is	 the	 principle	 of	 meditation	 that	enables	the	 interrelationship	of	 three	hypostases	 [existences	or	 ‘being	at	rest’].	However,	in	the	outset	these	hypostases	do	not	concern	the	Christian	Trinity,	but	rather	 what	 Plotinus	 calls	 the	 one,	 the	 mind,	 and	 the	 soul	 with	 reference	 to	Plato’s	form	of	the	good,	the	nous,	and	the	psukhē.	Plotinus	 influence	 in	 the	 Church	 Fathers,	 in	 particular,	 in	 Augustine	 is	however	 immediately	 apparent.	 The	 idea	 of	 the	 divine	 as	 three	 hypostasis	mediated	by	the	logos	is	the	epitome	of	the	orthodox	Christian	doctrine	in	which	the	Trinity	occurs	as	three	hypostases	in	one	essence	[ousia].	God’s	existence,	as	one	ousia,	is	then	reconciled	with	the	possibility	of	his	active	creation.	But	how	will	God’s	ruling	 find	 its	point	of	articulation	 in	 the	cities	of	men	 to	constitute	the	divine	providential	governance	of	 the	world?	 In	his	minor	 treatise	Against	
Praxeas,	a	heretic	who	like	Noetus	had	claimed	that	the	Father	had	suffered	and	died	with	the	Son,	we	find	Tertullian	arguing	that	God	must	indeed	be	seen	as	a	Trinity.	In	a	passage	of	this	text,	however,	we	also	find	the	peculiar	formulation	that	 the	Trinity	 is	what	safeguards	a	certain	mystery	of	 the	oikonomia	of	God,	God’s	 household:	 “And	 at	 the	 same	 time	 the	 mystery	 of	 the	 economy	[oikonomia]	 is	 safeguarded,	 for	 the	 unity	 is	 distributed	 in	 a	 Trinity.	 Placed	 in	order,	 the	 three	 are	 the	 Father,	 Son,	 and	 Spirit.”	 (Against	 Praxeas	 II).	 In	 his	treatise	Against	Noetus,	 Hippolytus,	 perhaps	 in	 allusion	 to	Tertullian,	makes	 a	similar	 connection	 between	 the	 Trinity	 and	 God’s	 oikonomia:	 “The	 Father's	
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Word	[logos],	 therefore,	knowing	the	economy	[oikonomia]	and	the	will	of	the	Father…	gave	this	charge	to	the	disciples	after	he	rose	from	the	dead:	‘Go	ye	and	teach	all	nations,	baptizing	them	in	the	name	of	the	Father,	and	of	the	Son,	and	of	the	Holy	Spirit’.”	(Against	Noetus	XIV).	By	a	series	of	displacements,	then,	Christian	though	has	now	arrived	at	the	place	where	no	Greek	could	go;	the	site	where	the	shepherd-flock	relationship	can	be	applied	as	a	general	model	 for	 the	art	of	 governing	men.	This	 sense	of	
oikonomia	would	clearly	have	seemed	strangely	alien	to	the	Greeks.	At	the	same	time,	one	should	not	forget	that	this	is	merely	yet	a	displacement	along	the	same	axis	of	truth	on	which	the	Logos	once	became	divided	from	polemos.	The	 logos	that	now	speaks	the	Word	of	God	is	the	same	logos	that,	once	detached	from	the	unceasing	motion	of	kosmos,	came	to	appear	at	that	middle	ground	where	man	once	 assumed	 the	 task	 of	 steering	 polemos	 –	 the	 metaphysical	 exercise	 par	excellence.	It	is	the	return	of	this	logos	that	appeared	with	the	fracture	by	which	the	logos	became	both	the	mean,	which	occurred	at	the	intersection	of	mind	and	desire,	and	the	account	of	 the	essential	nature	of	 things.	 It	 is	 the	return	of	 the	fracture	that	then	occurred	in	the	soul,	and	which	Aristotle	sought	to	avoid	by	projecting	it	onto	the	origin	and	the	plane	of	God,	an	ousia	permanently	at	rest,	but	capable	of	originating	movement.	We	are	 in	other	words	close	 to	Plotinus	use	of	the	term	hypostasis,	but,	in	Aristotle,	hypostasis	does	not	seem	to	occur	at	the	level	of	God.	It	is	rather	employed	in	the	sense	of	phronēsis	that	deals	with	a	particular	thing	that	is	immediately	apparent,	such	as	a	particular	specimen	of	a	species	animal.	That	 is,	 we	 are	 closer	 to	 the	 reality	 in	 which	 the	 logos	 must	 answer	 to	
phusis.	However,	having	been	 transcribed	as	 the	divine	Word	of	God,	 it	 is	 this	
logos	that	now	returns	to	constitute	yet	a	caesura	that	would	only	be	resolved	at	the	 site	 of	 the	 Trinity.	 One	 should	 therefore	 not	 be	 surprised	 to	 see	 Theos	appear	 before	 man	 again	 and,	 from	 that	 strange	 middle	 region	 where	 the	clearing	is	out	of	sight,	disclose	the	truth,	essence,	and	form	that	constitute	the	particularly	 pugnacious	 kind	 of	 thinking	 which	 in	 time	 would	 be	 known	 as	reason.	Continuing	this	line	of	thought,	it	is	clear	that	this	reason,	of	which	Kant	would	 say	 ‘there	 can	 be	 really	 no	 polemic’,	 would	 be	 reawakened	 at	 the	 site	where	 juridico-philosophical	 thought	discovers	 the	 solution	 to	 the	problem	of	
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order,	 the	 subject	 who	 cannot	 occur	 but	 from	 the	 suspension	 of	 the	 state	 of	nature	 and	 the	 sanitation	 of	 man’s	 relationship	 with	 war.	 As	 the	 necessary	counterpart	 to	 this	 reasonable	 subject,	 we	 now	 find	 the	 perfectly	 reasonable	state	[stato],	permanently	at	rest	and	fully	adequate	to	its	own	nature.	Foucault	has	 accurately	 captured	 this	 profound	 moment	 in	 Western	 political	 history	when,	from	the	end	of	the	sixteenth	century,	reason	would	enter	into	alignment	with	 the	 idea	 of	 ruling	 a	 certain	 domain	 permanently	 at	 rest,	 a	 stato,	 to	constitute	the	art	of	government	known	as	ragione	di	stato	or	raison	d’État.	Now,	what	is	understood	by	reason	in	this	discourse	on	the	art	of	governing	the	state?	Foucault’s	 references	 to	 Palazzo,	 Bacon,	 and	 Chemnitz	 are	 particularly	instructive:		‘Reason’,	 [Palazzo]	 says…	 is	 the	entire	 essence	of	 a	 thing,	which	 constitutes	 the	union,	 the	 combination	 of	 all	 its	 parts;	 it	 is	 the	 necessary	 bond	 between	 the	different	 elements	 that	 constitute	 a	 thing…	 But	 ‘reason’	 is	 also	 employed	 in	another	sense.	Subjectively,	reason	is	a	certain	power	of	the	soul	that	enables	it	to	know	the	truth	of	things,	 that	 is	to	say,	precisely	that	bond,	that	 integrity	of	the	different	parts	that	constitutes	a	thing.	(Foucault	2007:	256).				What	surfaces	in	this	discourse	on	the	reason	of	state	is,	of	course,	the	logos.	The	Greek	logos	does	not	come	up	in	the	text,	and	Foucault	naturally	does	not	refer	to	it	all	the	while	that	this	is	not	the	subject	at	stake.	In	parenthesis,	though,	we	should	 note	 that	 reason	 is	 derived	 from	 the	 Latin	 root,	 ratio,	 which	 is	 the	transliteration	of	logos.	As	we	know,	six-	and	seventeenth	century	writers,	such	as	Hobbes,	Locke,	Bacon,	Palazzo,	and	Chemnitz,	 commonly	wrote	 in	Latin.	By	recourse	 to	 Greek	 and	 Latin	 texts,	 they	 often	 employ	 the	 words	 logos,	 ratio,	
reason,	 and	 raison	 interchangeably.	 So,	 in	 these	writers,	 although	 they	 deploy	the	term	in	a	vastly	different	context,	we	never	leave	that	middle	ground	of	the	Classical	Greek	 logos	where	 the	power	of	 the	soul	 is	 in	perfect	alignment	with	the	essence	of	the	thing.	Moreover,	equally	striking	is	the	definition	we	find	of	the	word	‘state’	[stato]:		‘State’,	 says	 Palazzo,	 is	 a	word	 understood	 in	 four	 senses.	 A	 state	 is	 a	 domain,	
dominium.	Second,	he	says,	it	is	a	jurisdiction,	a	set	of	laws,	rules,	and	customs…	Third…	‘state’	is	a	condition	of	life,	that	is	to	say,	a	kind	of	individual	status,	or	a	
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profession:	 the	 state	magistrate,	 or	 the	 state	 of	 celibacy,	 or	 the	 religious	 state.	And	 finally,	 fourth,	 the	 ‘state’,	 he	 says,	 is	 something	 that	 renders	 things,	 if	 not	completely	immobile	–	and	here	I	skip	the	detail,	because,	he	says,	some	forms	of	immobility	would	be	contrary	to	the	thing’s	rest,	and	some	things	must	move	so	as	to	be	able	to	remain	really	at	rest	–	in	any	case	this	state	is	a	quality	that	means	that	the	thing	remains	what	it	is.	(Ibid.).		 		But	what,	then,	defines	the	conjunction	of	‘reason’	and	‘state’?	It	is	‘a	rule	or	an	art’,	 says	 Palazzo,	 “…	 which	makes	 known	 to	 us	 the	means	 for	 obtaining	 the	integrity,	 tranquillity,	or	peace	of	 the	republic.”	 It	 is	an	art	 that	“…	must	strive	solely	for	the	preservation;	the	expansion,	and	felicity	of	the	state,	and	for	which	it	must	employ	the	most	ready	and	swift	means.”	(Ibid.	257).	As	Foucault	notes,	it	is	remarkable	how	this	art	of	government	refers	to	nothing	but	the	state	itself.	There	are	no	gods	to	be	answered	to,	no	reference	to	nature,	to	cosmos	or	any	other	order	than	that,	which	is	the	essence	of	state.	There	is	no	reference	to	the	happiness	of	men	or	life	according	to	the	good	as	end	of	political	community.	It	has	no	end	foreign	to	the	state	itself.	The	reason	of	state	is	that	without	which	“[the]	republic	itself…	would	not	be	able	or	sufficient	to	maintain	itself	in	peace	for	 one	 hour.”	 (Ibid.	 259).	 As	 we	 know,	 this	 is	 precisely	 the	 sense	 of	 reason	Hobbes	had	in	mind	when	he	made	the	order	of	political	community	contingent	upon	the	principle	of	sovereignty.	By	then	we	are	obviously	far	from	the	Greek	experience	of	ruling,	but	it	seems	to	me	that	this	is	in	fact	where	we	can	see	one	of	the	most	significant	influences	of	the	Greeks	on	the	political	ethos	of	Western	culture.	While	the	Christian	heritage	is	evident	in	this	reason	of	state,	the	state	as	the	secular	form	of	the	divine	oikonomia	articulated	by	the	commandment	of	the	Word	 of	 God	 [logos]	 and	 the	 being	 of	 God	 as	 one	 ousia	 of	hypostasis,	 the	reason	 that	 Hobbes	 and	 the	 thinkers	 of	 the	 state	 of	 nature	 without	 further	difficulty	 could	 transcribe	 the	 divine	 art	 of	 ruling	 into	 its	 political	 form,	 the	mortal	 divinity	 Leviathan,	 has	 its	 ground	 at	 the	 much	 earlier	 period	 in	 time	where	 the	 idea	 of	 political	 authority	 was	 worked	 out	 by	 recourse	 to	 the	originarity	of	the	soul,	that	is,	the	soul	that	once	stepped	into	appearance	with	the	ruling	principle	to	take	charge	of	war	and	discover	its	freedom	and	salvation	in	the	recurrent	practice	of	conquest.	In	essence,	I	think	that	perhaps	one	of	the	defining	moments	in	Western	political	thought	occurred	in	the	period	we	might	
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now	have	 lost	 sight	 of,	 the	period	 in	which	 the	 friendship	with	war	was	once	replaced	by	the	practice	of	steering	war.	This	event	was	not	the	Fall	of	man,	but	rather	 the	 beginning	 of	 a	 tragedy	without	 end	 in	which	 the	military	model	 of	war	 would	 continue	 to	 be	 reinvested	 in	 the	 order	 of	 things	 from	 the	 middle	ground	of	 the	 logos.	As	 thought	walks	 from	the	halls	of	 the	Parthenon	with	 its	artful	 metopes	 of	 kosmos	 and	 agōnia,	 expressing	 the	 old	 kinship	 of	 man	 and	









6.1.	This	thesis	found	its	starting	point	in	the	wonderment	of	the	fragments	of	an	 ancient	 knowledge	 of	 war,	 a	 knowledge	 that	 articulated	 a	 site,	 seemingly	without	law	or	geometry,	time	and	space,	a	site	on	which	war	appeared	where	man	was	supposed	to	turn	up.	But	from	this	vantage	point	of	war	that	seemed	to	mark	 the	 site	 of	 the	 heterotopia,	 where	 words	 could	 not	 name	 their	 proper	subject	 or	 object	 and	 things	 seemed	 to	 repel	 their	 true	 identities,	 I	 came	 to	question	whether	in	fact	the	order	of	war	could	really	be	understood	in	terms	of	the	 concept	 that	 was	 said	 to	 define	 it;	 the	 concept	 that	 claimed	 war	 to	 be	 a	matter	 of	 the	 sovereign	 decision;	 that	 war	 was	 something	 one	 could	 decide	upon	and	shape	from	objectives	derived	from	strategic	and	tactic	interventions;	that	war	had	in	fact	always	been	understood	as	an	art	of	ruling	one	could	master	in	which	practice	the	mind	would	rise	above	men	and	gods,	the	slaves	and	the	free,	and,	in	the	splendour	of	its	perfect	plenitude,	announce	the	beginning	and	the	end.	Utopias	afford	consolation,	as	Foucault	says	in	the	preface	to	The	Order	
Of	Things,	while	reminding	us	that	order	is	both	‘that	which	is	given	in	things	as	their	inner	law’	and	‘that	which	has	no	existence	except	in	the	grid	created	by	a	glance,	an	examination,	a	language’	(2008:	xxi).	Utopias	open	up	the	untroubled	region	where	the	mind	must	not	answer	to	 the	war	 it	has	 taken	possession	of,	 and	where	 the	grammar	of	war	and	 the	war	that	is	given	in	things	have	no	need	for	a	common	place	of	residence.	The	Greek	experience	of	polemos	seems	to	have	provided	us	with	some	of	 the	 first	coordinates	for	the	strange	odyssey	of	war	where,	today,	the	mind,	believing	it	has	 the	 truth,	has	withdrawn	war	 to	 the	unattainable	place	of	 this	untroubled	region.	But	this	is	certainly	not	the	setting	in	which	we	find	the	order	of	war	on	the	terrain	of	ancient	Greece.	In	fact,	one	would	indeed	have	a	hard	time	finding	among	 the	 Greeks	 anything	 resembling	 our	 contemporary	 concept	 of	 war.	
Polemos	did	not	conform	to	the	idea	of	a	conflict	resulting	in	substantial	loss	of	
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(Diogenes	Laertius	VI:	72).	In	Diogenes,	the	word	kosmopolitēs	is	in	other	words	the	conjunction	of	two	essentially	antithetical	realities,	politēs	and	kosmos.	The	irony	Diogenes	seemingly	turns	against	himself	is	in	other	words	a	masquerade,	a	masquerade	which,	when	the	masks	come	off,	will	reveal	the	Cynic	who,	with	cruel	 subtlety	and	biting	wit,	deploys	 truth	 [alētheia]	as	a	weapon	against	 the	practices	and	virtues	that	rule	the	citizen	in	the	classical	polis.	For	what	would	seem	to	express	mere	satire	in	fact	contains	the	disturbing	truth	that	the	kind	of	
politeia	 that	 had	 materialised	 in	 the	 classical	 world,	 and	 whose	 perfection	Socrates	would	dream	about	in	the	Republic,	was	born	out	of	a	displacement;	a	dislocation	of	 the	chain	of	 resemblances	which,	 throughout	 the	archaic	period	and	 long	 into	 the	 classical	 world,	 guided	 man	 and	 his	 actions.	 During	 the	classical	period,	man	will	no	 longer	so	much	be	guided	by	polemos	 that	steers	the	kosmos.	Man	and	war	change	places	in	the	order	of	things	as	man	discovers	the	 idea	 of	 ruling	 and	 steering	war	 in	 the	 principle	 of	 command	 [arkhein].	 In	contrasting	 the	 Logos	 that	 steers	 the	 kosmos	 with	 the	 arkhē	 that	 rules	 the	
politēs,	 Diogenes	 may	 well	 have	 given	 the	 most	 beautiful	 formulation	 of	 the	caesura	 that	 once	 appeared	 at	 the	 vast	 divide	 in	Western	 history	where	man	began	to	assert	himself	over	war.	But	 political	 man,	 with	 his	 philosophy,	 his	 thēoria,	 and	 his	 desire,	 was	really	just	a	symptom.	He	was	the	symptom	of	the	birth	of	a	profound	concern	about	 the	 self,	 a	 concern	 that	 appeared	because	 this	was	 the	 form	knowledge	assumed	with	the	displacement	in	the	order	of	war,	wherein	man	and	war	came	to	change	places.	But	we	must	not	let	ourselves	get	caught-up	in	nostalgia	over	the	disappearance	of	man’s	 friendship	with	war.	After	 all,	 did	 the	 terrible	not	appear	precisely	in	the	splendour	of	life	most	intense,	most	vigorous,	and	most	divine?	In	other	words,	we	cannot	put	our	faith	in	that	certain	will	to	return	man	to	 the	 domain	 of	 the	 real	 and	 the	 site	 of	 the	 original.	 As	 Foucault	 says	 in	 a	passage	at	the	end	of	The	Order	of	Things:		[This	 is]	 the	 experience	 of	 Hölderlin,	 Nietzsche,	 and	 Heidegger,	 in	 which	 the	return	 is	 posited	 only	 in	 the	 extreme	 recession	 of	 the	 origin	 –	 “in	 that	 region	where	 the	 gods	 have	 turned	 away,	 where	 the	 desert	 is	 increasing,	 where	 the	
technē	has	established	the	dominion	of	its	will…	(Foucault	2008:	364).		
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If	we	dismiss	for	a	moment	the	predicament	that	the	‘dominion	of	the	technē’	is	in	fact	intimately	related	with	the	problem	of	the	one	God	who	is	man	himself,	we	 cannot	 however	 simply	 ignore	 this	 experience	 since	 it	 is	 precisely	 at	 this	point	 of	 the	 extreme	 recession	 of	 the	 origin,	 or	 rather,	 in	 the	 thought	 that	overturns	the	origin	and	displaces	it	upon	the	vicissitudes	of	history,	it	becomes	possible	 to	pose	 the	question	of	how	and	to	what	extent	 it	may	be	possible	 to	think	differently.	 It	 seems	 to	me	 then	 that,	perhaps,	one	must	 in	 fact	welcome	the	return	 to	 the	desert	of	 the	real,	 since	 it	 is	precisely	at	 this	site	of	polemos,	where	 things	 are	 nearest	 to	 man	 and	 yet	 furthest	 from	 him,	 that	 he	 might	decentre	himself	 from	 logos	 and	 let	 the	mind	be	 carried	off	 along	with	words	and	things,	men	and	gods,	the	slaves	and	the	free.	 In	fact,	we	would	then	have	left	behind	any	ambition	to	recover	what	 is	merely	the	 lure	of	the	 intoxicating	vapours	of	being	that	occurs	in	the	void	of	the	origin.	We	would	be	left	with	the	infinite	task,	not	of	knowing	what	polemos	is,	but	of	rethinking	the	present	at	the	site	of	polemos.	In	short,	we	would	be	at	the	site	of	the	permanent	displacement	of	the	anteriority	of	war.	
6.2.	One	thing	in	any	case	is	certain.	It	is	the	absence	of	a	power	over	life	that	comes	to	 light	 in	 the	uneasiness	one	might	 initially	 feel	when	reading	the	fragment	of	Heraclitus.	This	sense	of	uneasiness	is	in	other	words	not	simply	the	effect	of	the	nonattendance	of	the	concept	of	war,	but	probably	bound	up	with	the	 whole	 Western	 organisation	 of	 knowledge,	 in	 which,	 as	 Foucault	 said,	‘knowledge	and	 truth	cannot	not	belong	 to	 the	register	of	order	and	peace’	or	‘be	 found	on	 the	 side	 of	 violence,	 disorder,	 and	war’.	 It	 is	 bound	up	with	 this	entire	economy	war	that	ties	together	the	subject,	who	has	his	soul,	his	reason,	his	mind,	and	his	desires,	with	the	principle	of	state	and	the	military	model	of	war.	Of	these	hypostasis	mediated	by	the	logos,	to	borrow	a	topological	analogy	from	the	theologians,	the	modern	state	has	perhaps	been	the	site	on	which	man	has	 faced	 the	most	of	 the	so-called	enigmas,	 such	as	 the	Napoleonic	Wars,	 the	First	World	War,	and	the	Second	World	War.	Of	these	events,	the	one	that	saw	the	 rise	 of	 the	 principle	 of	 Führung	 may	 have	 appeared	 as	 perhaps	 the	most	disquieting.	But	this	Führer	with	his	flock	simply	declared	his	faithfulness	to	the	very	 principle	 of	 state	 and	 the	 sense	 of	 reason	 that	 belongs	 to	 this	 art	 of	government.	 Moreover,	 if	 this	 reason	 of	 state	 universalised	 war,	 it	 is	 equally	
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clear	that	it	is	the	same	war	that	appeared	in	Kant’s	utopia	of	perpetual	peace.	It	should	 therefore	 come	as	no	 surprise	 that	when,	 in	 the	 aftermath	of	 the	First	World	War,	a	new	discourse	awoke	to	overturn	the	Kantian	utopia,	it	would	not	be	by	recourse	to	the	suspension	of	the	war	of	every	man	against	every	man.	On	the	 contrary,	 the	 critique	 would	 situate	 itself	 precisely	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 the	universalisation	 of	 the	 state	 of	 nature	 as	 the	 principle	 that	 defines	 the	 very	order	 of	 states.	 The	 external	 constraint	 Kant	 sought	 out	 at	 the	 level	 of	cosmopolitical	being	 is	then	no	 longer	needed.	 In	 fact,	no	external	reference	 is	needed.	No	 gods	will	 have	 to	 be	 answered	 to,	 nor	will	 this	 order	 require	 any	reference	 to	 nature	 or	 cosmos.	 Beginning	with	 E.	 H.	 Carr,	 the	 constraint	 that	Kant	 located	 at	 the	 site	 of	 utopia	will	 be	 revealed	 as	 internal	 to	 the	 order	 of	states.	It	will	then	be	possible	to	recognise	order	and	peace	without	considering	anything	apart	from	the	state	of	war	among	states	that	constitutes	the	essence	of	the	relations	of	states.	Peace	is	therefore	to	be	seen	in	war	itself.	The	order	of	war,	which	at	least	since	the	Greeks	had	been	established	with	reference	to	an	external	constraint	of	some	kind	or	another,	reappears	at	the	site	of	the	origin	where	the	essence	of	war	reads	as	the	cipher	of	peace	given	by	the	balance	of	power.	The	discipline	of	international	relations	is	born.	It	 is	 certainly	 no	 coincidence	 that	 the	 enigma	which	 faces	 this	 discipline	from	its	inception,	and	the	nemesis	that	would	come	to	haunt	it	at	the	beginning	of	this	century,	is	that	the	subject	who	wages	war	is	no	longer	to	be	found	at	the	site	of	war.	Man	as	a	living	being	has	disappeared	from	the	site	of	war	where	he	for	millennia	had	come	 to	do	battle	with	 the	Other.	Today’s	drone	war,	which	soon	found	an	inexhaustible	source	of	renewal	in	the	rift	inflicted	by	terrorism	on	 the	 ordered	 surfaces	 of	war,	 is	 the	 disturbing	 sign	 of	 this	 development	 in	which	the	reality	of	war	now	appears	in	the	void	left	by	man’s	disappearance.	It	is	clear	that	the	invention	of	the	state	would	make	man	disappear	from	war,	but	it	 is	 equally	 obvious	 that	man’s	 absence	would	 coincide	with	 the	discovery	of	the	 terrorist.	 This	 is	 in	 fact	 where	 the	 odyssey	 of	 war,	 at	 least	 for	 now,	 will	exhaust	 itself	 –	 in	 the	 return	 of	 the	 origin,	 the	 logos,	 and	 that	middle	 ground	from	 where	 the	 concept	 of	 war	 provides	 the	 cipher	 of	 terrorism.	 From	 this	middle	 ground,	 where	 reason	 again	 takes	 hold	 of	 one	 side	 of	 polemos,	 and	
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